


GIFT OF
HORACE W. CARPENTIER



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MILITARY
ARTISTIAN



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR J. J. TALBOT HOBBS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., V.D.

THE STORY OF THE FIFTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

*Being an Authoritative Account of the Division's
Doings in Egypt, France and Belgium*

BY

CAPT. A. D. ELLIS, M.C.

29TH BATTALION, A.I.F.

WITH MAPS, CHARTS, PHOTOGRAPHS, AND APPENDICES

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LIMITED LONDON

TO OUR FALLEN COMRADES

FOREWORD

Dans la longue et âpre lutte où, dressées contre la Barbarie, les Nations Alliées ont déployé les plus belles qualités guerrières, le peuple Australien s'est conquis une place d'honneur par l'effort incontestable qui a fait surgir de son sol des contingents nombreux, hardis, valeureux.

S'il a apporté ainsi à la cause commune des Alliés un concours qui marquera dans l'histoire de la guerre, les Divisions Australiennes se sont acquises une gloire indiscutable dans les batailles décisives qui ont fait la victoire .

C'est pourquoi la 5^e Division Australienne a été heureusement inspirée en faisant revivre ses opérations et ses exploits par le livre qu'aujourd'hui elle dédie à la mémoire de ses morts .

Dans ces luttes - le plus souvent sanglantes - auxquelles elle a pris part depuis le mois de Juillet 1916 qui la vit débarquer en FRANCE, jusqu'au mois de Novembre 1918 qui sonna la capitulation allemande - quelques événements sont particulièrement à retenir et à méditer .

En 1917, coopérant aux opérations offensives engagées dans les FLANDRES par l'Armée Britannique, la 5^e Division Australienne se bat avec acharnement au Bois du Polygone .

On la retrouve sur la SOMME en 1918 quand la ruée allemande menace AMIENS, et, avec cette ville, les communications entre les Armées Britannique et Française . Le 24 Avril, VILLERS

BRETONNEUX

A *

BRETONNEUX est tombé aux mains des Allemands et la perte de cette position importante compromet au plus haut point la défense même d'AMIENS . Il faut y parer sans retard . Sir H.RAWLINSON lance la 5° Division Australienne à la contre-attaque, et, dès le lendemain, dans un élan magnifique ,celle-ei reprend VILLERS-BRETONNEUX .

Ce n'était qu'un commencement . Le 8 Août, elle est au nombre des Divisions Alliées qui, attaquant au Sud de la SOMME, pénètrent si profondément dans les lignes de défense ennemies, que, de ce jour, l'Allemagne sent passer sur sa tête le souffle de la défaite .

Au début de Septembre, elle s'empare brillamment de PERONNE et des passages de la SOMME près de cette ville. A la fin du même mois, elle est au contact de la fameuse position Hindenbourg, derrière laquelle les Allemands se sont repliés et qu'ils jugent imprenable .

De fait, c'est chose prodigieuse que cette position, où, sur des kilomètres de profondeur ,sont accumulés tranchées solides, abris bétonnés, fils de fer et défenses de toutes sortes . C'est vraiment le rempart de la résistance ennemie; à sa solidité se mesure l'effort à faire pour en venir à bout

On en est venu à bout, et la 5° Division Australienne, quant à elle, peut être fière d'inscrire dans ses annales les noms de BELLICOURT, NAUROY, ESTREES, JAUCOURT où elle a porté des coups décisifs à la redoutable organisation.

Elle a ainsi

Elle a ainsi pris sa part de l'effort; elle a également sa part de mérite et, en lui rendant hommage, il m'est agréable d'étendre cet hommage au Corps d'Armée Australien tout entier . Par ses magnifiques exploits en FRANCE,il a su conquérir ,pour lui comme pour la Nation dont il est issu, les plus beaux titres de gloire .-

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. Gork'. The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the left.

TRANSLATION

In the long and bitter struggle in which the allied nations—in battle array against barbarism—displayed the finest soldierly qualities, the people of Australia won for themselves a place of honour by the undeniable energy of the effort that called forth from their lands strong contingents of daring and valiant men.

Whilst Australia thus brought to the common cause of the Allies an aid that will make its mark in the history of the war, the Australian Divisions won for themselves a glory beyond dispute in the decisive battles that secured our victory.

This is why the 5th Australian Division has been happily inspired in recalling once more to life its operations and its exploits in the book it now dedicates to the memory of its dead.

In the battles—for the most part sanguinary conflicts—in which it bore a part, from the month of July, 1916, when it landed in France, to the month of November, 1918, when the capitulation rang the knell of Germany, there are certain events which specially deserve our consideration and remembrance.

In 1917, taking part in the offensive operations begun by the British Army in Flanders, the 5th Australian Division had some fierce fighting at Polygon Wood.

Again we find it on the Somme in 1918, when the German rush threatened Amiens, and with this city endangered the connection between the French and British Armies. On April 24th, Villers Bretonneux had fallen into the hands of the Germans and the loss of this important position imperilled in the highest degree the defence of Amiens itself. There must be no delay in parrying the blow. Sir H. Rawlinson sends off the 5th Australian Division to counter-attack, and by next morning it has made a splendid dash at Villers Bretonneux and retaken it.

This was only the beginning. On August 8th it is among the Allied Divisions which, attacking to the south of the Somme, penetrate so deeply into the enemy's defensive lines that from that day Germany feels the cold blast of defeat passing over her head.

In the beginning of September it brilliantly seizes Péronne and the crossings of the Somme near that city. By the end of the same month it is in touch with the famous Hindenburg Line, behind which the Germans have retired and which they consider to be impregnable.

And indeed that position was something marvellous, with its miles of depth, on which were accumulated solidly constructed trenches, concrete shelters, wire entanglements and defences of every kind. It was truly the rampart of the enemy's resistance; and its strength must be measured by the effort that was needed to master it.

But mastered it was; and as for the 5th Australian Division, it can proudly inscribe in its annals the names of Bellicourt, Nauroy, Estrées and Joncourt, where it struck decisive blows against this formidably organised line.

Thus it had its share in the struggle: it has a like share in the due meed of praise; and, in doing homage to it, it is a pleasure for me to extend this homage to the whole Australian Army Corps. By its magnificent exploits in France it was able to win for itself and for the nation from which it came the most splendid title to renown.

F. FOCH.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	Xiii
AUTHOR'S NOTE	xx

PART I

THE EGYPTIAN PERIOD

CHAPTER I

THE COMPOSITION OF A DIVISION	3
---	---

CHAPTER II

FORMATION OF THE 5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION	17
--	----

CHAPTER III

ACTIVITIES IN EGYPT; THE MOVE TO FRANCE	34
---	----

PART II

THE NORTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER IV

FROM BILLETS TO FRONT LINE	63
--------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF FROMELLES	81
-----------------------------------	----

CHAPTER VI

AUTUMN IN NORTHERN FRANCE	117
-------------------------------------	-----

PART III

FIRST SOMME CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER VII

	PAGE
WINTER ON THE SOMME	135

CHAPTER VIII

TO THE HINDENBURG LINE	175
----------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER IX

RESTING.	210
------------------	-----

PART IV

THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF POLYGON WOOD	227
--------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XI

THE MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE SECTOR	260
--	-----

PART V

SECOND SOMME CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER XII

VILLERS BRETONNEUX	287
------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XIII

FROM DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE	305
---------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XIV

THE COLLAPSE OF THE WESTERN FRONT	321
---	-----

CONTENTS

ix

CHAPTER XV

	PAGE
THE BATTLE OF PÉRONNE	343

CHAPTER XVI

THE BATTLE OF THE HINDENBURG LINE	362
---	-----

PART VI

PEACE

CHAPTER XVII

THE CURTAIN FALLS	388
-----------------------------	-----

APPENDICES	405
----------------------	-----

ILLUSTRATIONS

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR J. J. TALBOT HOBBS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., V.D.	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	<i>Facing page</i>
MAJOR-GENERAL E. TIVEY, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O..	24
BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. E. ELLIOTT, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M.	32
A TYPICAL COMMUNICATION TRENCH ON THE GUEUDECOURT SECTOR, DECEMBER, 1916	96
BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. J. BESSELL-BROWNE, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O..	120
A TYPICAL STREET IN BAPAUME ON THE DAY OF ITS CAPTURE, 17TH MARCH, 1917	144
STAFF OF FIFTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS, 20TH AUGUST, 1917	160
A STRETCH OF THE CORDUROY TRACK LEADING UP TO WESTHOEK RIDGE, OCTOBER, 1917	184
BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. C. STEWART, C.M.G., D.S.O.	216
AN INTERESTING EXHIBIT AT "D.A.D.O.S.," FIFTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION. MACHINE GUNS, MINENWERFER, ETC., CAPTURED BY 15TH BRIGADE AT VILLERS BRETONNEUX, 25TH APRIL, 1918	256
THE SOUTHERN ENTRANCE OF THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL TUNNEL	288
AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPH OF NORTHERN PART OF 5TH DIVISION'S SECTOR IN ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HINDENBURG SYSTEM, 29TH SEPTEMBER TO 2ND OCTOBER, 1918	304
IN FRONT OF ANVIL WOOD. A WIRE BELT WHICH THE 53RD BATTALION HAD TO PENETRATE, 1ST SEPTEMBER, 1918.	320

ILLUSTRATIONS

	<i>Facing page</i>
THE LARGE RAILWAY GUN CAPTURED BY 31ST BATTALION, 8TH AUGUST, 1918	336
THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE, MARCH AND APRIL, 1917.	352
THE PÉRONNE OPERATIONS, 1ST TO 5TH SEPTEMBER, 1918 . . .	368
THE DIVISION'S SECOND SOMME CAMPAIGN	384

ILLUSTRATIONS IN COLOUR

COLOURS OF BRIGADES AND BATTALIONS	20
COLOUR PATCHES OF UNITS	40

INTRODUCTION

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR J. J. TALBOT HOBBS,

K.C.B., K.C.M.G., V.D.

THIS book is dedicated to those splendid, gallant men who gave their lives in the greatest struggle the world has ever seen, for freedom and right, for all that is dearest to us, and without which life would be unendurable for our race.

It was thought that a book of this kind would be valued and appreciated not only by the relations and friends of the men of the 5th Australian Division and by their fellow countrymen and women, but by the men themselves, as a record, given in a reliable, palatable and interesting form, that would tend to keep green in their minds old comrades and the main incidents of their war service.

It not only deals with the life and doings of the 5th Australian Division, but enables the reader, who is perhaps ignorant of the composition of the various units that compose an Army, and of their organisation, armament, and equipment, to realise the stupendous difficulties that had to be overcome before the Australian Divisions could be placed in the field, ready and fit to fight and defeat the thoroughly well-trained, organised, and equipped armies that opposed them.

And the organisation, equipment, and training of the Australian Divisions, and the administrative work, have been no less efficient or remarkable than the magnificent valour of Australian soldiers.

Courage and valour go a long way to success, but good discipline, training, good feeding, equipment, clothing, and boots are just as essential to success. Our soldiers are entitled to feel as proud of their administrative efforts as they are of their fighting. Without the careful, thorough preparation and organisation before, during, and after the battle, it is doubtful if we should, notwithstanding the gallantry and self-sacrifice of the fighting men, have—even if we had gained our objectives—been able to “hold on” and make good our gains. In any case, the loss of life would have been greater and the suffering more intense.

The whole of the Australian Imperial Force and Australia are deeply indebted to officers of the British Army who came to us in

the early days, before the Australian Imperial Force had won its spurs. The name of General Sir William Birdwood will never be forgotten by Australians, and such men as Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, General Sir H. V. Cox, and Major-General N. M. Smyth will also long live in the memories of the Australian Imperial Force, for which they did so much. Officers and men of the 5th Australian Division will always remember how much the Division owes to that able and popular officer, Brigadier-General C. M. Wagstaff, its first G.S.O. I; to General Hobkirk, who commanded so ably, and so endeared himself to, the 14th Brigade; to Brigadier-General Carey, R.E., its first C.R.E.; and to other British officers, both staff and regimental.

As Divisional Commander for nearly two years it was my duty and privilege to get in close contact with, and observe, under all conditions the magnificent, splendid men who composed it. No words of mine can possibly convey the pride and honour I felt as their commander, or can express my wonder and admiration for their gallantry and devotion. No words, no writing, no photograph or picture can enable those who did not actually see them to visualise the hardships, privations and appalling dangers that they lived and fought under, especially during the awful winter of 1916-1917. The conditions of misery cheerfully endured, the resourcefulness, determination, courage, and devotion to duty which enabled our men to raid the enemy so frequently and so successfully, to beat him at patrol work, to worry him continually and wear him down, cannot be exaggerated.

The Division may well be intensely proud of the fact that it never failed to carry out with success any task or operation with which it was entrusted. It is true that, in the first battle—Fromelles—in which it was engaged, its losses were extremely severe. But the gallantry displayed by all ranks was beyond all praise. No men could have done more than our men did, and by the sacrifice made they in all probability achieved the strategical results desired by the Commander-in-Chief.

The men of the Division proved themselves, time after time, invincible soldiers, and it is thought that the reader, having read the narrative to the end, will recognise this fact. What troops have ever been more severely tested than the 15th Brigade when on the 25th September, 1917, the day before the Division was to attack at Polygon Wood, the enemy, after a violent bombardment, launched a well prepared and powerful infantry attack against it? The British Division on its right was driven back to a considerable depth, thus exposing the 15th Brigade's right flank and enabling the enemy to enfilade it and cause most serious losses. At the same time, the enemy's bombardment blew up the dumps and supplies of ammunition prepared for the pre-arranged attack on the following day (26th September). Our men, however, nothing daunted, carried

out the attack, as arranged, on the morning of the 26th and, assisted by the 8th Brigade, not only gained all their objectives, but, after the most severe fighting, materially assisted the British Division on their right to recover its lost ground and gain its objectives.

At Villers Bretonneux on the 24th April, 1918, the 14th Brigade after a terrible gas bombardment was, with the British Division on its right, most heavily attacked, and again the flank was completely uncovered through the British Division being driven back and Villers Bretonneux taken. The men of the 14th Brigade never wavered but held on to the front line, and, in addition, formed a front to their right flank, steadied the British troops thrown back, maintained the line, and prevented further penetration by the enemy. Their gallantry undoubtedly saved the situation and enabled the daring night attack made by the 15th and 13th Australian Infantry Brigades to be successfully carried out that night. This operation led to the recapture of Villers Bretonneux, with very severe losses to the Germans in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The operation of the 15th Brigade was exceedingly hazardous, as the details furnished later in the book will show, and none but the most highly trained and disciplined troops under such a leader as Brigadier-General Elliott could have accomplished it.

The advance to the Somme by the 8th Brigade after the operations of the 8-9th of August was a fine feat ; the magnificent gallantry and devotion of the 14th Brigade at the taking of Péronne which cost it 45 per cent. casualties, is unsurpassed in this war. Yet, notwithstanding its severe losses, within a month it was again heavily engaged in breaking the Hindenburg Line at Bellicourt (which General Monash, the Australian Corps Commander, described in a congratulatory order as "the most strongly fortified sector of the Western Front" and added "nothing more praiseworthy has been done by Australian troops in this war"), and after desperate fighting captured the Le Catelet System, and again suffered 35 per cent. losses. It was at this battle, too, that the battalions of the 8th Brigade, with irresistible fury, swept through Bellicourt and, passing through the Americans, captured the village of Nauroy. They would have gained their objectives that day had their flanks not been exposed and their losses consequently so severe that it was deemed advisable to bring them back until the troops on their flanks were able to fight their way forward the following day.

And if, during all this fighting, our infantry proved themselves invincible and worthy to rank with the finest fighting men this world has ever produced, the artillery, the engineers, machine gunners, medical and other divisional services proved themselves equally worthy of admiration and praise ; and in many respects the artillery, which enjoyed the thorough confidence of the infantry, that is so essential to success in battle, suffered hardships and dangers, which perhaps, if not so acute, extended over longer periods.

I consider that our regimental medical officers, stretcher-bearers, and battalion runners, during and directly after an engagement, were unsurpassed for their incomparable bravery, devotion and self-sacrifice. The casualty lists, and the honours granted to these heroes, will fully bear out my opinion.

Some of our chaplains, too, displayed the greatest gallantry and devotion in carrying out their good work, in some cases at the sacrifice of their lives.

The courage and devotion to duty of the great majority of our men were only equalled by the generous help and sympathy shown by them to the unfortunate civilians, especially the children, in the areas partly destroyed by the ravages of the war, or in areas that had suffered under the German occupation. I have in my possession copies of numerous letters and testimonials received by Commanding Officers, and others from the Maires, schoolmasters, citizens, and school-children, from all parts of Belgium and France where our men have served, expressing in warmest terms of admiration and gratitude their appreciation of the conduct, generosity, and assistance of our men.

May I also on behalf of the Division express the admiration felt by all ranks at the wonderful spirit of self-sacrifice displayed by the civil population whose countries and homes suffered during the war? How often have we seen them compelled to leave the homes where they were born and lived, and returning to their once beautiful villages, find them only a heap of ruins! Our men remember with gratitude how many of these civilians gave from their own scanty store so that their friends "Les Australiens" might have a little extra warmth or comfort.

I know our men were not saints. If they had not had something of the devil in them they would never have attempted, let alone accomplished, the daring, and at times almost incredible, deeds that gained immortal glory for them as soldiers. Some few, I know, by their misconduct, tarnished the good name of the Australian soldier, but I do say from knowledge born of experience that if they are properly understood, treated with justice and consistency, if their officers are in sympathy with them, study, and look after them as they should, anything can be accomplished with them. They will not only follow; they will lead, through fire and water, to death itself. They can adapt themselves to any situation that arises, cheerfully endure the greatest hardships and privations, and, under the most trying and difficult conditions, work and fight all day and all night when the necessity requires it. But they cannot be fooled; they must have confidence in their leaders. They are *men*, and can only be led by *men*.

I take the opportunity of expressing on behalf of the Division our deepest gratitude for, and appreciation of, all that has been done for us during the war by the people of Australia through such admirable

institutions as the Australian Comforts Fund, the Australian Y.M.C.A., and the Australian Red Cross Society, and to the officers of these institutions who have served with us in the field. Many of these gallant and devoted men, who shared the dangers and hardships of the soldiers, will never be forgotten. Their services, and the comforts (so generously provided by our countrymen and women) which they dispensed, many and many a time saved men on the verge of a breakdown and despair, and put fresh life, hope, and vigour into them. I doubt if it is generally known how much these Societies and their officers have helped to preserve our strength, morally and physically, and really helped to win the war.

It is the earnest desire of all ranks of the Division that I should express their gratitude to our friends in the United Kingdom who so generously extended their hospitality to so many of our officers and men when visiting the United Kingdom on leave. Many of our sick and wounded will ever remember the care and kindness they received in British homes during their convalescence.

And how can I express all that we have felt during the long dreary days, months, and years of the war for those in Australia who not only gave their labour, their thought, and money for us, but gave their sons, husbands, and brothers to fight in the great cause for which, alas! so many have made the great sacrifice? Those noble, self-sacrificing parents and relatives—the fathers, mothers, wives, and sisters of our soldiers—who bravely and patiently endured month in and month out the torture and anxiety concerning the safety and well-being of their loved ones thousands and thousands of miles away, command our deepest gratitude and admiration; and when, as only too often happened, the worst came, it was often my sorrowful privilege to write and express our sympathy with them in their grief.

I have been deeply touched at the letters of gratitude I received in acknowledgment. Many of these letters should be written in gold and exhibited throughout the Empire as glorious examples of the wonderful courage and patriotism of our men and women, and of their pride in the gallantry and self-sacrifice displayed by their loved ones in the cause of freedom and humanity.

Surely their fortitude and devotion were an inspiration to us “to carry on and see it through.” Brave, devoted, and patient as our men have been, many of our women (especially our nurses in theatres of war) have been equally so, and we are inexpressibly proud of them, and honour and thank them with all our hearts.

I have frequently been asked what particular incident, phase, or thought, during the war, has impressed me most. It is perhaps difficult to answer, but I think I should say: “*The paramount necessity of sound military training for our officers and men, and complete preparation for war.*” Notwithstanding “*The League of Nations,*” which we all earnestly desire may achieve its ideals, it is certain that unless we can change human nature, sooner or later we

shall again find ourselves engaged in war. By far the most likely way to prevent it is to be prepared for it, and, at all events, if we cannot prevent it, we can, by thorough preparation and training, endeavour to ensure success for our arms with the minimum of loss and sacrifice of life, of blinding and maiming of our men. In the past $4\frac{1}{2}$ years of war we have achieved many great and glorious successes, but, alas ! only too often at too great a sacrifice.

I regard three-fourths of Australian men who are physically fit as ready-made soldiers. They are bred from the best of our race. The sons of pioneers of a new country, their out-door life, their love of sport, their initiative, intelligence, and self-reliance, their determination and courage, are the great essentials in a soldier ; but in order to apply these qualities with the best results, discipline and training in the highest degree are necessary. The officers of all grades, whose appointment and promotion should depend solely on their energy, ability, and military qualifications, should not only possess the best blood and brains our country can produce, but should receive the benefit of the best and soundest training for their profession that it is possible to obtain. Even in peace, incompetent officers mean, at least, serious financial loss to the State. In war, it means the unnecessary loss of gallant lives, the maiming of men, untold suffering, both in the field and at home, and, perhaps, utter ruin in the end ; for some mistakes made in war or time of war are irreparable. Efficiency does not necessarily mean greater expenditure ; it should mean less. We must be prepared to pay the cost of " Insurance " of our liberty and freedom—by service as well as money. An inefficient and insufficient Defence Force is worse than useless. Let me emphasise the fact that the sound vigorous training and preparation that we were able *during* the war to impart to our divisions was one of the great factors in our success. We may not have the opportunity for such training and preparation the *next* time we are drawn into war.

I desire to express my deepest gratitude to Major-General McCay and the staff that assisted him in creating the 5th Australian Division, work which was of such immense value to me as its commander when the honour of that appointment was later conferred upon me. I have nothing but praise and whole-hearted thankfulness to offer the splendid devoted men who served so faithfully and so well on the Divisional Headquarters, Artillery, Engineer and Brigade Staffs, and Administrative Services and Departments. Their names and work will be revealed to the reader as he follows the narrative in this book. They are already known and revered by most men who served in the Division. The memory of such men as Brigadier-Generals Bessell-Browne, Tivey, Elliott, Hobkirk, Stewart, Wagstaff, and Colonels Bruche, the gallant devoted Hearne (killed in action), Peck and others will live for many generations to come. Words fail me in expressing my admiration and pride in the regimental officers and men of the

Division who served with me during the two most momentous, wonderful years of my life. Nothing I can say, nothing any man can say, is sufficient to do them justice. The more I ponder over the subject the more I am convinced it was the regimental officer, especially the platoon, the company, and battery officers, and the rank and file that won this war by their indomitable gallantry, initiative, determination, and incomparable devotion and self-sacrifice. No honour, no gratitude that we can offer, is too great for these splendid men, either those living or "The Glorious Dead."

Finally, it is my pleasure and duty to express, on behalf of the Division, our warmest thanks for, and deep appreciation of, the great and valuable service rendered by the writer of this book, Captain A. D. Ellis, M.C., who, I know, has at considerable self-sacrifice and without fee or reward so ably recorded the doings of the Division.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

THIS account of the doings of the 5th Australian Division is based on the official records furnished by the units and formations throughout the period of their existence.

The appendices have been compiled by Lieut. T. E. Stapleton, 29th Battalion A.I.F. Most of the maps and charts are the work of No. 3057, Private E. J. Addison, 5th Pioneer Battalion.

The acknowledgments of the writer are due to Major J. L. Treloar, O.B.E., and other members of the staff of Australian War Records Section ; to Lieut.-Col. C. T. Griffiths, C.M.G., O.B.E., of Australian Records ; and to the several officers who have assisted in the final revision of the manuscript.

THE STORY OF THE FIFTH AUSTRALIAN
DIVISION

PART I
THE EGYPTIAN PERIOD

CHAPTER I

THE COMPOSITION OF A DIVISION

As we are to follow the fortunes of a Division through several arduous campaigns, it will be best at the beginning to give some idea what its composition was, its strength in men, its establishment of animals and vehicles and guns. The figures given will be rather a general approximate estimate than a precisely correct statement, for, as was inevitable in a war of such length and variety, the establishments varied somewhat from time to time as the circumstances of the period dictated. Nevertheless, these variations were, after all, minor matters and did not affect very fundamentally either the composition of a Division or its employment as a fighting formation.

The chief part of a Division is its Infantry.

Throughout the war there were three brigades of infantry in a Division and the full strength of each brigade was about 4,000. A brigade was commanded by an officer of the rank of brigadier-general. For the greater part of the fighting period each infantry brigade contained four battalions, each battalion having a strength of about 35 officers and 970 other ranks. Each battalion was divided into four companies, each company into four platoons, and each platoon into four sections. A section was thus the smallest infantry unit. At its full strength it contained about 12 or 15 men and it was led by a non-commissioned officer called a section commander. The leader of the platoon was an officer of the rank of lieutenant and he was called the platoon commander. The commander of a company was a captain or a major, and of a battalion a lieutenant-colonel.

Each of the 12 infantry battalions had a transport establishment of about 25 vehicles and 55 animals—horses and mules. This was known as the Infantry First Line Transport. It carried the food and ammunition supplies over the last and most difficult stage of their long journey from factory to front line.

As a result of the prolonged trench warfare each infantry brigade was provided in 1916 with a Light Trench Mortar Battery. This was a small unit of four officers and 46 other ranks who were equipped

with that very useful form of trench artillery known as the Stokes 3-inch mortar. There were eight Stokes mortars in a Light Trench Mortar Battery.

Next in importance to the division's infantry came its artillery with a strength of about 80 officers and 2,300 other ranks. Its organisation changed considerably throughout the war and the changes will be noted in due course. For the last 18 months of the war the Divisional Artillery was organised into two Field Artillery Brigades, each consisting of four 6-gun batteries, three of them 18-pounder batteries, the fourth a 4.5-inch howitzer battery. During this period the total gun establishment of a Divisional Artillery was thus 48. Artillery ammunition supplies were maintained by the Divisional Ammunition Column, one section of which was responsible for the supply of small arms ammunition and grenades to the infantry. Owing to the weight of the guns themselves, the large number of mounted *personnel*, and the quantity of ammunition to be carried, the total transport establishment of a Divisional Artillery was very large, amounting to some 2,000 animals and 280 vehicles. Of these about 120 vehicles and 660 animals belonged to the Divisional Ammunition Column, the remainder being equally divided between the field artillery brigades. The whole Divisional Artillery was commanded by an officer of the rank of brigadier-general. He was called the C.R.A. (Commanding Royal Artillery). Each brigade of field artillery was commanded by a lieutenant-colonel and each battery by a major.

It should also be noted here that artillery weapons were added to by the extraordinary development of trench warfare in 1915, 1916, and 1917. We have seen that each infantry brigade had a battery of light trench mortars. Heavier types of these were also invented, but, as they were not sufficiently mobile for infantry purposes, and as they required considerable technical knowledge for their employment, they were added to the establishment of the Divisional Artillery as three Medium Trench Mortar Batteries and a Heavy Trench Mortar Battery. The whole was called the Divisional Trench Mortar Brigade. The strength of each medium battery was two officers and 23 other ranks, of the heavy battery three officers and 66 other ranks. The medium trench mortar fired a shell or bomb weighing about 60 pounds a distance of about 500 yards, while the huge "flying pig" of the heavy trench mortar weighed nearly 150 pounds and could be thrown about three-quarters of a mile. The three types of trench mortars, light, medium, and heavy, constituted a very effective reply to the devastating *minenwerfer* of the enemy.

Although a Divisional Artillery contained only the guns described above, it must not be imagined that, in the warfare of the Western Front, an infantry division had no other artillery support. The long struggle for artillery superiority led to such a multiplication

of guns that guns equal in number to several Divisional Artilleries were usually available to co-operate with a single infantry division. This result was further assisted by the fact that the artillery was generally kept in the line for much longer periods than the infantry.

Perhaps no arm of the Service under purely divisional administration underwent more changes of organisation than the Machine Gun. When the 5th Australian Division was formed early in 1916 the establishment provided each brigade of infantry with a Machine Gun Company, consisting of about six officers and 200 other ranks with 16 Maxim or Vickers machine guns. This was a marked change from the previous organisation, which had consisted of a machine-gun officer and 32 other ranks with four machine guns to each battalion. As the value of the machine-gun became more and more recognised, and its tactical employment better understood, additions were made to the establishment. In 1917 a Divisional Machine Gun Company was added to each division and, early in 1918, the four machine gun companies were grouped into a Divisional Machine Gun Battalion with a total strength of about 50 officers and 870 other ranks and an establishment of 64 Vickers machine-guns. Over 60 transport vehicles and 230 animals were allotted to the Machine Gun Battalion. The Machine Gun Battalion having thus become divisional troops, its disposal for operations rested entirely with the divisional commander. He might, for instance, attach one company to each of the three infantry brigades and maintain one as a divisional reserve, or he might utilise them in any other way that suited the general purpose of the division. The changing conception of the employment of machine gunners from battalion to brigade, and, finally, to divisional troops, is an interesting commentary on the development of administrative and tactical methods throughout the war.

The withdrawal of the machine gun proper from the battalion organisation was compensated for by the issue of an automatic rifle called the Lewis gun, which grew in use and popularity so much that, by March, 1918, each battalion had about 30 of these admirable weapons. The marked difference in the tactical handling of the Lewis gun and the Vickers machine gun will be referred to in its appropriate place.

The Divisional Engineers were organised throughout the war into three Field Companies each with a strength of six officers and about 200 other ranks. An engineering company is a highly trained technical unit capable of undertaking all branches of field engineering, construction, and demolition. The organisation of the Divisional Engineers into three companies provided a complete company for attachment to each infantry brigade, and in operations they were frequently so used. But engineers are divisional troops, and an officer known as the C.R.E. (Commanding Royal Engineers) commanded and administered the whole of the engineering services

of the division. He formed part of the divisional staff and worked at divisional headquarters and, by maintaining close liaison with the other branches of the staff, was enabled to direct and co-ordinate the work of all three field companies, howsoever they were employed, and in accordance with the requirements of the division as a whole. The transport establishment of each field company included about 50 vehicles, 70 animals, and a large number of bicycles.

The Pioneer Battalion is mentioned at this stage because it so often worked under the direction of, or in co-operation with, the C.R.E. But, though frequently so employed, it was administered quite apart from the engineers, having its own C.O. and battalion staff, and an organisation into four companies like an infantry battalion. The Pioneer Battalion was in reality the handy man of the division, and was just as useful to it as is a handy man about a house or farm. It was thoroughly trained in all infantry work and was likely to be called upon to take its place in the fighting line at any moment ; but it was composed of specially picked men of many different trades, so that it was able to undertake almost any form of field engineering. It was the most versatile unit of the division. Its strength and its transport establishment were very similar to those of an infantry battalion.

Included with the engineers of a division was the Divisional Signal Company. In a war of such intense artillery concentration few problems were more difficult than to maintain communication between the different parts of a division engaged in active operations. The great bulk of this work fell upon the Divisional Signal Company. It had a strength of about 16 officers and 350 other ranks, who were, for the most part, experts in telegraphy, telephony, wireless, visual signalling, or some other branch of the work of communication. A staff of expert motor cyclists formed the D.R.L.S.—Despatch Rider Letter Service. These men handled the entire written correspondence of the division. By day and by night alike, over all roads and in all weathers, they maintained unbroken the chain of official correspondence. Each infantry brigade, divisional artillery headquarters, each artillery brigade and the machine gun battalion, had normally attached to it one officer and about 20 other ranks of the Divisional Signal Company. These numbers were increased during periods of major operations. The signalling officer and signalling *personnel* of infantry and pioneer battalions were regimental details and not members of the Divisional Signal Company. The transport establishment of a Divisional Signal Company was about 40 vehicles and 120 animals. Among the vehicles were two motor lorries, one of which carried a portable electric lighting plant. To ensure prompt supervision of every part of the widespread net of divisional communications the O.C. Divisional Signal Company was also provided with a motor car.

The organisation of the medical services of a division was

similar in many respects to that of the engineers. There were three Field Ambulances, each with a strength of 10 officers and 250 other ranks. As each was a complete medical unit, organised for collecting and treating battle casualties, each could at any moment be attached to an infantry brigade and carry out all its immediate medical requirements. This would be the normal employment of the field ambulances if all three infantry brigades were involved equally and simultaneously in active operations. The Assistant Director of Medical Services (A.D.M.S.) commanded the entire medical services of the division. Like the C.R.E., he worked at divisional headquarters and was thus enabled to administer his command as the requirements of the division as a whole dictated. The A.D.M.S. and his chief assistant, the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (D.A.D.M.S.) formed part of the divisional staff.

About 150 of the *personnel* of a field ambulance were trained as stretcher-bearers, and a large part of the remainder constituted the nursing service of the ambulance. Each field ambulance could accommodate 150 patients, and it is important to remember that casualties were not permanently treated there. The ambulance was rather a field depôt where casualties were collected, temporarily treated, and held until they could be evacuated to a casualty clearing station (C.C.S.), generally a matter of only a few hours. The transport establishment of a field ambulance included some 50 horses and 20 vehicles of which latter seven were motor ambulances and three horse ambulances.

In addition to the three field ambulances the medical services of a division included about 20 regimental medical officers (R.M.O.). These were distributed among various units of the division, one to each infantry battalion, the pioneer battalion, machine-gun battalion, each brigade of artillery, the divisional engineers and the divisional train. They lived permanently with these units, attended daily to the sick parades, sanitation, etc., and accompanied them into action.

Another medical unit attached to a division was the Divisional Sanitary Section, consisting of one medical officer and 27 other ranks. As the name indicates, the chief responsibility of this unit was the sanitation of the whole divisional area. The *personnel* were distributed throughout the area and visited frequently all places the sanitary condition of which demanded special attention. To enable him to supervise effectively the whole area, the O.C. Divisional Sanitary Section was provided with a small car.

The Divisional Train, which is part of the Army Service Corps, was entirely a transport and supply organisation. Its function was to convey in horse-drawn vehicles all the food and forage required in the division from the place where it had been brought by rail or motor transport. It took these supplies to the brigade

refilling points, where they were collected by the first line transport of units and carried forward to wherever required. There were four companies in a Divisional Train, one for each infantry brigade and its attached troops, and one, somewhat larger than the brigade companies, called the Headquarters Company. This last company supplied normally the divisional artillery, pioneers, the divisional machine gun battalion, and, indeed, all divisional troops. An officer of the rank of lieutenant-colonel commanded the whole of a divisional train. His chief assistant was the Senior Supply Officer (S.S.O.) whose special task was the superintendence of the supply, as distinguished from the transport, functions of the train.


In addition to the work of supplying its division with forage and rations, the divisional train was also responsible for the transport of the blankets, kits, and other baggage of the entire division when it moved from place to place. Further, like any other transport unit, when it was not fully occupied with its ordinary duties its vehicles and horses were often diverted to other uses, *e.g.*, carting gravel for the repair of roads, or timber for engineering purposes. The strength of a divisional train was about 20 officers and 400 other ranks, and the establishment of transport was necessarily high, being about 180 vehicles and 400 horses. No mules were used in a divisional train.

As it was obviously quite probable that a division might be operating too far from its supply railhead for the horses of the divisional train to go there daily for supplies, each division was served by a mechanical transport unit designed to carry supplies from railhead to refilling point, where they could be picked up by the divisional train. In the case of ammunition, the supplies would, of course, be collected by the divisional ammunition column. The kind of mechanical transport used was 3-ton motor lorries of which each division was allotted about 80. In practice these lorries were invariably all pooled under the control of Army Corps Headquarters, which allotted them to divisions as circumstances demanded. They proved extraordinarily useful right throughout the war, and frequently for other purposes than that for which they were originally provided. The organisation of the mechanical transport services changed somewhat from time to time, but in its final state it existed as a Divisional M.T. Company of five sections each of 16 lorries. Its strength was nine officers and 350 other ranks of the Army Service Corps, and, in addition to its transport activities, it maintained a workshop and a staff of motor mechanics for the repair of all lorries, motor cars, and motor cycles of a division.

The whole organisation for the supply of troops in the field is so interesting and important that it has been considered advisable to insert a diagrammatic representation of the channel by which supplies reached the front line from the base.

While ammunition, food, and forage, were provided in the manner

described, most of the other articles required by a division were supplied through the organisation popularly known as D.A.D.O.S. The word is composed of the initial letters of the appointment held by the officer in charge—Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services. He had a staff of about 50 other ranks of the Army Ordnance Corps, and his duty was to receive indents from units for clothing, equipment, boots, bicycles, vehicles, guns and their spare parts, and, indeed, practically every article which was an issue, and to ensure that the required articles were obtained promptly from the base. He had several motor lorries which carried the



articles from railhead to the various units, or to his store, where they were collected by the units' transport.

The very large number of horses and mules in a division necessitated the employment of a veterinary staff. This consisted of about five veterinary officers and 40 other ranks of the Army Veterinary Corps. It was controlled by the Deputy Assistant Director of Veterinary Services (D.A.D.V.S.) who was a member of the divisional staff and administered his command from divisional headquarters. The remaining veterinary officers were located throughout the divisional area and shared equally the work of maintaining the animals in health or treating the sick and wounded. In this they were assisted by about 15 sergeants of the A.V.C. who were further distributed among the units and were trained in first aid and the elementary principles of veterinary work. An interesting feature of the veterinary services of a division was the Mobile

Veterinary Section (M.V.S.) which had a strength of one officer and 20 other ranks. It functioned in much the same way as a field ambulance, receiving and treating such casualties as were too serious to be dealt with in the unit until arrangements could be completed for their evacuation to a base hospital. During heavy fighting the M.V.S. established advanced posts for the immediate reception of wounded animals in order that units' operations might not be embarrassed by their retention.

Another small but important unit of a division was its detachment of troops from the Provost Corps. It consisted of one officer and about 26 other ranks, all mounted. As this unit had the important duty of policing the whole divisional area, the *personnel* of the Provost Corps were always specially selected men. In addition to policing the area, the Provost Corps detachment with a division was also responsible for the control of traffic throughout the area. To assist it in the heavy duties thus involved, an additional officer, called a Traffic Control Officer, was posted from the Provost Corps to each division, and he was assisted in the work by about 50 other ranks chosen from the various units of the division. This unit became known as the Traffic Control Detachment. The Assistant Provost Marshal (A.P.M.) was usually stationed at divisional headquarters and was a member of the divisional staff. Late in the war his appointment was termed Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal (D.A.P.M.).

The Divisional Salvage Company consisted of one officer and about 70 other ranks, and was added to divisional troops during 1916. As its name indicates, this company was used to salvage and return to base all abandoned material and stores which were of any military value. When it is remembered that every great battlefield contained many thousands of pounds' worth of such material, the use of a salvage company becomes apparent. This was particularly the case in a war which, to a great extent, resolved itself into a war of material.

Another unit which filled an important *rôle* in the daily life of a division was the French Mission. This was attached to a division on its arrival in French territory and its strength was one officer, who lived at divisional headquarters, and about 20 interpreters, who were distributed throughout the units of the division. The chief duty of the French Mission was to facilitate intercourse between the division and civilians, to interpret, to assist in billeting arrangements, and, generally, to safeguard the interests of the civil population while assisting to provide for the legitimate requirements of the military. When a division moved into Belgium, a similar mission of Belgian interpreters was provided by the Belgian Army and it carried out similar duties.

All arrangements for the payment of troops were carried out under the supervision of the Divisional Paymaster and his staff.

The Divisional Paymaster himself was a member of the Army Pay Corps, but most of his staff of about 20 pay sergeants were men selected from the units for their knowledge of banking or accountancy. Most of these sergeants were posted to the various units of the division and carried out their duties there; but the Divisional Paymaster and a small staff controlled the whole pay organisation from divisional headquarters.

A Divisional Claims Officer was provided to inquire into, and, if possible, to settle, all claims made by the civilian population for compensation for damages done to their property by soldiers, or incurred by the unavoidable incidents of military occupation.

Early in 1917 it was found necessary to appoint a Divisional Burials Officer, who, with a small staff, saw to the proper interment of all bodies in the divisional area, kept a record of the location of graves, and attended to the proper disposal of the effects of deceased soldiers.

Canteens were widely instituted throughout the British Armies in France. They enabled troops to purchase at reasonable rates supplies otherwise unprocurable. The Divisional Canteen itself was so large a business undertaking that it was necessary to detail an experienced officer to conduct it. To procure canteen supplies was often a difficult matter, but they were eagerly purchased by the troops and the normal takings of the Divisional Canteen were many thousands of francs daily.

Several lines of communication units were associated with each division, although they did not work under divisional supervision. These units included five Depôt Units of Supply as well as a Field Bakery and a Field Butchery. The Depôt Units of Supply were employed at the base or along the lines of communication, where they helped to superintend the dispatch of supplies to the divisions in the field.

An organisation that calls for more attention was that provided for the supervision and assistance of officers and men on their way to join, or to rejoin, their units at the Front. It consisted of Divisional Base Depôts at Étaples and Havre, where Australian *personnel* arrived in France from overseas. Here they were retained and trained until the time came for them to join up their units. They were then dispatched from the Base Depôt by train, which took them to the Divisional Wing of the Corps Reinforcement Camp, generally situated within easy marching distance of the division. Here the men were met, accommodated, and rationed, and a training staff was also provided so that they could be profitably employed during the few days that might elapse before they marched out to their units.

A staff of about 12 chaplains of the various religious denominations was provided for a division, and posted by it to the different units for duty. Their work was concerned with the spiritual and social welfare of the troops.

The Divisional Concert Party must not be overlooked. It comprised about 20 men, specially picked from the units for their ability as entertainers. Provided with a piano and a few orchestral instruments, as well as pierrot costumes and simple stage properties, they gave nightly entertainments to crowded houses of officers and men. Cinemas, provided by the Australian Comforts Fund and by the Y.M.C.A., were also staffed and managed by the division.

The work of the Divisional Baths Officer and his small staff did a great deal for the comfort and cleanliness of the troops. His duty was to establish sufficient baths throughout the divisional area to enable all men to be bathed regularly. He also superintended the necessary changing of soiled underclothing, and his lorries plied regularly between the baths and a Corps Laundry, taking the soiled clothing to the laundry and bringing up fresh supplies of clean garments.

Representatives of two highly esteemed non-military organisations, the Australian Comforts Fund and the Young Men's Christian Association, were attached to each Australian division, and were assisted in every possible way in their efforts to increase the comfort of the troops. Detailed reference to the work of these organisations will be made in due course.

While the foregoing list of divisional formations, units, and detachments, is not entirely exhaustive, enough has been said to afford the reader a fair general idea of the composition of an Australian division during the last three years of the war. As already stated, the actual strengths and establishments varied somewhat from time to time, but the sum total of *personnel* and transport may be put down roughly at 850 officers and 19,000 other ranks with nearly 1,000 vehicles and some 4,000 animals for transport purposes. It will be well if the reader tries to realise exactly what a large formation a division is. For instance, marching along a road in ordinary march formation, it would extend from 15 to 20 miles and would take about five hours to pass a given point. If an ordinary suburban train carried 600 passengers it would take about 30 such trains to shift the officers and men of a division. It would take 25 trains each with 20 horse trucks each carrying eight horses to shift the animals of a division. And it would probably take another 25 goods trains of average dimensions as Australians know them to shift the general service and limbered wagons and the guns. And wherever a division went its supplies of food, ammunition, and clothing had to follow it closely or to be provided *en route*, and arrangements must exist for its immediate accommodation on its arrival in a new area. Enough has been said, however, to make it clear that a division was really a very large formation, its maintenance a costly and difficult matter, and its transport from place to place no easy undertaking for those who had to arrange it. Yet some 400 similar formations on both sides of the Western Front

were for years juggled hither and thither throughout France and Flanders, as the swaying fortunes of the war dictated, and with comparative comfort, celerity, and precision. Perhaps no greater testimony exists to the extraordinary efficiency of the modern war machine.

And, it may be asked, how is a large organisation like a Division directed and controlled? Is it possible that a single mind could cope with every detail that arises in connection with the daily administration of such a large and varied command? Obviously not. No G.O.C., whatever his intellectual and physical capacity, whatever his passion for work, could expect to give his personal attention to every one of the hundreds of minor matters that must be adjusted daily. Indeed, it would be false economy if he attempted it, for his attention would then be diverted from the many and grave major issues that constantly arise for his attention and decision.

So all officers commanding large formations are given a staff of officers to assist them in administering their commands. The duties of the staff may be briefly summarised as follows:—

- to carry out fully and loyally all the commands and wishes of the General Officer Commanding;
- to relieve the G.O.C. of all minor details of organisation and administration;
- to submit to him for his decision all important questions arising in their department of staff work;
- to give, if the G.O.C. desires it, their expert advice on any subject he may refer to them.

As the whole aim of a good G.O.C. is the fighting efficiency of his command and the comfort and well-being of his soldiers, the work of all staff officers should be directed mainly to those ends. Thus the value of a staff officer may generally be estimated by the extent to which his work has benefited the training of officers and other ranks for their functions in battle; by the success of his plans for operations, and by the avoidance of needless casualties or hardships in the field; by the efficient maintenance of supplies of food, clothing, ammunition, and equipment under all conditions, however difficult or disheartening; by the degree of comfort and well-being which his efforts procure for the men.

The staff officer speaks with the voice of authority of the G.O.C., and represents him, not only in interior dealings in the formation itself, but also in matters concerning external and superior formations. Thus a high degree of tact and courtesy is called for, and few weaknesses in staff officers are more deplorable than an overbearing and discourteous manner, that leads to needless friction and militates against the smooth and agreeable working of the whole military machine.

Summed up, then, the function of the staff is the loyal and

sincere service of the G.O.C., which, in effect, resolves itself into the service of the troops. That is why the coloured capband and gorget patches by which staff officers are distinguished have been called the "badges of an honourable servitude." They are the servants of the men.

In the British Army staff duties are divided into three main branches. There is the General Staff, or "G" Branch, which is concerned mainly with the battle training of all ranks and their actual employment in the field. An important sub-division of the General Staff is the Intelligence, or "I," Department, which is concerned chiefly with the collection of information regarding the enemy, his movements, dispositions, and intentions. The Adjutant-General's, or "A," Branch deals with such matters as discipline, appointments and promotions, transfers and maintenance of *personnel*, medical administration and other important matters. Finally, the Quartermaster-General's, or "Q," Branch is responsible for all matters of supplies, of food and clothing, of land or sea transport, of accommodation, and of veterinary administration.

On a Divisional Headquarters, "G," "A," and "Q" branches of the staff were all represented by special officers. Three officers, known ordinarily as G.S.O. I, G.S.O. II, and G.S.O. III, divided the work of the General Staff between them. The Intelligence Department was also represented by an officer known as the Divisional Intelligence Officer, but this appointment was not authorised until 1917. The "A" and "Q" branches were controlled by the officer who was known as A.A. and Q.M.G., that is, the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General. Working under this officer were the D.A.A.G.—Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, and the D.A.Q.M.G., that is, the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General. The D.A.A.G.,¹ as his appointment indicates, was chiefly occupied with the "A" branch of the work, while the D.A.Q.M.G. attended to business on the "Q" side. It is almost needless to add that the efficiency of the division depended very considerably on the close and cordial co-operation of all three branches of the staff.

In lower formations, where the staff work was neither so great in volume nor so varied in character, the staff duties were carried out by smaller staffs. Thus an infantry brigadier had only two staff officers, the Brigade Major who, in practice, attended to the "G" side of the work, and the Staff Captain, who did the "A" and "Q." The organisation was very similar at the headquarters of a divisional artillery where, however, in 1917, a Staff Officer for Reconnaissance was provided. His duties were analogous to those of Intelligence Officer.

In addition to the officers already mentioned, brigade and divisional headquarters usually had a number of "attached"

¹ He was known as the D.A. and Q.M.G. (Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General) until early in 1917.

officers, either to assist, and to learn the duties of, the regular staff—these were called Staff Trainees—or to superintend phases of the formation's work where a specialist knowledge of some branch was required. Examples of the latter were to be found in bombing, gas, and musketry officers.

The G.O.C. Division had also two aides-de-camp. Their appointments were made and terminated at the personal pleasure of the G.O.C. The senior of the two "aides" usually undertook the duties of Camp Commandant of D.H.Q., that is, he administered the large staff of clerks, orderlies, grooms, motor drivers, and batmen, who were necessarily attached to D.H.Q. In addition, he had to provide the accommodation for all D.H.Q. As this included messes, offices, billets, stables, etc., it was no easy matter to arrange, especially when D.H.Q. was located in some ruined village, or, worse still, in a few leaky huts, or in commodious dug-outs. The second aide-de-camp was concerned rather with personal attendance on the G.O.C. He was the channel through which interviews with the G.O.C. could be arranged; he accompanied the General in his daily visits of inspection; he assisted him in a clerical and informative capacity and, generally, did everything he could to relieve him of those minor distractions that might otherwise intrude to the detriment of more important matters.

It is hoped that this survey, however brief and sketchy, will have afforded the reader a fair general idea of the composition of a division, the functions of its various component parts, and the means by which it was staffed; nor will it be necessary to emphasise the great responsibility of the Divisional Commander himself and the heavy strain that was imposed upon him physically, mentally, and nervously. At all times it was necessary that he should be the embodiment of justice and personal integrity; for the very foundation on which the welfare and efficiency of the division rested was the content of each individual in it, and this in turn depended on each man feeling that he was being fairly treated, and that a ready redress was at his hand should he become the victim of any injustice. But it was just before and during operations that a special strain was imposed upon the Divisional Commander. At these times the lives of hundreds, even thousands, of men rested on the decision of his single mind, on his foresight, common sense, and professional skill, on his knowledge of the many arms of the service which he had to control. Enough for the artilleryman to know his guns, the infantryman his musketry, the engineer his bridge and road construction, the machine gunner his arrangement of indirect fire; the Divisional Commander must know all of these, these and many other things besides; he must be fully conversant with all three branches of staff work; he must understand his enemy, and his enemy's weapons and tactical methods. Above all, in a battle he must remain cold, detached, judicial, bearing a check with fortitude,

a success with equanimity, actuated at the same time by a relentless determination to destroy his enemy and an affectionate regard for the dangers and hardships of his own men.

As the names of formations higher than a division will be used from time to time throughout this narrative, it may assist the reader if a few particulars of them are given.

Several divisions were generally grouped together to form an Army Corps. This was commanded by an officer of the rank of lieutenant-general. He was usually known as the Corps Commander and he was assisted by a large staff. In addition to the divisions which the Corps contained, it comprised also other bodies of troops known as Corps Troops. These included certain Artillery, Air Force, Cycle, Labour, and Mounted units, and others. During operations parts of these troops were frequently allotted to divisions and acted throughout the engagement under the Divisional Commander.

Just as several divisions comprised a corps, so several corps comprised an Army. The Army Commander was usually a general. He and his large staff administered, in addition to the corps, certain Army troops, including, among others, Artillery, Tunnelling, and Air Force units. During its employment in France the Australian Corps served in several different armies.

The five British Armies in France were directed by the highest British organisation there, known as General Headquarters. Throughout the whole active service of the Australian troops in France Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig was in command at General Headquarters.

CHAPTER II

(14th of February, 1916—31st of March, 1916.)

FORMATION OF 5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Important contemporaneous events :

Russians captured Erzerum,	February 16th.
German offensive against Verdun opened ..	” 21st.
Senussi outbreak in Western Egypt quelled ..	” 26st.
Unsuccessful British attempts to relieve Kut	

IT will be readily recognised that the formation of such a large unit as a Division is not a light task, and that it cannot be carried out in a day or in a few days. There were special circumstances, too, surrounding the formation of the 5th Australian Division which added considerably to the difficulty, and which necessitated more than usual prevision if the highest efficiency was to be secured. In order to understand this thoroughly, the reader will require to know what Australian troops were available for new formations in Egypt in February and March, 1916.

Two almost complete Australian Divisions, the 1st and the 2nd had recently returned from Gallipoli. These included the following :—

1ST DIVISION.—1st Infantry Brigade, 2nd Infantry Brigade, 3rd Infantry Brigade, 1st Divisional Artillery, and the usual engineering, medical and supply services.

2ND DIVISION.—5th Infantry Brigade, 6th Infantry Brigade, 7th Infantry Brigade, and certain engineering, medical, and supply units. The 2nd Divisional Artillery, though it had not been on Gallipoli, was in Egypt.

Other formations in Egypt were :—

4TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.—This Brigade, together with two New Zealand infantry brigades, had formed the infantry of the composite Australian and New Zealand Division, and the three Divisions now mentioned had comprised the “A.N.Z.A.C. Corps” of the Peninsula.

8TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.—This Brigade had now been in Egypt for some months and, in February, 1916, was holding

a sector of the advanced line of the Canal defences some eight miles east of the Suez Canal. With the 8th Brigade were the 3rd Australian Signal Section, the 8th Field Ambulance, and the 18th Company A.A.S.C.

Other troops available in Egypt at the time were the many thousands of reinforcements, chiefly Infantry and Light Horse, who were then concentrated for the most part in the vicinity of Cairo. These reinforcements were so numerous that it was seen that ample material existed for the formation of two new Australian Divisions. Only four new infantry brigades were required as the 4th and 8th Brigades were already in existence. As preliminary arrangements for the formation in Australia of a 3rd Australian Division were already in train, it was necessary to number the new divisions the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions.

The task of organisation devolved in the first place on the Headquarters of the Australian and New Zealand Forces. Shortly after its return from Gallipoli, A.N.Z.A.C. Corps Headquarters had been established at Ismailia, a town on the west bank of the Suez Canal about half-way between Suez and Port Said. As the Australian and New Zealand troops in Egypt were now very considerably more than the A.N.Z.A.C. Corps of the Peninsula, a new Administrative Staff, called H.Q. A. and N.Z. Forces, was instituted early in February, 1916. It was this Staff that arranged for the formation of the 4th and 5th Divisions and the allotment of all the Australian Divisions and the New Zealand Division to two Army Corps—1st A.N.Z.A.C. and 2nd A.N.Z.A.C. General Birdwood was in command at Headquarters A. and N.Z. Forces during its comparatively short existence, and he had with him certain of his old A.N.Z.A.C. Corps Staff, conspicuous among them being General C. B. B. White, who even at that early stage in the history of the Australian armies was displaying all that professional ability that eventually carried him so far.

Two considerations of a conflicting nature were felt regarding the method of formation of the two new Australian divisions. In the first place, it was very rightly considered of the greatest importance that each of the new divisions should contain a strong nucleus of officers and men who had already fought in Gallipoli and had therefore actual experience of modern war conditions. This would involve the transfer of many officers and men from the old units to the new ones. Secondly, there was very great reluctance to detach men from units which they had grown to love, and in which they felt the strong *esprit de corps* so greatly valued as a means to military efficiency. However, the first consideration was deemed the more important of the two, and it was decided to observe it, and to reconcile the transferred men to the change by preserving as far as possible in the new units identity of territorial origin and identity of unit colours. In this way it was anticipated that the

esprit de corps of the new units would be more readily generated, and the break with the old ones less keenly felt.

That this partition of old units might be limited as much as possible, it was further decided that the only brigades to be affected by it should be the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Brigades of the 1st Australian Division and the 4th Infantry Brigade of the Australian and New Zealand Division. These were the oldest and most experienced Australian infantry brigades. Thus the entire 2nd Australian Division (comprising 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry Brigades) would be left intact.

It had already been decided in Australia that the 3rd Australian Division should contain 9th, 10th, and 11th Infantry Brigades. It was therefore necessary that any additional infantry brigades formed in Egypt should be numbered after the 11th. In this way the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry Brigades came into being, the 12th and 13th being combined with the existing 4th Brigade to form the 4th Australian Division, and the 14th and 15th Brigades with the existing 8th Brigade to form the 5th Australian Division.

The nucleus of the 12th Infantry Brigade was provided by the 3rd Brigade, and that of the 13th Brigade by the 4th Brigade. As the 4th, 12th, and 13th Brigades formed the 4th Australian Division, with which this history is not primarily concerned, further details regarding their formation will not be given here.

To form the 14th Brigade of the 5th Australian Division the 1st Brigade gave half its strength of officers and men as a nucleus, and, as the 1st Brigade was raised entirely in New South Wales, care was taken that the 14th Brigade should be built up of men from the same State. Identity of territorial origin in the 14th Brigade was thus maintained. The 1st Brigade colour was green and those of its four battalions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions) were black, purple, brown, and white, worn horizontally above the green of the Brigade. Exactly the same colours were allotted to the 14th Brigade and its component battalions, but they were worn vertically (the Brigade green being to the rear), in order to distinguish them from the 1st Brigade. The battalions of the 14th Brigade were 53rd, 54th, 55th, and 56th.





















A similar policy was adopted in the 15th Infantry brigade, of which the "parent unit" was the 2nd Infantry Brigade. Both formations were entirely Victorian in origin and, as far as was practicable, both were so maintained. As red, worn horizontally, was the colour of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, so red, worn vertically, became the colour of the 15th Brigade. The battalion colours of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battalions of the 2nd Brigade were black, purple, brown, and white respectively, worn horizontally immediately above the red of the Brigade. Accordingly, battalion colours of the 57th, 58th, 59th, and 60th Battalions of the 15th Brigade were kept the same, but they also were worn vertically in

front of the Brigade red. In the chart facing this page the connection between the parent and new formations will be apparent.

Thus the 14th and 15th Australian Infantry Brigades came into being. About half of each battalion of the 1st and 2nd Brigades moved into the area of the 14th and 15th Brigades, and sufficient reinforcements were available at Zeitoun to bring all four brigades up to their approximate war strength. It may be stated here that the aim of the Staff of Australian and New Zealand Forces H.Q., in organising the new units in the manner described, was realised; the 5th Division benefited very considerably from the large infusion of officers and men possessing actual experience of modern warfare, and a strong cordial spirit developed between the sister battalions of the four brigades concerned, and endured throughout the arduous years of campaigning on the western front.

With the large part of the Division, its three brigades of infantry, thus provided for, it was necessary to determine the policy by which the artillery and other arms of the Division should be raised. There were insufficient artillery reinforcements available, but the supply of Engineering, Medical, and Army Service Corps *personnel* was somewhat better. It was obvious, therefore, that most of the new artillery *personnel*, and a smaller proportion of the other arms, would have to be drawn from existing Infantry and Light Horse units and from their reinforcements, of which there still remained a copious supply. Accordingly, applications for transfer to the new units were invited throughout the three infantry brigades of the 5th Division and throughout the camps of Infantry and Light Horse reinforcements, and many hundreds were found willing to try their fortunes in other arms of the service. No applications of men genuinely anxious to transfer were refused, and infantry company commanders sighed as man after man, and N.C.O. after N.C.O., signified his desire for transfer. But many of the men had never previously had an opportunity of joining the arm of the service to which they were instinctively attached, or for which they were by previous training best qualified; and the infantry ranks at that time contained many who could have been employed more profitably elsewhere. So the building up of the new Divisional Artillery, Engineers, Signallers, Medical, and Supply Services meant generally the partial depletion of the infantry brigades and their reinforcements. If it was hard for infantry commanders to lose well-trained men and to have them replaced by less experienced reinforcements, it was certainly a great advantage for the other arms to receive so many recruits who were anxious to join them, and temperamentally or professionally qualified for their work.

Although the majority of the *personnel* for these other units was thus obtained by voluntary transfer, it must not be imagined that the principle of having in each of the new units a nucleus of men with Gallipoli experience was overlooked. On the contrary,

PARENT BRIGADE.				NEW BRIGADE.					
BRIGADE.	BDE. COLOUR	BTN.	BTN. COLOUR	LOCALITY	BRIGADE	BDE. COLOUR.	BTN.	BTN. COLOUR	LOCALITY
1 ST		1 ST		NEW SOUTH WALES.	14 TH		53 RD		NEW SOUTH WALES.
		2 ND					54 TH		
		3 RD					55 TH		
		4 TH					56 TH		
PARENT BRIGADE.									
NEW BRIGADE.									
BRIGADE.	BDE. COLOUR	BTN.	BTN. COLOUR	LOCALITY	BRIGADE	BDE. COLOUR	BTN.	BTN. COLOUR	LOCALITY
2 ND		5 TH		VICTORIA.	15 TH		57 TH		VICTORIA.
		6 TH					58 TH		
		7 TH					59 TH		
		8 TH					60 TH		

ATM'S DOUGALL.

it was kept very much in evidence and all of the 5th Divisional formations contained a very appreciable leaven of Gallipoli men. The 1st Divisional Artillery, for instance, sent a nucleus of several hundred officers and other ranks, most of them specialists, to the 5th Division, and the 2nd Divisional Artillery, which, though it had not been to the Peninsula, had been training for a considerable time in Egypt, also contributed a few. 1st Divisional Engineers, Medical Services, and 1st Divisional Train also made substantial transfers to the corresponding units of the 5th Division.

Surveying thus the general policy observed in the organisation of the 5th Division, it may be said that the foundations of a good formation were well and truly laid. The three guiding principles followed were almost certainly the most important that influenced the decision at the time and under the circumstances of its consideration. The distribution of a large number of 1st Divisional men throughout the Division made for efficiency, as well as developed a spirit of fraternity with the units of the other Division; the facilities offered for voluntary transfer to other arms of the service generated content among the men, and guaranteed enthusiasm in their new work; the value of the territorial basis where it is practicable in the organisation of military units is universally recognised, and requires no demonstration here. Thus the foundations were laid on sound lines and the extraordinary efficiency attained by the Division about 18 months later was doubtless due partly to the wisdom of its founders.

Having thus sketched in outline the general policy pursued in the formation of the new Division it will be possible now to pass to the various units in detail, giving a few brief particulars regarding the circumstances of the birth of each. The order in which they normally appear in the Divisional Order of Battle will be followed, commencing with the Divisional Staff.

Major-General the Hon. J. W. McCay was appointed to command the Division, but, pending his arrival from Australia, the temporary command was held successively by General Smythe, V.C., and General G. Irving.

General McCay was born at Castlemaine (Vic.) in 1864 and was educated at Scotch College and Melbourne University, where he completed his law course and later on he practised this profession with success. Early in life he directed his attention to political matters and embarked on an active political career which was crowned by his appointment as Minister of Defence in the early years of the Commonwealth. His commission in the Volunteer and Militia Forces of Victoria dated from 1886, and by 1913 he had risen to the rank of Colonel and held the important appointment of Director of Intelligence. On the outbreak of the war he had been given the command of the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade and had led it with skill in the Gallipoli fighting where finally he was wounded

severely and forced to undergo a long period of convalescence. Throughout his Peninsula service he was known as a leader of considerable military skill, as a somewhat strict disciplinarian, and as a soldier possessed of a high degree of personal gallantry. During the period of his convalescence in Australia he had filled the responsible position of Inspector General of Training, and his return to active service was marked by his promotion to the command of the 5th Division.

The first staff officer to commence duty at D.H.Q. was Lieut.-Col. C. M. Wagstaff, C.I.E., D.S.O., R.E., the Division's G.S.O. I. Born in Calcutta in 1878, he had, since his early school days in England, adopted the Army as a profession and his military record included a distinguished career at the Staff College. He had soldiered for many years in India, fighting on the north-west frontier, acting as G.S.O. at Simla, and, in August, 1914, carrying out the duties of Secretary of the War Committee at Army H.Q. He left India with General Birdwood in December, 1914, and served with A.N.Z.A.C. on the Peninsula as G.S.O. II and as A.A. and Q.M.G. On the 8th of February he received his appointment as G.S.O. I of the 5th Australian Division, and he commenced at once on the work of laying the foundations of the new formation. Tall and of soldierly bearing, he combined with the dignity and self-restraint which his position demanded, a cordial and sympathetic manner which assured him the affection of all his subordinates. He was a careful student of character and soon understood the Australian temperament, and this, even more than his position as the first staff officer of the Division, enabled him to exercise over it an influence that made it his debtor, and that survived long after his inevitable promotion had carried him away to other duties.

His first assistants on the General Staff were Major D. M. King (the King's Liverpool Regiment), who was appointed G.S.O. II, and Captain Boase, who was the Division's first G.S.O. III. Major King had the ardent and energetic temperament of so many men of Irish extraction, and his personal gallantry and his experience of staff and regimental work promised well for his success as G.S.O. II. Captain Boase was one of the earlier graduates of Duntroon. He was quiet and unassuming, capable and painstaking, and altogether efficient in everything that he undertook.

Lieut.-Col. P. McGlinn took up the duties of A.A. and Q.M.G. of the Division on the 15th of March. He had served for many years in the Militia Forces in Australia, and to the experience acquired there he now brought the additional credentials of service on Gallipoli as Brigade Major of the 4th Brigade. Under his guidance it was certain that the A. and Q. Branches of the Staff would soon be on a sound and efficient foundation.

Lieut.-Col. McGlinn had as his A.Q. subordinates Major R. Varwell (Royal Irish Rifles), who was appointed D.A.A. and Q.M.G.,

and Captain G. D. Smith, late of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, who became D.A.Q.M.G. Major Varwell had been wounded fighting with his regiment in France in the opening phases of the war, and his all-round experience of military matters was likely to prove of considerable service to the Division. Captain Smith was of Scotch extraction and had been educated at the Glasgow High School, but most of his life had been spent in Australia and he was well known in business circles in Perth and Sydney. He had been associated with the Light Horse in Western Australia and with the 1st Australian Divisional Train on Gallipoli, and this experience and his business training were of great service in his new position. Captain Smith's outstanding characteristic was an unsparing devotion to the interests of his Division, which he served whole-heartedly for the greater part of its war service.

Lieut.-Col. Carey, the C.R.E., was of Welsh descent and had spent the whole of his professional life in the Engineer Services of the British Army. His fine work on Gallipoli had won flattering recognition, and he came to the Division as an experienced, enthusiastic, and thoroughly competent engineer, whose professional ability was enhanced by the kindly humour of the personality through which it was exercised.

Col. C. H. W. Hardy, V.D., the A.D.M.S., had been C.O. of the 6th Field Ambulance. For over 30 years he had been associated with the Medical Services of the Volunteer and Militia Forces in Australia. He brought to the Division a good record of administrative achievement and medical ability, and was in every respect qualified to put the medical administration of the Division on a sound basis. Major Follitt, the D.A.D.M.S., was equally well qualified for his duties.

Major Max Henry, D.A.D.V.S., was a member of a well-known Sydney family and was educated at King's School, Parramatta. His high professional attainments and the unflinching conscientiousness with which they were exercised soon rendered him an invaluable member of the Division which he was destined to serve throughout the whole of its fighting career.

Major E. Langley, D.S.O., had served with distinction in South Africa and had also served with the Commonwealth Military Forces. His Gallipoli service had shown him possessed of courage and judgment, and these, combined with the geniality and tact of his manner, peculiarly fitted him for his duties as A.P.M.

Captain J. Rodd, A.O.D., the Division's first D.A.D.O.S., was possessed of fine business instincts and sound organising capacity. He was already thoroughly conversant with his duties, and his zeal and energy soon enabled him to establish the Ordnance Services on an admirable footing.

Passing from the Divisional Staff to the infantry brigades, some brief notice of the earlier history of the 8th Brigade will be given.

It was anterior in origin to the other formations of the Division. In June, 1915, it was decided to form in Australia another infantry brigade, and the command was given to Col. E. Tivey, D.S.O., who at that time was Commandant of the Officers' School at Broadmeadows. The brigade was to be a composite one, that is, composed of recruits from several of the States, and Col. Tivey visited New South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia with a view to selecting the quotas to be supplied by those States. The 29th and 31st Battalions assembled in Melbourne. Of these, the 29th and two companies of the 31st consisted of Victorian troops, the remaining two companies of the 31st coming from Queensland. The 30th Battalion was a New South Wales unit and sailed from Sydney. The 32nd Battalion consisted of two companies of South Australians and two of Western Australians. The whole Battalion assembled at Adelaide and embarked there. The Brigade arrived in Egypt early in December accompanied by the 8th Field Ambulance, the 18th Company A.A.S.C., and the 3rd Australian Signal Section. After a few days in camp near Heliopolis, the Brigade was sent to take over a section of the Canal defences, including Tussum, Serapeum, and Deversoir. Its detailed history for the ensuing two months does not properly come within the scope of this narrative. When in February, 1916, it received orders to proceed to Tel-el-Kebir to join in the formation of the 5th Australian Division, it was holding a sector of the advanced Canal defences about eight miles east of the waterway.

Brigadier-General E. Tivey, who commanded the 8th Brigade from its formation to the end of the fighting, was educated at Wesley College, Melbourne, and had followed with success a business career, being at the outbreak of the war an esteemed member of the Melbourne Stock Exchange. But his absorption in business had never overcome his natural love of soldiering, and he had served in the Volunteer and Militia Forces of Australia for twenty-five years prior to the outbreak of war. In the South African War he had gained distinction in a mounted regiment, and his subsequent career in the Commonwealth Military Forces had been marked by steady promotion. As Commandant of the Officers' Training School at Broadmeadows, he had trained a large number of the subalterns who were platoon officers in the 8th and 15th Brigades of the Division. By this time General Tivey had endeared himself to all ranks of his command as much by the unaffected sincerity of his manner as by the vigilant personal care with which he safeguarded their interests, and mitigated by every means in his power the hardships incidental to active service.

At the time of the formation of the 5th Division Major C. W. Davies (The Leicestershire Regiment) was Brigade Major of the 8th Brigade. After a successful military career he had received an appointment to the Staff at Duntroon, which he had left to come



MAJOR-GENERAL E. TIVEY, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

away as Staff Captain of the 8th Brigade. His subsequent promotion to Brigade Major created a vacancy in the appointment of Staff Captain. This was filled eventually by Captain Harry Cuming, son of a well-known Melbourne business man. After his education at Melbourne Church of England Grammar School he had passed into his father's business and had there gained considerable experience which he now found of much assistance in the Q. side of military life. A cheerful personality, endowed also with tact, energy, and courage, he made in many respects an ideal Staff Captain.

The Staff of the 8th Brigade has thus been introduced at some length because it eventually exercised a considerable influence on the Division as a whole. General Tivey became Divisional Commander, Major Davies became G.O.C. of the 8th Infantry Brigade, and Captain Cuming became D.A.Q.M.G. of the Division—a somewhat unique record of military advancement.

Of the 8th Brigade Battalion, Commanders Lieut.-Col. Bennett, V.D., 29th Battalion, was a well-known Ballarat business man, popular also in local military and sporting circles. He was loved by his men for his cheery, unaffected bearing and his good fellowship towards all ranks of his command. Lieut.-Col. J. W. Clark, 30th Battalion, had had a long experience in the volunteer forces in Australia, being associated particularly with the 4th and 16th Infantry Regiments in, New South Wales. Lieut.-Col. F. W. Toll, 31st Battalion, was equally well known in Queensland, and his South African War experiences and his professional enthusiasm had combined to make him a capable commanding officer. Lieut.-Col. D. M. R. Coghill, 32nd Battalion, was another Militia officer well known in Victoria and South Australia, where he was interested in educational matters.

The method of the formation of the 14th Infantry Brigade with its strong nucleus from the 1st Brigade has already been set out. The formation commenced about the 14th of February, 1916, at which time the 1st Australian Brigade was already encamped at Tel-el-Kebir. Half of each of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions was accordingly dispatched from the 1st Brigade area of the Tel-el-Kebir Camp and marched across to the 14th Brigade area, where the organisation of the 53rd, 54th, 55th, and 56th Battalions was immediately entered upon. The remainder of the 1st Brigade christened the newly-formed units of the 14th Brigade "The War Babies," while they retained for themselves the proud title of the "Dinkum Anzacs." The camps of the two formations were liberally posted with notices to this effect.

The policy adopted in all four battalions was to organise its half battalion of nucleus into a complete skeleton battalion which would contain all four companies, which in their turn would contain the usual four platoons each comprised of four sections. But as the nucleus supplied was only a half battalion these units were all necessarily

at half strength. This was done during the few days following the 14th of February and, by the time it was completed, large drafts of reinforcements had already reported. With these each battalion was speedily brought up to its approximate war strength, and all battalions were now so constituted that the Gallipoli men were evenly distributed throughout each company, platoon, and section. There was inevitably a good deal of shuffling of officers during the first weeks of the Division's existence. General Smyth, V.C., commanded the 14th Infantry Brigade for the first week or two. On the 3rd March, General G. Irving took over the command, while General Smyth took command of the Division pending the arrival of General McCay.

The first staff of the 14th Brigade consisted of General G. G. H. Irving, who had long been an officer of the Administrative and Instructional Staff of the permanent Australian Forces. His professional career had been a very successful one, but as he remained in the Division for only a few weeks no extended notice of it is given here. Major A. B. Baker, D.S.O., and Captain Tollemache were Brigade Major and Staff Captain respectively. Like their chief, they were very shortly afterwards called away to other appointments. It will suffice to say of all three that they worked hard for the efficiency of the new formation and that the Brigade made rapid improvement under their administration.

Of the original Battalion Commanders of the 14th Brigade three were afterwards killed in action, these were Lieut.-Col. I. B. Norris (53rd Battalion), Lieut.-Col. D. M. McConaghy (55th Battalion), and Lieut.-Col. A. H. Scott (56th Battalion). Lieut.-Col. W. E. H. Cass was the first Commanding Officer of the 54th Battalion. Lieut.-Col. Norris's promotion in the New South Wales Militia Forces had been rapid, and his work in the field soon revealed him as a fine soldier. Lieut.-Col. Scott was a member of a well-known Sydney family, and his military career was one of unusual promise. He was brave and popular, an ardent and competent soldier. Lieut.-Col. Cass was a well-known member of the A. and I. Staff of the permanent forces of the Commonwealth, where his career had been characterised by much hard work and steady devotion to duty. Lieut.-Col. McConaghy, the first C.O. of the 55th Battalion, had taken an active interest in the Militia Forces in Australia, and was a prominent member of an East Sydney Regiment at the outbreak of the war. His military career too was full of promise.

The formation of the 15th Infantry Brigade was carried out at the same time and in much the same manner as that of the 14th Brigade. There was this chief difference—the 2nd Brigade, the parent formation of the 15th Brigade, was, in the middle of February, not at Tel-el-Kebir like the 1st Brigade but at Serapeum™ on the Suez Canal. Hence it was necessary to move the four half battalions of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battalions from Serapeum to Tel-el-

Kebir. This was done on the 21st of February and the half battalions, now the nucleus of the 57th, 58th, 59th, and 60th Battalions, immediately set about the work of organisation. The method adopted was very similar to that employed by the 14th Brigade, but General Elliott carried to much greater length the principle of territorial origin in the composition of the units, and, for a time, each large town and important district in Victoria was represented by a unit in the 15th Brigade. From the 23rd of February to the 26th of February reinforcements to the number of about 500 per battalion arrived from Zeitoun and were distributed throughout the skeleton formations already existing, bringing them practically to their war footing. From the 21st of February to the 2nd of March, General Irving commanded the Brigade, but on the latter date he relinquished the command and passed to the 14th Brigade, his successor being General H. E. Elliott, who thus commenced his long and invaluable association with the 15th Brigade.

Few more striking personalities than that of General H. E. Elliott, were to be found in the Australian Imperial Forces. Born in Ballarat and educated at Ballarat College, he had achieved in his early life equal success in sport and studies. At Ormond College and the Melbourne University his academic successes were of the highest order and he entered the legal profession with very exceptional credentials. The South African War was an irresistible appeal to his fighting instincts, and, to a man of his temperament, being in a battle and displaying extraordinary personal courage were synonymous terms. He returned with a D.C.M., and associated himself actively with the Commonwealth Military Forces, being at the outbreak of war Commanding Officer of the 58th Infantry (Essendon Rifles). In October, 1914, he left Australia as C.O. 7th Battalion, and throughout the Gallipoli Campaign he led it with conspicuous ability and dash. A big man, with big generous impulses, he was known and loved by every member of his command, and his appointment to the 15th Brigade was hailed by all ranks as a matter for sincere rejoicing. He commanded the Brigade from its earliest days till its latest, and throughout the whole war he directed every moment of his time, and every ounce of his energy, to promoting and maintaining its efficiency. After Major Durrant had capably filled the appointment of temporary Brigade Major 15th Brigade for a few weeks, Major G. Wieck took over the duties of the position. Major Wieck had served as a machine-gunner in the South African War and afterwards had been appointed to the A. and I. Staff in the permanent forces of Australia. He left Australia as Adjutant of the 9th Light Horse Regiment and was with that unit at Anzac. This varied experience of military work, combined with Major Wieck's natural ability, conscientiousness, and whole-hearted devotion to his duty, made his influence in the new formation very great and very beneficial. Indeed his influence

in the Brigade was very analogous to that of Lieut.-Col. Wagstaff in the Division. It would be difficult to say more. Captain R. Legge, a Duntroon graduate, was the Brigade Staff Captain. He had left Australia as Machine gun Officer of the 13th Battalion, and had rendered good service in the fighting on Gallipoli. His sound training coupled with a high degree of natural ability enabled him to carry out his responsible duties with credit to himself and entire satisfaction to the Brigade.

Of the original battalion commanders of the 15th Brigade only one, Lieut.-Col. J. C. Stewart (57th Battalion), served long with the Division. He had been a trusted and popular officer in the 5th Battalion on Gallipoli and he soon proved himself a sound and reliable administrator. His greatest professional asset was, however, the possession of that rare gift, excellent tactical discrimination. Of Scottish extraction, with the quiet and humorous sagacity of his race, he soon became as popular as he was efficient. Lieut.-Cols. C. R. Davis (58th Battalion), E. A. Harris (59th Battalion), and J. W. B. Field (60th Battalion) worked hard and successfully for their respective commands while they remained with them, but as that period was comparatively short no extended notice of their previous careers is here necessary.

The authority for the formation of the 5th Australian Divisional Artillery was a memorandum from H.Q. Australian and New Zealand Forces Ismailia dated 17th of February, 1916. It was intended originally that a whole brigade of the 1st Australian D.A. should be spared to form a nucleus of the 5th D.A. but this was later found to be impracticable. There was substituted instead a wide channel of transfers from the 1st D.A. and by this means a fair proportion of seasoned gunners passed into the 5th Division. The 2nd Brigade A.F.A., for instance, spared a very large number of officers and N.C.O. specialists whose influence in the new formation was far-reaching and beneficial. The remainder of the 5th D.A. was built up partly by transfer from the 8th, 14th, and 15th Infantry Brigades and partly by reinforcements of volunteers from the Light Horse. About the 20th of February the concentration of the 5th D.A. *personnel* commenced at Tel-el-Kebir. General S. E. Christian was appointed to command and the various units of the formation began to fill up rapidly. If few of the new men had had previous artillery experience they were, at least, all keen to learn the new work, and this itself was sufficient guarantee of early efficiency. Indeed, the extraordinary rapidity with which most of these raw recruits became efficient members of a technical arm is one of the outstanding tributes to the versatility of the Australian soldier.

As was said in the previous chapter, the organisation of the Divisional Artillery was changed from time to time throughout the war. In February, 1916, it provided for four brigades, and a divisional ammunition column. Of these four brigades three

consisted of four batteries each and each battery had four 18-pounder guns. The other brigade was a howitzer brigade and it had only three batteries, each of which had four 4.5-howitzers. In addition to the D.A.C. each brigade of artillery had its own brigade ammunition column. The 5th Divisional Artillery was constituted on this basis and its brigades and batteries were numbered as follows:—

13th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. H. O. Caddy) 49th, 50th, 51st, and 52nd Batteries of 18-pounders.

13th B.A.C.

14th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. O. F. Phillips), 53rd, 54th, 55th, and 56th Batteries of 18-pounders.

14th B.A.C.

15th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. J. W. S. Lucas) 57th, 58th, 59th, and 60th Batteries of 18-pounders.

15th B.A.C.

25th (Howitzer) Brigade (Lieut.-Col. H. J. Cox-Taylor) 113th, 114th, and 115th Howitzer Batteries.

25th B.A.C.

5th Divisional Ammunition Column (Major McClean).

General Christian had long been known in the R.A.G.A. and R.A.F.A. of the Australian permanent forces. He had served with an artillery unit in the South African War and his subsequent experience in Australia and then on Gallipoli as commander of an artillery brigade brought his professional knowledge to a high level. His experience in the training of his Gallipoli command now fitted him admirably for the difficult work of training the new artillery and he at once devoted himself to the work with equal energy and success. Major F. Thornthwaite and Captain J. H. Newmarch first filled the positions of Brigade Major and Staff Captain respectively on General Christian's staff. Both officers were capable and painstaking and in their hands the formation gained steadily in efficiency in all its branches.

The names of the Commanding Officers of the four Artillery Brigades and the D.A.C. have been given above. Of these officers Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor was a well-known member of the R.A.G.A. in the permanent forces of Australia and Lieut.-Col. Phillips was also well known in the R.A.F.A. of the permanent forces. The professional abilities of both these officers were inevitably high, and Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor had in addition gained considerable experience in the South African War. Lieut.-Col. Caddy had served in the Militia artillery forces in Australia, where his pronounced gift for artillery work had brought him rapid promotion which his war service later fully justified. Lieut.-Col. J. W. S. Lucas had for a considerable time been identified with the Militia artillery forces in New South Wales. He had left Australia in August, 1914, and his present promotion was due to his good service with the 1st

Divisional Artillery on Gallipoli. Major F. S. McClean after many years' service in the R.A.G.A. in Australia had left with the 30th Battalion, from which unit he transferred to take command of the 5th D.A.C.

The authority for the formation of the 5th Divisional Engineers was dated from Ismailia on the 20th of February, 1916. It directed that the 8th Field Company of Engineers should move to Tel-el-Kebir and there provide a nucleus for the 14th and 15th Field Companies. It further authorised certain transfers from the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisional Engineers to the 5th Divisional Engineers, and gave authority for the transfer from infantry units of the *personnel* required to complete establishment. The 14th and 15th Field Companies may thus be said to date their existence from the 10th of March, 1916, on which day the members of the new units commenced to assemble at Tel-el-Kebir. Both companies had a strong infusion of the 1st Divisional Engineers and, as fairly large numbers of engineer reinforcements were also available, few transfers from other arms of the service were required. One point about the 8th Field Company deserves special notice. It had been formed in Egypt as the 5th Field Company about August, 1915, and had had three months' service on the Peninsula. As another 5th Field Company had already been formed in Australia with apparently priority of title, the Egyptian-formed unit was accordingly called the 8th Field Company, and was known thereafter as such.

The officers commanding the three Field Companies were Major V. A. H. Sturdee (8th Field Company), Major H. Bachtold (14th Field Company), and after a short period during which Major J. M. Corlette commanded, Major H. Greenway (15th Field Company). All three officers were men of very sound professional attainments and fine administrative ability, and each was spared to render long and valuable service to the 5th Division.

The 5th Divisional Signal Company was formed at the same time and in much the same way as were the three field companies. Captain R. A. Stanley, the O.C., was himself a Gallipoli man and thoroughly qualified to train the many members of his new unit who were as yet inexperienced in the nature of their duties.

The memorandum from H.Q. Australian and New Zealand Forces which authorised the formation of four Pioneer Battalions, the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th Australian Pioneer Battalions, was dated from Ismailia on 22nd of February, 1916. As was pointed out in the first chapter, the Pioneer Battalion was, in the British Army, a war development—an almost inevitable development—in a war in which road, railway, trench, and strong point construction were emphasised as they had never been before. As the establishment of pioneer battalions was not authorised before the Gallipoli expedition, the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions were as yet without them. It thus came about that the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th Pioneer Battalions were created at the same time and under the same authority.

The 5th Pioneer Battalion commenced its regimental existence on the 3rd of March, 1916, on which date about 550 voluntary transferors from the 8th, 14th, and 15th Infantry Brigades assembled at Tel-el-Kebir under the command of Major Carter. The 8th Brigade details were formed into "A" Company, the 14th into "B" Company, and the 15th into "C" Company. In selecting *personnel* for the Battalion it had been necessary to give preference to tradesmen of the required trades. Some twenty trades were thus represented, and the remainder of the Battalion strength consisted of "handy-men" and men with mining or other pick and shovel experience. The Battalion lost no time in getting to work, and on the 4th of March commenced constructing a full-sized rifle range about three miles from Tel-el-Kebir. Major Carter, who commanded the unit with conspicuous ability and success throughout the entire length of the war, was a well-known engineering graduate of Sydney University, and under his direction the Battalion grew from day to day in use and service to the Division.

The organisation of the Medical Services of the 5th Australian Division was outlined in an Australian and New Zealand Force memorandum dated 18th of February, 1916. As the 8th Field Ambulance, which had left Australia with the 8th Infantry Brigade, was already available in Egypt, it was allotted directly to the 5th Division. With the 8th Field Ambulance was No. 2 Dental Unit. The 14th Field Ambulance was given a nucleus from the 1st Australian Field Ambulance, comprising mainly "C" Section, of two officers and fifty other ranks, and another of equal strength from the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance. These assembled on the 25th of February at Tel-el-Kebir and Army Medical reinforcements gradually brought the new unit to its full strength. The 15th Field Ambulance had as its nucleus "C" Sections of both the 5th Field Ambulance and the 8th Field Ambulance which arrived from Ferry Post and Serapeum on the 25th of February, and joined the other medical units at Tel-el-Kebir. On the 5th of March certain details of the 4th A.L.H. Field Ambulance under Lieut.-Col. A. Horn joined up, and that officer assumed command of the new unit. During March, No. 32 and No. 22 Dental Units joined the 14th and 15th Field Ambulances respectively.

Colonel A. E. Shepherd was the first C.O. of the 8th Field Ambulance. He had been long associated with the Medical Services of the Militia forces in Australia, and had acted as P.M.O. in South Australia as well as Deputy Director General of Medical Services in Australia. Lieut.-Col. A. H. Tebbutt had also considerable experience of the medical side of militia soldiering, while Lieut.-Col. A. Horn, like Lieut.-Col. A. H. Tebbutt, had, in addition to his militia experience, Gallipoli service to his credit. The professional endowments of all three officers were high and the Medical Services in consequence soon became very efficient.

A memorandum from H.Q. Australian and New Zealand Forces,

dated 21st of February, 1916, authorised, and indicated the method of, the formation of the 5th Divisional Train. It was ordered to assemble at Alexandria and the A.S.C. troops available included the 18th A.A.S.C., then at Serapeum, and the 20th A.A.S.C., at Heliopolis. The 20th A.A.S.C. was divided up into two skeleton companies each at half strength, one of which was to form the nucleus of the 10th Company A.A.S.C. This company became the H.Q. Company of the 5th Australian Division. To provide the other three companies, the 18th Company A.A.S.C. was broken up into three skeleton units, each of which acted as nucleus for the subsequent formation of a complete company. The three thus formed were known as the 18th, 28th, and 29th Companies A.A.S.C., and grouped, with the 10th mentioned above, made up the four Companies of the 5th Australian Divisional Train. The *personnel* assembled at Metras Camp, Alexandria, during March, and by the 12th of that month the Train had reached approximately its full strength of men, horses, and vehicles. Many of the new men were A.S.C. reinforcements, but about 100 came from the 2nd Australian Divisional Train. Before the end of March the Divisional Train organisation was practically completed, and on the 29th of that month it moved by train to Ismailia in order to undertake the supply and transport services of the Division which, as will be seen in due course, was then moving from Tel-el-Kebir down to the Canal defences. Major F. H. Francis was appointed to command the Divisional Train. He had gained considerable experience of both Infantry and Army Service Corps work in the Militia Forces in Australia. He had left Perth with the 1st Divisional Train in 1914 and after service on the Peninsula had taken part in the campaign against the Senussi in Western Egypt. This wide experience fitted him admirably for his new post, the responsibilities of which he bore creditably till the end of the war. Lieut.-Col. A. McMorland, V.D., was the Division's first S.S.O., but he left the formation within a few months, after having carried out the duties capably during that first difficult period.

The same memorandum which authorised the formation of the 5th Divisional Train also gave directions for the formation of the five Depôt Units of Supply. These were small units located on the Lines of Communication, where they assisted in the work of sending the supplies forward to railhead. A Field Butchery and a Field Bakery were also formed for work in the Lines of Communication area.

D.A.D.O.S. 5th Australian Division was formed on authority dated 1/3/1916. Instructions were issued for the *personnel* to assemble at Tel-el-Kebir. The organisation of the time provided for the formation of a staff at D.H.Q. and smaller staffs at each of the Infantry Brigade H.Q. In practice, it was soon found advisable to centralise the entire work under D.H.Q. Captain J. Rodd, A.O.D., to whom reference has already been made, was the first D.A.D.O.S. of the Division.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. E. ELLIOTT, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M.

Nothing has, as yet, been said of the formation of the 8th, 14th, and 15th Machine Gun Companies. The period marked one of the important developments in the administrative and tactical conception of machine gun units. Up till this time machine guns had been regarded mainly as a contribution to the ordinary musketry fire of the front line infantry units, and they had been allotted for this purpose to infantry battalions at the rate of four per battalion and, so used, had rendered good service chiefly as an auxiliary to the ordinary rifle fire of the front line. Now, however, it was thought that machine-gun units could be administered better and become of greater tactical value if they operated directly under brigade control. Accordingly, the machine gun sections were now withdrawn from battalions and massed together as brigade troops operating as directed by the infantry brigadier. This course was followed in the formation of the 8th Machine Gun Company. As the battalions of the 14th and 15th Brigades had not so far been provided with their machine gun sections, the Machine Gun Companies of these two Brigades were formed immediately as such. Captain R. Marsden, Captain C. M. Spier, and Captain S. Neale were the first commanders of the 8th, 14th, and 15th Machine Gun Companies respectively.

While it was realised that significant administrative and tactical advantages would result from the brigading of machine gun units, there was great reluctance to withdraw from the control of the front line troops the undoubted protection which machine guns had afforded them as an addition to their musketry fire. This difficulty was surmounted by the adoption about this time of an automatic rifle called the Lewis Gun. It was much lighter and more mobile than the machine gun proper, and it lent itself much more readily to the requirements of the front line, particularly in attack. Its rate of fire was quicker than that of the Vickers machine gun, although, owing to the frequent changes of drums, which contained only forty-seven cartridges, the number of shots per minute was not so great as that fired by the Vickers, the belts of which held 250 rounds. Each infantry and pioneer battalion was accordingly provided with a Lewis Gun Section with an establishment of four Lewis guns. As time went on and the great utility of the Lewis Gun was more fully demonstrated the establishment per battalion was raised first to 8, then to 12 and, finally, to over 20 Lewis guns, and Lewis gun work became part of the regular training of the average infantryman.

No details are here given regarding the formation of the 5th Divisional Cyclist Company or of the 5th Divisional Mounted Troops. Two such units were formed, but shortly afterwards left the Division to become Corps troops.

The colour patches, as finally approved for all units of the Division, are reproduced facing page 40.

CHAPTER III

(*March, April, May, June, 1916.*)

ACTIVITIES IN EGYPT ; THE MOVE TO FRANCE

Important contemporaneous events :

Continued bitter fighting at Verdun	
Armed rebellion in Dublin	April 24th.
The surrender of Kut-el-Amara	„ 25th.
Austrian offensive against Italy opened ..	May 15th.
Conscription introduced in England	„ 25th.
Battle of Jutland	„ 31st.
Russian offensive opened under Brusiloff ..	June 4th.
The death of Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener.	„ 5th.

In the preceding chapter a short account of the birth of most of the principal units of the Division was given, and we are free now to commence the narrative proper of its doings. These words are being penned in London on the very day that has brought the news of Germany's abject surrender to the allied arms, and the great city outside is delirious with delight, and the air is torn with the acclamations of the multitudes who are crowding the streets in a frenzy of triumph and thanksgiving. The crashing cheers and the blare of bands knock insistently on the windows, the quickening beats of the heart of the greatest Empire in the world are audible to-day as they have never been before ; and one's thoughts fly back over many months of gloom and anxiety to those days of March, 1916, when the thousands of care-free young Australians assembled at Tel-el-Kebir and launched the Division on its proud and terrible voyage into history. How is it possible for any pen to describe in fitting terms the sufferings and the dangers that it endured, the sacrifices that it cheerfully rendered, or the triumph which it now has won ?

The Egyptian period of the Division's history divides itself into four phases :—

(a) Continued organisation and training at Tel-el-Kebir till about the end of March when the Division moved to Ferry Post ;

(b) The holding of a section of the Canal Defences about eight miles east of the Suez Canal ;

(c) The handing over, about the end of May, of this sector to the 53rd British Division, and the concentration of the 5th Division about Moascar, preparatory to the move overseas ;

(d) The move by rail to Alexandria, the embarkation there, the voyage to Marseilles, and the long railway journey to the North of France.

Long ago the waters of the Nile, in their annual flooding of its valley, found channels for dispersion which do not now exist as such. One of these channels was a long basin, or Wadi, which, running from the Nile near Cairo, stretched some ninety miles east as far as Lake Timsah, into which it poured annually a large amount of water. This basin was of considerable width and the deposits of the flood waters, artificially aided by industrious irrigation, rendered the greater part of the whole valley area one of marked fertility. Hence, from Cairo to Lake Timsah the country supported a large population, and, although the desert has now encroached in many places, the valley area retains much of its original attractiveness. It is doubtless due to this connection with the Nile that Lake Timsah, the Crocodile Lake, was so named, although those delightful creatures are no longer to be found in its present salt waters.

In addition to attracting a large population, the comparative fertility of the Wadi Tumilat has exercised a considerable influence on the destinies of Egypt. In 1858, largely as a result of the adverse report of Stephenson, the eminent railway engineer, on the projected Suez Canal, the British Government decided to connect Cairo and Suez by rail, and the course of a great part of the line naturally lay along the Wadi Tumilat. This immediately invested the valley with considerable strategic importance, which was increased a few years later by the construction through it of the Sweet Water Canal leading from the Nile to Suez and supplying with drinking water the thousands of native labourers who were digging the Suez Canal. Practical demonstration of this was afforded in 1882, when it became the theatre of operations for General Wolseley's campaign against Arabi Pasha. The armies met at Tel-el-Kebir, *i.e.*, the Mound, a small but dominating fold in the ground, where Arabi dug trenches in an attempt to hold the valley, and to check the advance of Wolseley on Cairo, some 50 or 60 miles away. In this he failed rather badly ; and the battle of Tel-el-Kebir closed the campaign and may be said to have initiated the control of Egypt by England. Arabi was sent to his prison in Ceylon, and it probably astonished him to learn that the principle for which his revolt was undertaken, " Egypt for the Egyptians," was served better by his defeat than it would have been by his success. In fact, Arabi achieved his end by failing in

his means, a reflection which has perhaps done little to comfort the declining years of the gifted agitator.

Apart from its historical associations, Tel-el-Kebir had much to recommend it as a site for a large military encampment. Only the absence of an adequate water supply had prevented its adoption as the chief Australian camp in Egypt in 1914, but this had since been remedied. On the main line from Cairo to Ismailia, whence branches run north to Port Said and Alexandria and south to Suez, it gave all the necessary facilities for the movement of troops in any direction. And, while the greatest danger was anticipated from the Turks east of the Suez Canal, the menace of the restless desert tribes west of Egypt was never entirely absent, and its very vagueness perhaps rendered it the more formidable. To this was added a certain anxiety that was felt about the native population of Egypt itself. It is always difficult to probe the oriental mind, to ascertain its latent sympathies, or to forecast its probable activities, and a tribal rising, insignificant in itself, might at any moment become grave by the adherence to it of millions of Egyptian natives swayed by this or that obscure instinct, racial, religious, or political. It was also popularly believed that Cairo, with its large leaven of foreign merchants, agents, and prostitutes, was a hotbed of enemy intrigue, where at any moment the match might be applied that would set Egypt in flames. It was eminently desirable, therefore, that troops not actually employed on a line of defence should be held in some central position permitting of their rapid distribution where required.

While Tel-el-Kebir thus afforded the requisite means for the rapid concentration at any threatened point, it was nevertheless sufficiently far from all the big cities to render impracticable a large allotment of leave, and to reduce to a minimum the temptation for the men to absent themselves without permission. This was doubtless one of the considerations that determined the choice of Tel-el-Kebir as the place of formation of the new divisions. Propinquity to a large city has invariably a distracting influence on military training, and, when the city is one like Cairo, with its oriental glitter and fascination, its dissipation, and its potent temptations to vice of all kinds, the danger is double. Particularly is this so when units are in a state of formation, when the lines of officers and men are full of strange faces, and before the regular habits of work and discipline have had time to assert themselves.

There was still another recommendation for Tel-el-Kebir as the site of a military training camp. Around it the country was not wholly covered with a deep deposit of sand. There were extensive patches of firm ground where men could be marched and trained with a minimum of fatigue. These patches were covered in places with water-worn pebbles, which, if not an ideal terrain for training purposes, were at any rate much better than the deep, fatiguing sand stretches, with which many of the troops were already too

familiar. As the avoidance of unnecessary fatigue in military training is essential to the maintenance of interest and, therefore, to rapid progress, the advantages of the Tel-el-Kebir site in this connection were also considerable.


Despite, or perhaps because of, its situation in a partial desert, there was much that was picturesque in the camp at Tel-el-Kebir. It was a very large tented area. The 4th and 5th Australian Divisions were not the only formations stationed there at the time, and they alone must have numbered over 30,000 troops. It was one of the many canvas cities that were dotted over the world throughout the war, and its streets were numerous and precisely set out, its traffic controlled, its telephones and water supply systematically arranged, its sanitation and its policing carefully organised. While most of the accommodation was canvas, there were many large huts, constructed of light timber and matting, for the messes of officers and men. A section of the camp was allotted to certain authorised natives for trading purposes, and their picturesque booths, sparkling with the brilliant trinkets of the East, were a constant source of attraction to the Australian soldiers, and hundreds of parcels of silken material and coral ornaments were dispatched to Australia by every mail. Throughout the training hours, the old battlefield near the camp was dotted by innumerable groups of soldiers of all arms busy with their respective training. Occasionally, an artillery unit would be seen engaged in shell practice, and the men would watch from a respectful distance the wicked bursting of the shrapnel that most of them were now seeing for the first time. As the months of February and March are the end of the northern winter, the weather was generally pleasant while the Division was at Tel-el-Kebir. The middle of the day was warm, but the heat was invigorating and not usually excessive, and the nights were always cool and pleasant.

As the end of the day's training hours approached, the troops usually fell in and marched back to camp by battalions, or even by brigades, and the regimental bands, where they existed, would play the soldiers home. Then tea would be served in the mess huts, the evening shadows would lengthen, and the beauty of the twilight pass swiftly into darkness. Then hundreds of lights would twinkle through the night, the booths of the natives would flare with torches, and the men would wander through the lines, visiting and being visited, making new friendships and renewing old ones, or fling away in hundreds to some picture theatre or boxing match. It was here that the famous fight occurred between Sergt. Rowan, a noted Collingwood footballer, and Corporal Kavanagh, an old Geelong Collegian, who were both members of the 29th Battalion. It went the full twenty rounds and both contestants made the fight memorable equally by their pluck and by their chivalry. Poor Rowan was killed during the war, but the memory of his fight will

endure as long as the lives of those who witnessed it. Kavanagh was returned to Australia after rendering distinguished service.

Thus were spent the early days of the Division's history in and about the old battlefield of Tel-el-Kebir. General McCay had not yet arrived from Australia, and till the 21st of March temporary command of the Division fell to General Irving, and, later to General Smyth. The Divisional Staff also was as yet far from complete. Major-General Sir H. V. Cox (Indian Army) had been placed in command of the entire camp during the period of formation of the new Divisions, and it is probable that he was well satisfied with the progress that was made in the work of organisation and training. The new units settled down very quickly, and in a few weeks the 14th and 15th Infantry Brigades had made marked progress in their organisation and work. The artillery brigades, though formed at a somewhat later date and under less favourable circumstances, were also making promising progress, though their strength was not yet fully complete. During March, however, 400 men were transferred to artillery from each of the three infantry brigades, 150 reinforcements of the 1st Divisional Artillery came to hand, and some 800 volunteers arrived from the 5th and 6th Light Horse Regiments and were posted to the various units. These substantial additions to the nucleus already provided from the 1st Divisional Artillery brought the artillery strength in men to its full establishment. This done, the artillery brigades soon began to take shape and develop as fighting units. On the 15th of March Lieut.-Col. J. P. McGlenn, arrived at D.H.Q. and took up his duties as A.A. and Q.M.G. of the 5th Division. On the 21st the Divisional Commander Major-General the Hon. J. W. McCay landed at Suez, where he was met by Lieut.-Col. Wagstaff and conducted to the headquarters of his new command.

About the 20th of March the Division received instructions to take over a sector of the front line of the Suez Canal defences, and immediate steps were taken to arrange for the move from Tel-el-Kebir to the canal zone (Map, page 39). As the front line was to be taken over by one brigade on the 26th it was necessary to lose no time in completing preparations for the move. Accordingly, the 8th Brigade was ordered to move on the 23rd by train to Moascar, a distance of about thirty miles, and to march thence to Ferry Post on the Canal (about five miles), and from there to march to the front line (eight miles) where it would relieve the N.Z.M.R. on the 26th. The remaining two brigades of infantry were to be held in reserve at Ferry Post, and as there was no urgent haste for their move they were ordered to complete the entire journey to Ferry Post by march route. It was decided that they should move in three "flights," or successive parties, leaving Tel-el-Kebir on the 27th of March, 28th of March, and 1st of April respectively. Each flight was to spend three days on the march, the first day's stage taking it to



Mahsama, the second to Moascar, and the third to Ferry Post, where all would concentrate. An advanced party of the 8th Brigade was dispatched to Ferry Post on the 22nd, and all arrangements for the "take over" were put in train.

It was on the 22nd of March that H.R.H. the Prince of Wales rode through the camp at Tel-el-Kebir on a visit of inspection. He was accompanied by General Birdwood and a large suite of distinguished soldiers. Few of the Australian troops had yet seen the young Prince, and they lined the main thoroughfares of the camp in a curious and appreciative mood, anxious to see the distinguished subaltern who had volunteered like themselves to serve the Empire in the field. He sat his horse loosely, almost negligently, presenting a face a little tired, and reddened by contact with the Egyptian sun. The men cheered informally and enthusiastically as he passed by, and commented in friendly terms on the frank, boyish personality, the clear eye and healthy complexion, characteristic of the best type of young Englishman. On all sides, too, were heard comparisons between the heirs to the throne of England and that of Germany—the one carrying out rather well the duties of a subaltern in a regiment, interrupted only occasionally by ceremonial inspections such as this, and the other commanding rather badly, and particularly badly at that moment, a group of armies on the Western Front. It may be said here that the Prince was frequently seen again by the men of the Division about the battlefields of France and Flanders, and that the good impression was intensified by further acquaintance.

On the 23rd of March the 8th Brigade moved by train to Moascar and marched on to Ferry Post. Here the 32nd Battalion took over the garrison duties at Ferry Post itself, while the 29th, 30th, and 31st Battalions moved out to the front line defences, where, during the next few days, they completed the relief of the N.Z.M.R. By that time the 55th Battalion had relieved the 32nd in the Ferry Post garrison, and the latter had moved out and joined up with the remainder of the 8th Brigade.


The move of the rest of the Division from Tel-el-Kebir to Ferry Post is memorable for the distressing experience of the 14th Infantry Brigade flight, which consisted, in addition to the Infantry Brigade, of details of D.H.Q., Divisional Artillery, Signal Company, 8th Field Co. A.E., and the 8th Field Ambulance. The other two flights also found the march extremely trying, and it is questionable if the troops as a whole were quite ready for an undertaking of such a nature. The first day's march was from Tel-el-Kebir to Mahsama, a distance of about fourteen miles. To people unacquainted with the sands of Egypt it may appear incredible that even untrained Australian soldiers should find any difficulty in such a march, but all who have trudged through long stretches of heavy sand will realise that it was a big undertaking. In order to enjoy the full benefit of the cool hours



DIV. HD.QRS. ARTILLERY ENGINEERS M.G. BN. PNR. BN.




A.A.MC. DIV^{NS} TRAIN M. V. S. A. A. P.C. A.A.O.C.



BDE.HD.QRS. 29TH BN. 30TH BN. 31ST BN. 32ND BN.

8TH AUST. INFANTRY BDE.



BDE.HD.QRS 53RD BN 54TH BN. 55TH BN 56TH BN.

14TH AUST. INFANTRY BDE.



BDE.HD.QRS 57TH BN. 58TH BN. 59TH BN. 60TH BN

15TH AUST INFANTRY BDE.

COLOUR PATCHES

OF UNITS OF 5TH AUST. DIVISION

of early morning General Irving wisely provided for an early start. Reveillé was at 4.30 a.m., and the long column was under way by 7.30 a.m. The formation of the assembly was complicated by a very heavy fog, which not only made it extremely difficult to maintain direction, but also drenched the men's clothing and equipment, while their boots soon became soaked in the damp sand. Before many miles had been covered there were numerous stragglers and the 8th Field Ambulance at the rear of the column was busy collecting sufferers from sore feet, sickness, and exhaustion. A burning sun was now beating down upon the column, aggravating the men's distress and causing extreme thirst. Many water bottles were soon empty, although the necessity for the careful conservation of water had been emphasised in the Brigade order for the march. The water discipline seems to have been bad. At every halt it was found necessary to post picquets on the Sweet Water Canal, the water of which was unfit for human consumption. By the time Mahsama was reached at 3 p.m., most of the men were very much exhausted, and few of them felt equal to continuing the march on the following day. However, water and food supplies had been provided at Mahsama, and after tea the men settled down for the night and awoke much refreshed on the following morning. But a still more trying march of sixteen miles to Moascar awaited them and, unfortunately, the day turned out to be particularly hot. A start was made at 7 a.m. and, for an hour or two, the column swung along well on good going over comparatively firm ground. By 10.30 a.m. the good ground was left behind and the route, followed under directions received from Division, struck across heavy sand hills. These, in the rapidly growing heat, proved too much for the stamina of scores of the men. They literally dropped in their tracks, overcome with thirst and exhaustion. The officers and N.C.O.'s did all in their power to encourage them forward and, through the additional efforts thus imposed, some of them, too, were compelled to fall out. Moascar was now but a few miles distant and it was reached by those who had kept going at about three o'clock in the afternoon. Here news of the plight of the remainder reached General McCay. Water supplies were immediately requisitioned and sent out along the route, and the men, half dead with exhaustion or distracted by thirst, were gradually collected and restored. Here, too, the 5th Australian Division had its first notable experience of the splendid helpfulness and kindness of the N.Z. Forces. Some N.Z. units, hearing of the serious condition of the Brigade, immediately turned out to render all the assistance in their power, and busied themselves for hours in bringing water and other assistance to the sufferers. This splendid example of comradeship was characteristic of the New Zealanders right throughout the war. It did not matter where an Australian was in difficulties, whether thirsting in the desert, or freezing in the icy mud of the Somme, if a New Zealander

heard of it and could by any possible chance render assistance, the assistance always came, cheerfully and promptly.


In the rear of the long and stricken column the 8th Field Ambulance under Col. Shepherd had been working heroically to cope with the great numbers of those who had fallen by the wayside, and it is largely due to their efforts that most of the sufferers were soon afterwards fit again. Not only did the men receive all the medical attention available, but they were relieved as far as possible of the heavy packs which had contributed so much to their exhaustion. These were carried along in Ambulance wagons, until the owners were sufficiently recovered to take them again.

The march was undoubtedly an inauspicious beginning to the careers of the new units concerned in it. On behalf of the Brigade it may be stated that many of the troops were not yet physically fit, that a percentage of foot injuries, "B" Class men, worn-out boots, and recent inoculations, all contributed their quota to the great suffering that it undoubtedly experienced. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the two succeeding flights accomplished the march with considerably less distress, and were at all stages of it a fighting formation capable of immediate tactical employment. And further, it must be added that they undoubtedly benefited by the experience of the first flight.

An amusing anecdote was related at the time which illustrates the unflinching humour of the Australian even at his last gasp. It was said that the first man of the 14th Brigade to reach Moascar was hailed by a New Zealand sentry, who halted him and inquired "Who goes there?" The man dropped his pack on the ground and wearily stretched himself before replying. "I'm Burke and bleeding Wills" he answered.

On the 29th of March the 14th Brigade flight completed the last and easiest stage of the march, and arrived at the Ferry Post Camp about noon. On the 30th the 15th Brigade flight, under General Elliott, completed its second day's stage, arriving at Moascar in good order although suffering fairly severely. They had marched only in the morning and in the evening, resting throughout the hot hours of noon and the early afternoon. On the following day this flight proceeded also to the Ferry Post camp, where they settled down near the 14th Brigade. It was not until the 1st of April that the 3rd flight, consisting of the Pioneer Battalion and certain details under the command of Major Carter, left Tel-el-Kebir. They marched in the same stages to Ferry Post which they reached on the 3rd of April in satisfactory condition. The 14th Field Artillery Brigade travelled down by train on the same day, but the 13th, 15th, and 25th Artillery Brigades and the D.A.C. did not move until about a week later.

With the greater part of the Division now concentrated at Ferry Post, it will be advisable to give a brief description of that part of the Suez Canal, and the system of defences which had been arranged for



its protection. If you glance at the map (page 43) you will see on the west bank of the Canal the substantial town of Ismailia. It is here that the railway from Cairo and Tel-el-Kebir branches, one branch running south to Suez, another north, serving both Port Said and Alexandria. Ismailia itself is a picturesque town with charming gardens, broad, tree-lined streets, and, in the European quarter, many fine residences. The native quarter is considerably less wholesome, though it contains many attractive shops. Prior to the war the European population consisted largely of Canal Company officials and their families, as well as numerous prosperous business men engaged in shipping or commerce of various kinds. Apart from its position on the Canal, the town derives a high strategic value from its railway connections, while its water supply system also renders it an important asset in military operations. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that Ismailia was jealously guarded, and that the Turks were prepared to risk a great deal to take it. Something of this nature had already been tried in February, 1915, when a comparatively small enemy force crossed the desert and actually reached the Canal in the vicinity of Ismailia. The shot-riddled pontoons in which they had endeavoured to cross the Canal were still to be seen at Ismailia, and the graves of many of the attackers, with that of the German Major who had led them, were scattered along the Canal bank some little distance south. Both graves and pontoons constituted an eloquent warning of the enemy's ambition and the risks he was prepared to take for its attainment.

To relieve the pressure on the railway station at Ismailia, which had proved totally inadequate to meet the enormous demands now made upon it by military traffic, certain sidings had been constructed in the vicinity. One of these was at Moascar, which has already frequently been mentioned in connection with the march from Tel-el-Kebir to Ferry Post. Moascar was about three miles west of Ismailia, with which it was connected by a good road.

About a mile to the east of Ismailia lay the nearest part of the Suez Canal, and immediately across the Canal was the fort or work known as Ferry Post. (Map page 43.) Outside the fort, but particularly on its south and eastern sides, lay the large military camp known as Ferry Post Staging Camp, accommodating at that time perhaps 15,000 men. In the early days of the war, before the dispatch of large numbers of troops to Egypt had been possible, the Suez Canal had been guarded by a chain of strong points along its eastern bank. These posts varied in size and strength in accordance with the importance of the positions they guarded, and the one that lay just in front of Ismailia, Ferry Post, was naturally one of the strongest, easily providing for a garrison of a battalion. Most of the other posts were considerably smaller and were designed generally to accommodate a company or even a platoon. Between all these posts on the eastern bank of the Canal sentries patrolled at least once an hour

throughout the night, and, as an additional safeguard, a broad path was swept in the sand daily by camels, so that footprints could be seen if anyone had succeeded in eluding the night sentries and reaching the Canal. This would be done either to place mines in the water or to cross it for purposes of espionage. The early Canal defences were completed by the retention in it of a few small patrolling cruisers, of which the British "Venus" was a familiar sight to all soldiers employed in the vicinity of Ismailia. These boats provided a very mobile if small artillery support for the Canal defenders. The French boat "Requin," though stranded, was also part of the artillery defences. In addition to the boats, trenches well-sited and moderately well appointed had been constructed on the west bank of the Canal, enabling every part of it to be commanded by rifle fire.

But, by the time of the 5th Division's arrival in the Canal zone, the old method of defence had been to some extent superseded. This was due to the recognition of the fact that the enemy need not actually reach the Canal itself in order to achieve his main purpose, that is, to prevent its employment as a highway for shipping. If the Turks could succeed in establishing their artillery in the desert within four or five miles of the Canal that would be quite sufficient to cause its neutralisation as a waterway. Accordingly, it was decided to establish a strong "front line" some eight miles east of the Canal, sufficiently far away to keep it beyond the range of any artillery that could be employed effectively against it. This was carried out during 1915 and, by April, 1916, an almost continuous system of front line trenches had been constructed about eight miles east of the Canal and running roughly parallel to it. This system was wired. The Canal defences were also divided up into sections and sub-sections, and a Division was allotted to the defence of each sub-section.

When General McCay took over the 5th Divisional section he examined carefully the existing methods of holding the line and, in a thoughtful appreciation of the position, he informed II. A.N.Z.A.C. (to which Corps the 5th Division had been allotted) that he considered the system of continuous trenches protected by continuous wire a mistake. He explained that the operations of mobile units such as Light Horse and Artillery would be embarrassed by continuous wire and trenches, and recommended a modification of the system to a series of strong self-contained posts sufficiently close together to give mutual support, and the concentration behind them of a strong mobile reserve which could be employed at short notice wherever the line was threatened. As there would be a danger that one or more of the strong posts in the front line might be temporarily isolated by a heavy attack, it would be necessary to make them "self-contained," that is, stocked with sufficient reserves of food, water, and ammunition to enable the defenders to hold out until the mobile reserve could restore the position. For the suggested modification there were numerous other reasons which it is not necessary to discuss here. It

will suffice to say that it was approved and that the sector was held on the lines indicated by General McCay.

The front allotted to the Division was about eight miles in length, and it was all blank, hopeless desert. But, though a desert, it was far from featureless, and the features had been more or less appropriately named by the 2nd Australian Division, which had held the sector some little time previously. As there was no fighting on the line held by the Division, no detailed description of the terrain will be given. It will be sufficient merely to recall some well-known names with which the infantry and machine gun units, as well as the engineering and medical services, became familiar. Commencing from the north we find Gundagai, Mount Kembla, Duntroon Plateau, Australia Hill, Mount Katoomba, Broadmeadows, The Plateau, The Wallow, Brighton Beach, Round Hill, Club Foot, Soup Plate, The Sphinx, and Gazelle Heights. Reference to the map on page 43 will give some indication of the positions. Most of the places named were strong points manned by substantial garrisons and holding the necessary reserve supplies to make them self-contained for two or three days. They had the necessary trenches and wire protection as well as the machine gun positions, some of which were particularly well concealed and even provided with overhead cover. In and about these the men worked by day and watched and waited by night for the enemy who failed to come. Their greatest hardships were the limited supply of water, the daily increasing heat, and the dreadful Khamsin winds which raged from time to time. The word Khamsin means fifty, and the wind was so named because it is prevalent during about fifty days in April and May.

Except for numerous snakes and scorpions and the sacred scarab beetle, there was little animal life in the desert. Hares and gazelles were seen occasionally. The scorpions were of a robust and virile breed, but the snakes were extremely small, seldom attaining more than 12 inches in length. Despite this diminutive size, they uttered, when angered, an extraordinarily powerful hiss which would have done credit to the vocal apparatus of a fully grown boa constrictor. Although this tiny serpent was said to be the same species of asp which caused the death of Cleopatra, there is no record that any of the men who were bitten by it died from the effects. The Scarab beetle, which is held sacred by the natives as the symbol of life and its genesis, was not similarly venerated by the Australian soldiers. On the contrary, they employed it as the unconscious instrument of a mild gambling game. They would make a small ring of sand in which were left a few small openings or gates. Placing the beetle in the middle of the ring, they stood around and made bets on the opening through which the Scarab would crawl in making its escape.

To maintain large forces so far beyond the Canal considerable transport was necessary. To facilitate this, the Canal was bridged at Ferry Post in various ways. A large pontoon bridge crossed it, but

during the transit of ships it was often necessary to "swing" the pontoon for several hours at a time. Passage across the Canal for *personnel* and ordinary transport was then maintained by a commodious ferry which was worked by men who pulled it across by chains. Further, a few small ferry boats were maintained there for use when the party requiring to cross consisted of only a few individuals. From the landing on the Ferry Post side a road and a narrow gauge railway of the Decauville pattern had been constructed. These ran through the Ferry Post Staging Camp and passed beyond it some four or five miles out into the desert in the direction of the front line. From Roadhead or Railhead supplies for the front line were carried by horse or camel transport. A small-bore water-pipe also went out as far as Roadhead. Through this a sufficient but very limited supply of water reached the troops in the forward area. On one occasion a benevolent native, wandering idly along the water-pipe, discovered a tap which he obligingly turned, thereby stopping the flow of water for some hours and causing considerable inconvenience to the front line troops.

The Decauville railway was something of a mixed blessing. When the conditions were favourable it proved very helpful, but when a Khamsin arose, as one did about the 13th of April, and blew for days, the air was choked with clouds of whirling sand, and the whole surface of the desert was changed. Trenches were filled, the railway lines, especially in cuttings, completely covered, and in a night the eternal forces of the desert obliterated man's long efforts to make his mark upon it. On occasions such as these railway transport was impossible, and the war diary of the S.S.O., Lieut.-Col. McMorland, shows that on the 13th of April the railway engines became clogged with dust, and the line covered with sand, so that he had to procure 400 camels to transport supplies to the front line. The camel is the product of the desert and is, after all, the most reliable means of transport in all the humours of the desert.

The 8th Brigade Group held the forward line from the 26th of March till the 14th of April, when it was relieved by the 15th Brigade. The 15th Brigade was relieved by the 14th Brigade on the 14th of May, and it, in turn, was relieved on the 30th of May by the 160th Brigade, 53rd (British) Division. Each Brigade on its relief returned to Ferry Post Camp.

Although there was no actual fighting during this time the period was not without its alarms. On the 23rd of April the enemy surprised a force of Yeomanry at Katia, some miles north of the Divisional sector, and caused it considerable loss, while earlier in the month a successful little raid by mounted troops of the 4th Australian Division, in the sector on our right, had yielded a few prisoners. Aeroplanes in their daily reconnaissances brought back news of considerable enemy forces within striking distance of our front line. Late in April a Turkish aeroplane crossed General Elliott's line, and British

agents were continually reporting that a heavy enemy attack was contemplated against the 5th Division's front. As the hot season was now so far advanced that all desert manœuvres would soon be impossible, it was felt that if an attack was really intended it was certain to take place almost immediately. The most reliable information indicated that it would fall about the 12th of May. Accordingly, all precautions were taken to meet the threat. The 15th Infantry Brigade in the line was reinforced by the 54th and 56th Battalions on the 8th of May and additional supplies of water and ammunition were sent out to the forward positions. All ranks stood to arms between 3.30 and 4.30 a.m., and the Light Horse, daily patrolling well beyond the front line, redoubled their vigilance and activity. But nothing happened. The Division was to make its debut on a larger and more tragic stage.

Despite the absence of fighting, the instructive value of this period in the trenches was very great. Officers and men gained clear ideas of defensive positions and soon became familiar with the routine of trench life. The mechanism of reliefs, the nature of outpost duty, the local problems of food and water supply, were all studied, and the lessons learned were an invaluable introduction to the trench warfare of the Western Front.

About the middle of May several days of intense heat caused the men much distress and perhaps finally closed to the Turks all chances of attack until the next winter. It is impossible to state in what temperature the majority of the men lived and worked, but, in a cool tent of the E.P. pattern, the thermometer rose to 115°, 117°, and 118° on successive days. In an ordinary bell tent it must have been considerably higher, and in the sun itself it was almost unbearable. The inevitable effect of this was a sudden rise in the sick percentage and a corresponding activity on the part of all medical units. But a cool change did much to restore the position, and the health of the troops kept surprisingly good. This was largely due to the great attention paid by all the medical staff to proper sanitation. They worked hard against all sorts of difficulties, against flies, heat, natives, insufficient sanitary material, and what appears to be the prehistoric bias of the East against cleanliness. Of all these things flies were undoubtedly the worst, and a strenuous campaign was waged against them; their breeding places were scientifically treated and destroyed, and a campaign of fly hate was organised which must have accomplished a great deal towards their destruction. Doubtless there are still flies in Egypt; indeed, an European feels that the natives would be as unhappy without the flies as the flies would be without the natives. Nevertheless, the medical and sanitary services, indifferent to all congenital sympathies of flies and natives, by dint of much hard work preserved a high standard of health throughout the Division.

It should be mentioned here that the health of the animals of the Division was also carefully safeguarded and that Major Henry and his veterinary officers were kept particularly busy for some time in testing

for glanders, by subcutaneous injection, nearly 3,000 horses. Only one animal was found affected and it was destroyed.

During the Ferry Post period the Engineers were also kept very busy. In addition to the work of the front line defences, which required careful supervision, there was much to be done in improving and adding to the works about the Ferry Post garrison. This was done by the Engineers and by large infantry working parties under engineer direction, and on it many hundreds of men were employed daily. There was also the laying out of new camps, and the construction of mess and lecture-huts to be seen to, while the water supply services demanded constant attention. In this connection it may be noted that 3,000 yards of a 3-inch piping were laid in three days by one of the field companies. Any spare time was filled up in the gradual completion of the equipment of the field companies and in their training, both in musketry and in the technical branches of their work. The Signal Company found itself responsible for the maintenance of a very elaborate system of signal communications, and Capt. Stanley's unit contained many men as yet comparatively inexperienced in signal work. The Pioneer Battalion also was far from idle, one of its tasks being a three days' bivouac along the Decauville railway, from which it removed the sand and other debris of the Khamsin.

The Divisional Artillery, now almost completed in strength, but still very short of equipment and guns and animals, devoted itself almost entirely to matters of training and organisation. General Christian, after a careful reconnaissance of the front, formulated a plan of artillery action in case of attack. That done, he expedited by every possible means the training of his command, and frequent practices with live shell were held. The men threw themselves with ardour into artillery work, and Lieut.-Col. Caddy's Brigade, the 13th, was specially complimented by the Divisional Commander on its rapid improvement in general efficiency. An important modification in the artillery organisation was effected about this time. It will be recalled that on the formation of the 5th D.A. each brigade had a Brigade Ammunition Column of its own and, in addition, there was a small D.A.C. On the 9th of May brigade ammunition columns were abolished as such and joined up with the D.A.C. to make one large ammunition supply unit for the whole of the D.A. The advantages of this policy, especially in fighting like that in progress on the Western Front, are too obvious to require any enumeration.

About the same time it was decided that the Divisional Cyclist Company and the Divisional Mounted Troops should in future become Corps Troops instead of Divisional. So the 5th Divisional Cyclist Company and the 5th Divisional Squadron ("C" of the 13th Light Horse) soon afterwards passed beyond the borders of this little history and took their place as part of Corps Troops.

Apart from the defence of the sector the two most insistent demands made upon the Division were the need of the early completion of its

equipment, and the training of all arms in their respective functions. The work of equipping a Division is an exacting one, and for some weeks the burden lay very heavily on D.A.D.O.S. and his staff. Capt. Rodd's difficulties were many, but the main ones were the inability to get stores promptly from the Base, and the changing establishments of the units themselves. It was an era of change in military organisation. During May, the Mark III or "low velocity" rifles firing Mark VI ammunition were all exchanged for Mark IV "high velocity" weapons firing Mark VII ammunition. In addition to the many thousand rifles which had to be changed, over 3,000,000 rounds of Mark VI ammunition had to be replaced by Mark VII. Towards the end of May, however, ordnance supplies began to come through much more freely. Some Vickers and Lewis guns made their appearance, but artillery stores and wheeled transport of all descriptions were still difficult to obtain. Clothing, boots, and the more everyday items of Ordnance supply were much more satisfactory.

During April and May the training of all arms progressed apace. Even in the forward areas rifle ranges were constructed, while schools for officers, N.C.O.'s, and men sprang into being throughout the Divisional area and did much towards making the new units efficient. Perhaps the two reserve brigades at Ferry Post had greater opportunities for training than the one in the front line, although the work on the garrison defences made very large demands on their *personnel*.

Advantage was taken, too, of the opportunity to acquaint men with the new weapons with which the British Armies were now being equipped. Grenade Schools for training with the Mills Hand Grenade were in full swing, and Capt. Geddes (8th Brigade), Captain Ramsay (14th Brigade), and Lieut. Keen (15th Brigade) were in charge of busy bombing classes. During a bombing practice Cpl. Allen McKenzie, 31st Battalion, at considerable personal risk averted a bad accident, for which he was commended in Divisional Routine Orders shortly afterwards.

Demonstrations of the use of Vickers and Lewis guns were given about the same time, and the Stokes mortar was here first seen in action by our men in a highly successful demonstration given during April. The actual formation of a Light Trench Mortar Battery for each brigade was not yet commenced, owing doubtless to the lack of mortars in Egypt at the time.

Night operations were encouraged and many a man, who had hitherto thought himself possessed of sound bushman instincts for distance and direction, learned how little reliance could be placed on these when endeavouring to march to a point in the desert on a moderately dark night. The North Pole star was an object of very considerable attention on these occasions, and did not escape a good deal of hostile criticism for its alleged infirmities as a guide. Difficult as night operations always are, they were here exceptionally trying, and needless to say furnished a good many humorous incidents.

However, they afforded much practice in marching on compass bearings, practice that, under vastly different circumstances, was to prove of much service later on.

General McCay also took advantage of opportunities to exercise the Division in operations as a complete formation. On these occasions the two reserve infantry brigades at Ferry Post, the artillery, engineers, medical, and supply units, would march out in the dark and attack about dawn some position in the advanced zone held by a skeleton force provided by the front line brigade. These exercises did much to acquaint officers and men with their functions in battle, and to illustrate the necessity for the co-ordination of all arms in action. There were several such "Divisional Days" in the training, but the more usual practice was to leave the training of units to unit officers. In this way that intimate acquaintance between officers and men to which the Australian Forces owed so much of their efficiency was steadily generated.

Swimming in the Canal was always encouraged, and that waterway often presented a very animated appearance, especially in the vicinity of Ferry Post itself. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of sun-tanned figures could be seen splashing about, while long streams of traffic crossed the pontoon bridge, and on the large ferries the perishing men working on the chains looked enviously at their comrades in the water, or beguiled the tedium of their work by chanting weird and unprintable verses in imitation of the natives' hymns to Allah. Then, perhaps, the pontoon would be swung, the ferry service suspended, and the long procession of ships of all types would pass slowly by, ocean liners bearing their message from far away Australia, supply vessels, grimy colliers, swift little canal launches, or the picturesque native dahabeeyah returning from their day's fishing in the adjacent lakes. The men would swim out to the passing vessels and receive with delight the magazines and tins of tobacco that were tossed to them in the water. Altogether the days of work and training at Ferry Post were pleasant enough, despite flies and heat and dust, and the nights were passed in letter writing or conversation, mostly conjecture as to the next move of the Division, when it would take place, and whether it would be to France, Salonica, or Mesopotamia. The men, even at this early stage in the Division's history, were benefiting by the work of the Australian Comforts Fund and of the Y.M.C.A. Representatives of both organisations had already joined the Division, and the value of their work was widely appreciated.

A restricted scale of leave was in operation throughout the period. It usually took the form of a day's leave to visit Ismailia, where the shops and restaurants, and a handsomely appointed club for officers, provided a mild and welcome distraction from the routine of regimental life. The leave allotment to Cairo was naturally considerably smaller than that to Ismailia, but it was much more highly valued. Cairo seemed to evoke all the vast stores of exuberance with which

the Australian soldier is so happily endowed. Cavalcades of them could be seen clattering along the busy streets on little donkeys, the native owners panting behind, each belabouring his "Moses" with a stick and exhorting it to greater efforts. Cairo and its environs were full of interesting sights. The Pyramids, the Moussky, the Museum, the Mosques, boating on the Nile—these were but a few of the attractions, and the Australian soldier enjoyed them all. Here, as everywhere on his adventurous journeys, he conducted himself as a free and independent individual, following the dictates of his wishes, frank and friendly to high and low alike, and prodigal of his money as he was later with his blood. A distinguished commentator on Egyptian affairs has stated that nothing did more to maintain British prestige in Egypt during these critical times than the flow of Australian money, and the royal air of affable superiority which was assumed as naturally by the Australian private as it was accepted without question by the Egyptian natives. The subject of precedence was never debated, simply because it never arose.

There were few important changes in command during April and May, but Colonel Pope relieved General Irving at 14th Brigade Headquarters, while Major Smith became S.S.O. in succession to Lieut.-Col. McMorland. Lieut.-Col. Carey had already taken up his duties as C.R.E. The names of the C.O.'s of the period will be found in the order of battle of the Division dated 31st of May and inserted on the last page of this chapter.

Moving news of the great war came to hand from time to time. The fall of Kut about the end of April caused a good deal of disappointment, modified, however, by the feeling that things there would be settled up somehow or other later on. The swaying battle before Verdun excited more apprehension, and, inexperienced as most of the men were, they were already commencing to realise that the French armies were possessed of a tenacity second to none in the world. But all anxieties were soon immersed in the preoccupations of the moment. A soldier has little opportunity to indulge in reflections, sorrowful or otherwise. He lives in the present, and when he has time to project his thoughts elsewhere it is rather into the future than the past.

The celebration of the first anniversary of the landing on Gallipoli was observed on the 25th of April with fitting ceremony. A general holiday was given and sports and dinners were organised to celebrate the occasion. A kind donor provided a coloured ribbon for all those who had been on Gallipoli, with an extra ribbon for those who had been present at the landing itself.

On the 25th of May a review of the Division was held by the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, General Sir Archibald Murray. The whole Division except the 14th Brigade Group, which was then in the front line, was paraded in review order just east of the Ferry Post Camp. After the general salute the troops wheeled and marched past

the saluting base. The deep sand made marching difficult, but the review was a great success and the C.I.C. was reported to have been favourably impressed with what he saw.

By this time the Division had spent about two months on the Canal defences, and, as was previously mentioned, the hot weather now precluded much probability of an enemy attack in strength on the Canal. The impression too was gaining ground that the Division would soon be shipped to France. It was known that the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions had already arrived there, the 4th Division was reported to be on the way, and the training that the Division was now undergoing seemed to be especially directed to fitting it for the conditions of the Western Front. Much importance was attached to gas training, and officers received instruction in billeting troops in villages.

On the 30th of May the 14th Brigade Group was relieved in the front line by the 160th Brigade of the 53rd (British) Division. The 8th Infantry Brigade and a proportion of the other arms had, a few days earlier, moved back from Ferry Post to Moascar. The Artillery moved to the same place on the 31st and, during the first week in June, the 15th Brigade Group also assembled there. The 14th Brigade Group on its relief in the advanced zone did not, however, concentrate immediately at Moascar with the remainder of the Division, but remained at Ferry Post for the next couple of weeks, training and completing its equipment. The general concentration in the vicinity of the railway was accepted by all as a preliminary to a move overseas. Units if below strength were made up to their war establishment; if above strength, they returned their surplus of officers and men to the 5th Australian Divisional Base Dépôt, then at Tel-el-Kebir. Meantime Ordnance was straining every nerve to make the equipment and stores of the Division as complete as possible.

On the 5th of June a representative of every unit accompanied by a number of Staff officers under the direction of Major D. M. King, G.S.O. II left the Division as an advanced party to prepare the way for its move to France. The advanced party travelled by train to Alexandria, and there embarked immediately on the "Oriana" and reached Marseilles on the 12th of June. Here they set about making all arrangements for the disembarkation of the Division, and its entrainment for its long journey to the extreme north of France.

As the remainder of the Division did not leave Egypt before the middle of June the first fortnight of that month gave it a welcome opportunity of getting everything in order for its departure. The efforts of D.A.D.O.S. to complete its equipment met with considerably more success about this time, due, apparently, to better transport facilities between England and Egypt. When it finally left Egypt the Division was moderately well equipped in most respects, while

in clothing, boots, rifles, and the more essential articles it was practically complete.

The fortnight spent at Moascar preparatory to entraining for Alexandria was not without incident. The 3rd of June, the King's Birthday, was celebrated in various ways, many of the officers' messes giving dinners in honour of the occasion. A tragic note was struck a week or so later when news of the death by drowning of Lord Kitchener reached the Division. Memorial services in honour of the great soldier were held on the 13th of June, and officers were ordered to wear crêpe bands on the left arm. It seemed particularly fitting that the dead Field-Marshal should be thus honoured in the land of his greatest achievements by the soldiers of the young Commonwealth, the early military organisation of which had benefited by his influence and personal supervision. His death was sincerely mourned throughout the Division. His was the supreme military figure in the British Empire at the time of his death, and the eyes of the nation were focussed on him, seeking for guidance, and all were prepared to follow wherever he led. Like Hindenburg in Germany, he was the military idol of the nation, and this, apart altogether from his undoubted military genius, made him unique and his loss irreparable. But his spirit lived on in the great armies he had created, and accompanied them as they marched imperturbably on to victory.

During this period the Division was also preoccupied by a series of sports meetings, which culminated on June 14th in a grand Divisional contest that occasioned keen rivalry between the competing units. To avoid the great heat of midday, the sports commenced at 6 a.m. and were completed shortly after 9 a.m. After a close contest with the 8th Brigade Group, the 15th Brigade won the cup for the best aggregate of points. The Artillery came third. In justice to the 14th Infantry Brigade, it must be pointed out that, as it was still at Ferry Post, its representatives had to travel over five miles to reach the sports ground, and this doubtless contributed to their low scoring.

Hard upon the Divisional Sports came the long awaited move. Entrainment was ordered to take place at Moascar siding and detrainment at the wharves of Alexandria, a journey of about 150 miles, which, in the trains provided, took about eight hours. The entrainment began in earnest on the 15th of June, and as the Moascar Camp emptied, the 14th Brigade moved back to it from Ferry Post. The move of the Division to Alexandria was completed within a week, and such was the organisation at the port that units in most cases stepped off the train and on to the boat within an hour or two. The very fine transport arrangements which characterised this move reflected with equal credit both on the staff work of the Lines of Communication authorities and also on the interior organisation of the Division. It resulted in an extremely prompt embarkation and, as no leave could be given to visit the city itself, Alexandria remained but a name to most of the men who passed through it. They learned

nothing of the great soldier who had founded it so many centuries ago, of the gallant Abercrombie, who there had yielded his life in his country's service, or of its dramatic bombardment by the British fleet in 1881 which administered the first severe check to the turbulent Arabi Pasha.

The men went aboard wearing khaki drill suits and carrying in their black kit-bags a change of underclothing and a warm serge uniform. Towards the end of the voyage the men changed their underclothing and got into their new uniforms, while the soiled garments and the khaki drill suits were placed in the kit-bags and left on the ship for return to Egypt. Owing to the varying quantity and nature of the accommodation, it was not practicable to embark every unit complete on a ship, although this was done as far as possible. The transport units and sections were particularly affected owing to the necessity of providing the required horse accommodation for them. Practically the whole Division was shipped between the 16th and 23rd of June, and the boats sailed in the following order:—"Tunisian," "Hororata," "Rhesus," 17th; "Manitou," "Transylvania," "Kalvan," "Knight Templar," 18th; "Georgia," 19th; "Canada," 20th; "Invernia," "Huntsend," "Caledonia," "Royal George," "Kinfauns Castle," 22nd.

The voyage through the Mediterranean was one of the most grateful interludes in the history of the Division. To men wearied with the heat and toil of Egypt, whose feet were sore from tramping through the sand, whose eyes were strained by the glaring reflections of the desert, the rest and charm of the voyage were indescribable. Most of the vessels experienced ideal weather conditions, and the "winedark waters," with their dreaming islands, all redolent of history, or rich in the fascination of classical tradition, slipped rapidly behind in a week's welcome rest. The diet on board ship was a welcome variation from the army routine. Parade and lecture hours were short, though gas drill was steadily practised. In addition, practice fire alarms and submarine alarms were given until all ranks were acquainted with their stations and duties should a real alarm be sounded. Many of the men were rather looking forward to seeing an enemy submarine and some even to being torpedoed. They contemplated with equanimity the possibility of spending an hour or two in the mild waters of the Mediterranean until they could be picked up, and there was more than an undercurrent of regret that nothing of the kind transpired. One of the vessels, the "Kalyan," did experience a little excitement, and it was reported that a torpedo had passed fifty yards astern of her.

It is impossible to give the exact course that the transports followed between Alexandria and Marseilles. Few of them appeared to have kept precisely the same route, and probably none of them steered the usual course. Some of them passed just north of Crete, while some did not sight that island at all; some put in at Malta,


but many did not ; some reported that they had passed very close to Corsica and Sardinia. All were escorted during the greater part of the voyage by destroyer escorts of the Royal Navy, and the work of these little terriers of the ocean elicited the warmest admiration from the soldiers. They were indefatigable. Racing hither and thither, now darting ahead and now swinging off to the flank, they investigated this or that suspicious circumstance ; they were the incarnation of vigilance and aggressiveness. " Gee," exclaimed an admiring gunner, " Look at that little water pup ! She'd butt into a bull-fight if she could."

Eager eyes were strained in the direction of land when it was known that Marseilles was close at hand, and the men hailed with many exclamations of delight the first glimpse of that prosperous city, with a background of green hills and fertility to which they had so long been strangers. The huge and strident advertisement of a well-known British whisky, with which the harbour of Marseilles was disfigured, was greeted with general approval as indicating at least a return to civilisation. As the ships passed up the harbour with its rocky islands and precipitous cliffs, each point of interest was closely scanned and eagerly discussed. The Chateau d'If, famous in Dumas's romance, " The Count of Monte Cristo," and later as the prison of Mirabeau, evoked special interest.

The celerity that had characterised the detraining and embarkation at Alexandria was happily preserved in the disembarkation and entraining at Marseilles. The work of the advanced party was evidenced in the excellent arrangements which existed for the transfer of the troops from boat to train. The party had been divided into two groups, A.M.L.O.'s to supervise the disembarkation and to provide guides to lead the troops to the entraining point ; and R.T.O.'s to supervise the entraining at the station. Accordingly, everything proceeded smoothly and the men were soon settled in their carriages. Over thirty trains, each of great length, were required for the transportation of the Division, and four days' supplies were placed on each train. Five hundred and thirty-four miles to the north-west lay Paris and about 150 miles further to the north, by the route to be followed, lay the important railway junction of Hazebrouck. In an area to the west of this the Division was to be billeted, about twenty miles distant from the Armentières sector of the front line.

The process of disembarkation and entrainment, which commenced about the 23rd of June, continued steadily till the 30th, by which date practically the whole Division had left Marseilles. It was a happy augury for the Division's future reputation in France that the change from boat to train was completed so rapidly and with such exemplary conduct by all ranks. This the Lines of Communication authorities were not slow to recognise, and they furnished to the Divisional Commander a warm tribute of their admiration.

If the novelty and beauty of the passage across the Mediterranean had delighted the men they were but a small thing in comparison with the enchantment of the fairy land through which they now travelled. There may be more beautiful places in the world than the south of France in June, but few of the 5th Australian Division had seen them, or will see them. And after so many months of the Egyptian desert, or the barren horror of the Gallipoli Peninsula, the revelation was the



SKETCH SHOWING (i). RAILWAY JOURNEY FROM MARSEILLES TO HAZE BROUCK
(ii). APPROXIMATE FRONT LINE AT END OF JUNE 1916. -----

more startling, the charm the more potent. The beauty of the countryside went to the men's heads as its wine would have done. Thrilled and intoxicated by it, they crowded round the windows, laughing, cheering, and admiring, their spirits on the very crest of a wave of exuberance.

For many miles the route lay along the valley of the stately Rhone, which there flows through a countryside of extraordinary fertility, a garden of wonderful opulence. Near by were golden fields in which the peasants were already busy with scythe and sickle. They would

pause in their work as the cheering troop trains drew near and wave glad greetings to the tempestuous salutations which volleyed from every window; or, perhaps, some girl would detach herself from a group sitting at lunch, and, rising in true French courtesy, would toast the passing soldiers in a glass of wine, the red of which glowed richly against the mellow gold of the fields behind, while her dark eyes shone and her face lit up with her welcome to the men who were hastening to the deliverance of France. The valley was dotted with farms, each of which in robes of creepers and grape vines was a bower of beauty, while, on the "castled crags" of the more distant heights, stately chateaux stood sentinel, the white of their gates and columns gleaming amid the parks of trees around them. For a short time, too, if one looked out to the east, one caught the glimpse of some far away mountain crest, an outpost peak perhaps of the mighty chain of Alps that lay in that direction.

But if the welcome of the peasants in the fields was cordial, it had not, and could not have, the concerted enthusiasm that marked the greetings of the populous towns. In these, every door, and every window, and every place that afforded a view of the passing trains was packed with cheering parties, waving flags and handkerchiefs, or shouting "Vive l'Australie" and other appropriate greetings. As for the troops, they did everything in their power to express their acknowledgments in whatever way they deemed most suitable. They sang the "Marseillaise" and their regimental anthems; they waved and cheered, and applauded the French and themselves with equal enthusiasm. In heroic but futile attempts to make themselves understood, they roared out greetings in pigeon English or atrocious Arabic. A hundred times they sang "Australia will be there" with such impressiveness that it was soon afterwards noted by the leading French papers, which translated it for the benefit of their readers under the proud title, "Australie Sera Là." It is extraordinary how a wretched melody set to an atrocious jingle of words will at times capture the heart of an entire continent, so that even intelligent people thrill to it, or, rather, to its associations.

And so the Division made its first journey through beautiful, tragic France. On the second day, Paris was passed to the east and all eyes were turned in its direction. Little could be seen except the top of the Eiffel Tower, yet the magnetism of the city seemed to fall upon all, and one was reminded somehow of the dramatic invocation in Charpentier's opera, "Louise." The line wound through charming suburbs in the vicinity of Versailles, but it soon headed north again and Paris was left behind.

The stations known as "haltes repas" were often the scenes of animated incidents. At one, a courtly French colonel, assisted by a group of charming girls, entertained the officers at luncheon, and, after an eloquent speech, which nobody comprehended but everybody applauded, kissed on both cheeks the astonished Australian

colonel who stood beside him. At another "halte repas" a large number of French residents collected outside the railway yard, which was there surrounded by a high fence. As the civilians included a large proportion of pretty girls it was not long before many of the soldiers were in close conversation with them, and many a kiss was exchanged without visible detriment to either party, or, in most cases, to the fence between them. These tender salutations were not infrequently accompanied by a gift to the lady of a tin of bully-beef, an article not ordinarily used as a medium of sentimental expression.

As the miles were left behind the appearance of the country gradually changed. Though still rich and pleasant to the eye, the vegetation lacked something of the exuberance that it had possessed further south. The temperature was distinctly lower and the skies looked rainy. Thus Amiens was passed, and Abbeville, and the trains proceeded on their long journey up the coast, through Étapes, Boulogne, and Calais. Near the last named town the direction changed suddenly from north to a little south of east, and in another thirty miles the new divisional area was reached. All the units of the Division did not detrain at the same place. The 8th Brigade Group went to Morbecque, the 14th Brigade to Thiennes, the 15th Brigade to Steenbecque while the 5th Pioneers and the Divisional Artillery were quartered at Lynde. The units were led by guides to their billeting areas and here for a time we will leave them, wandering around with much curiosity, and endeavouring to ascertain, and to adapt themselves to, the nature of their new environment. They settled down very quickly, thanks largely to the fine billeting arrangements made under the direction of Major Varwell, the D.A.A. and Q.M.G., and of Licut. M. Mauss, the officer in charge of the French Mission, who had joined the advance party a few days before.

One important variation must not be overlooked. It will be remembered that the transport units as well as the artillery left Egypt considerably deficient in vehicles, animals, guns, and other equipment. To remedy this, all transport units except the artillery detrained at Abbeville, where their shortages were completed almost immediately. That accomplished, they proceeded by road to their units, a distance of thirty or forty miles. As Artillery Supply Base was at Havre, it was necessary to send the artillery there to complete its establishment, and it too on completion proceeded by rail to Erzinghem and thence by road to Lynde.

Divisional Headquarters opened at Blaringhem on the 25th of June, and three days later General Plumer, who commanded the Second Army, to which the II Anzac Corps was allotted, visited General McCay at his headquarters. Artillery headquarters did not open at Lynde till early in July. The 8th Brigade reached Morbecque on the 26th of June, the 14th Brigade arrived at Thiennes on the 30th, and the 15th Brigade at Steenbecque on the 27th. Like the Artillery, the Divisional Train did not reach the new area till early in July,

but the Pioneers arrived at Lynde on the 28th of June. The engineering and medical services reached the area of their affiliated brigades at about the same time as the remainder of the brigade units.

ORDER OF BATTLE, MAY 31ST, 1916.

G.O.C. Major-General the Right Honourable J. W. McCAY, C.B., V.D.

G.S.O. i. Lieut.-Col. C. M. WAGSTAFF, A.A. and Q.M.G., Lieut.-Col. J. P. C.I.E., D.S.O. McGLINN, V.D.
 G.S.O. ii. Major D. M. KING. D.A.A. and Q.M.G., Major R. P. VARWELL.
 G.S.O. iii. Capt. BOASE. D.A.Q.M.G., Capt. G. D. SMITH.

Infantry Brigades

8th A.I. Bde., Gen. Tivey, D.S.O.	14th A.I. Bde., Lt.-Col. Pope, C.B.
29th Bn., Lt.-Col. Bennett.	53rd Bn., Lt.-Col. Norris.
30th Bn., Lt.-Col. Clarke.	54th Bn., Lt.-Col. Cass, C.M.G.
31st Bn., Lt.-Col. Toll.	55th Bn., Lt.-Col. McConaghy, C.M.G.
32nd Bn., Lt.-Col. Coghill.	56th Bn., Lt.-Col. Scott, D.S.O.
8th M.G.Coy., Capt. R. Marsden.	14th M.G.Coy., Lt. Spier.
	15th Bde., Gen. Elliott.
	57th Bn., Lt.-Col. Stewart.
	58th Bn., Lt.-Col. Davies.
	59th Bn., Lt. Col. Harris.
	60th Bn., Lt.-Col. Field.
	15th M.G.Coy., Lt. Neale.

Artillery : Gen. Christian, C.M.G.

13th A.F.A. Bde., Major Caddy.	15th A.F.A. Bde., Lt.-Col. Lucas.
14th A.F.A. Bde., Lt.-Col. Phillips.	25th How. Bde., Lt.-Col. Cox-Taylor.
	5th D.A.C., Capt. McClean.

Engineers : C.R.E., Lt.-Col. Carey.

8th Fd. Coy., Major Sturdee.	15th Fd. Coy., Major Greenway.
14th Fd. Coy., Major Bachtold.	5th Div. Signal Coy., Capt. Stanley.

Other Services

C. Sqd. 13th A.L.H.	. Major Hutchings.
5th Pioneer Bn.	. Major Carter.
5th Div. Train	. Lieut.-Col. Francis.
A.D.M.S.	. Col. Hardy.
D.A.D.M.S.	. Major Follitt.
8th Fd. Amb.	. Col. Shepherd.
14th Fd. Amb.	. Lieut.-Col. Tebbutt.
15th Fd. Amb.	. Lieut.-Col. Horne.
5th Div. San. Sect.	. Capt. Mattei.
D.A.D.O.S.	. Capt. Rodd.
A.D.V.S.	. Major Henry.
5th M.V.S.	. Capt. Walters.

PART II
THE NORTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER IV

(July 1st to July 15th, 1916.)

FROM BILLETS TO FRONT LINE

Important contemporaneous events :

Somme offensive opened July 1st.
Russian offensive under Brusiloff in progress.

THE Egyptian period of the Division's history had proved in effect to be little more than a full dress rehearsal of its part in the great world drama. There, it had donned its accoutrements, learned a good deal of its stage department, and breathed something of the atmosphere, fateful but fascinating, that invests the war stage proper. But, from the moment of its detrainment in the Blaringhem area it may be said to have stepped out from the wings into the full glare of the footlights of war; before it, it vaguely felt the world-wide audience of humanity, watching with drawn, tense features the issue of the play; and, on the stage itself, it gradually became conscious of other figures and of other faces, of sudden movements hither and thither, of fierce, sanguinary struggles, of rival forces each superbly organised, meeting and clashing in a long line of fire and carnage, above which hovered unceasingly the angels of Destruction and of Death.

Now, while it is our main business to follow the part played by the 5th Australian Division, it is clear that this cannot be done intelligently if we are ignorant of the general trend of events on the whole of the stage. Let us commence, therefore, with a concise review of the situation as it was at that time, showing how matters stood and the grouping of the principal characters of the drama.

On the 30th of June, 1916, the Western Front extended from the vicinity of Nieuport on the Belgian coast to the point where the boundaries of France, Germany, and Switzerland meet. As the crow flies, this distance is less than 300 miles, and the direction is almost exactly north-west and south-east. But the firing line did not run directly from one point to the other. It had in it many twistings and turnings, due to tactical considerations, and these convolutions brought the entire length of the front to over 400

miles. The effect of the first rush for Paris in 1914 was still evident in the chief bulge in the present line, a huge protuberance in the northern half, projecting some fifty or sixty miles in advance of the direct north-west and south-east line. The effect of this bulge was to cause the northern sector of the line, say from Nieuport to Lassigny, to run almost due north and south; while the central sector, in front of Lassigny, Soissons, Rheims, and Verdun, lay almost east and west. The trend of the most southerly sector, from Verdun to the Swiss border, was approximately north-west and south-east.


Of the 400 odd miles of fighting front about one-fourth was held by the British Armies then operating in France and Belgium. The 100 miles held by the British constituted the extreme north part of the Western Front, and the most northerly 35 miles, from Nieuport to the vicinity of Armentières, lay across Belgian territory. A few miles of this sector were occupied by the indomitable little Belgian Army, which, throughout the war, maintained a strength of about half a dozen divisions. The remaining 300 miles of the Western Front, that is, from the vicinity of Albert to the Swiss border, were held by the French, and the fact should never be overlooked that throughout the war the French Army sustained a much greater share of the responsibility of the Western Front than did the forces on it of all the other allies combined. But this responsibility was not proportionate to the mileage. For it should also be pointed out that for 120 miles of its southern extremity the line lay very near the border between France and its old provinces, Lorraine and Alsace. On the northern half of this sector the line was in French territory, while on the southern sixty miles it lay through what was then the German province, Alsace. For obvious reasons, strategical as well as political, no very significant operations were undertaken by either side on the southern Lorraine or the Alsace sector. Reference to the map on p. 57 will afford the reader a clear idea of the main features of the front as it existed on the 30th of June, 1916.

Interesting as the subject is, it is hardly possible in a work of this nature to discuss the German method of holding the line on the Western Front. It will be enough to say that throughout the war the composite allied forces containing French, Belgian, British, Portuguese, and American armies, with other less significant elements, were opposed almost entirely by German troops. The burden of such an undertaking on the part of the German nation may be better imagined than described, particularly when her preoccupations in Russia and the Balkans are borne in mind.

The entire British front was divided into sectors, to each of which an army was allotted. It must not be imagined that the division into army sectors existed only on and in the vicinity of the front line. On the contrary, it extended far to the rear. The

conditions of modern war are so exacting that troops cannot be kept indefinitely in an advanced zone, and it is necessary to provide them with frequent short rests from front line work, as well as occasional long reliefs, as far as is practicable, from all sounds and suggestions of war. Accordingly, an army organisation had to provide areas where troops could enjoy short rests in close reserve, as well as other more remote places, perhaps 50 miles away from the fighting, to which they could be withdrawn for a longer period of physical and nervous recuperation. How this was secured will be readily understood by reference to the following diagram.

Suppose the army consisted of three corps, X, Y, and Z, and



PLAN SHOWING HOW TROOPS OF AN ARMY IN THE LINE MAY BE DISPOSED FOR PERIODICAL RELIEFS.

each corps of four divisions. The army commander might decide to hold his front with two corps, X and Y. Z corps is withdrawn 50 miles away to the rear to comfortable billets for a prolonged rest of perhaps two months. The army front is then divided between X and Y corps. The commander of X corps, containing 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions, decides to rest his 4th division for a month in the corps reserve area, and to hold the corps front with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd divisions. The 4th division is withdrawn, say 15 miles, and held in readiness there for a month, during which time it enjoys a considerable degree of rest and relief from nervous tension.

Meantime, the commander of the 1st division, containing *A*, *B*, and *C* brigades, decides that he will rest a brigade in divisional reserve for 10 days out of every 30. Accordingly, he holds his front with *A* and *B* brigades for 10 days, while *C* rests five miles in rear as divisional reserve. At the end of 10 days *C* relieves *B* in the line, and *B* rests as divisional reserve till its turn comes to relieve *A*. Similarly, brigade commanders relieve their battalions regularly, distributing them throughout the front, support, and reserve line trenches, in a regular routine as far as circumstances will permit.

As a similar procedure is followed throughout all the other divisions in *X* corps and throughout *Y* corps, the reader will see that normally only a small proportion of an Army's infantry is employed in the front line on any given day.

As the term was used during the war, an Army Area was thus a moderately wide and a very deep zone of country, through which its troops were constantly circulating as they passed and repassed to places of rest and of fighting. And much care was taken to ensure that the burdens of war were shared equally by all, although, in an army, as elsewhere, it invariably happened that the greatest part was borne eventually by the best workers. And this was particularly the case in critical periods of intense strain.

With this brief and entirely hypothetical sketch of an Army's organisation for reliefs we may turn again to the narrative of the Division. 2nd A.N.Z.A.C. had been allotted to the Second Army, commanded by General Sir H. Plumer, and the area now occupied by the 5th Division was part of that Army's reserve zone. It was situated in the department of Nord, one of the large provinces into which France is divided for administrative purposes. Heaven knows that this pleasant countryside had seen enough history in its troublous past without Australians coming from the ends of the earth to make more. Before the Christian era the Morini and the Atrebates had there discovered what it meant to clash swords with Cæsar and his conquering legions. Later, the seductive voice of Christianity had stolen through its forests, and had won the hearts of its simple peoples who little dreamed that the new faith would witness in the twentieth century lust more foul, and savagery more wanton, than the most hideous barbarian of their age could have devised. In the fifth century it had bowed to Clovis and his Frankish followers; later it had responded to the romantic call of the Crusades; it had groaned beneath the exactions of the contending Powers in the long struggle with England in the fourteenth century; the Renaissance had illumined it with its own starry light; but its later history was mostly of wars and bloodshed. Henry II. of France and Philip II. of Spain; Marlborough and Prince Eugene and Louis XIV.; Austrians in Lille in 1792, Napoleonic convulsions a century ago, Von Bismarck in 1870 and Von Kluck in 1914! And now here were Australians, thousands of them, a bronzed,

cheerful, devil-may-care race, come 10,000 miles to die if need be in its defence. Truly a pageant of history !

The Blaringhem area was in many respects an ideal one for the accommodation and training of reserve troops. Blaringhem itself was a pretty little village, in the modern red-brick chateau of which General McCay's headquarters found suitable housing. West of the township lay the canal of Neuf Fosse, which, a few miles to the south, connected near Aire with the more famous Lys Canal. A beautiful towpath ran along the canal bank from Blaringhem to Aire, and heavy barges, laden with all kinds of military and civilian stores, and drawn by horses or, sometimes, by men and women, passed constantly to and fro. The canal offered fine facilities for swimming and the men were not slow to avail themselves of them, although the weather was not yet sufficiently warm to make this pastime universally popular. The 14th Infantry Brigade at Thiennes was nearer to the Lys Canal, but the 8th Brigade at Morbecque, the 15th at Steenbeeque, and the Artillery and Pioneers near Lynde were not equally fortunate. Nevertheless, all ranks of the Division soon became as familiar with French and Belgian canals as they were with those of Egypt, and it will be surprising if their lively appreciation of their industrial value will not in due course have its effect in the undeveloped possibilities of water communication in Australia.

The Divisional area was almost entirely an agricultural one, and the men were consequently in familiar surroundings. They were as much amazed at the apparently primitive methods of cultivation as they were at the surprisingly good results achieved ; but French agricultural methods, with their system of intense culture, their careful fertilisation of the soil, and their systematic rotation of crops, are much more scientific than they appear at first to a casual observer. If the reaper and binder has not displaced the sickle, it is because the holdings are so small that the changes are unnecessary and profitless. As time went on and the agricultural methods became better understood, the early contemptuous comments were less often heard, and it is probable that a great deal of valuable information was eventually gained by those who inquired more deeply into the subject.

One astonishing feature of the district was the almost entire absence of fences between holdings. This could be practicable only in a community where very little grazing of animals took place. There were relatively few cattle in the area, and sheep were even fewer. The Frenchman is not a great meat-eater, and perhaps the pen of rabbits in the barn-yard of most houses, supplementing the ample poultry supply, sufficed for the ordinary requirements of the family. Pigs were fairly numerous. They were mostly white in colour and were endowed with extraordinarily large ears, which hung inconveniently over their eyes, making it almost impossible

for them to see. Perhaps they could hear so well that it did not matter, but one felt rather sorry for them. One aspect of the local farm methods was happily novel to Australians. At any farm where butter was made a huge wheel, constructed as a hollow framework, was generally to be seen outside the house. The axis of this wheel passed through the wall and worked a churn inside. The power on which the apparatus depended for its employment was usually provided by a huge dog of forbidding demeanour and obscure pedigree. He was kept religiously chained when not required for work and consequently was always in the mood for a good run. This he would get when the family decided to make butter. They would unchain the animal and put him in the framework of the wheel which was too closely constructed to permit of his escape and too narrow to allow him to turn round. As soon as he moved forward the wheel revolved and the harder he galloped the faster the wheel went round and the quicker the butter was made. Every half hour or so somebody would give him a drink of water and he would canter with gradually diminishing enthusiasm until the work was finished. Perhaps the dog enjoyed it, but he generally conveyed to the sympathetic Australian eye that he regarded it as an unkind perversion of his natural instinct for happy exercise. A somewhat similar device by which a draught horse worked a treadmill was also frequently seen. The power thus generated was employed to actuate a chaff-cutter or a thrashing machine.

The farm buildings themselves were generally constructed in the form of a rough square enclosing a courtyard. Possibly this was a reminiscence of mediæval architecture when substantial buildings were thus designed to afford defences against unprincipled neighbours. The cattle and other stock could be driven in, the stout gates barricaded, and a tolerable resistance offered to marauders. But in the twentieth century this design of farm buildings retained all the inconvenience that it necessarily entailed without conferring the benefits which once made it endurable, for the stables and fowl houses were either attached to the residence or unpleasantly near to it, while the pond in the centre of the courtyard, originally constructed to supply the animals with water, had now degenerated into a filthy morass of water and manure where the pigs browsed among the house and stable refuse in placid enjoyment of their congenial surroundings. The inconvenience of the close proximity of animals to the dwelling-house was accentuated by the fact that the winter in France is so cold that cows and horses have to be stabled indoors continuously for several months. The men were astonished that people, admittedly so clean as the French, should be able to live healthily in such places, but the explanation probably lay in the fact that the colder climate of France is not so favourable to the production and virility of disease germs as is the Australian. Thus the conditions were dirty without being acutely insanitary.

It must also be borne in mind that all the Frenchmen of military age had long since been called to the colours and the farms had, in consequence, suffered much neglect.

If the exterior of the farm-house was thus frankly uninviting, no word of criticism could be spoken against the interior. Here all the fastidious instinct of cleanliness of which the French woman is possessed was at once evident. The tiled floors were scrubbed daily and the stoves and other metal furnishings were polished until they shone. The bed-frames were almost always constructed of wood and the mattresses were extraordinarily comfortable. "It is like sleeping in a cloud," remarked one officer enthusiastically. The house decorations reflected the tendency of the French peasants to somewhat florid and glittering ornament. Colour was a passion with them, and its arrangement was not usually in accordance with Australian tastes. Gilt was always much in evidence. Good engravings were frequently seen, but one felt somehow that this was due rather to fortuitous circumstances than to the dictates of the owner's tastes. It was largely in houses of this nature that the Division spent the first ten days of July, 1916. The officers were billeted in rooms in the dwelling-houses, for each of which, by international arrangement, a scale of payment of about a franc (9d.) a day was provided. This was paid by the military authorities and not from the private purse of the officer. Junior officers were lucky if they got beds, but they unrolled their valises and slept very comfortably on the floors. Indeed, there was not sufficient billeting accommodation in the area for all ranks of the Division, and several units were allotted camps of tents or huts which had been erected to supplement the civilian accommodation. The men were given billets in barns and other outbuildings. In these their comfort varied greatly. Sometimes they would find themselves in clean, warm, dry buildings where they lacked nothing that a soldier on service could reasonably expect. At other times they were less fortunate. In these cases all the latent resource of Australians was called forth and it was surprising how soon they would convert an apparently hopeless billet into a moderately comfortable one.

The distribution of units to billets often involved their dispersion over a comparatively wide area. The immediate effect of this was the development of a greater sense of responsibility among subordinate officers and N.C.O.'s. Hitherto platoons and sections had generally been under the immediate supervision of battalion headquarters, or its equivalent in other arms, and always under the vigilant eye of the company commander. But now units were considerably broken. The platoon officer with a couple of his sections was probably at one farm-house while the remainder of his little command, under the platoon sergeant, might be half a mile away at another farm. The company-commander was perhaps a mile away and battalion headquarters farther still. These

conditions naturally did much to foster the sense of responsibility in good officers and N.C.O.'s, and the men themselves were also affected by them.

Nothing could have caused General McCay greater satisfaction than the cordial relations which soon developed between the troops and the French civilians. The men were always intelligent observers of the farming activities by which they were surrounded, and not infrequently they were ready helpers at work in the fields—especially when a charming girl seemed to be in difficulties. But it was not merely an accidental community of interest in agriculture which led to this happy mutual regard. The cause lay deeper, and it is hard to specify exactly what it was. It was a temperamental matter. The French are lively, quick-witted, and humorous; they are hospitable and courteous to the last degree; they are frank and honourable, musical and fond of fun; they are the most democratic people on earth, or, perhaps one should say, their form of democracy exhibits fewer vices and more virtues than does the democracy of any other people. All these characteristics were understood and appreciated by the average Australian soldier, and to this temperamental affinity the spirit of mutual regard was chiefly due. And, even in 1916, there were few homes in France that had not already suffered grievously in the war, and the uncomplaining fortitude with which the afflictions were endured, and the noble part borne by French women in sharing the national burdens, appealed profoundly to Australian chivalry, and evoked the finest feelings of regard and helpfulness.

The small villages with which the area was studded were nightly the scenes of mild revelry. The men would ramble through the old-fashioned streets, inspecting shop windows and exchanging greetings with the villagers and romping with the children. Sometimes they would gather round the piano of a popular estaminet and make the night melodious with songs of their homeland. In this area everybody learned how to say, "Bon jour" and "Bon soir," and also "œuf" and "vin" and "pain." The two first expressions kept the *Entente Cordiale* alight, while the last three sufficed for communicating the urgent requirements of the inner man. Happily, it was still possible in 1916 to purchase in France moderately good wine at a reasonable price, while eggs were readily procurable during the summer months, and meat and butter not difficult to obtain.

Enough has now been said to afford the reader a reasonably clear idea of the conditions in which the men found themselves in their first billeting area in France. Precedence has here been given to the domestic life of the troops and to their relations with the civil population because those aspects for the time being rather effaced in interest the purely military ones. For the period at Blaringhem was merely a brief halt by the wayside designed to allow the men to recover themselves after their long journey, and

to give the artillery and the transport units time to join up after completing their equipment at Le Havre and Abbeville respectively.

During the last days of June the greater part of the Division had arrived in the area and, by the 2nd or 3rd of July it was complete with the exception of the artillery and transport units. These arrived during the next few days, the artillery by train and road from Le Havre, and the transport by road from Abbeville, a journey of about 60 miles. The artillery proceeded to the Lynde area while the transport details reported to their unit headquarters, wherever they were. The guns, horses, and equipment supplied at the bases were generally good and, with their arrival, the Division commenced its existence as a formation complete in every detail. Billeting had been carried out on the Brigade Group principle, that is, the three field companies, the three field ambulances, and the companies of the Divisional Train were attached to their affiliated infantry brigades and worked with them. As this was the usual method of disposing of the Division, and as it was characteristic of a large proportion of the Divisional dispositions throughout the war, it will be as well to give the distribution in detail.

Infantry Brigade Groups.

8th Brigade Group (Morbecque)	{	H.Q. 8th Infantry Brigade. 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd Battalions. 8th Machine Gun Company. 8th Field Company Engineers. 8th Field Ambulance. 18th Company A.A.S.C.
14th Brigade Group (Thiennes)	{	H.Q. 14th Infantry Brigade. 53rd, 54th, 55th and 56th Battalions. 14th Machine Gun Company. 14th Field Company Engineers. 14th Field Ambulance. 28th Company A.A.S.C.
15th Brigade Group (Steenbecque)	{	H.Q. 15th Infantry Brigade. 57th, 58th, 59th, and 60th Battalions. 15th Machine Gun Company. 15th Field Company Engineers. 15th Field Ambulance. 29th Company A.A.S.C.

With the units disposed as given above the remainder of the Division comprised the other Divisional troops. That is :—

- H.Q. 5th Australian Division.
- 5th Divisional Artillery.
- 5th Pioneer Battalion.
- 5th Divisional Sanitary Section.
- 10th (Headquarters Company) A.A.S.C.

Two matters called for immediate attention in the training of the Division. The first was the physical condition of the men, which, after the comparative idleness of the last two weeks, could be presumed to have softened considerably. To restore this, most of the units were given a series of route marches of gradually increasing severity, and they soon commenced to regain the toughness which they had acquired in Egypt. Despite this, the sudden change of climate made the immediate recovery of form impracticable. Even in the sunny days the great humidity of the atmosphere occasioned some distress on route marches, and the damp, clinging, warmth was found to be very enervating to troops accustomed to the dry, exhilarating atmospheres of Australia and of Egypt.

The other matter which received great attention at this period was gas training. After several practices in exercising and bayonet fighting with gas helmets in position, the whole Division was put through a live gas cloud. This was done between the 5th and 10th of July under the supervision of Captain Barlow, the Chemical Adviser of Second Army. Cylinders containing poison gas were placed in position in a field, and, when the wind had dropped or was very light, the gas was liberated and the men, with their helmets in position, walked through it. The experience gave them great confidence in their new helmets, and the rule that no officer or man should go into a forward area until he had passed through a poison gas cloud was always rigorously enforced. After going through the cloud the men were allowed to walk unhelmeted through a mild cloud of lachrymatory (or tear) gas. This made their eyes water very copiously, but they learned how to detect the vapour by its smell. Most of this training was carried out in the vicinity of Morbecque.

During the Blaringhem period, the structure of the Division underwent some important modifications. Trench mortar batteries were formed. On the 5th of July each infantry brigade proceeded to form its own light trench mortar battery. The approximate establishment was stated in Chapter I. and it is not necessary to repeat it here. The battery strength was raised by voluntary transfer from the infantry battalions and, as none of the men had had any previous training in the work, instructors were furnished by the 1st Australian Division, which was at that time still in the area of II A.N.Z.A.C. Some officers and N.C.O.'s of each of the 8th, 14th, and 15th L.T.M.B. were also dispatched for a course of instruction to the famous Second Army Bombing School at Terdegghem. Command of the L.T.M.B. of the 8th, 14th, and 15th Brigades was entrusted to Capt. W. L. Jack, Capt. Hopkins, and Lieut. W. C. Scurry, M.C., D.C.M., respectively.

At about the same period the Divisional Artillery was instructed to form one heavy and three medium trench mortar batteries. The work was undertaken immediately and the formation commenced on the 5th of July, on which date a number of officers and other

ranks were sent to a course of instruction at Berthen. The *personnel* of the Divisional Trench Mortar Brigade consisted of artillerymen and infantrymen transferred from the various units of the Division. Captain Miles was appointed D.T.M.O. It must be clearly understood that the three light trench mortar batteries were brigade troops and operated under the command of the infantry brigadiers, while the one heavy and three medium trench mortar batteries were artillery units purely, and acted under the command of the C.R.A. The Divisional Trench Mortar Brigade assembled on the 13th of July at Winter's Night near Fleurbaix. Each of the three medium trench mortar batteries had a strength of three officers and twenty-three other ranks and was at that time supplied with four 1.57-inch mortars, though the 2-inch mortars were supplied very shortly afterwards. No heavy mortar was received until about the middle of September. The H.T.M.B. was known as the V.5.A. Battery, while the M.T.M. batteries were designated X.5.A, Y.5.A, and Z.5.A. respectively. The 5.A in all these names stood of course for 5th Australian (Division).

On the 7th of July an important modification in the composition of the artillery brigades was effected. It will be remembered that at its formation the Divisional Artillery contained three 18-pounder brigades each consisting of four batteries, and one howitzer brigade consisting of three batteries. It was now ordered that each 18-pounder brigade was to send one battery to the howitzer brigade, while the howitzer brigade was to hand back in exchange one howitzer battery to each of two of the 18-pounder brigades. This change in the composition of the artillery brigades can best be seen from the following table. The effect of the change was to distribute the howitzer batteries through three of the four brigades instead of keeping them all as one brigade.

Original Composition of D.A.

13th Brigade (18-Pdr.)	{	49th Battery
		50th "
		51st "
		52nd "
14th Brigade	{	53rd Battery
		54th "
		55th "
		56th "
15th Brigade	{	57th Battery
		58th "
		59th "
		60th "
25th Brigade (How.)	{	113th Battery
		114th "
		115th "

New Composition of D.A.

13th Brigade	{	49th Battery
		50th "
		51st "
		113th How. Battery
14th Brigade	{	53rd Battery
		54th "
		55th "
		114th How. Battery
15th Brigade	{	57th Battery
		58th "
		59th "
		No How. Battery
25th Brigade	{	52nd Battery
		56th "
		60th "
		115th How. Battery

The stay of the Division in the pleasant Blaringhem area was destined to be a very short one, and coming events were already casting their shadows before. During the first week of July the Division made arrangements for the senior officers of all arms to visit the southern sector of the Second Army front, which at that time was held by the 4th Australian Division. This was believed by all to indicate an early relief of the 4th Division by the 5th, and the prediction was speedily verified. On the 8th of July II A.N.Z.A.C. published an order to the effect that the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions would leave the II A.N.Z.A.C. area forthwith and move, under the orders of I A.N.Z.A.C., to a destination not specified. The 4th Australian Division, less artillery, was to be relieved by the 5th Australian Division and, on its relief, was to pass into G.H.Q. Reserve, and hold itself in readiness for immediate entrainment. It was generally accepted that the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Australian Divisions were on the eve of a move to the Somme. Flattering reports of the great Anglo-French offensive there were daily arriving and many people, their hopes confounding their judgment, were already predicting an early collapse of the enemy armies and a peace before Christmas.

The move of the Division to the front line was a long and eagerly anticipated event. All the men were anxious to be done for ever with the tiresome preliminary training. They had had four months of work as a complete Division and most of them had been, in addition to this, training as recruits for several months. Musketry and bayonet fighting, drill, gas training, and route marches had been practised *ad nauseam*; they were anxious to grapple with the real work in hand, to come to grips with the enemy himself. The short stay at Blaringhem merely served to whet this appetite, for, though it was over twenty miles from the line, the sounds of gun-fire were often distinctly audible and everybody was eager to participate in the stirring work in progress there. But sometimes when the evening cannonade waxed to a furious crescendo and the air throbbed to the concussions of many guns a momentary silence would fall on the noisy billets. The men would listen thoughtfully to the significant far-away clamour. Perhaps many hundreds of them caught its tones with death's prophetic ear. If so, they said nothing, and carried on cheerfully with the occupation of the moment.

The move forward commenced on the morning of the 8th, and it was carried out by route march. As the total distance was over twenty miles it was decided that units would billet in the Estaires area on the night of the 8th and complete the journey on the 9th. The 8th and 15th Brigade Groups accomplished the journey on the dates mentioned, the 14th Brigade Group on the 9th and 10th. Divisional H.Q. closed at Blaringhem on the 8th and opened at Croix du Bac on the same day.


The first day's march through Estaires, about fifteen miles, was

not without incident. The route lay along the north side of the Lys Canal, via Croix Marraise and Merville, and the weather was hot and steamy. Laden with full marching order and further weighted by a blanket, many of the men found the conditions too oppressive for their stamina and a large number dropped out. Foot troubles were aggravated by the fact that some miles of the route were paved with cobble stones, a trying experience for feet accustomed to the soft sand drifts of Egypt. Not even the charm of the countryside and the novelty of the surroundings could outweigh these disadvantages, and the reflection that they were virtually marching into action was not sufficiently impressed on the men. General McCay was quite properly annoyed at the amount of the straggling and the casual way in which many of the men appeared to regard the whole proceeding. Accordingly, he published a sharp order reminding all ranks that they were in fact marching up into action, and that to fall out for comparatively trifling causes was therefore dishonourable and discreditable to the whole Division. This order was read on the morning of the 9th before the resumption of the march and its effect was immediate, and entirely satisfactory. The men forgot their old peace-time route march standards, and, although by now there was a fair proportion of genuine distress, it was ignored, and not a unit had a single straggler at the termination of the second day's march. The instance is typical of Australian soldiers. Casual and easy-going while there is no apparent need for special exertion, they are never to be found wanting in the pressure of a real emergency.

The sector of the line which was to be taken over by the Division was about four miles in length, and it ran in a north-east and south-west direction at an average distance of about three miles south of Armentières. Farther south still lay Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, Givenchy, while to the north lay Armentières, Messines, and Ypres, all of which places had been points of extreme sensitiveness in the bitter fighting of 1914 and 1915. But by July, 1916, the front here was comparatively tranquil, and the sector allotted to the 5th Division appears to have been a favourite one for the initiation of troops to front line work. About a mile behind the line lay the little battered villages of Bois Grenier and Fleurbaix, and the sector was commonly known as the Bois Grenier or the Fleurbaix Sector in consequence. It was held by the 4th Australian Division with three brigades in the line, the 4th, 12th, and 13th, each holding frontages of about 2,000 yards from left to right respectively.

It was decided that the 8th, 14th, and 15th Brigades should relieve the 4th, 12th, and 13th in the order named, and accordingly, on completion of the second day of the march from Blaringhem, the Brigades were billeted in areas behind their respective fronts, the 8th around Erquinghem, the 14th around Fleurbaix, and the 15th at Sailly. In these positions the infantry was thus at an average distance of about three miles from the front line. No time was lost in setting

about the relief. Dumps, baths, dressing stations, and H.Q. were handed over almost immediately on the arrival of the incoming Division. On the night of the 10th/11th, the 8th and 15th Brigades relieved the 4th and 13th Brigades respectively, while the 14th Brigade took over the frontage of the 12th Brigade on the following night. These reliefs completed, the infantry and other arms of the 4th Division left the Bois Grenier Sector with the exception of the



4th Divisional Artillery, which remained in it for reasons to be explained later.

Let us proceed with one of the infantry units on this its first visit to the front line.

During the whole of the long sunny day the men have been kept close to their billets or huts, and the tendency to wander round and see things, so dear to the Australian soldier, has been firmly repressed. Orders, too, have been promulgated that men must not loiter in the open or stand about in groups, especially when enemy aeroplanes or observation balloons are up. As the area is within

easy artillery range and is thickly packed with troops and transport, the necessity for these orders is apparent to everyone and little trouble is required for their enforcement. So the hours pass quietly in the careful inspection of arms and accoutrements. Gas helmets are critically examined, rifles cleaned again, and the grit and dust carefully wiped off the 120 rounds of ammunition carried by each man. Officers collect their platoons and tell them what they can of the evening's work, of the precautions to be observed in the march forward, of the duties and responsibilities of troops in the front line. Everybody is in the highest spirits and the moment of departure is eagerly awaited. The shadows lengthen and lengthen, and the beautiful, protracted afternoon gradually deepens into evening, its clear soft light into the gentle gloaming of a French summer night. The busy aeroplanes have turned reluctantly homewards pursued in cases by harmless parting salvos from enemy anti-aircraft batteries; the peasants in the fields cease their labour; there falls over the landscape the sustained preliminary hush of night.

In suppressed excitement the platoons fall in and a muster roll is called. Everybody is "present and correct." There is no delay. Another company of the battalion has just marched down the road, and our company files out in column of route behind it at a distance of 200 yards. The men swing along at ease, sturdy, confident, and resolute. It is their deportment throughout the war. The cobbled road speaks shrewdly to their feet, still tender from the trying march to Estaires. But that is forgotten, for now nothing short of a broken limb would cause a man to straggle. The twilight thickens. An odd light or two glimmers from cottages still tenanted, for the nightly horror of bombing aeroplanes is as yet unknown. Thus we march for a mile or two, till the files connecting our company with the preceding one pass the word back for a halt. The men break from their column of route and rest on the right of the road, their packs affording a welcome support for their backs. An enterprising private endeavours to light a cigarette, but is thwarted by the vigilance of the platoon sergeant. The attempt is not repeated.

The company commander speaks a few words to his four platoon officers. The order to continue the march is received from in front, and the column is re-formed in a moment and moves on again, but now in different formation, marching by platoons each at a distance of 50 yards. Another mile or two is covered. A deserted village is passed through. On its outskirts is seen a ruined house from which projects the sinister nose of a gun pointing high in the air. Another brief rest. Then on again, this time by sections of men in file at a distance of a dozen yards. A subtle change has come over everybody. Orders are given in subdued tones. The most inveterate humorist is quiet for once. A large hole has been torn in the middle of the road. The men sniff curiously as they pass it, for the sulphurous smell of the high explosive still lingers about it. No wonder they are

a little silent, perhaps unconsciously almost reverent. For they are the votaries of Mars and they are crossing the threshold of his proudest temple.

Soon they turn from the road with its enclosing trees and hedges and strike across the fields by a narrow path. Although it is dark the range of vision has become suddenly widened. They are in a broad dark plain and in front of them, a mile or two away, is a long, intermittent line of rockets, rising from the ground in utter darkness, but glowing into flame as they soar skywards until, for a moment, they poise majestically and then fall gracefully to the ground, illuminating the landscape even at this distance. Nobody has seen this sight before, nobody has been told of it. But everybody knows exactly what it is, sees the purpose of the lights and knows by the curve which are ours and which are enemy, and wonders perhaps why the German lights are so much better, and why they are fired more frequently.

From the line of lights a sound of rifle firing is heard and a spent bullet passes overhead with a pleasant, gentle sigh. The sections halt again. A staff officer appears from the darkness and pauses in whispered consultation with the platoon commander. There is a momentary murmur of voices, a jest, a smothered laugh, and the section files on again past the staff officer, whose cheery, confident personality reaches them through the darkness in some subtle, refreshing way. On again, and a sound comes upon the ears as if the troops in front are marching over a wooden bridge. Suddenly the section just in front disappears, and then our feet, too, strike a wooden flooring of some kind and we are swallowed up in darkness. It is the sap leading to the front line and we are walking on its duck-board floor. We become aware, too, of a novel smell, a strong yet indefinable aroma which we find out later to be characteristic more or less of all trenches in all parts of the Western Front. It is a mixture of damp earth, high explosive, and perhaps of other things.

The trench seems interminable. In reality it is perhaps only a thousand yards in length, but it zig-zags every few yards and doesn't seem to be heading for anywhere in particular. We know that the frequent turns in it are made to localise the effect of bursting shells. We remember learning that. And there are signs in the trench that it is a wise precaution.

We march on and on. Sometimes other trenches seem to branch off from ours and we imagine they lead to other parts of the line. Presently we cross a bigger and more substantial work cutting our trench at right-angles. We suppose that it is the Support Line. Two men, carrying a silent figure on a stretcher meet us in the trench and we halt and lean over to one side in order to allow them to pass. On again and we are now getting very near to the lights that rise and fall so continuously. The sounds of desultory rifle and machine gun fire are now loud and penetrating, and a burst of

machine gun bullets sputters unpleasantly near us, but we feel safe enough in our trench. All at once we are conscious of greater room and clearer atmosphere. The oppressiveness has gone; we are out of the trench. It is the front line.

A heavy black wall ten feet high lies before us. About us to right and left are ugly, shapeless masses of sand-bags. Dug-outs. Between these, dim figures are moving, overcoats on, steel helmets in position, gas bags in readiness. Our platoon officer turns to the left and leads on some little distance. Then halts. The other sections close up. A lieutenant of the 4th Division appears from nowhere and our platoon officer vanishes with him into his dug-out headquarters. N.C.O.'s and men of the 4th Division gather round us and tell us about the sector. The officers reappear in a moment and commence a detailed examination of the platoon frontage. Lewis gun positions, reserve ammunition supplies, the sally port, dug-out accommodation, sanitary conveniences, trench stores, company headquarters, all are pointed out, and our platoon officer gives a receipt for all trench stores handed over. Similarly, the 4th Division section commanders guide our N.C.O.'s round the sector. We look about us and see that a parados has been constructed a few feet behind the parapet. Both parapet and parados rise upwards from the ground-level, for here the country is much too damp for sunken trenches. The space between the two works thus corresponds with a front trench and, at intervals of every ten or fifteen yards, stout traverses have been built backwards from the parapet dividing it into many "bays." All the bays are numbered. On the return of the N.C.O.'s the men are allotted to the various bays and move off to their posts. The 4th Division platoon prepares to move out. Our company commander arrives and assures himself that all is correct.

This is the long-awaited moment. Everybody is anxious to get on the fire-step and have his first peep over No Man's Land. A succession of enemy machine-gun bullets raps rhythmically along the top of our parapet "That's Parapet Joe," explains a 4th Division Corporal, "He can play a tune with his blanky gun." The music of Parapet Joe passes down the line and we look out curiously over No Man's Land. A hundred yards away a long, low, irregular line can be seen dimly across the intervening waste. A tall private standing well above the parapet points his rifle at it and delivers "ten rounds rapid" regardless of consequences. "Thank God," he says, "I have had a crack at something at last." A horn sounds clearly from the enemy trench.

"You're lucky," remarks a 4th Division sergeant. "That's Fritz's casualty horn. You must have winged somebody." The tall private sniffs contemptuously.

"Winged?" he says. "I hope I blew his bleedin' head off."

* * * * *

So part of the Western Front passed for the first time into the

keeping of the 5th Australian Division. The relief was completed well and without casualty on the Divisional front, a tribute to the perfection of the staff arrangements. On the right, General Elliott employed the 57th (Lieut.-Col. Stewart) and 58th (Lieut.-Col. Jackson) Battalions in the front line; in the centre, Colonel Pope used the 55th (Lieut.-Col. McConaghy) and 56th (Lieut.-Col. H. Scott) Battalions, while General Tivey on the left employed the 29th (Lieut.-Col. Bennett) and 30th (Lieut.-Col. Clark) Battalions as his front line troops. Each battalion held a frontage of about 1,000 yards. The remaining battalions were in reserve. The engineer companies, field ambulances, and companies of the Divisional Train worked with their affiliated infantry brigades.

Although battle casualties averaging about twenty a day were reported, the next few days contained little of importance. The first shoot of the newly-formed L.T.M.B. deserves, however, to be chronicled. The front line infantry watched their enthusiastic preparations with a good deal of dubious curiosity. The instructions to the gun crews were to get off their ten rounds as quickly as they could and to make back to the Support Line with all possible haste. They carried out their programme to perfection, "They issued Fritz his ration," said an infantryman who watched Lieut. Scurry's first operation on the 15th Brigade front. "Ten in the air and they were half-way down Pinney's Avenue before the first one burst. Then Fritz issued *his* ration and *we* got it!" On the Battery's next arrival in the front line the infantry were not slow to remind them of their last performance. They were dubbed "The shoot and scatter mob," "The Imshi Artillery," "The Stove-pipe Howitzers," "The Crab Drawers," and "The Duckboard Harriers." Despite this friendly banter, the infantry was quick to recognise both the extraordinary value of the L.T.M. as an offensive weapon, and the gallantry of the officers and men of the various batteries. The Stokes mortar soon grew to be one of the most valued arms of the Division as well as one most cordially hated by the enemy, and before long this arm of the service took rank and precedence as one of the most *élite* of the several "Suicide Clubs" of the army.

CHAPTER V

(19th and 20th July, 1916.)

THE BATTLE OF FROMELLES

British Official *Communiqué*, 20th July, 2.50 p.m. :

“Yesterday evening, south of Armentières, we carried out some important raids on a front of two miles in which Australian troops took part. About 140 German prisoners were captured.”

German Official *Communiqué*, 20th July :

“Considerable British forces attacked our positions north and west of Fromelles. They were repulsed and wherever they succeeded in penetrating our trenches they were ejected by counter-attacks, in which we captured over 300 prisoners, among them being some officers.”

German Official *Communiqué*, 21st July :

“The English attack in the region of Fromelles on Wednesday was carried out, as we have ascertained, by two strong Divisions. The brave Bavarian Division, against whose front the attack was made, counted on the ground in front of them more than 2,000 enemy corpses. We have brought in so far 481 prisoners, including ten officers, together with 16 machine guns.”

The *communiqués* quoted above are the British and German official versions of the Battle of Fromelles. We sustained a severe local reverse and, as was generally the case throughout the war, the official report of the successful side was much nearer the truth than that of the side that failed. By no stretch of the imagination could the operations be described as “some important raids.” It was an attack carried out by the 61st British and the 5th Australian Divisions. The immediate intention was to capture and to hold the front and support lines of the enemy on a front of about 4,000 yards. And it was hoped that, if the attack succeeded, it would be the prelude to a further and more important offensive against vital enemy positions on the Aubers Ridge. So that in no sense was the operation a raid, or several raids. These remarks are made solely for the enlightenment of the reader, whose present knowledge may

be presumed to be based chiefly on the official British *communiqué*; they are not intended as an attack on the falsification of *communiqués* which, on occasion, is a very important and necessary part of the duty of the General Staff, especially when it is desirable to deceive an enemy or to preserve civilian *moral* during a period of tension.

Nevertheless, this official distortion of the facts of the Battle of Fromelles has resulted in a general and profound misconception of its purpose and its gravity, and there are few incidents of the war which deserve a closer attention from the Australian public. For this reason the events leading up to the battle are here set out with some slight attention to detail.

* * * * *

On the 8th of July, 1916, General Sir Charles Monro, then commanding the First British Army in France, held a conference of his Corps Commanders at First Army Headquarters. Among those present was General Sir Roger Haking, who commanded the XI Corps, at that time a part of the First Army. General Monro explained that in order to prevent the enemy from withdrawing troops on this front to the Somme it would probably be necessary to carry out offensive operations somewhere in the vicinity of the junction of the First and Second Army fronts. He added that he had communicated with General Sir Herbert Plumer, commanding Second Army, on the subject, and he now verbally instructed Sir Roger Haking to prepare the plans for such an attack, on the assumption that one complete Division and some additional artillery would be placed at his disposal by the G.O.C. Second Army. This, apparently, General Plumer had undertaken to do.

On the 13th of July official information of the proposed operations was furnished to the 5th Australian Division in a memorandum from H.Q. Second Army. It embodied much the same information as had been communicated by the G.O.C. First Army to his Corps Commanders at the meeting on the 8th, and stated further that the 5th Australian Division, the 4th Australian Divisional Artillery, and certain heavy batteries would in due course be placed at the disposal of Sir Roger Haking for the attack. So far the position was one of expectancy, and the date and front of the attack were not yet communicated.

On the same day, however, First Army informed General Haking that Sir Douglas Haig required a threat against Lille. It appeared that some nine enemy battalions, recently withdrawn from the Lille front, had just been identified on the Somme, and it was considered that in view of this removal of troops a threat against Lille would have good chances of success. In any case, it would at least deter the enemy from moving more battalions to the support of his hard-pressed legions on the Somme. On receipt of this instruction, General Haking expedited his plans for attack.

On the same night, at 11 p.m., a conference was held at II

A.N.Z.A.C. H.Q. at La Motte. Here General McCay was informed that the 5th Australian Division would be employed under XI Corps in an offensive operation in conjunction with two English divisions. The front of his attack was shown him and it comprised a sector on the right part of the present Divisional front, held then by the 15th Brigade. The artillery preparation was to commence on the following day, the 14th, and the attack was provisionally fixed for the 17th.

On his return to D.H.Q. General McCay issued preparatory orders in accordance with the information he had received. The 8th and 14th Infantry Brigades at once received instructions concerning the details of their relief from their present line and their movement to the contracted front of the operation. This was to be done on the nights 14th/15th and 15th/16th of July. It will afford some idea of the extreme haste which characterised the proceedings that, although the artillery preparation was due to commence on the 14th, it was not until the 16th that all the batteries participating could be got into position.

On the 14th of July General Plumer placed at General Haking's disposal the 5th Australian Division, the artillery of the 4th Australian Division, as well as some little additional heavy artillery. On the same date, at 9.45 a.m., General Haking held a conference at Hinges, the H.Q. of XI Corps, which was attended by General McCay and Lieut.-Col. Wagstaff. Here the Corps Commander made known several important alterations to the programme which had been outlined to General McCay on the previous evening. Owing to the inexperience of the Australian artillery and trench mortar units, the attack was now to be carried out on a two divisional front only, and the divisions concerned were to be the 5th Australian on the left and the 61st British on the right. The objectives were to be the enemy front and support lines on a front of about 4,000 yards. These were to be taken and held. Certain strong points deeper in the enemy's defences were also ordered to be taken, but these additional objectives were cancelled later on. The divisions were instructed to attack each with three brigades in the line, and it was further laid down that only two battalions of each brigade were to be employed in the actual assault as it was desired to maintain the other two battalions intact for future operations. If during the operation divisional commanders desired to use more troops, the sanction of General Haking was first to be secured. An alteration of the front of attack was necessitated by this change of plans and the new front was now approximately from Trivelet to Farm Delangré, the left half of which, from the Sugar Loaf exclusive to Farm Delangré, was allotted to the 5th Australian Division. In order that the reader may follow the narrative more clearly an approximate sketch of the battlefield is given. It will be noticed that Farm Delangré, which for convenience has been mentioned as

the left boundary of the objective, is really some little distance beyond it, and was not, in fact, included in the area to be captured.

An order issued by II A.N.Z.A.C., also on the 14th of July, laid down the arrangements under which the reliefs necessitated by the contraction of the 5th Divisional front were to be carried out. The 1st and 3rd N.Z. Rifle Brigades were to relieve the 8th Brigade on the left; in the centre the 60th Infantry Brigade (20th British Division), which had been placed at the disposal of 2nd A.N.Z.A.C. for the purpose, was to relieve the 14th Infantry Brigade as well as the part of the left of the 15th Brigade outside the front of assault and occupied at the time by the 58th Battalion. The effect of this was to withdraw the 8th and 14th Brigades from the line, while the 57th and 58th Battalions of the 15th Brigade remained in position on the front of attack. These orders were given effect to on the nights of 14th-15th, 15th-16th of July, and the 8th and 14th Brigades were withdrawn to billets in the Fleurbaix and Bach St. Maur areas respectively.

From the first receipt of definite instructions regarding the attack, the necessary preparations were commenced with all haste. It is not proposed here to emphasise the absolutely vital influence which thorough preparation exercises over all military operations. At least one distinguished Australian soldier has said that he has not an anxious moment during an operation, but many prior to it. If when Zero hour comes he knows his preparations are complete and perfect in every detail, the battle, he says, is won. Zero hour has then no anxieties for him. Although this doctrine did not become universally fashionable till later on in the war, there is no doubt that its intrinsic truth was fully realised by General McCay, and every energy of the staff and of all ranks was concentrated on the preparatory work. What did it involve? It necessitated the communication to everybody concerned of as much information regarding the operation as it was necessary for him to have in order to act to the best advantage. It meant the collection and dissemination to the people concerned of a great deal of information concerning the enemy, his dispositions, his defences, and his battle tactics. It meant the accumulation of considerable stores of ammunition, including over 60,000 rounds of 18-pounder for the artillery and, for the trench mortars and the infantry, proportionately heavy stores of ammunition and bombs. A great part of these had, of course, to be man-handled through saps over the final stages of their transport to the front line. Incidentally, a tramway to the front line was surveyed and constructed to facilitate forward transport, a difficult task, which, despite casualties caused by persistent enemy shelling, was carried out by the 5th Pioneer Battalion in two nights' strenuous work. Apart from the distribution of ammunition, it was necessary also to accumulate large engineering stores in forward positions, so that the captured trenches might be consolidated rapidly

in anticipation of the enemy's counter-attacks. Many hundreds of duckboards, and of wire hurdles of special pattern for revetting purposes, were accordingly constructed by the engineers and conveyed by infantry working parties to the front line. Thousands of sandbags and hundreds of picks and shovels were also provided to facilitate the digging in of the assaulting troops, and large reserves of all the mentioned stores and of many others were accumulated in forward engineering dumps lest those in the front line should suffer by enemy artillery action. The engineer preparations included also the plans for engineer co-operation in the work of demolition of the enemy defences and in the construction of new positions, while the important task of connecting up the captured trenches with our old front line was specially attended to.

The preparations included also special instructions for the medical services of the Division. New Advanced Dressing Stations had to be installed and staffed, a large new Main Dressing Station had to be provided, and careful provision made for a speedy service of ambulances to ply between them in the work of evacuating casualties.

While infantry, engineer, and medical services were thus engaged at top pressure perhaps the case of the artillery was even more trying. The 4th Australian Divisional Artillery, as well as three 18-pounder batteries of the 171st Artillery Brigade, were added to the command of the C.R.A. 5th Australian Division for the operation. Though, judged by later standards, this was a comparatively weak artillery support for an attacking division, it nevertheless involved a great amount of preliminary work. The new batteries had to travel to the sector and take up battery positions; the whole force had to be re-grouped into three groups, one to support each assaulting infantry brigade, and the registration on new targets and barrage lines to be completed. For this latter work the assistance of two squadrons, the 10th and the 16th, of the R.F.C. was obtained, and although their work was considerably hampered by a succession of misty mornings the clear hours were crowded with busy registration. This had to be done in two days and in such a way, if possible, that the enemy would not suspect that an offensive action was impending. In addition to the artillery batteries, five medium trench mortar batteries, two of them Canadian, were placed at the disposal of the Division for the operation. Positions had to be found for these and ammunition carried to them before they could commence their work of registration and wire-cutting.

The Signal Company was equally busy. To facilitate communication it was necessary to lay alternative lines to many posts, as well as to dig many hundreds of yards of trench in which to bury the more important cables. This latter work threw additional strain on the working parties of infantry and pioneers who were engaged upon it.

While originating and directing all these activities, the Divisional Staff had many other duties. Several conferences were held in order to co-ordinate the work of the various arms. Operation orders setting out the nature and scope of the attack were issued. A formation for the infantry attack was recommended to infantry brigadiers, and all three brigade commanders adhered to its main principles.

Into this heavy preparatory work, of which only a brief outline has been given, all ranks of all services entered with energy. To complete it before dawn on the 17th was hardly possible, but everybody did his utmost and the work made surprising headway. In two directions only did it lag and that through no fault of the parties concerned. Artillery registrations were hampered by a succession of foggy mornings which rendered aeroplane co-operation impracticable till comparatively late in the day. The transport of ammunition and engineering material to the front line was limited by the capacity of the saps through which they had to be carried for the last three-quarters of a mile, and the forward dumps in consequence were not yet quite as full as was desired. Added to this, all ranks were considerably exhausted by the strenuous efforts of the last few days, and nobody was sorry when on the morning of the 17th, after successive postponements, due to fog, of Zero hour from 4 a.m. to 8 a.m. and then to 11 a.m., it was eventually decided by General Haking that the operation could not take place till the 19th. The infantry battalions which were all in position for the assault were at once withdrawn from the crowded forward trenches and only a normal garrison was left, so that excessive casualties might not be occasioned by the enemy's artillery response to the registration and wire-cutting on which our batteries were busily engaged. As many men as possible were rested and the remainder were engaged in completing the stocking of the front line dumps, and in rounding off whatever yet remained of the preliminary work.

Meanwhile, what was known of the attack and what was surmised on the other side of No Man's Land? The haste with which the preparations were conducted necessarily led to much movement of troops and transport by daylight which ordinarily would have been conducted by night. The enemy must have known that new batteries were taking up positions and registering on a limited part of his forward zone, and his aeroplane and balloon observers can scarcely have been unconscious of suddenly increasing activity on the British side of the line. Rumours of the presence of traitors and spies among the civilian population of the district were persistent and sinister, and, though much was suspected, little or nothing was positively ascertained. Every day, too, carrier pigeons were reported crossing No Man's Land, and it is highly probable that some at least of them were enemy birds.

Apparently, however, by the 15th of July sufficient information

of our intention reached the enemy to induce him to take extreme measures to procure more. At about 11 p.m. on that date he suddenly turned upon a sector of the line occupied by A and B Companies of the 58th Battalion an extremely violent concentration of artillery and trench mortars. It was the men's first experience of anything like a concentrated artillery bombardment, and few of the survivors are likely to forget it. Dug-outs and parapets crumbled under the fire and men and sandbags and duckboards were flung aloft in fountains of fire or torn asunder by the shattering power of high explosives. The earth trembled beneath the fury of this storm of shells, and everywhere were dust and fire and smoke and the pitiful ruins of men and of the works of men. Under cover of this fire a small enemy raiding party approached the trench and, on the lifting of the barrage, entered the bays to the accompaniment of a lively fusillade of hand grenades. They appear to have accounted for all the occupants of one or two bays, some of whom were killed by bombs. The casualty returns, amounting to about 140, included a small number of missing, and it is reasonably certain that several of these were made prisoners of war. The enemy party vanished as suddenly as it had appeared. It was a well staged and successful raid, and, to the previous uncertain amount of the enemy knowledge of our intentions had now to be added whatever he might succeed in extracting from the prisoners. While many prisoners can be relied upon to preserve silence or to give false information to enemy interrogators, there is always the chance that some man, weak from wounds or dazed by concussion, will succumb to the additional strain of a third degree examination and reveal what he should withhold. This is the general experience, gained from many wars and from soldiers of all nations.

A night or two later the enemy raided part of the front just vacated by the 8th Brigade and there too he secured identifications. Even assuming that none of the captured prisoners gave him any information whatever concerning the actual assault, it is certain that whatever suspicions he had previously entertained were intensified as a result of the raids. He would ascertain at least that certain important movements were on foot on the British side of the line; that a division which had just taken over a sector had been suddenly relieved on a part of it, and, coupling this with the increasing movement and artillery activity, it would be strange if he did not conjecture a local offensive. At the least, he would know enough to put him very much on the alert, and to make all preparations for any situation that might arise.

In this connection, too, it should not be overlooked that the front of the 61st Division was equally active. Just as the brigades of the 5th Division assembled on a front contracted to the right, so did the brigades of the adjoining 61st Division assemble on a front contracted to their left. This, too, was carried out on the nights of

the 14th/15th and 15th/16th. It may be mentioned here that the preparations of the 61st Division were complicated by the presence in their forward area of several thousand gas cylinders. It was, of course, imperative that these should be removed before any heavy enemy artillery action occurred, and this work entailed a severe strain on their infantry working parties as well as occasioning considerable congestion in the saps leading to the front line.

In view of all these circumstances it is therefore almost certain that the enemy was well aware of our offensive intentions. The haste of the preparation, necessitated by the urgent call for a diversion, thus lost the attacking side one of its chief elements of success, surprise effect. Whatever disadvantage was incurred thereby—and it was doubtless a grave disadvantage—the cause of it lay far beyond Divisional control, perhaps, indeed, beyond any human control.

The Fromelles battlefield lay on one of the lowest parts of the Western Front. It was a flat, dank area about fifty feet above sea level and was covered, where it was not torn by shell-holes, with rank self-sown grass and crops. It may occasion surprise that a firing line voluntarily adopted by one of the belligerents should lie through an area apparently so devoid of tactical advantages. The explanation is simple. The German General Staff, when its first wild rush for Paris was definitely checked, was confronted with the necessity of taking up the strongest defensive line that the occupied territory offered. Accordingly, it selected as the buttress of its new line a series of eminences that lay more or less continuously from the sea to Switzerland. Examples of high ground thus selected are Passchendaele Ridge, Messines Ridge, Aubers Ridge, Vimy Ridge, and there were many others. Their tactical importance was amply evidenced by the sanguinary struggles which eventually centred round most of them.

But the German General Staff was far too astute to site its front line on the topmost crest of these ridges, for, had it done so, a slight enemy advance of a few hundred yards would have cost him his most commanding height with all its advantages of observation. Accordingly his front defences were invariably flung out some thousands of yards in front of the dominating ridges in order that he could enjoy the advantages of superior observation during all the fighting that must inevitably elapse before possession of the ridge itself could be disputed. Another very significant advantage secured by this policy was that it constrained the enemy to attack over low-lying ground which, in a muddy terrain like Flanders, was usually a heartbreaking handicap. In general terms, then, it may be said that the typical German position consisted of a considerable width of low-lying ground, trenched, wired, and studded with strong points, behind which rose in tiers ridge after ridge of higher ground, culminating finally in a feature that conferred command

over all the adjacent terrain for miles. And in the Flanders area particularly it should be added that this command was derived not so much from any great height of the ridges themselves as from the utter flatness of the rest of the country.

The ridge which thus buttressed the front line in the Fromelles sector was known as the Aubers Heights, and its possession was a matter of extreme importance, as it dominated all the western approaches to the important city of Lille. Opposite the sector of attack it rose, some three miles behind the enemy front line, to a height of about 120 feet. Small as it may appear to be, this elevation was sufficient to confer all the advantages which have been mentioned. Thus, when the order for a threat against Lille was received, General Haking's plan necessarily contemplated the eventual capture of part of the Aubers Heights and the operation now being described was designed as the preliminary phase of that larger scheme.

Recurring, again, to a more detailed description of the Fromelles battlefield, it has been said that the area was flat and damp. Through it trickled the tiny river Laies, perhaps four or five feet wide, except where it had been enlarged by shell-holes. The stream itself offered some impediment to infantry and some of the shell-hole enlargements were of such size that, filled with water as they were, they provided local obstacles of considerable difficulty. On the front of the 61st Division the river Laies ran about 150 yards behind the enemy front line, but, just opposite the right of the 5th Division's sector its channel emerged into No Man's Land, which it crossed diagonally along the 15th Brigade front, and it entered our lines near the junction of that brigade front with the 14th. Its course through our support and reserve systems was of no tactical importance in the action. The battle takes its name from the village of Fromelles, which lay about two miles on the German side of the line.

The front lines of the opposing forces along the front of attack lay, in the 5th Divisional Sector, almost due east and west. On the extreme right of the Divisional Sector the enemy defences swung suddenly south-west, which direction they maintained along the front allotted to the 61st Division. The result of this change of direction was to create a marked projection of the enemy's line at the point of change, and this projection thus effectively enfiladed No Man's Land both to its right and to its left. This was assisted by the fact that a slight local rise, perhaps the ruin of an old building, existed at the spot. Quick to avail himself of the advantages conferred by such a disposition the enemy had spared no effort to strengthen further a point already formidable, and elaborate concrete protections now made its machine gun garrison secure against all but a highly accurate bombardment of the heaviest artillery. Owing to its shape and slight elevation, this point had been aptly named the Sugar Loaf, and it exercised a potent and fatal influence on the fortunes of the fight that was waged around it.

While it has been said that the line on the 5th Divisional Sector ran almost due east and west, it is necessary to add that our and the enemy lines were not exactly parallel. On the extreme right of the sector the lines were separated by 450 yards, but they gradually and regularly converged towards the left until, at the extreme left of the front of attack, No Man's Land was only about 120 yards across. The result of this convergence caused considerable differences in the width of No Man's Land to be crossed by the three brigades, the 15th Brigade on the right having an average width of about 400 yards, the 14th Brigade in the centre, 250 yards, and the 8th Brigade on the left, about 150 yards. It was not anticipated, however, that any great variation would be occasioned by this in the tasks allotted to the three brigades. For the plan of operations provided for the first wave of each brigade deploying into No Man's Land about 100 yards in front of the enemy parapet during the last fifteen minutes of the artillery bombardment of the enemy front line, and, on the artillery lift to barrage lines, the foremost troops of each brigade would then have assaulted over equal distances—assuming, of course, that the deployment in No Man's Land had been successful. And General Haking's selection of a narrow No Man's Land for the extreme left of his whole attack conferred one marked advantage, it involved the construction of only a short fire trench by which his old front line would be connected with the new one in the captured ground. As flank protection, especially in an operation on a very limited front, is a *sine qua non* of success, that consideration was of great importance.

No detailed description of the British trench system is necessary for an understanding of the operation. Its chief characteristics have already been indicated in the preceding chapter, and the reader should remember that the front line was a stout breastwork and not a trench. Behind it lay the 75 yards line, a small and unpretentious fire trench constructed for defensive emergency. The 300 yards line, at the distance named from the front line, was the main support trench and it was substantially built of thick sandbagged breastworks and it had a number of shelters and other accommodation for its garrison. The reserve positions were about 700 yards farther back, but they do not call for any description here. A point of importance, however, is the means by which the front line was reached. The Rue du Bois or the Rue Petillon, two roads of good quality, were normally used for approach, and these were connected with the front line by saps, or communication trenches, through which the last half mile or so of the journey was accomplished. As it was of the highest importance that a constant flow of traffic to and from the front line should be maintained throughout the fight, care was taken to ensure that each brigade front had one at least of these saps for its traffic. On the 8th Brigade front, Cellar Farm Avenue led into the front line at the extreme left of the attack frontage,

and Mine Avenue, which, in the vicinity of the 300 yards line, branched off to the right from Cellar Farm Avenue, also led into the 8th Brigade front near its right extremity. The 14th Brigade front was fed by Brompton Avenue, a sap that had recently been little used and that required extensive repairs by the 14th Field Company before it was serviceable. The 15th Brigade front was supplied by Pinney's Avenue, entering near its left boundary, and V.C. Avenue, which came in about the centre of that brigade sector. Bond Street, which lay just outside the 15th Brigade frontage on its right, was allotted to the 184th Brigade, which was the left brigade of the 61st Division. All the places mentioned will be seen on the map of the Fromelles battlefield, p. 93. By dawn on the 19th the preparations were to all intents and purposes complete. Col. Hardy, the A.D.M.S., had secured for one Main Dressing Station a huge factory in Bac St. Maur capable of accommodating several thousand patients. It was staffed by six officers and 130 *personnel* of the 14th and 15th Field Ambulances. The Main Dressing Station of the 8th Brigade on the left was established at Fort Rompu, and was staffed by five officers and 166 other ranks. Both M.D.S. contained all the required facilities for quick admissions and operations, and clearances back to No. 2 A.C.C.S at Estaires. Advanced Dressing Stations were established at Port à Clous, Le croix les Cornex, Fleurbaix, Rouge de Bout, and Croix Blanche, while Regimental Aid Posts were located at Rifle Villa, Eton Hall, Meikle House, Foray House, Y Farm, and J Post. Twenty-one motor ambulances were secured especially for the operation, as the ambulances of the Division had not yet come to hand. Soyer stoves were installed at all dressing stations and supplies of hot water, cocoa, and soup were thereby ensured.

Largely through Lieut.-Col. Carey's energetic organisation the engineer companies had completed their dumps, and by constant repairing had kept in a serviceable condition the main saps to their respective brigade frontages. The strength of each field company was divided up and allotted to definite tasks, part to go across behind the attacking waves and to help them to consolidate, part to direct the digging of trenches across No Man's Land in order to link up the captured ground with our old front line, and the remainder to direct the flow of engineering material forward, and to ensure that the saps and tram-lines were maintained in a workable condition.

The artillery was grouped by General Christian into three groups, a right under Lieut.-Col. Phillips to support the 15th Infantry Brigade, a centre group under Lieut.-Col. Caddy to support the 14th Infantry Brigade, and a left group under Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor to support the 8th Infantry Brigade. Lieut.-Col. Lucas's Artillery Brigade, the 15th, was divided up between the other three groups. The brigades of the 4th Australian Divisional Artillery were also distributed evenly throughout the groups, the 10th Brigade working


on the right, the 9th Brigade in the centre, and the 11th Brigade on the left. The 171st British Brigade of R.F.A. was similarly distributed throughout the groups. The three groups were thus of similar strength and composition, each consisting of nine 18-pounders and two 4.5 howitzer batteries. A small force of heavy artillery with definitely allotted targets operated under Corps control throughout the fight. It included a small number of 6-inch guns, two batteries of 9.2-inch and two 12-inch howitzers mounted on railway trucks.

The five trench mortar batteries, medium and heavy, which were lent to the Division for the operation, were placed under Major Sir T. Keane, R.F.A., who acted as D.T.M.O. throughout the battle. The officers and *personnel* of the 5th Divisional Trench Mortar Batteries, who had not yet had a fortnight's experience of their new arm, were distributed among the loaned batteries to assist wherever possible and to learn all they could of their new work.

The artillery programme was not complicated. It comprised registration and a certain amount of wire-cutting on the days before the attack. At Zero hour, which was finally fixed for 11 a.m. on the 19th, an artillery bombardment of seven hours' duration was to precede the infantry attack. It was considered that this would be sufficient to flatten the enemy front and support lines to such an extent that they would offer no serious obstacle to the infantry. At stated times throughout the seven hours' bombardment a succession of four brief lifts to barrage lines was arranged. These lifts were to be of a few minutes' duration and were designed to induce the enemy to believe that the infantry assault was about to commence, and thus to cause him to come out of his underground shelters and man his parapets. At the conclusion of each lift the barrage was to fall suddenly again on to the enemy front line, where it was hoped it would cause heavy casualties to his exposed infantry and machine-gunners. For this reason shrapnel was to be used for the first two minutes after each lift instead of high explosive. The lifts were timed as follows :—

- 1st Lift 3.25 p.m. to 3.29 p.m.
- 2nd Lift 4.4. p.m. to 4.9 p.m.
- 3rd Lift 4.29 p.m. to 4.36 p.m.
- 4th Lift 5.20 p.m. to 5.31 p.m.

During each lift the men in the front line were instructed to show their naked bayonets and dummy figures over the parapet in order to encourage the delusion that they were about to assault. At 6 p.m. the artillery was to lift finally to certain barrage areas behind the objectives, where it was hoped that it would afford the infantry security during its consolidation of the new positions. The medium and heavy trench mortar programme was arranged on similar lines, except that their special mission was the destruction of the enemy



wire that skirted in thick, impenetrable waves the entire enemy front line.

The arrangements for the infantry assault were simple. The three brigades were to attack each on a two-battalion frontage; the third battalion was to be employed in carrying stores to the attacking troops and in garrisoning the front line after the others had moved out of it. The fourth battalion of each brigade was to be held in reserve. The assaulting troops were to go over in four waves at distances of about 100 yards. The orders provided for the commencement of the deployment of the leading wave in No Man's Land 15 minutes before the final lift of the artillery and as near to the enemy front as our own barrage permitted.

It will be remembered that when the Division took over the Bois Grenier sector, the 29th and 30th Battalions of the 8th Brigade, the 55th and 56th of the 14th Brigade, and the 57th and 58th of the 15th Brigade were sent to the front line, while the remaining battalions of each brigade were kept in reserve. Accordingly both General Tivey and Colonel Pope decided to entrust the assault on their fronts to the battalions which had so far not been employed. General Elliott, whose front line battalions had not been moved from their original position, at first determined to carry out the assault with them, but the additional fatigue and strain caused by the postponement, as well as the heavy enemy artillery retaliation, led him to change his plans and to relieve the 57th and 58th with the 59th and 60th Battalions. This was carried out on the 18th; consequently the order from right to left of the attacking battalions of the 5th Division was 59th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Harris), 60th Battalion (Major McRae), 53rd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Norris), 54th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Cass), 31st Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Toll), 32nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Coghill). These were the two assaulting battalions of each brigade. On the 15th Brigade front General Elliott had his 58th Battalion (Major Denehy) in support, while Col. Pope and General Tivey allotted this position to the 55th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. McConaghy) and 30th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Clark) respectively. The reserve battalions of the three brigades were thus the 57th (Lieut.-Col. Stewart), 56th (Lieut.-Col. Scott), and 29th (Lieut.-Col. Bennett).

On the 18th an order from General Haking to the attacking divisions was published. It read:—

To the Troops of the 61st Division and 5th Australian
Division.

As you know we were going to have a fight on Monday, but the weather was so thick that our artillery could not see well enough to produce the very accurate shooting we require for the success of our plan. So I had to put it off and G.H.Q. said

do it as soon as you can. I have fixed Zero for Wednesday and I know you will do your best for the sake of our lads who are fighting down south.

(Signed) R. HAKING.

XI Corps H.Q. 18th July, 1916.

The morning of the 19th was calm and misty with the promise of a clear, fine day later. Reports from patrols in No Man's Land during the night indicated that the damage done to the enemy's wire was as yet inconsiderable, but no great importance was attached to that as the chief part of the artillery preparation had still to come. The patrol reports disclosed also that the enemy was very vigilant and that close inspection of parts of his wire was impossible owing to the presence of strong enemy posts in No Man's Land. At 8 a.m. news was received by the Division that Zero hour would be 11 a.m., which, allowing for the seven hours' artillery preparation, meant that the infantry assault would take place at 6 p.m. The morning was comparatively quiet with at first but little enemy retaliation to the fire of our guns and trench mortars. It almost seemed that he knew that our forward lines were not yet packed with the infantry assembling for the assault. At 2.15 p.m., however, there was a marked increase in enemy counter preparation, and by 3 p.m. a heavy and continuous volume of fire was falling over the front and support line and the saps leading to them, now filled with the assembling infantry. Minenwerfer were reaching our lines on the left and centre sectors, while Pinney's Avenue was already badly damaged and the 15th Brigade area was being raked with shrapnel. In these circumstances casualties commenced to mount steadily, but reports from the front line stated that the enemy wire and parapets were suffering severely and were likely to prove of little protection to him at the moment of assault. The assembly was reported complete on the 8th Brigade front at 3.26 p.m. on the 14th at 3.45 p.m. and on the 15th at 4 p.m. The men had received specially good breakfasts and dinners and were in high spirits. The enemy fire continued to increase in volume on the front trenches, where already three of the four company commanders of the 53rd Battalion had become casualties. At about 5 p.m. the fire diminished considerably on the front line, but a heavy barrage soon fell across the support and communication trenches. Meanwhile, the artillery lifts were being carried out as directed and, in some places at least, with the desired effect. On the 61st Division's front the position was much the same. The enemy parapet was there stated to have been "shattered all along the line." Subsequent investigations showed, however, that on both fronts the damage sustained by the enemy defences, though considerable, was over-estimated in these first reports. It should be stated here that the L.T.M.B. of each division co-operated strongly in the preliminary artillery bombardment, and some thousands of

Stokes bombs added their contribution to the storm of destruction that was breaking over the enemy lines.

Punctually at 5.45 p.m. deployment into No Man's Land commenced, and it was hoped that the artillery barrage would be sufficiently intense to keep enemy heads down until the deployment was completed. From this point the deployment and assault of each brigade will be described in order, commencing with the 15th Brigade on the right.

On the extreme right of the 5th Divisional frontage, the 59th Battalion was scarcely over the parapet before a little desultory musketry fire was opened on it, coming chiefly from the Sugar Loaf. Before the men had gone 30 yards this fire had grown in intensity and a machine gun added its significant voice to the rapidly increasing fusillade. The waves pressed forward steadily, but just as steadily the enemy fire grew hotter and hotter and the enemy front lines were seen to be thickly manned with troops. The losses mounted rapidly as the men pressed gallantly on into the withering fire. Lieut.-Col. Harris was disabled by a shell and Major Layh took charge of the dwindling lines, which, finding a slight depression about 100 yards from the enemy parapet, halted in the scanty cover it provided and commenced to reorganise their broken and depleted units.

The deployment of the 60th Battalion was attended by similar circumstances. Heavy fire was encountered almost from the moment of its appearance over the parapet. Into this the troops pressed with the same steadiness as that displayed by the 59th, and with the same result. The ranks, especially on the right, where they were most exposed to the Sugar Loaf, thinned rapidly, but the later waves followed on without hesitation or confusion. On the left flank more headway was made. To halt in No Man's Land in these circumstances was to court certain death, and Major McRae led his troops right on towards the enemy parapet. It was his last act of gallant leadership. Just at the enemy wire the enfilade fire from the Sugar Loaf became intense and there, almost at his goal, he fell. His adjutant fell beside him, and there, too, the greater part of the 60th Battalion melted away. Only on the extreme left were the enemy trenches entered by elements of the 60th. They appear to have had some temporary success, for they sent back a few prisoners, but, as the official report significantly states, "Touch with them was subsequently lost." Thus, on the entire front of the 15th Brigade within half an hour from the time of assault it was apparent that the 61st Division had failed to take the Sugar Loaf, and that it was beyond human power to cross so wide a No Man's Land in the face of the machine gun fire that streamed continuously from it. By 6.30 p.m. the remnants of the two battalions were doggedly digging in as near to the enemy parapet as they could get. Thirty-five out of 39 of the assaulting officers were already killed or wounded, and with them most of the N.C.O.'s. In these circumstances the survivors



A TYPICAL COMMUNICATION TRENCH ON THE GUEUDECOURT SECTOR, DECEMBER, 1916.

could only hold on determinedly to what they had won, and await such further action as their trusted Brigade Commander might devise to meet the situation. Meanwhile Major Greenway's engineer sections under Lieut. Noedl, who was severely wounded but still at duty, were pushing on vigorously with the sap across No Man's Land. The enemy, on his part, was quick to appreciate its importance and strove by all means in his power to retard its progress. Some machine guns were also trained on the belt of land that lay between our parapet and the thin line out in No Man's Land, and effectually prevented regular communication between the two; other machine-guns and snipers moved to positions whence they could better enfilade the troops in their shallow *ex tempore* defences. To crown all, his artillery was informed of the position and, as night closed in, a continuous stream of shells fell over and around the grim but helpless line in No Man's Land.

The troops of the centre and left brigades, although they had suffered heavily under the preliminary bombardment, experienced in their assault a vastly different fortune. Immune from the fatal enfilade of the Sugar Loaf, the 53rd and 54th Battalions completed their deployment with comparatively slight additional casualties and, as the barrage lifted, the leading waves dashed into the enemy front lines. The enemy was caught in the act of manning his parapets and some bitter hand to hand fighting followed. It terminated, as all such hand to hand fighting terminated throughout the war, in the absolute triumph of the Australians and the extinction or capitulation of the Germans. The front line thus secured, the later waves streamed over it and made for the enemy support trench, which, according to their information, lay about 150 yards behind his front line. The intervening country, torn with shell-holes and intersected by communication trenches, was difficult to cross, and it was swept by a certain amount of machine-gun and musketry fire. By this time both Lieut.-Col. Norris and his adjutant were killed and the 53rd Battalion was thus early deprived of practically all its senior officers. A careful search of the terrain failed to disclose anything in the nature of an organised enemy support line at the place indicated on the aeroplane maps, and both 53rd and 54th Battalions spent a considerable time in searching for one. Except for certain fragmentary trench sections, all that could be found was an old ditch containing a couple of feet of water. Whatever the purpose of its original construction, it was now used as a drain to convey away the water pumped by pumping plants from the deep dug-outs of the front line. The non-existence of an organised support line at the place indicated in the orders was an immediate and fruitful source of complication, aggravated particularly in the 53rd Battalion by the dearth of senior officers. Instead of stepping into a definite and well constructed line, the men became dispersed in the search for one, and, with night closing in and the

enemy counter-attacks impending, the necessity to consolidate somewhere became pressing. This was done, but the line taken up lacked the continuity and lateral communications that a good trench would have afforded. In these circumstances, the 53rd Battalion's touch with the 54th on its left became intermittent and finally ceased altogether, while even between the elements of the 53rd itself communication was irregular. The position of the 54th Battalion was materially better. Although three of its four company commanders and three of its four seconds in command were casualties prior to the assault, Lieut.-Col. Cass had happily escaped injury and was thus able to direct the consolidation of his position. By strenuous effort the line of the drain was improved and a moderately good fire position along the whole of the 54th Battalion frontage was soon in course of construction. Taken altogether, the situation on Col. Pope's sector for a time appeared encouraging. Capt. Dick, O.C. 14th Machine Gun Company, succeeded in pushing across No Man's Land ten of his machine guns, and these were soon located in favourable positions in the captured ground. Major Bachtold was able to report also that the communication trench, which the 14th Field Company was constructing across No Man's Land, was making rapid headway and promised to be complete before dawn.

On the left sector, General Tivey was faced from the outset with the heavy responsibility of securing the extreme left flank of the entire battle frontage. In order that his battalions might deploy unhindered by fire from the intact enemy trenches beyond his left boundary, arrangements were made for the troops on the left of the 8th Brigade to cover the deployment with heavy rifle fire. In addition to this, a mine laid in No Man's Land just outside the brigade's left boundary and charged with 1,200 lb. of ammonal was ordered to be fired at the moment of assault as a screen from enemy machine gun fire. The trench to be dug across No Man's Land in the 8th Brigade sector was sited on the left extremity of the brigade frontage, and was designed to serve as a fire as well as a communication trench, for, had the operation succeeded, it would have become part of the new front line.

In the front trench the casualties had been numerous before the hour of deployment, and they still mounted steadily as the waves passed over the top into No Man's Land. Major Higgon, who led A Company, 32nd Battalion, was shot dead as he left our parapet, and many other officers became casualties in the same vicinity. Here, as in the other brigades, every man carried 120 rounds of S.A.A., two Mill's grenades, and two sandbags, while every third man carried pick or shovel alternately.

At 6 p.m. the battalions stormed over what was left of the enemy wire and were soon masters of the enemy front trench. Many Germans were killed and a good number of prisoners taken. Pressing on to their next objective, they met with an experience precisely

similar to that of the battalions of the 14th Brigade. An open ditch containing about three feet of water, some 150 yards behind the enemy front line, was the only trace of enemy works in the vicinity, and, though Lieut.-Col. Toll personally explored the country for several hundred yards farther, he found no trace of an enemy support line. The search for the expected system took many of the officers and men of both battalions into the area of our own protective barrage, and not a few casualties were suffered thereby. Constrained to make the best of things, Col. Toll ordered his battalion to consolidate along the ditch. This was proceeded with, and touch with the 54th Battalion on the right was for a time secured. But the work of digging up the tenacious Flanders mud was heart-breaking, and it was equally laborious to put it into sandbags for the construction of a parapet. Thus, comparatively early in the operation, it was already becoming doubtful if a reasonably good defence line could be prepared before morning. The 32nd Battalion, preoccupied with the necessity of maintaining the left flank, was already gravitating in that direction, and touch with the 31st was not continuous. Availing itself of whatever scattered shell-holes and vantage points seemed best suited to its purpose, the 32nd Battalion commenced to link them up with the captured part of the enemy front line. In this, too, a block was made on the extreme left in order to keep at bay possible enemy attempts to storm down their own front line and take the battalion in the rear.

The general position on the 5th Divisional front at 7.30 p.m. on the 19th was that the attack was definitely held up on the right brigade sector and successful on the centre and left sectors. The 59th and 60th Battalions had suffered terribly, and in the 53rd, 54th, 31st, and 32nd Battalions the percentage of losses, especially among the officers, was very high and was still mounting steadily. The line held was an indifferent one. Consolidation was difficult; the line was not continuous and lateral communication along it was irregular and uncertain. The engineer companies, each assisted by strong infantry parties from the supporting battalions, were all making excellent headway with the communication trenches across No Man's Land. A company from each of the supporting battalions was engaged in carrying stores of ammunition and engineering material forward to the captured positions. The remaining companies of the supporting battalions had moved to our front line about the time of the assault and were now garrisoning it, while the reserve battalions of each brigade had been moved forward into the 300 yards line and to positions near it.

Meanwhile, what was happening in the front of the 61st Division? Enemy artillery counter preparation had caused considerable casualties in all three brigades, but deployment, which commenced at 5.30 p.m., was on the whole successful. The 182nd Brigade on the right and the 183rd in the centre got into position with compara-

tively slight additional losses. The 184th Brigade was less fortunate. There were 140 casualties in the assaulting companies before they left their front line, and the losses rapidly mounted as they crossed the parapet and deployed into No Man's Land. The two Berks companies were practically annihilated, and Lieut.-Col. Bear, the battalion commander, was killed by machine gun fire from the Sugar Loaf. The two Bucks companies on the left managed to get into position before the Sugar Loaf, but they incurred heavy losses in doing so.

The 61st Division attack was temporarily successful on the right only. Some Warwicks companies reached the enemy trenches, captured 60 prisoners, and held on for a time. But over all the rest of the front the attack failed definitely. In the centre the Gloucesters were stopped by machine gun fire, while on the left a small part from the Bucks companies got into the Sugar Loaf and were not seen again. In these circumstances, the 61st Divisional Commander decided, in accordance with instructions previously received, to withdraw the elements in the captured trenches and to reopen the bombardment of the enemy front line as a preliminary to another attack along his whole divisional front at 9 p.m. This decision was communicated to the 5th Division, and the co-operation of our right brigade was asked for the capture of the Sugar Loaf at that hour. General Haking having given his sanction for the use of another half battalion for the attack on the Sugar Loaf, General Elliott instructed the 58th Battalion to carry out the operation, and after considerable difficulty C and D Companies were got into position in time for the assault.

About 8.20 p.m. General Haking telephoned the 61st Division that the assault should not be renewed and that all troops should be withdrawn from the captured trenches after dark. This verbal order was confirmed by a written message at 8.55 p.m. The second attack was to be postponed to the following morning, and the 5th Australian Division was instructed to hold on over-night in order to assist the new attack on the 20th. This order reached the 5th Australian Division, but, unfortunately, not in time for it to get to the 58th Battalion before the two companies attacked at 9 p.m.

At 9.55 p.m. General Haking telephoned G.O.C. 61st Division pointing out the desirability of getting into the Sugar Loaf during the night in order to help the Australians. At about the same time, the Brigadier-General, General Staff, XI Corps, conferring with General McCay, advised him to hold on for the attack of the 61st Division on the Sugar Loaf.

At 10.40 p.m. General Haking again spoke to G.O.C. 61st Division and issued definite orders that the Sugar Loaf had to be taken during the night. The 184th Brigade was accordingly ordered to take the Sugar Loaf.

At 11.17 p.m. information reached General Haking that the

whole of the 61st Division was now back in its original front line.

At 1.25 a.m. on the 20th General Haking again laid stress on the capture of the Sugar Loaf by the 61st Division before daylight.

At 2.10 a.m. the 61st Division reported that owing to great congestion in the saps it was impossible to get into position to attack the Sugar Loaf before daylight.

All this is recorded without comment. Whatever subsequent attacks were projected on the front of the 61st Division, none eventuated; such troops as had entered the enemy lines were all withdrawn by about 9 p.m. The artillery fire then gradually died away, and by 9.30 p.m. all active operations on the part of the 61st Division may be said to have been concluded. The total casualties of the Division were 1,582. The 184th Brigade lost 400. The actual number of infantry employed in the assault was about 2,400.

The progress of the fight on the 5th Divisional front will now be traced to its conclusion and, as the dispositions of the three brigades now rendered their concerted action almost impossible, the narratives of each will be treated separately. As active operations terminated on the 15th Brigade front at about 1 a.m. on the 20th, on the 8th Brigade front at about 6 a.m. and on the 14th Brigade front at about 9 a.m., the recountal will be made in the order mentioned.

General Elliott received official news of the failure of the 61st Division at about 7.30 p.m., by which time he was also aware that the 59th and 60th Battalions were badly cut up and quite unable to advance without assistance. On receipt of the information at 7.52 that he could use two companies of the 58th to support his attack in conjunction with the attack of the 184th Brigade on the Sugar Loaf, he took immediate steps to make the necessary arrangements, and by 8.45 p.m. was able to report that all preparations were completed. Command of the attack was entrusted to Major Hutchinson. Few more gallant episodes than this dashing, hopeless assault exist in the annals of any army in the world. As the reader already knows, the attack of the 61st Division had been abandoned and the Sugar Loaf defences were thus enabled to concentrate the whole of their organised machine gun fire on the one thin line that now endeavoured to penetrate it. With wonderful dash the companies pressed on, losing at every step, but undaunted to the end. They reached the remnants of the 59th and 60th Battalions where they lay grimly waiting in their shallow improvised positions; they caught them up and carried them on towards the enemy by the impetus of their own heroic charge; impeded by broken ground and shell-holes, the thinning line surged brokenly forward, reeling under the galling enfilade, enduring everything but the thought of failing. It was in vain. At the enemy wire the fire became hellish, irresistible. Major Hutchinson, his body riddled with bullets, perished gloriously, close to the German parapet. The attack melted into nothingness

—passed in a few quivering moments from the realm of man's high endeavour to the record of his deathless failures. The Brigade had failed—failed magnificently in a sublime attempt to achieve the impossible. The ground was covered with its dead and dying, among whom the wounded dragged themselves painfully, seeking the fearful security of a shell-hole or a mound that might give some protection from the machine gun fire that still enveloped them. Some few, preserved by a miracle from either wounds or death, did what was in their power to assist the wounded, and even to patch up some form of a defensive line; but the fruitlessness of further sacrifice was now apparent to all. After a couple of hours the remnants of all three battalions commenced to drift back to their old front line, wounded assisting wounded, those still unscathed bearing some comrade too badly stricken to aid himself. The communication trench on which the 15th Field Company and its infantry helpers had not ceased for a moment to work, here proved invaluable and afforded to many of the survivors a moderately safe transit over the 200 yards of its length. On their arrival in the front line the remnants were hastily organised under the skilful control of Capt. R. G. Legge, the Staff Captain, and withdrawn to the rear, and the defence of the brigade front was passed to the 57th Battalion, which entered at once on the imperative duties of improving the front parapet and of succouring the wounded in No Man's Land.

Tragedy, less stark because longer delayed, but in the end equally absolute, attended the operations of the 8th and 14th Brigades. On General Tivey's front the casualties had been severe before the assault and very considerable during it and Lieut.-Col. Toll on the brigade right, and Lieut.-Col. Coghill on its left, both felt that reinforcements were necessary if the new positions were to be maintained permanently. About 8.50 p.m., therefore, both battalions asked for support, and authority was granted for the use of half the 30th Battalion for this purpose. A company of this battalion was already engaged under the 8th Field Company in digging the communication trench across No Man's Land, and B Company was also employed in carrying stores across to the new positions. C and D Companies were accordingly dispatched to reinforce the 31st and 32nd Battalions, and half the 29th Battalion was moved up to hold our original front line. The troops in the enemy positions worked feverishly all night long to consolidate, and Lieut.-Col. Coghill and Lieut.-Col. Toll, the latter bleeding from a wound in the head, spared no effort to render the position defensible. The 8th Machine Gun Company under Capt. Marsden got a number of guns into the captured area and, despite considerable losses, was thus able to contribute something towards its security. While most of the assaulting troops of both battalions were dispersed along the foremost line of defence, the possibility of being forced back into the enemy front line was not overlooked and everything that was

practicable was done to convert it into a strong support position. Thus the fight continued throughout the night. The enemy artillery never for a moment ceased its pounding of the lines; enemy machine guns from their strong points at The Tadpole, Farm Delangré, and de Mouquet Farm, swept the whole field with their deadly transverse fire; heavy bombing attacks from front or flank were met and repelled. The darkness of the night and the smoke and confusion of battle rendered observation impossible and the enemy, aided by his perfect knowledge of the ground and its communication trenches, appeared and disappeared in the most bewildering way. Messages were sent for ammunition, for sandbags, for water for the machine guns, and for engineering material. The carrying parties, plying backwards and forwards across No Man's Land, did their best to supply these requirements, but in the obscurity and turmoil of a night operation it was often difficult to find exactly where the various loads were required. The communication trench across No Man's Land progressed rapidly, but the workers on it suffered severely. Lieut. Tenbosch the engineer officer in charge was killed early in the fight but towards morning the trench was complete except for the last score of yards where it approached the left of the captured trench. The enemy was quick to realise its purpose and importance and concentrated on the sap-head heavy sniping and machine gun fire from the unassaulted part of his line; so that the trench became blocked with dead and further work on it was impossible. As the night progressed, the strain on the assaulting troops became heavier and heavier, while their numbers dwindled steadily. The appeal for reinforcements was insistent and troops not detailed for the fight were insensibly drawn into it. Capt. Mortimer, of the 29th Battalion, took his A Company over to carry stores, and both he and Capt. Sheridan, his second in command, were killed, and few of the men who had followed them over returned. Major Hughes, second in command of the 32nd Battalion, with a small party was engaged in organising a depression into a strong point when he was struck down with a severe body wound. Faint from loss of blood, he lost consciousness again and again throughout the night, but always when he came to he rallied the men around him and kept on exhorting them to fight to the last. He was borne off into captivity the next morning, but happily recovered from his wounds and returned again to his native land. Before dawn the 32nd Battalion was almost without officers. Lieut.-Col. Coghill was still doing what yet might be done to hold the position, and Capt. White and Capt. Geddes of D Company were also un wounded. But the company commanders and their seconds in command of the other three companies were all either killed or wounded and with them most of their subalterns.

Just about dawn the end came with dramatic suddenness. Capt. White, holding the attenuated left of the 32nd Battalion

against persistent enemy attempts to penetrate, sent an urgent verbal message to Capt. Mills of the 31st Battalion on his right to come and see him. Capt. Mills immediately made his way to the left and found Capt. White hard pressed to maintain his line. The two officers discussed the position and decided that Capt. White's best defence was a vigorous offensive outward movement which Capt. Mills would support by extending his command to the left. Capt. Mills returned to give effect to this arrangement, but before he had reached his position his right hand was suddenly shattered, the air was filled with bursting grenades, and a German had seized him roughly, saying, "Officer, why do you not put up your hands?" He was dragged into a communication trench and hurried to the rear as a prisoner of war. At the same time a heavy enemy bombing attack was in progress on the left of the line, and though it was held in places, it crumpled our resistance in the vicinity of the enemy front line, where considerable forces of Germans managed to penetrate.

The position of the forward troops of the 32nd Battalion immediately became desperate. They were already almost cut off and the only course left them was to endeavour to cut their way back to the enemy front line and, if possible, to hold that. This many tried to do, but few succeeded. To the front and enfilade fire which they had endured for nine hours was now added a murderous stream of bullets from the rear, and by these they were either killed or driven to cover in the shell-holes and broken communication trenches with which the ground was dotted. Although no concerted resistance was possible by these isolated parties, all of them continued to resist individually for some hours, by which time they were either killed or mopped up as prisoners. This resistance, although it availed nothing for the recovery of the 8th Brigade ground, had eventually important consequences, for it delayed any heavy enemy concentration on the left flank of the 14th Brigade until that formation had completed its preparations for withdrawal.

The crumpling of the left flank about 4 a.m. had an immediate effect on the 31st Battalion. The fire coming from the rear was their first intimation of the enemy's recovery of part of his old front line, and the only course left them was now to return to that part of it which still remained in British hands. This was done, though with considerable loss, and Lieut.-Col. Toll, undismayed by the thickening dangers and complications of his position, strove to defend the trench by re-organising the remnants of all four battalions of the brigade as well as the machine gunners who were now there. But the effort was vain, and, though the men held on for another half-hour or more, heavy converging bombing attacks about 5 a.m. broke by their weight the defences of the wearied survivors. Many had expended all their ammunition and bombs, and practically all the officers were casualties. In these circumstances

further resistance was impossible and further sacrifice without avail. Their empty rifles in their hands, the broken remnants of the assaulting units picked their way back across No Man's Land through a hot machine gun fire from the unassaulted sectors of the enemy front. Lieut.-Col. Toll was the last to leave the enemy trench, and he strode back contemptuously through the enemy fire, maintaining to the end of the action the soldierly bearing and disregard of personal safety that had characterised his conduct throughout the operation.

The retiring troops had scarcely regained their original front line when the enemy, well-informed of their withdrawal, threw a heavy artillery barrage over our ruined trenches. Under this the survivors of the 32nd, 31st, and 30th Battalions were hastily collected and withdrawn to the rear, the defence of the entire brigade sector passing into the keeping of the 29th Battalion, the remaining two companies of which had been moved up from the support and 75 yards lines for that purpose. Thus at about 6 a.m. on the 20th, infantry action on the front of the 8th Brigade terminated. Like the 15th Brigade, it had been set a task which, as it turned out, was beyond the power of man to accomplish, and, like the 15th Brigade, it achieved in its failure a renown that will never die, a glory that cannot pass away. It tried and died. It is no wonder that General Tivey, hurrying to the front line at the first moment he could be spared from Brigade H.Q., stood for a moment stricken silent with grief at the spectacle he saw. Above all other things he was characterised by a loving attachment to his men, and he was deeply moved as he picked his way carefully through the front line among the bodies of the men he had loved so well.

Events on the 14th Brigade front present in many respects a striking similarity to those on the 8th Brigade front. We have already seen that Lieut.-Col. Cass, in command of the 54th Battalion, had been able to consolidate a moderately good fire position. The failure of the attack of the 15th Brigade had immediately thrown on the 53rd Battalion the onus of securing the right flank of the new position, and, preoccupied with this heavy responsibility, it appears to have gravitated to the right, just as, on the 8th Brigade front, the 32nd Battalion was forced to concentrate most of its attention on the left. Thus the 54th Battalion, like the 31st, temporarily immune from flank distractions, had better opportunities to organise its position for defence. Despite these advantages, however, the losses had been severe and were steadily growing under the constant artillery pounding. In these circumstances Lieut.-Col. Cass saw that he would require help before dawn, and, at 7.30 p.m. sent back a request for reinforcements. The necessary authority being forthcoming, Colonel Pope directed Lieut.-Col. McConaghy of the 55th Battalion to send two of his companies over. Two companies were accordingly dispatched, one to reinforce the

53rd and one to the 54th. As one company of the 55th was already engaged in digging the communication trench across No Man's Land, and another company in carrying stores, the whole 55th Battalion was now involved. Accordingly, at 10 p.m. Lieut.-Col. McConaghy moved his headquarters to the enemy front line while A and B Companies of the 56th Battalion moved up to our front line as its garrison. Before long, however, additional infantry working parties were required for the communication trench, and Capt. Roberts took his B Company out, and it was largely owing to their fine work that the trench was completed at about 2.30 a.m. on the 20th.

By this time enemy concentrations on the right flank were causing the gravest anxiety to the 53rd Battalion. Bombing attack after bombing attack had sought to penetrate the right flank and the entire energies of what was left of the battalion were absorbed in maintaining the position. Touch was finally lost with the 54th Battalion on the left, and a gap of some extent was created between the two battalions. The enemy was quick to avail himself of this opening, and Lieut.-Col. Cass, whose men had at 2.20 a.m. repulsed a heavy frontal attack, was suddenly forced about twenty minutes later to beat off another attempt on his right. This was his first definite intimation that things were not going well with the 53rd and that his right flank was in danger. Towards daylight the persistent enemy attempts on the right of the 53rd commenced to make headway. Capt. Arblaster, on whom the chief burden of the advanced command seems to have fallen, worked most heroically all night, until at last he was dangerously wounded. This gallant officer died some days later as a prisoner of war at Douai, and, thanks to the sympathy and courtesy of the French civilians there, was accorded a funeral that befitted his heroic end. But the outer lines of the 53rd were no longer intact. They were pierced in several places and the defenders were broken into isolated though still resisting groups or driven back to the enemy front line, which Lieut.-Col. McConaghy and Major R. Cowey were organising as a support position. Already hints of enemy encroachments had been experienced here, and now that the right flank was no longer secure the maintenance of the support position became of vital importance. To relieve the pressure somewhat, Lieut.-Col. McConaghy organised a bayonet assault along parapet and parados. This was carried out most gallantly by Lieut. Denoon and a party of about 50 men, who cleared the front trench of enemy for a further distance of 60 yards to the right, a very welcome addition to the limited base on which the brigade salient was established. Lieut. Matthews (55th Battalion) and a party of 56th Battalion bombers did very good work about this time.

Lieut.-Col. Cass was similarly beset on the forward line and resorted to similar means to keep the enemy at a distance. Pioneer

Sergeant Stringer rendered valuable service at the head of a successful bayonet assault about 4 a.m., and, for a time at any rate, the enemy desisted from further serious attempts on the line of the 54th. But the tension was soon renewed when it became evident that all was not going well with the 8th Brigade on the left. Although not definitely informed of events in that quarter, Lieut.-Col. Cass was able to gather that the enemy was making headway and that his left flank might soon be exposed. To provide for that contingency, which had indeed already arisen, he drew his line back to the left in a semi-circular direction and prepared it to meet any attacks that might now threaten from that flank. Fortunately, however, the isolated parties of the 31st and 32nd Battalions on the left as well as of the 53rd on the right, though cut off and hopelessly surrounded, were still a factor to be reckoned with. As it turned out, it took some hours for the enemy to mop them up, and before that time the survivors of the 54th and 55th Battalions were safely extricated from a position that was already desperate and soon would have been hopeless.

The information that the 8th Brigade could no longer maintain the left flank against the increasing enemy pressure was received at Divisional H.Q. about 5 a.m. on the 20th. At this moment General Monro, commanding First Army, was with General McCay and other officers at Sailly in conference on the situation, and it was immediately decided that the 14th Brigade should be withdrawn forthwith from its now precarious position. To cover the withdrawal, it was arranged that an artillery barrage should be placed right round the troops involved, behind which it was hoped that they would regain their old front line with a minimum of interference from the enemy. Instructions were accordingly dispatched to General Christian to arrange for the barrage, while the 14th Brigade was instructed to direct Lieut.-Col. Cass to withdraw in the manner decided upon. Communication was difficult at this time, and none of the first seven runners dispatched succeeded in reaching Lieut.-Col. Cass. The eighth runner had better success, and Lieut.-Col. Cass acknowledged the receipt of the instructions at 7.50 a.m. In anticipation of some such order, he had for some time been dribbling back to our front line what machine guns he had still undamaged and on receipt of the order he made immediate preparations for its execution. He instructed Lieut.-Col. McConaghy, who was still in the enemy front line, to provide from his command a rearguard to hold back the enemy during the withdrawal, and Capt. Gibbons and several other officers, together with about 50 men of the 55th Battalion, were detailed for this responsible and desperate duty. The artillery barrage fell, shutting out effectually the enemy beyond it, but there were already considerable numbers well within it, and these pressed the retiring troops with spirit and skill. Two things only saved the brigade from further heavy losses. The first was the

magnificent heroism and self-sacrifice of the small rearguard under Capt. Gibbons ; the second was the existence of the communication trench cut across No Man's Land by Lieut. Fry's section of the 14th Field Company and the infantry parties working under his direction, with whom, too, Capt. Scott, with D Company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion, was now associated. Thanks to fine engineering and to the enthusiasm of the workers, this trench was now four feet deep at its shallowest part and was almost entirely duckboarded. Through it, therefore, the withdrawing infantry hurried in safety, while overhead the machine-gun bullets whistled harmlessly from both flanks of the assaulted sector. But it all took time, and long before the movement was completed Capt. Gibbons's small rearguard found itself fighting bitterly against overwhelming numbers of the victorious enemy. No one thought of himself ; no one thought of yielding ; no one thought of anything save holding on with his last ounce of strength, until the brigade should be extricated. So one by one they fell at their posts, and of this gallant band scarce a man was left alive when the last file of their comrades had passed through the trench to safety. And thus it was that at about 9 a.m. on the 20th the survivors of the 14th Brigade regained their old front line and the battle of Fromelles was concluded. The artillery, indeed, kept up a deliberate rate of fire for some hours longer, and, on both sides of the line, snipers were active, availing themselves of the opportunity to pick off enemies moving along the ruined trenches. But the actual battle was over. These happenings were but the aftermath. The moving finger had passed and was already busy writing of other things.

During this time the attention of the reader has been focussed on the events of the front line and beyond. What of the artillery ? What of the medical services ? What of the reserve troops, the carrying parties, the signal services, the staffs, all that organisation behind the line on which the efficiency of the fighting troops depends ? All alike had passed through a tense and trying night and all alike had done everything within their power to achieve success. The artillery had performed very creditably. Considering everything, the haste of the preparations, the limited opportunities for registration, the comparatively brief training of officers and men in their highly technical arm and the inexperience of most of them to battle conditions, the artillery work was most promising. There were, of course, the inevitable casualties to our own infantry, but that happens in every battle where the assaulting troops are required to work close to the artillery barrage ; and it is better to lose a few men from friendly artillery if by keeping close to the barrage many casualties from hostile machine guns can be avoided. Apart from that, it must be remembered that on the 8th Brigade front the trenches were little more than 100 yards apart, a narrow margin at any time for artillery work. That the wire was generally well cut was evidenced by the little

difficulty experienced by the infantry in crossing it, and the damage to the hostile trench system was very considerable although, as previously stated, the concrete defences and the deeper dug-outs were not seriously damaged. The casualties caused to the enemy by our artillery were great, and his front line and the areas just behind it were littered with his dead, and our prisoners of war saw hundreds of his wounded being evacuated from the field. Throughout the night constant messages were coming through from the infantry asking for artillery fire on centres of enemy activity and the fire always came promptly and accurately and Lieut.-Cols. Phillips, Caddy and Cox-Taylor had good reason to feel proud of the work of their respective groups. The final barrage placed round the 14th Brigade to cover its withdrawal was an effective piece of artillery work and General Christian and Major Thornthwaite, his Brigade Major, had reason to be gratified with the special praise that the work of the artillery received.

One extraordinary feature of the artillery work of both sides was the comparative absence of counter-battery work. Practically no effort appears to have been made to knock out the guns, and the artillery concentration on each side was used almost solely against the infantry. The result was exceptionally heavy infantry casualties and extremely light artillery losses, only one officer and sixteen other ranks of the 5th Division Artillery being hit. The losses of the co-operating artillery were proportionate although the 4th Division lists included among the killed Captain G. K. Thomson, who commanded the 48th Battery.

The artillery work, and, indeed, the organisation of the entire action, were greatly facilitated by the good service maintained by the 5th Divisional Signal Company (Captain R. A. Stanley). Despite heavy shelling good communication was maintained during the action in all but the most forward areas. The lines to infantry brigade headquarters held all night, and thence to the front line communication was also fairly reliable. From the front line to the captured position, however, all wires were cut almost as soon as they were laid, and communications there depended almost entirely on runners among whom the casualties were exceptionally heavy.

No troops engaged in the battle had a longer period of work at high pressure than the medical services and the regimental stretcher-bearers associated with them. The large Main Dressing Station at Bac St. Maur staffed by the 14th (Lieut.-Col. Tebbutt) and 15th (Lieut.-Col. Horne) Field Ambulances proved an ideal site and amply vindicated Colonel Hardy's judgment in selecting it. Owing to its position the flow of casualties to it was greater than that to Fort Rompu, the Main Dressing Station of the 8th Field Ambulance, and Col. Shepherd, although some hundreds of wounded reached him, was able to spare both officers and men to reinforce the other two field ambulances. From the Regimental Aid Posts at Rifle Villa,

and elsewhere casualties poured steadily backward, commencing about noon on the 19th and continuing until early on the 21st, by which time all dressing stations were reported clear of wounded. At midnight on the 19th the pressure of medical work was intense and assistance was sought and obtained from the ever helpful New Zealanders on the left, while doctors and bearers were also furnished by the Oxford and Bucks Brigade and by the attached heavy artillery units. Medical *personnel* engaged at the Saily baths were hastily recalled and every available medical reserve was summoned in order to cope with the critical situation. The Advanced Dressing Stations, especially those at Rouge de Bout and Croix les Cornex, were working at top pressure, while at Rifle Villa, where the strain was intense, the skill and energy of Captain J. B. Metcalfe were saving many lives. Despite the urgent need for haste—and evacuations took place at the rate of two a minute when the rush was heaviest—the quality of the work done was not allowed to suffer in any way. Every patient received an injection of anti-tetanic serum, and all patients who were able to take it were given hot soup or hot cocoa, with most beneficial results. After many hours of extreme tension the rate of admission gradually lessened and the medical staffs were able to secure some badly-needed rest. Lieut.-Col. Horne of the 15th Field Ambulance compiled a chart of great interest showing the anatomical distribution of the wounds treated by his Ambulance. It shows :

Head and neck	328
Shoulders	99
Upper limbs	424
Chest	70
Back	91
Abdomen	48
Lower limbs	496
Shell shock	121
						<hr/>
Total	1,669

The bearers of the field ambulances, the medical officers, and the regimental stretcher bearers worked throughout the night and the following 24 hours in positions of great danger and difficulty. Major Follitt, D.A.D.M.S., rendered valuable service during the operation by maintaining communications between the forward posts and dressing stations. He used a motor bicycle, where possible, and was enabled by this means to deal promptly with each new requirement as it rose. Thousands of wounded were evacuated from the forward area, and the only channel of evacuation lay through the several trenches back from the front line. Thus Pinney's Avenue, Brompton Avenue, and Cellar Farm Avenue were congested all night long. Stretcher-bearers, their knuckles bleeding from repeated knocking

against the sides of the narrow trench, struggled hard to get their burdens back to the dressing stations, while company after company of the support and reserve battalions pressed their way forward to garrison the front line or to deliver their loads of grenades and ammunition. In these circumstances, passage through the trenches was painfully slow and it took hours to go a thousand yards. Regularly throughout the night enemy artillery played up and down these crowded thoroughfares, often hitting and blocking them completely. But as often as that happened willing hands removed the dead and wounded and set to work to clear up the debris so that the stream of traffic might resume its course again. This congestion of the trenches naturally led to a certain amount of delay in evacuating casualties from the front line, but the delay was of comparatively brief duration and the front was practically clear of wounded by 10 a.m. on the 20th. There were still, however, hundreds of wounded in the shell-holes of No Man's Land. It was a pitiful sight to see the hands beckoning from No Man's Land for the assistance that could not come to them, and early on the 20th Major Murdoch, of the 29th Battalion, made a gallant but unsuccessful attempt to bring about their relief. Fashioning a rough red cross on a piece of newspaper he crossed, with Private Miles of "D" Company 29th Battalion, to the enemy trenches and asked to see an officer. A Bavarian Lieutenant, immaculately dressed, emerged from the enemy trench, and Major Murdoch asked if an informal cessation of hostilities could not be mutually arranged to enable the wounded to be brought in. The Bavarian replied courteously enough, regretting that he had no authority to give any order to that effect and saying that he would telephone for instructions. Meanwhile, the men on both sides of the line were not slow to take advantage of the curious situation, and while our men busied themselves in bringing in wounded, the Germans exposed themselves equally freely in repairing breaches in their parapet. Major Murdoch returned unmolested to the front line, but, shortly afterwards, a few warning shots fired high indicated the enemy's intention to resume hostilities. Our men accordingly returned to their trench and the incident closed.

The 20th was another fine warm day and was spent by all front line battalions in clearing up the debris of the battle. Trolley lines in the front trench were repaired and the bodies of the dead were placed on them and conveyed back to one of the cemeteries in the rear. Here graves had been dug and chaplains were busy officiating at their sorrowful duty. The parapets and dug-outs of the front system were terribly battered and it was obviously a work of many weeks to restore them to a state of efficiency. Nevertheless, the engineers were soon on the spot and the work was at once taken vigorously in hand. At 2 p.m., when it was clear that the battle would not be reopened, the 5th Australian Division passed back from XI Corps to II A.N.Z.A.C. again. The total casualties from noon

19th July to noon 20th July were 178 officers and 5,335 other ranks. The chief units to suffer were :—

			Officers.	Other Ranks.
8th Infantry Brigade	54	1,846
15th Infantry Brigade	51	1,725
14th Infantry Brigade	65	1,652
Divisional Engineers	3	85

The infantry battalions that suffered most heavily were the 60th, the 32nd, and the 59th with 757, 718, and 695 casualties respectively. The 53rd, 31st, and 54th Battalions also lost more than half their strength and it is doubtful if any British division in the whole war suffered equally heavy losses in the same space of time. The casualties in the brigades of the 61st Division were 577, 336, and 400 in the 182nd, 183rd, and 184th Brigades respectively.

Many congratulatory messages on the work of the Division in the Battle of Fromelles were received, and it should not be forgotten that, while the operation in itself was an unqualified local failure, its main purpose in preventing the withdrawal of enemy troops to the Somme was doubtless to some extent achieved. Sir Douglas Haig in the midst of his Somme anxieties found time to telegraph :—

“ Please convey to the troops engaged last night my appreciation of their gallant efforts and of the careful and thorough preparation made for it. I wish them to realise that their enterprise has not been by any means in vain, and that the gallantry with which they carried out the attack is fully recognised.

“ Dated, 20th July, 1916.”

General Plumer stated that he had received the report of the operation with great pleasure, and congratulated the Division on the success achieved.¹

General Godley congratulated the men not only on their gallantry, but because they were the first Australian Division to earn the recognition of the Commander-in-Chief in France.

General Haking, in forwarding General McCay's report of the operation to First Army, covered it by the following minute, a copy of which was sent to the 5th Australian Division :—

“ ADVANCED FIRST ARMY.

“ I forward herewith the report of the G.O.C. 5th Australian Division on the attack carried out on the 19th inst.

“ The report clearly describes the operations, and there is nothing for me to add except that I think the attack of the Australian Division, which was new to fighting out here, was carried out in an exceptionally gallant manner. There is no doubt that the men advanced with the

¹ Probably this message was dispatched by General Plumer at a phase in the operations when they appeared likely to succeed.

greatest determination. Their difficulties on the right flank were caused by the failure of the 61st Division to carry the Sugar Loaf. On their left flank the Australian Division was unable to consolidate sufficiently during the night and consequently when that flank gave way the remainder of the line was compelled to withdraw.

"I am quite sure that on the next occasion when the Division is ordered to attack it will distinguish itself even more than on this occasion. I have nothing but admiration for the fine fighting spirit displayed by Commanders and all ranks in the Division.

"The artillery work turned out even better than I expected, though many of the batteries had had very little experience.

"(Sgd.) R. HAKING, Lieut.-Gen.
"Commanding XI Corps.

"26th July."

The enemy was naturally elated at the result of the battle, and several interesting evidences of this were in due course forthcoming. His General Staff was rather nonplussed by the attack, and there can be no doubt that for a time, at any rate, considerable numbers of enemy troops were immobilised on the sector in consequence. The utmost curiosity as to why Australians should concern themselves in the war was manifested by all the interrogators of our captured men—as if the principles of justice and humanity and honour did not appeal as strongly to Australians as to any other civilised people. But this was beyond German comprehension and is doubtless still a source of wonderment to them. It may be stated here that the treatment of our prisoners in Germany varied from very bad to moderately good. The medical attention given to our wounded was for the most part indifferent, with exceptional cases of extremely bad and also of extremely good treatment.

Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria reviewed the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division shortly after the battle and the following notice of the ceremony appeared in the *London Times* of August 5th, 1916, under the heading "Through German Eyes":—

"THE CROWN PRINCE OF BAVARIA.

"The Australians in their brilliant action at Fromelles last month were opposed by a Bavarian Division. These troops were subsequently inspected by the Bavarian Crown Prince, who congratulated them on the fight which they had made and bade them to renew their vow 'to hold out for the whole welfare of the Fatherland.'

"According to the H.Q. Correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the Crown Prince also spoke individually to the men who had particularly distinguished themselves.

"'Well, how did you come by your decoration?' he inquired of one man.

“ ‘For gallant bomb-throwing, your Royal Highness,’ the man replied.

“ ‘How many did you throw?’

“ ‘Over 500, your Royal Highness.’

“ ‘Donnerwetter, what a performance!’

“The Crown Prince turned to another, a native of Munich, who enigmatically explained that he had won his decoration for ‘immediately rushing to the spot where most of them came from.’

“ ‘How many of the enemy did you settle?’ asked the Crown Prince.

“ ‘That I can’t say, exactly, your Royal Highness,’ was the reply; ‘but it must have been a good many.’

“ ‘How far can you throw?’ was the question addressed to a tall grenadier.

“ ‘Thirty metres, your Royal Highness.’

“ ‘Did you settle many?’

“ ‘That I don’t know, your Royal Highness, but I put a machine gun out of action with a bomb.’

“Among the decorated Bavarian N.C.O.’s was a Berlin ‘Professor’ of geography and history who, it is claimed, ‘held off a detachment of English.’ Another N.C.O. with two men had cleared 75 yards of trench and captured 15 prisoners and a machine gun. Yet another machine gunner had fired 14,000 rounds.”

One wonders if Prince Rupprecht ever had another occasion of congratulating his troops on the result of an encounter with Australians.

The night of the 20th July was memorable for the great number of wounded brought in from No Man’s Land. In this dangerous work the 57th Battalion and the 5th Pioneer Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Carter) greatly distinguished themselves, the 57th alone bringing in over 200 wounded. The 56th and 29th Battalions were busy at the same work on the 14th and the 8th Brigades fronts, and many lives were saved by the devotion of all ranks to this duty. It was inevitable that some were missed, but the search was continued nightly and each successive night till the 24th saw the rescue of some of our wounded. It was extraordinary that wounded men could survive thus exposed for five successive nights and days, but the weather was mild and there were, alas, dead bodies enough within reach, from the haversacks and water-bottles of which the wounded near them could secure food and drink.

The enemy fought the battle pretty cleanly—for Germans. But the filthy element in the composition of so many of them showed itself in several ways. Our wounded lying on and near their parapet, were in some cases allowed to remain there for days, acting as decoys to our stretcher-bearers, who were fired on when they endeavoured to recover them. One German murderer, his cruelty less refined than

this, came out during daylight of the 23rd and dropped a bomb on a wounded Australian lying near the enemy parapet. The Australian was killed and the murderer fell into a shell-hole to escape the furious fire directed at him from all parts of our line. It is feared that he regained his trench when night fell. A prisoner of war stated that he saw a wounded Australian approach unarmed an enemy stretcher-bearing party to get assistance for his mate, who was seriously wounded and unable to move. This happened on the morning of the 20th. The officer or N.C.O. in charge of the party drew a revolver and shot the unarmed man dead through the head. Is it any wonder that the Battle of Fromelles changed the 5th Australian Division from fighters of the frank, sporting variety into a thoughtful, scientific and terribly efficient weapon for the extermination by every legitimate art of warfare of its dishonourable foe?

The bringing in of the wounded completed, and the work of clearing up the debris of the battle well in hand, one important duty still remained, and that was to extend the Division again to its original frontage. This was done by withdrawing the 14th Brigade entirely from the centre sector of the battle line and sending it to take over the left of the Division's first front, that is, the sector formerly occupied by the 8th Brigade. This was done on the night of the 22nd-23rd July, and the 8th and 15th Brigades shared the remaining two-thirds of the Divisional front between them. Summed up, the effect of this was to leave the 15th Brigade on the right of the Division in what was approximately its original sector, while the 8th and 14th Brigades had exchanged places, the former being now in the centre. This accomplished, the 5th Divisional Artillery was re-grouped behind the infantry, while the batteries attached for the operation soon after left the sector to rejoin their own formations. All of them, both artillery and trench mortar, had earned the cordial goodwill of the Division by their readiness to do everything in their power to assist it.

Several important changes of command occurred shortly after the battle. Col. Pope, C.B., relinquished the command of the 14th Brigade and Brigadier-General C. J. Hobkirk, D.S.O., of the Essex Regiment, was appointed to succeed him. General Hobkirk represented a fine type of English professional soldier. In appearance he was tall and well-proportioned, in character brave, energetic, and capable, in manner unassuming and courteous, the best type of cultivated Englishman. These characteristics enabled him easily to bridge the temperamental gap existing between most Australians and most Englishmen, and he soon became a popular and respected commander. Other changes in the 14th Brigade were the appointment of Major Crowshaw to command the 53rd Battalion, vice Lieut.-Col. Norris killed in action, Major Holdorf, late 30th Battalion to command the 54th vice Lieut.-Col. Cass invalided, and the appointment of Capt. G. Street as Staff Captain of the 14th Brigade. Capt. Street's predecessor, Capt. Hopkins, had relinquished the appoint-

ment to command the 14th Light Trench Mortar Battery, but was unfortunately killed in one of its first operations.

In the 15th Brigade, Majors Denehy, Layh, and Duigan took over command with the rank of Lieut.-Col. of the 58th, 59th, and 60th Battalions, while Lieut. Muirson became O.C. of the 15th Machine-Gun Company in succession to Capt. S. W. Neal, who resumed duty with his Battalion, the 59th. In the 8th Brigade, Major R. H. Beardsmore succeeded Lieut.-Col. Coghill in command of the 32nd Battalion, while Major Davies, the Brigade Major, was evacuated with an injured leg and his place temporarily filled by Captain Ferrars-Guy.

CHAPTER VI

(23rd July—19th October, 1916.)

AUTUMN IN NORTHERN FRANCE

Important contemporaneous events :

Steady progress of Somme offensive.	
Continued success of Russian offensive under Brusiloff.	
Hindenburg succeeded Falkenhayn as German Chief of Staff.	
Turkish reverse at Katia.	
Successful Italian offensive opened	August 6th.
General Sarrail assumed modified offensive on Salonikan front 21st.
Roumania declared war on Austria 27th.
Italy declared war against Germany 28th.
Mackensen had successes in Dobruja ..	September 4th.

THE Division remained in the line in the vicinity of Armentières for nearly three months after the Battle of Fromelles. Although the period was not marked by any major operation, it was crowded with hard, useful work and minor incidents. Internally the Division underwent a marked change. The sharp, terrible experience of Fromelles caused the men to develop very quickly from novices into veterans. In a few crowded hours they had seen more of the horrors of war than most divisions experienced in as many months. The effect of the reverse on the *moral* of the Division was transient. It was soon as buoyant, as optimistic, as determined as ever, but it was also more prudent and calculating, more observant of its enemy, disposed to add to dash and gallantry, those native inheritances of the Australian soldier, whatever could be gained by a scientific study of the art of modern warfare.

One result of the Battle of Fromelles was to reduce the Division to nearly 6,000 below its strength. By the end of September the arrival of reinforcements had reduced this deficiency to one of 54 officers and 3,371 other ranks. The average casualties for the period were about 300 a month, the great majority of whom were wounded by artillery fire.

Throughout the period dealt with in this chapter the policy of the Division was to pin a large enemy force to the sector in order to pre-

vent his further withdrawal of troops to the Somme. This was effected by keeping him in a state of constant suspense regarding our intentions, and Lieut.-Col. Wagstaff, G.S.O.,I, had a busy time devising and co-ordinating a long series of minor offensive operations. Heavy artillery and trench mortar concentrations were frequently laid across his forward zones in order to encourage the idea that we were preparing another offensive operation on a large scale. In this way, in the month of August alone, over 40,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were fired. The heavy and medium trench mortar batteries were equally active, and the light trench mortar batteries of the three infantry brigades fired on an average about 150 rounds a day in their systematic destruction of the enemy defences. A series of raids was undertaken by the three infantry brigades, and they were generally accompanied by dummy raids and diversions at other parts of the Divisional front. The result was that the enemy soon became extremely "jumpy." At night he kept the front constantly illuminated by an extravagant display of lights, and he showed other signs of nerves. At the first indication of a barrage on his front line during the night the garrison affected, fearing a raid, would usually bolt to the rear, and the result was that many of our raiding parties were unable to get prisoners. Above all, the Division at once reasserted the complete individual ascendancy of the Australian over the German by its vigorous sniping and daring patrolling of No Man's Land by night. Indeed, No Man's Land soon became Our Men's Land, and our patrols roamed over it at will in the almost vain hope of encountering hostile parties. Thanks, too, to the policy of the artillery and to the munition organisation in England, the enemy guns rarely dared to promote a "strafe," and were never permitted to have the last word in an artillery argument. The sum total of these various activities was that, before the Division left the sector, it was predominant in every phase of trench fighting, while the enemy had become the comparatively passive recipient of every form of entertainment that was devised for his benefit. His need for the conservation of ammunition and men was no doubt partly responsible for this supine attitude, but there can be no doubt also that in this sector was initiated that great individual moral ascendancy of our men which became in the later phases of the war a marked feature of every fight.

Apart from its continual offensive policy the period was marked by much heavy work behind the lines. This included:—

(1) Urgent repairs to the front and support systems of the damage suffered in the battle;

(2) Improvement of existing, and construction of new accommodation for the Division's winter quarters. This entailed a great deal of work in front, support, and reserve areas.

These works absorbed the entire energies of the three field companies, of the Pioneer Battalion, and of large working parties daily

supplied by the infantry units in reserve. An elaborate system of drainage of the forward trenches was a fundamental part of the preparation of the area for winter quarters. Lieut.-Col. Carey ascertained that the river Laies was here 12 feet higher than the river Lys, which lay some four miles behind our line, and by the very careful grading of drains the water level of the whole forward area was reduced 2 feet 6 inches lower than it had been in the previous winter. This was a wonderful contribution to the comfort of all the occupants of the forward area, and reflected most creditably on Lieut. Tidswell, 5th Pioneer Battalion, who superintended the draining, and on Capt. Scott and "D" Company of the same unit, who carried out the forward construction.

In view of the greatly diminished strength of most of the battalions, the supply of the daily working parties left few men available for training. The tension was in part relieved by the attachment to the Division for some weeks of several hundred officers and men of the Corps Mounted Regiment comprising Cyclists and Light Horse. These details were attached to various infantry battalions and took their turn in the line and helped with the working parties and in all respects rendered admirable service to the Division.

One other noteworthy feature of the period was the formation, about the 20th of September, of Franks' Force, a composite force under General Franks and composed of two brigade groups, one supplied by the 34th (British) Division and one by the 5th Australian Division. The purpose of this force was to relieve the 51st (Highland) Division, occupying the left sector of the Army Corps front just before Armentières. The 34th Division and the 5th Australian Division were obliged therefore to hold their fronts with two brigades, each instead of three as heretofore, while the other two brigades, one from each division, took over the 51st Divisional front, leaving this latter formation free for employment elsewhere. Further reference will be made to this in due course.

The work of the medical services throughout the period was comparatively light, due largely to the general mildness of the weather, and to the excellence of the preventive measures against disease. The sick wastage of August was only 0.5 per cent., but in the wetter month of September it rose somewhat, 11 officers and 277 other ranks being evacuated through sickness. Mild epidemics of mumps and measles also contributed to the heavier sick rate of September. The epidemics were kept well in hand and the vigilance of the medical officers prevented their wider dissemination.

During the whole of the period the Railhead for supplies was Bac St. Maur, and under the supervision of Lieut.-Col. McGlenn and Capt. G. D. Smith the "Q" organisation of the Division found little difficulty in maintaining them to the satisfaction of all concerned. It was an easy area from a supply point of view and with Staff Captains like Capt. H. W. Cuming (8th Brigade), Capt. G.

Street (14th Brigade), Capt. R. Legge (15th Brigade), and Capt. Dickenson (5th Divisional Artillery) it would have been strange if the supply services had been defective from an administrative standpoint. As Bac St. Maur was only about three miles from the firing line Lieut.-Col. Francis was able to collect the rations and forage with the transport of the Divisional Train at Railhead and distribute them to the various brigade refilling points. Here, they were divided up into the quotas for each unit of the brigade group and were removed by the first line transport of those units right up to their most advanced dumps. Here they were put into sandbags for transport to the front line. The proximity of Railhead to the front line thus dispensed with the necessity of using the Mechanical Transport which normally links up Railhead with the Divisional Train. Though a certain amount of additional responsibility was thrown on Lieut.-Col. Francis's unit, the arrangement set free a large number of motor lorries for important duties elsewhere.

For D.A.D.O.S., too, it was a busy and useful period. Ordnance stores came through with pleasing regularity and promptness. The approach of winter necessitated the supply of large quantities of winter clothing, and Capt. Rodd's staff received and issued in September an extra 20,000 blankets, making two per man for the whole Division. Socks and other winter issues were supplied on a similar scale. In September, too, the P.H. gas helmet was supplanted by the new small box respirators, 18,000 of which were issued by D.A.D.O.S. to the various units of the Division. A bootmaker's and an armourer's shop were by this time established at D.A.D.O.S. and an Officers' Purchase Department supplied large demands of officers for Ordnance clothing.

Although, as has been said, there was generally little time for training within the units themselves, there were some notable exceptions to this. On the 29th of August the 31st Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Toll) marched to the vicinity of La Motte and spent an interesting week in training for wood fighting in the Bois des Vaches. It returned to the line about the 7th of September and was followed at La Motte by the 53rd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Crowshaw), which remained there engaged in similar training from the 8th to the 17th of September. The week's training in their sylvan surroundings was very refreshing to the battalions, both of which had suffered severely at Fromelles.

Apart from training within the units, a great number of men were sent to various military schools both within and beyond the Divisional area. The Divisional Bomb and Raiding School with Capt. R. A. Geddes as its commandant did excellent work at Saily, training all the raiding parties of the Division as well as providing short courses in bombing, bayonet fighting, and physical training for other infantry details. H.M. the King, the Prince of Wales, and General Plumer visited the School on the 14th of August, and



BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. J. BESSELL-BROWNE, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

were very favourably impressed with the work that was being done there. In addition to this School, Major King soon established Divisional Gas, Engineering, and Signalling Schools, all of which did valuable work in their respective branches. Of the schools outside Divisional administration, perhaps none became better known or more highly esteemed than the Second Army School at Wisques, and the Second Army Bombing and Trench Mortar School at Terdegghem. Many interesting lectures on military subjects were given at the Empire Theatre in Saily, and Major-General Harington's account of the progress of the Somme battle was heard with great interest by a large audience. It may be noted here that imperial cadets, that is, candidates for officers' commissions in the British Army, were attached for training and experience to various units of the Division. They participated in whatever work was in progress and most of them left a favourable impression of their ability.

An allotment of leave to the United Kingdom was granted to the Division shortly after its arrival in France, and quotas of officers and men left daily for the long-looked-for holiday. The leave at first was of 10 days' duration, and a travelling warrant was provided which franked the bearer free of charge to any railway station in England, Scotland, or Ireland. Hundreds of private persons and many public institutions were ready and anxious to entertain the Australian soldiers, and this opportunity is taken to place on record the deep appreciation of all members of the Division who benefited from the splendid hospitality which awaited many of them in the old country. Lady Harrowby's work in this connection especially has made hundreds of Australians her lifelong debtors, while bonnie Scotland and its still bonnier lassies cheered many thousands of lonely Australian soldiers. In fact, Australian love for the warm-hearted northern folk soon equalled Australian admiration for the Scottish soldiers, and it would be difficult to say more.

Divisional organisations for the greater comfort and the entertainment of the men became firmly established in this area. The good work of the A.C.F. and the Y.M.C.A. was actively continued. A nightly cinema entertainment was provided in Saily and a Divisional Concert Party instituted with happy results. A large Horse Show, which also provided competitions for the transport units, was held about the end of September and it did much to improve the condition of the animals and wheeled transport of the Division.

During this period the first serious disciplinary cases came up for trial by court-martial. The first sentence of death was passed on a soldier of the Division on the 13th of August. The sentence was commuted by General McCay to a term of penal servitude, and it may be stated here that no death sentence was carried out in the Division throughout its existence. Generally speaking, however, the discipline of the Division kept at a very high level, and a more

vigorous system of estaminet supervision instituted by Major Langley, the A.P.M., and carried out by his capable staff, sensibly reduced the number of trifling misdemeanours.

The virtual absence of a death penalty in the Australian Forces had a threefold effect:—

(1) It preserved the lives of the few weaklings and habitual offenders who would have suffered it;

(2) It tempted from their duty a considerably larger number of men, who, with a death penalty as a deterrent, would have served on with honour to themselves and credit to Australia;

(3) It thus threw an additional strain on the brave and willing workers of the Division, many of whom lost their lives in carrying out duties that would otherwise have fallen upon the men mentioned in (2).

Although this is not the place for a detailed account of court-martial proceedings, the reader may be interested in a brief summary of their salient features. The Army Act authorised the punishment of military offences by military authorities, defined the acts or omissions which constituted military offences, and indicated the kind, and the maximum extent, of punishment which might be inflicted for each offence. On active service the less important offences could be dealt with summarily by the commanding officer of the accused, and, in certain trivial charges, even by his company commander on authority delegated to him by the commanding officer. The accused had all reasonable opportunities to call witnesses and prepare his defence. For the more serious offences the accused was generally remanded for trial by court-martial, and, even in the less important offences, he had always the right to elect such trial instead of being dealt with summarily by his commanding officer. The Army Act set up various courts for the purposes of these trials. Two types were commonly used in France throughout the war, the General Court-Martial and the Field General Court-Martial.

The General Court-Martial was a formal and fairly elaborate trial which normally was employed for the trial of officers. It consisted of at least five experienced officers, and the Judge Advocate-General, or his Deputy, was usually present to ensure that the correct procedure was followed. The procedure was approximately that of English Criminal Law and, where it was modified at all, the modification was intended for the benefit of the accused. The accused was furnished beforehand with a copy of the charge preferred against him and a summary of the evidence of the witnesses, taken at a preliminary inquiry. He was entitled to nominate a "prisoner's friend" to appear as his counsel, and he had all facilities for seeing his witnesses and for preparing his defence.

The Field General Court-Martial, as its name indicates, was a form of General Court-Martial specially adapted to the circum-

stances of active service. The court was smaller, rarely exceeding three or four members, and the proceedings were more direct and less elaborate. Field General Courts-Martial were employed for the trial of non-commissioned officers and men, though the trial of an officer by a Field General Court-Martial was perfectly legal. An officer of the rank of Major was usually President of the Court and the accused had the same facilities for his defence as were mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Although everything possible was done both by the Army Act and by the authorities administering it, including the officers on the courts, it cannot be said that a uniformity of justice was secured by the machinery provided. This was due to two causes, the different views taken by courts regarding the gravity of offences and, more frequently, the neglect of the accused to nominate a competent "prisoner's friend" to defend him. Later on in the war a Corps Courts-Martial Officer and Divisional Courts-Martial Officers were appointed. These officers were qualified lawyers and, by attending every Court-martial held, they did much to ensure both a more correct procedure at the trials and greater uniformity of punishment throughout the units. The work of Capt. E. M. Johnson, as Corps Court-Martial Officer in 1917 and 1918 will be gratefully remembered in this respect.

Court-Martial proceedings inevitably gave rise to many humorous incidents, and the marked dislike exhibited by the average Australian towards disciplinary correction at the hands of any but Australian officers is admirably illustrated in the following anecdote. An Australian private attached to an English formation was accused of some offence and was about to be tried by a court consisting entirely of English officers. The president of the court, a major of courteous and polished bearing, followed the prescribed routine and asked the accused:—

"Do you object to being tried by myself as President or by any other member of this Court?"

"Certainly I do," answered the Australian promptly.

"What is your objection?" the President inquired politely.

"Well, to start off with," said the Australian, "you're all Tommies! In fact," he added frankly, "I've never clapped eyes on such a pack of duds in all my life!"

We shall turn now from this general survey of the Division's activities for the period under review to the details which call for more particular notice. It will be remembered that shortly after the Fromelles Battle the Division extended left from its contracted front and reoccupied practically its old front line. The 15th Brigade was still on the right, but the 8th Brigade was now in the centre and the 14th Brigade on the left. Lieut.-Col. Phillips with Capt. Crombie as his Adjutant commanded the right Artillery Group, Lieut.-Col. Caddy with Capt. Dreyer as Adjutant covered the centre brigade, while Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor, whose Adjutant was Capt. Noonan,

was allotted to the left sector covering the 14th Infantry Brigade. The 15th Field Artillery Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Lucas) was distributed throughout the other three groups. This distribution of artillery remained in force till the formation of Franks' Force about the 20th of September.

The constant offensive policy of the Division kept the artillery very busy, and General Christian and Major Thornthwaite were kept hard at work devising and carrying out various artillery programmes for the discomfiture of the enemy. Much wire cutting to prepare the way for raids was necessary, and the artillery work during the raid itself called for the nicest adjustment. The general plan was to smother the few yards of enemy trench to be entered with a concentrated bombardment lasting for a few minutes. During this the raiding infantry would be lying in No Man's Land within 100 yards of the bombarded sector. At the precise moment of assault the artillery would lift to support and flank areas, and the infantry would dash into the wrecked trenches and secure their identifications. After staying a few minutes to collect further information and demolish the enemy works, the infantry would return to their own front line while the artillery and machine-guns would cover their retirement with fire along the flanks of the raided sector of the trench. It is scarcely necessary to point out the extreme care required in artillery work of this nature, and it should be said here that in every raid carried out in the sector the artillery support was admirable and was spoken of in the most complimentary terms by the infantry concerned.

Although the work of the artillery was mainly offensive throughout the period, the possibility of its defensive employment was not overlooked and all the artillery brigades evolved defence measures to cover any emergency that might arise. These were not required, however. Some of the artillery devices to cause loss to the enemy were very ingenious, and Lieut.-Col. Caddy used the following plan to cause casualties. He would concentrate with high explosive on a group of occupied buildings and then suddenly cease fire. After a few seconds' interval he would spray the vicinity of the buildings thoroughly with shrapnel and thus catch the enemy as he hurried away across the open from the threatened houses.

For the first few weeks after Fromelles the enemy struggled hard to secure artillery superiority, but he was forced to relinquish the idea and by the end of the period his chief desire appeared to be to avoid provoking our artillery at all costs. The tremendous consumption of artillery ammunition on the Somme was doubtless partly responsible, and the daily allowance for our own batteries also suffered some reduction from the same cause. But it was always more than sufficient to enable our batteries to maintain unquestioned supremacy. Capt. Miles with his Trench Mortar Brigade had a busy time, and nothing was more cordially detested by the enemy than the clumsy

“plum-puddings” and “flying pigs” which were issued to him every day in liberal quantities. The percentage of casualties in the Trench Mortar Brigade was here considerably higher than in the other artillery units, and authority was given in August for a reserve of 50 trench-mortar *personnel*, drawn equally from artillery and infantry units, to be attached to the D.T.M.O. for training and as reinforcements when required.

The first of the infantry raids was carried on the 19th of August by the 15th Brigade and General Elliott allotted this work to the 57th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Stewart), who appointed Major N. Marshall as O.C. Raid. Captain F. W. Harris was O.C. Assault, and 2nd Lieuts. C. C. D. Pinnock and R. Doutreband, with about 50 other ranks, constituted the remainder of the assaulting party. With faces blackened and dressed in English uniforms the party proceeded to the “lie position” in front of the enemy wire and reported O.K. at 10.28 p.m. At 10.30 p.m. the artillery barrage opened and at 10.31½ the enemy retaliation fell thickly enough on No Man’s Land, and on our own front line. At 10.40 our barrage lifted, the raiders dashed in and met with no resistance. The trench was occupied by 16 enemy dead, killed in the artillery bombardment. A machine gun was captured, bombs were thrown into deep dug-outs, and screaming was heard. Documents and clothing identifications were secured. At 10.47 the three telephone wires connecting the front line with Brigade H.Q. were all severed by enemy artillery fire. At 10.50 all the raiders had left the enemy trench and a signal rocket was fired to inform the artillery of that fact. A shell burst close by as the rocket was discharged and affected its flight sufficiently to prevent its being observed by the artillery. So our guns kept on firing and the enemy retaliation also continued. A runner was dispatched at 11.10 to tell the artillery to cease fire. He was killed in Pinney’s Avenue. At 11.40 another runner was sent and was severely wounded *en route*. At 12.10 a.m. the message finally got through to the artillery and all fire ceased. During this time the raiders were making their way back across No Man’s Land and they suffered heavily from the enemy barrage. Capt. Harris and Lieut. Pinnock, who had both displayed fine powers of leadership, were killed, and Lieut. Watson, who was part of our front line garrison, was also killed. The raiding party suffered about 20 casualties, all in returning across No Man’s Land, and the casualties in the front line garrison were also fairly numerous. Although the enemy casualties were doubtless still heavier, our own losses made this raid a costly adventure. However, it succeeded in establishing the identity of the enemy division holding the sector and it was the first of a series of small but telling blows at his *moral*. All ranks displayed great dash and gallantry and the experience gained was of considerable assistance to later raiding parties. The 14th Field Artillery Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Phillips) provided the artillery support

and it was assisted by two batteries of the Centre Group. The strength and accuracy of the artillery bombardment left nothing to be desired. Coincident with the raid, Lieut.-Col. Caddy's group created a diversion in another part of the sector.

Partly because it was the first raid of the Division and partly because the losses were rather heavy, this raid has been described in some little detail. The other raids of the period will be more briefly recorded, especially where the plan was based on similar lines.

The second Divisional Raid was carried out by the 56th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Scott) at 8.55 p.m. on the 15th of September. Capt. Lucas was O.C. Raid and directed the operations from the front line. Lieut. Pitt was O.C. Assault. An artillery bombardment of 20 minutes was carried out by the Left Group under Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor. This was so effective that the trenches were obliterated and the enemy were either dead or fled. Lieut. McNabb, 14th L.T.M.B., contributed to this bombardment, firing no fewer than 506 rounds on to the enemy parapet. No prisoners were taken because no living Germans were encountered, but valuable information was collected and only four slight casualties were suffered.

On the next night, the 16th of September, the third Divisional Raid was carried out very successfully on the 8th Brigade front. "D" Company of the 30th Battalion supplied the assault party, which was led by Lieut. E. A. Macfarlane and 2nd Lieut. E. Adams. Capt. Cheeseman was O.C. Raid and the arrangements for the operations as a whole were in the hands of Major Davies, who had now recovered from his injured leg and was back at duty with his brigade. Zero hour was 10.30 p.m. and the artillery and trench mortar barrage was again effective. It was supplied chiefly by the Centre Group under the command of Lieut.-Col. Caddy. Some opposition was encountered from enemy bombers, and Corporal Forbes, A.H., and Private Hales, E. W., displayed conspicuous courage. Four prisoners were captured, two of whom lost their lives by enemy fire in No Man's Land on the way back to our front line. Twelve dead Germans were seen in the trench. The raiding party sustained only four casualties, one man being killed and 2nd Lieut. Adams and two others slightly wounded. It was a highly successful raid and General Tivey was naturally gratified at its result.

The fourth Divisional Raid was carried out by the 58th Battalion on the early morning of the 18th of September. Lieut. Godfrey and 2nd Lieut. N. Gratton led an assaulting party of 55 other ranks into the enemy trench at 12.10 a.m. The artillery support provided by the Right Group was again excellent, but an enemy flare, fired from near the point of entry of the raiders, brought down on them a severe artillery barrage. No prisoners were taken but six minutes were spent in demolitions and in collecting information before the raiding party withdrew. Lieut. Godfrey carried with him Sergeant

McDonald, who had been severely wounded and who was lying on the parapet just above where it had been mined. By dint of great effort the wounded N.C.O. was conveyed back to his own line. 2nd Lieut. Gration and four other ranks were missing at roll call and there were six other casualties. Captain Ferres, O.C. Raid, spent the remainder of the night in a thorough personal examination of No Man's Land, but failed to find the missing men, and it was concluded that they had been killed by artillery fire in the enemy trenches.

As the 56th Battalion raiding party had not recovered from its disappointment in encountering no enemy on its first exploit it sought and received permission to repeat its raid as a silent operation, that is, without artillery support. In this way it hoped to make certain of coming to grips with its elusive enemy. It was not disappointed. Under cover of a dummy raid carried out as a diversion by the Centre Artillery Group, the same party of the 56th Battalion assaulted the enemy trenches on the 20th of September. Some sharp fighting occurred, the surprised Germans disputing with bombs the entry to their trenches. All that were not killed fled and so again no prisoner was secured. Having done considerable damage to the trenches, where active repairs had been in progress, the raiding party returned to its own line with a loss of only four casualties. Everybody was sorry that this spirited attempt of the 56th to get prisoners had not met with the success that it deserved.

The sixth Divisional Raid was undertaken by the 55th Battalion (Major R. Cowey) on the 30th of September and General Hobkirk, determined that at this attempt his brigade should get prisoners, arranged that Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor's artillery brigade should place a complete box barrage round the raided trench and thus prevent the escape of the enemy to the rear. He also arranged that our aeroplanes should patrol above enemy battery positions in order to discourage them from firing and thus disclosing their locations. The plan for the capture of prisoners succeeded, and the enemy artillery retaliation was conspicuously less than usual. Capt. Stutchbury led the assault and Lieut. Gitshan and 60 other ranks followed him into the enemy trench at a point known as Clapham Junction. The raid was entirely successful. Twenty enemy dead were seen in the demolished trenches. One prisoner was secured and several other Germans were killed in hand-to-hand fighting. In this connection the narratives of the men taking part in the assault make interesting reading. For instance,

No. 194, Cpl. Wood stated that he killed one German and secured his rifle. Also searched his body but found nothing.

No. 5406, Pte. Mills bombed two dug-outs. Heard someone inside squeak. Secured an officer's mackintosh.

No. 1131, Cpl. Hitchiner killed a German after a struggle and secured his rifle.

Many others sent in reports of equal interest.

The next raid was undertaken by the 8th Brigade on the 7th of October, but as that formation was then part of Franks' Force and holding the Houplines sector N.E. of Armentières, some three or four miles north of the 5th Divisional front, we must first follow it to its new sector and see how it was situated.

The means by which Franks' Force was constituted on the 21st of September have already been described. By virtually rearranging two 3-brigade divisions into three 2-brigade divisions the 5th Australian and 34th British Divisions were able to hold three divisional fronts, and thus to free the 51st (Highland) Division for employment elsewhere. The 8th Brigade Group with its quota of artillery and pioneers was detached as the 5th Divisional contribution to the formation of Franks' Force. Accordingly, it was relieved on the 21st of September by the 14th and 15th Brigades, which extended to right and left respectively to cover the vacated central sector. The 8th Brigade accompanied by its M. G. Company, its L.T.M.B., the 8th Field Ambulance, the 8th Field Company Engineers, the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, Y.5A. M.T.M.B., No. 3 Section D.A.C., and C Company 5th Pioneer Battalion moved to Armentières and relieved the 154th Brigade on the night of the 23rd of September. This was the left or Houplines frontage of the Armentières sector. The 103rd Brigade (of the 34th Division) took over the right half at the same time and General Franks with an improvised Divisional Staff controlled both brigade groups after the manner of a divisional commander.

The line in this sector presented some marked contrasts to the one the 8th Brigade had just left. Although the trenches were nominally continuous, they were held rather as a series of strong posts with unoccupied stretches between them. The works were in need of considerable repair and the 8th Field Company and the pioneer company were soon hard at work on them. The town of Armentières, though only about two miles from the front line, was not at the time entirely vacated by its civilian population, and was far from being the utter ruin that it eventually became. Nevertheless it was undergoing steady demolition and heavy bursts of enemy shelling, especially one on the 28th of September, materially added to its destruction and caused a good many casualties among its civilians. "C" Company of the Pioneer Battalion suffered severely on the same day. A large shell struck the carpenter's shop, in which a number of men were working and killed five outright. Five others died of wounds and six others were more or less severely wounded. This was a double misfortune for "C" Company as it had recently lost eight men through a shell striking one of its billets near Fleurbaix. Casualties in this sector were treated by the 8th Field Ambulance, which numbered amongst its patients a good many civilians. Colonel Shepherd acted as S.M.O. of Franks'

Force, a position equivalent to A.D.M.S. of the Division. In a similar way, Major V. A. H. Sturdee of the 8th Field Company acted as C.R.E. of the Force, command of the 8th Field Company passing for the time being to Capt. Farquhar.

The withdrawal of the 8th Brigade Group and the 13th F.A. Brigade necessitated the re-grouping of the remainder of the Divisional Artillery to conform to the two brigade frontage. General Christian accordingly reorganised the artillery into two groups, a Right Group under Lieut.-Col. Phillips supporting the 15th Brigade, and a Left under Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor supporting the 14th Infantry Brigade. The 15th F.A. Brigade remained distributed among the Groups, but Lieut.-Col. Lucas, with Capt. O. Steele as his adjutant, relieved Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor as O.C. of the Left Group on the 30th of September. The Division remained so disposed until its entire relief in the sector on the 13th of October.

The seventh Divisional Raid carried out by troops of the 5th Australian Division was allotted by General Tivey to the 29th Battalion and, on the night of the 7th of October, Lieut. Stirling and 2nd Lieut. Stanton led a platoon against the strong point known as the Chicken Run. On attempting to enter the enemy trench they were met with heavy rifle and machine-gun fire and many bombs were thrown among them. Despite the gallantry of the leaders, the party was unable to force an entry and finally withdrew. Lieut. Stirling, known to be very badly wounded, was missing at the conclusion of the affair. Second Lieut. Stanton was also wounded and so were other members of the assaulters.

Determined to bring the offending strong point to book, General Tivey launched against it at 7.30 on the night of the 12th a much stronger raiding party consisting of five officers, and 100 other ranks of the 31st Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Toll). The leaders were Capt. R. C. Aland (O.C. Raid) and Lieuts. C. J. Blomfield, J. G. Brodie, R. S. Thompson, and F. R. Smith. This, the eighth Divisional Raid, was an unqualified success. After a ten-minute bombardment the party entered the Chicken Run and soon overpowered the opposition. About 100 Germans were killed and several prisoners and a machine-gun secured. The raiders remained in possession for no less than an hour, carrying out extensive demolitions, and finally withdrew unmolested with a loss of only three killed and seven wounded. It was a highly successful venture and reflected most creditably on staff, artillery, and all ranks associated with it.

On the same night no fewer than three other enterprises were carried out by the Division. On General Hobkirk's front the 54th Battalion provided a raiding party of about sixty under Lieuts. Judd and Mitchell. Capt. Lecky was O.C. Raid. A box barrage of five minutes succeeded by a lift of only fifty yards was the artillery's contribution. Twenty-one enemy dead were found in the trenches, but not a living German was to be seen. The enemy attempted a

feeble counter-attack, but his party was easily repulsed. With a loss of only five wounded the raiders returned to their line. This was the ninth Divisional Raid.

The tenth and eleventh raids were carried out by the 15th Brigade. Capt. L. L. Hornby and Lieuts. Johnston and Gannon led a fine team of 59th Battalion raiders into the enemy trenches on the old Fromelles battle front. Despite the fact that only a three minute bombardment was used, the enemy again managed to get clear away and no prisoners were taken. The party returned after the usual destruction of the enemy works. The losses were three slightly wounded, one of whom was Lieut. Johnston.

General Elliott's personal daring and enterprise were admirably reflected in the attempt of the 57th Battalion to capture a machine gun that was causing it some annoyance from the Sugar Loaf. This hazardous enterprise was carried out as a silent raid, coincidentally with the raid of the 59th Battalion. Second Lieut. C. D. Robertson led a small party of thirteen other ranks against the formidable position and almost succeeded in his undertaking, but heavy opposition forced the withdrawal of the attackers. One member of the party, whose name unfortunately does not appear to have been preserved, noticed when almost back in his own lines that a comrade was missing. He returned across No Man's Land and found his friend badly wounded, but lifted him up and had almost regained his trench when he was shot dead. The man whom he had so gallantly rescued was soon recovered. In addition to these two the party sustained five other wounded casualties of whom Lieut. Robertson was one.

The four raids on the night of the 12th-13th of October, 1916, were something in the nature of the 5th Division's parting benediction to the sector. For some few days it had been known that a move to the Somme was imminent and, on the 13th of October the New Zealand Division relieved the 5th Australian Division and the latter formation concentrated, after its relief, in the vicinity of Bailleul, which was to be the entraining point for the Somme. The 5th Divisional Artillery and its supply unit, the 10th (Head-quarters) Company A.A.S.C., were not included in the relief and remained at work in the sector for about a month longer. After relief, the 8th Brigade Group was established at Strazeele, the 14th at Outersteene, and the 15th at Estaires. D.H.Q. opened at Merris on the 14th of October. During the 17th and 18th of October 24 tactical trains, leaving the Bailleul and Bailleul West stations, conveyed the Division, via Hazebrouck, Calais, Boulogne, and Abbeville, to the vicinity of Ailly-le-Haut-Clocher, a charming village on the lower Somme, where D.H.Q. opened on the 18th of October. Detraining took place at Longpré and Pont Remy and the 8th, 14th, and 15th Brigade Groups were billeted in the Gorenflos, Bellancourt, and Brucamps areas respectively. Though the arrangements for

the move by train were in every sense satisfactory, the hardships and irritations inseparable from all such affairs were experienced by some of the units. The men were fully laden and most of them had a march of several miles to the entraining point. Here the train accommodation was in some instances so meagre that over 40 men with their accoutrements had to be crowded into each truck. Those travelling by night found the journey extremely bleak and, on their arrival at the detraining point, some units found that marches up to 8 miles in length still lay between them and the village in which they were to be billeted. These reached their destinations in the small hours of a wintry morning and, in these circumstances, the billeting into houses and barns proved a wearisome and tedious business. However, the arrangements for their accommodation had been made by advance parties, and the men settled down in quicker time than might have been expected.

A marked change in the nature of the country was noticeable in the Ailly-le-Haut-Clocher area. The terrain was considerably more broken than that of the flat northern province, and the countryside was cut by numerous valleys the sides of which had often fairly steep gradients. These undulations imparted to the scenery a diversity and charm that were lacking in the flatter northern country, and lent it a beauty and a fascination that not even the depressing premonitions of an early winter could extinguish. Another striking characteristic was the absence of the isolated farm dwellings that normally indicate the agricultural community. The farmers here seemed to have packed their houses all close together, forming little villages from which they issued daily to their work in the fields. Whether some economy of arable land was secured by this or whether the practice was dictated by motives of protection, sociability, or convenience was not clear; but the effect was to heighten the picturesqueness of the landscape.

The polling on the first conscription referendum in Australia took place about this time. In some of the units it was completed before the move from the Fleurbaix sector, in others it was carried out during the few days' rest in the Ailly-le-Haut-Clocher area. Many of the men, perhaps the majority of them, voted under the impression that the referendum, if carried, would compel every man of military age to don khaki forthwith, irrespective of any other considerations whatever. The nature and extent of the exemption clauses were not thoroughly grasped, and the officers all refrained, perhaps too scrupulously, from any explanations that might have appeared to savour of persuasion. The reference of political issues to an army abroad on active service raises some complicated problems.

With the move to Ailly-le-Haut-Clocher area the Division's first campaign was closed. The present was but a brief interlude before the curtain rose on a new and terrible scene, the Somme

battlefield of 1916-1917. The Flanders experiences had taught the Division a good deal, and the Division was very ready to learn. Everybody knew that a heavy ordeal of some kind would be encountered on the Somme, but the men faced the future with a quiet confidence that nothing could unsettle. For the immediate present they bent themselves resolutely to getting as fit as possible for whatever the future might have in store for them. Convinced of their individual ascendancy over the enemy, they waited with quiet confidence the opportunity for its demonstration in the field.

Gratifying acknowledgments of the Division's work in the Flanders area were received from Corps and Army H.Q.

General Sir Herbert Plumer on the 14th of October wrote from Second Army Headquarters of the men of the Division :—

“ Their work in the trenches and their vicinity has been excellent and has very materially improved the defences of the sector of the line they have held, and the manner in which they have organised and carried out minor enterprises, and the fine spirit invariably shown by all ranks inspire great confidence as to the way in which they will carry out any offensive operations entrusted to them.”

From II A.N.Z.A.C. H.Q. came the following appreciation, dated the 9th of October :—

“ I am directed by the Corps Commander to say that this morning he inspected practically the entire length of the support line of your Division. He wishes me to say that he was very much impressed with the amount and excellence of the work that has been done, especially in the provision of dug-outs for the winter.

“ The organisation of the line, especially in its neatness and tidiness, was very much above the average, and he would be glad if you would convey to all ranks his high appreciation of the zeal and energy required to produce so gratifying a result.”

A later Second A.N.Z.A.C. Corps communication to General McCay made a special acknowledgment to Lieut.-Col. Carter and the 5th Pioneer Battalion and also to the engineering services of the Division, and concludes :—“ You and your Division have reason to be proud of the state in which you hand over your line.”

Thus, despite the Fromelles reverse, the authorities best able to judge were already forming fine opinions of the Division, and these opinions became ever intensified as time went on and the fateful crises of the war developed.

PART III
FIRST SOMME CAMPAIGN

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
CHAPTER VII


(October 19th, 1916—February 22nd, 1917.)

WINTER ON THE SOMME

Important contemporaneous events :	
First Australian referendum on conscription ..	October 29th.
General Nivelle assumed offensive at Verdun.	
Monastir recaptured	November 19th.
Italian offensive had yielded 40,000 prisoners by end of November	
Bucharest fell	December 6th.
Mr. Lloyd George replaced Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister	December 7th.
German offer of peace made	December 12th.
President Wilson's Peace Note issued	December 18th.
Growing tension in Greece.	
Political parties of Mr. W. M. Hughes and of Mr. J. Cook combined to form Nationalist Party in Australia	February 1917.
Germany opened ruthless submarine warfare ..	February 1917.

THE move from Ailly-le-Haut-Clocher to the Somme battle area was important in that it afforded the Division its first experience of one of the methods of the French Army in transporting *personnel*. Perhaps because all railways to the Somme battlefield were already over-burdened with the vast stores of supplies and ammunition daily required there, it was directed that the Division would move by 'bus over the 35 miles that lay between Ailly-le-Haut-Clocher and Buire, the debussing point. The 'buses were supplied by the French Army, and the arrangements were in the hands of French officers. The organisation was splendid. The 'buses met the troops at rendezvous near the various billeting villages, and, in an extraordinarily brief space every man had embussed and the convoy was speeding away to its destination. In case of a breakdown one 'bus in every ten was left empty and, in addition, a "breakdown gang" accompanied each convoy to deal with mechanical defects. The drivers, clad in heavy goat-skin coats, drove at a rapid rate, and the convoys, many miles in length, made an impressive sight as they dashed through village after village and swung out with open





throttles along the broad high-roads of the Somme Valley. Amiens was passed through, but the men got only a fleeting glimpse of it as yet. How many guessed in those days of premature triumph that a sword was hanging over the beautiful city, and how fine was the thread by which it was suspended? How many thought that, eighteen months later, the Division would again be hurrying down from Flanders to stand steadfast between the fair city and the hordes by which it was threatened?

So admirable was the organisation of the move that a few hours after embussment the troops found themselves debussed in the vicinity of Buire, about three miles west of Albert and within twelve miles from the part of the firing line which they were to occupy. The 8th and 14th Brigades travelled on the 20th of October, the 15th Brigade on the 21st. The transport units did the journey by road, leaving a day earlier than the infantry and joining them on completion of the journey. From around Buire the troops marched to the Fricourt area, where they spent their first night on the Somme battlefield. On the 22nd of October D.H.Q., after staging at Belle Vue Farm, was established at Fricourt Château, a collection of dug-outs and tents near the site of that demolished building.

The Somme battle had now been in progress for nearly four months. It had opened on the 1st of July with a combined British and French attack on a front, restricted by shortage of heavy artillery, of about 50 miles. The British attack was directed by Sir Douglas Haig, the French by General Foch, and the front was shared about equally by the two armies, the British having the northern half from Gommecourt to Hardecourt. The British attack failed in its northern sector, but met with more success on the south, where the French, too, gained substantial results. General Haig determined to develop his southern successes and to take from the south the northern positions about Thiepval, Beaumont Hamel, and Gommecourt, which he had failed to hold in his frontal attack there. In pursuit of this policy he continued vigorous blows in a northerly and north-easterly direction, and in successive stages, and by bitter and costly struggles, had by this time penetrated about six miles into the enemy defences. He was now threatening on its southern flank the ground to the north which he had been forced to relinquish in the opening phase of the operation, while, farther east, the important town of Bapaume was also in jeopardy. A notable phase of these operations had been the capture of the dominating position of Pozières by troops of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Australian Divisions. Meanwhile, the French on the British right had made practically equal progress and their advance was now threatening Péronne. The map (pp. 136, 137) shows the approximate line as it existed on the arrival of the 5th Australian Division.

The tactics employed by both British and French armies in this offensive were fundamentally the same. They comprised an

unprecedentedly long artillery preparation which was designed to annihilate utterly all enemy forward communications and defences except the deepest dug-outs. This was succeeded by infantry attacks on objectives of limited depth. After consolidation of the objective, preparations for the next advance were at once undertaken and usually these were found to require about a fortnight. The merits of this tactical policy may be left to the judgment of later historians. Some of its effects, however, in so far as they concerned a division brought into the line towards the end of its application, may be briefly indicated :—

(1) An unprecedented concentration of artillery existed on both sides of the line. This necessitated an enormous amount of ammunition transport.

(2) The infantry was massed very thickly, a divisional front in October being only about 1 mile in width. As there was practically no splinter-proof cover in the forward areas, our infantry casualties from enemy artillery fire were exceptionally heavy.

(3) All roads and railways had been torn to pieces by the preliminary artillery bombardments. This necessitated the construction and maintenance of new roads and light railways, and, despite the work accomplished by all units engaged on the task, the communications were still few and inadequate, and generally stopped far short of the front line. Such roads as existed were crowded by transport night and day, and it took many hours to move a company of infantry a few miles along them. Enemy artillery could reach almost every road in the area, and the forward roads suffered continuous shelling.

(4) Every vestige of accommodation had been utterly wiped out in the preliminary bombardments and sufficient engineering material had not yet come to hand to house all the troops in the area. This resulted in much bivouacking on wet ground and in improvised shelters, and consequent hardship and sickness of the troops.

(5) The front trench system was the barest line of roughly linked shell-holes. The complete lack of engineering material in the most advanced areas prevented the revetting which was necessary to support good trenches and dug-outs. The effect of this on the infantry holding the line was very severe. It was impossible to walk about during daylight, and the men, crouching almost motionless in their muddy shell-holes, were equally exposed to weather and artillery fire.

(6) Stores and casualties had to be man-handled for great distances in the forward areas. This necessitated the employment of large infantry working parties in the most heavily shelled areas. It caused great fatigue and added a good deal to the casualty list.

(7) The accommodation in course of erection was mostly four or five miles from the front line. The nature of the intervening ground

was such that it took men six or eight hours to go from the camps to the front line, or *vice versa*. In either case they reached their destination utterly exhausted.

The whole area was one of indescribable desolation. Once a charming countryside, it had swelled upwards in a series of gentle undulations between the Somme and the Ancre River valleys, both of which were here about 150 feet above sea level. Between the rivers, the highest ground was the ridge connecting, with occasional depressions, Pozières, Martinpuich, High Wood, Longueval, and Delville Wood, where the altitude maintained was nearly 500 feet. Before the war the area had supported the usual French agricultural populations and its fields were neatly kept and fertile, its villages numerous and quietly prosperous, its inhabitants diligent and content with their simple *rôle* in the scheme of things. The natural beauty of the landscape was enhanced by the woods and villages with which it was dotted, the former carefully kept and, in summer, green, cool, and alluring, the villages, their houses half hidden by the trees and orchards about them, clustering snugly around their Gothic churches as if seeking security in the shadow of their soaring spires. Dainty roads wound, ribbon-like, between the villages connecting them all in a network of loving fraternity.

A blast from the trumpet of war and all was changed; the idyllic landscape became in a few short months the most loathsome and appalling terrain in the world. No brush will ever paint, and no pen will ever tell, a tenth part of its repulsiveness, or of the sufferings of those who endured its horrors. A storm of high explosive raged over it night and day for many weeks. Millions of shells, each freighted with a hideous force of disruption, fell upon its fields, its woods, its villages. Chewed and masticated by the teeth of war, they lost all semblance of their former shapes. The fields became mere areas of dishevelled rubbish, the shell-holes filled with putrid water in which rotted the corpses of men and animals. The frames of gun carriages and of other vehicles, twisted into grotesque shapes, lay everywhere, and, even when the fiery breath of war had swept on to fresh devastation, death lurked for many in the unexploded shells and bombs with which the whole ground was littered. The villages were not merely destroyed. They were obliterated. At first they had burned. When that phase was over there were still standing the stout frameworks of the stone and brick edifices. These in turn had been shattered till they lay on the ground as shapeless heaps of brick and rubble. Not content with this, the storm of destruction had still fallen upon them, grinding and breaking and burying them until they were now scarcely distinguishable from the turgid seas of mud that had once been the meadows about them. But the transformation of the woods was more pitiable still. In them the resistance had been stoutest; on them, therefore, the fury of war had been the most concentrated. Their leaves had fallen

prematurely ; their boughs had been lopped off by flying fragments ; their trunks, at first only scarred by shrapnel, had all in turn received the direct hit that had rent them asunder. Crashing to the ground, they had been hastily improvised as impediments to the relentless British advance, and meshes of barbed wire had held them for a space till the inevitable barrage came down once again. And then had come the infantry assault, when the surviving attackers met the surviving defenders in the grim shock of naked steel and clashing rifle butts, when, locked in a death embrace, friend and foe had wrestled desperately among the riven tree trunks and in the gaping shell-holes where their roots lay exposed. So that by now the once lovely woods were but a grim, silent concourse of the shattered boles of trees, standing stiffly there like a regiment of the dead on parade. And hundreds of the shell-holes among them were the sepulchres of unknown heroes and every broken tree trunk a memorial without a name. Delville Wood in October, 1916, was surely the most terrible spectacle that war had yet vouchsafed the world—Delville Wood, with its unburied corpses and its stinking trenches parapeted with dead Germans to protect those who yet lived. And perhaps some of the men who died in its foul recesses saw with the prophetic eye of death a future still unrevealed to those of us who are left. For a Tommy and a German, dying together in the same shell-hole, had smiled at each other before they breathed their last, and had clasped hands across some other bodies that lay there. Death had not parted the grip nor quite obliterated the expression of mutual goodwill and understanding that had accompanied it. Who knows but that they saw an era as yet undisclosed when the German will become a clean man again and live in amity with decent people ?

All these things had happened a couple of months before the 5th Division arrived on the Somme and, during that space, an early winter had come on apace. Terrible as had been the battlefield in the long drawn summer days and in the clinging mists of autumn, the approach of winter now made it horrible beyond description. With the first rains the surface grew sticky and, in the depressions, slimy. In September military operations were already seriously retarded by the difficulty of transport, and now, towards the end of October, other heavy rains had converted the entire battlefield into a sea of mud, a foul, repulsive morass, over which frosts and icy winds and driving snow and rain storms held incessant sway. By tremendous effort a few miles of metal roads were made and maintained in each Divisional sector, but, off these, wheeled and even pack transport were utterly impossible. The result was that the existing roads were crowded every hour of the twenty-four with dense lines of slow-moving vehicles, between which infantry units marching to the line were forced to pick a precarious way among the wheels and hoofs by which they were surrounded. Only an

elaborate system of expert control enabled the traffic to be handled at all, and, as many of the roads were one-way routes, long detours were often necessary. That was the comparatively satisfactory state of affairs to within about three miles of the front line. Forward of that the situation was infinitely worse. Enemy shelling utterly prevented any satisfactory construction or maintenance of main roads. So infantrymen were forced to plough their way as best they could through varying thicknesses of mud to the front line. Along many of the tracks a mile an hour was good going, and a very few miles of this meant utter exhaustion for the heavily weighted infantry. Ammunition to the forward batteries was carried mostly by pack mules, but it was done at great cost to the animals, many of which were bogged and drowned in the mud. Moving the guns themselves was a task of almost superhuman exertion. As many as fourteen horses were required in many places to move an ordinary transport wagon. On the enemy side of the line, where the ground had not yet been fought over, the conditions were immeasurably easier. Though his forward area had suffered heavily from our shelling, the roads and railways to within three miles of the line were almost intact; while, as our communications lengthened over country of the utmost difficulty, his were shortened and simplified. In fact, the tactical methods pursued on the Somme, while they ensured steady limited advances at great cost, were their own guarantee against any decisive success; for they created before the enemy an impenetrable barrier of broken country in crossing which our blows lost half their strength, and beyond which they could not be followed up with sufficient rapidity to embarrass the enemy or threaten the general stability of his front. But the attrition of both armies was immense, and doubtless it was felt at the time that "killing Germans" was a sound, if uninspired, policy and, provided that our own losses were not disproportionately heavy, one that ensured a victorious if long-deferred termination of the war. The opinion then held by many reputable strategists—that neither side would ever succeed in definitely smashing the enemy front—was reflected in the reply of a German officer prisoner during his interrogation:—

"When do you think the war will end?" he was asked.

"I don't know *when* it will end," he said, "but I can tell you *where* it will end."

He was wrong, of course, but many exalted experts shared his error.

One aspect of the Somme Battle deserves particular attention. It was the most horrible "blood bath" that the world had ever witnessed, and it subjected the men on both sides of the line to the most terrible ordeal that armies had as yet endured. And British nerves stood it better than German. The fact is revealed in the thousands of enemy letters captured during the offensive. The

writers were all in a pitiable condition of nervous dread, and, severely as our armies felt the strain, no collection of British letters showing a similar condition of fright and horror could have been made. The Somme Battle eventually had tactical results of the most far-reaching character—though they were not fully seen till over a year later—but it is doubtful if they exceeded in importance the moral conviction forced upon the enemy that in the most appalling strain of modern warfare he was not the equal of the French and British Armies opposed to him.

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The Division's First Somme Campaign was divided into two phases :—

(1) From the 20th of October, 1916, to the 22nd of February, 1917. During this period the Division held the line, with occasional reliefs, in the vicinity of Flers and Gueudecourt, but without undertaking any major operation. The account of this phase is given in this chapter.


(2) From the 22nd of February, 1917, to the middle of June, 1917. This was the period of the enemy withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line and of the attacks near Bullecourt. It was characterised by much fighting and will be treated in Chapter VII.

The Division on its arrival on the battlefield proper lost no time in taking over the sector it was to hold for the next fortnight. It was known as the Flers sector (map, pp. 136, 137) because the front line lay due north of that demolished village and within 2,000 yards of its still smoking ruins. The front, then held by the 30th British Division with two brigades in the line and one in reserve, was about 2,000 yards in length and lay almost due east and west. The chief approach to it was the main road from Albert, which, passing in turn through Fricourt, Mametz, and Montauban, reached Bernafay Wood and passed on in the direction of Guillemont. On the western edge of Bernafay Wood a cross-road running north led on to Longueval, about two miles, and thence on to the north-west edge of Delville Wood, in which vicinity many heavy batteries were stationed. From this point the road became gradually worse and worse till it lost itself in the sea of mud by which the village of Flers was surrounded. Thence to the front line two long communication trenches had been cut, one, Fish Alley, which led up past Factory Corner to the right brigade front, and Turk Lane, which led to the forward system of the left brigade. About half a mile from the front line Turk Lane was intersected by another communication trench called Goose Alley, which crossed it from left to right and fed the right part of the left brigade front. There was a noteworthy disproportion in the length of the brigade fronts, the right being about half that of the left. In these circumstances the right brigade front was held with one battalion in the line and the left with two. The whole divisional front lay on a slight forward slope, which, a mile away,

dropped more quickly into a valley in which lay the little hamlets of Le Barque, Ligny-Thillois, and Thillois. Beyond the valley the ground rose in another undulation on which stood the town of Bapaume, about three miles distant from the front line, in direction a little east of north. The Butte de Warlencourt was the only other feature which calls for mention. This curious mound lay about half a mile to the left front of the Division's left boundary and near to the main Albert-Bapaume Road.

The 8th Brigade (Brigadier-General E. Tivey, D.S.O.) and the 14th Brigade (Brigadier-General E. Hobkirk, D.S.O.) were instructed to take over the right and left brigade frontages respectively. Both brigades had debussed at Buire on the 20th of October, and the 14th Brigade had, on the same date, marched about ten miles along the difficult road to Pommiers Redoubt Camp near Montauban. Here hundreds of the weary men found that, owing to insufficient accommodation, they would have to pass the night in the open, and a bitterly cold night it turned out to be. On the next day the battalions completed their laborious journey, the 55th (Lieut.-Col. McConaghy) and 56th (Lieut.-Col. Scott) taking over the left brigade sector. The 53rd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Crowshaw) held the support system, and the 54th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Holdorf) went into reserve. During the journey to the front line it was found that Turk's Lane was too deep in mud for use, and the battalions were forced to pick their way over the open. The 8th Brigade, which had marched to Mametz on the 21st of October, took over the right brigade front on the 22nd, the 29th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Bennett) going into the front line, the 30th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Clark) in support, at Flers Trench, the 31st Battalion (Major Eckersley) at Cress Trench, and the 32nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Beardsmore) in reserve at Montauban. At the time of the "take over" the famous 29th (British) Division held the divisional sector on the right, and the 9th (British) Division was on the left. The whole sector formed part of the front of the Fourth Army.

There was a sharp frost during the first couple of nights and the men in the front line, blanketless and in open shell holes, suffered very severely. Both General Tivey and General Hobkirk maintained a rotation of frequent reliefs of the front line battalions, forty-eight hours constituting the usual tour of duty there. Despite this, the distance back to the reserve camps near Montauban was so great and the route so arduous that all ranks soon commenced to suffer a great deal from fatigue. The enemy artillery fire was heavy and accurate. Such paths and communication trenches as existed were shelled as severely as the front line itself, and casualties were steady from the beginning. The absence of serviceable trenches and communication trenches necessitated a great deal of exposure to snipers, and the toll of casualties from this cause was heavy on both sides of the line.



A TYPICAL STREET IN BAFUME, ON THE DAY OF ITS CAPTURE, 17TH MARCH, 1917.

It was here that the Division got its first experience of Trench Foot. This disease had been recorded in military chronicles from the earliest times. In modern wars it was experienced particularly in the Napoleonic Campaign in Russia, in the Crimean War, and on the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915. The condition commenced with the ordinary numbness of the feet that would be expected in men forced to remain for many hours in a cramped position in trenches, knee deep in icy mud. The next stage was marked by pains, especially in the toes, accompanied by considerable swelling of the feet. If relief was not secured before this stage developed very far the feet would become gangrenous, varying in extent from small spots of rottenness to the death of the whole foot or leg, when amputation would be necessary. The disease was caused primarily by a lowering of the temperature of the feet, an auxiliary agent being a tiny germ which penetrated into the foot through cracks at the sides of the toe nails or through cuts or ruptures in the skin itself. The treatment prescribed at first included wearing gum boots to keep the feet dry, change of socks twice daily, daily massage of the feet with whale oil to preserve warmth and blood circulation, and physical exercise where practicable to keep the feet warm. It will be readily understood that the difficulties of carrying out this course of treatment in the front line were considerable, but all ranks did their utmost to comply with the medical instructions.

During the first few days of this period the 15th Brigade (Brigadier-General H. E. Elliott) was in reserve in the vicinity of Montauban, which it had reached after marching from Fricourt on the 22nd. Here it had at once become occupied on the urgent problem of increasing the accommodation in the reserve area. The strain was relieved somewhat by the issue of a number of tents on the 24th. General Elliott also supplied large stretcher-bearing parties to work under the 8th and 14th Brigades, which were already finding that the ordinary number of stretcher-bearers was quite unable to cope with the evacuation of casualties over the trying stages of the forward areas.

Although the approach of a particularly severe and early winter rendered vain for the moment any hope of major operations, there was still a possibility that a spell of fine weather might intervene and dry the area sufficiently to attempt another general advance. In view of this, preparations were being made for an attack by the Fourth and the Reserve British Armies, and the date provisionally fixed for the assault was the 25th of October. The Division thus became at once involved in all the preparations for a major operation. Of these, the most laborious was the digging of assembly trenches on the jumping-off line of the attacking infantry. It was a heart-breaking task. The work had to be done by night, and the journey to and from the trenches was itself a nightmare. The sticky mud would not "throw off" the shovels, and almost as fast as the trench

was dug the wet sides crumbled in again. All three infantry brigades lent every spare man for the task, but the weather, instead of moderating, grew worse and worse. The operation was postponed again and again and finally abandoned, but, on the 5th Divisional front, a minor operation was decided upon, designed really as a preliminary to the bigger attack. Its object was an improvement of our front line on the left brigade front, and the 14th Brigade was instructed to carry out the operation. To give it the necessary rest and freshening up, the 15th Brigade relieved it in the front line on the 28th of October, the 57th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Stewart) taking over on that date. The 58th (Lieut.-Col. Denehy), 59th (Lieut.-Col. Layh), and the 60th (Lieut.-Col. Duigan) Battalions were distributed throughout supports and reserves, and the 14th Brigade moved for a day's rest into the camps near Montauban. It moved up again on the 29th and 30th of October, expecting to attack on the 1st of November and 1,000 men of the 15th Brigade spent the night of the 31st in digging assembly trenches for the operation. But the weather continued vile; the trenches collapsed as fast as they were dug and all ranks of both brigades were gradually becoming exhausted and in no condition for undertaking operations. Meanwhile, the 8th Brigade had been continuously in the line on the shorter right sector, and it, too, was commencing to feel the strain. After several postponements of the operation word was received that the 5th Division would be relieved by the 2nd Australian Division on the 4th of November, and that the 7th Brigade of that Division would carry out the attack in place of the 14th Brigade, but under the direction of the 5th Australian Divisional Staff, which was better acquainted with the local conditions than the staff of the incoming 2nd Australian Division. The 50th Division, which was now on the left of the 5th Australian Division, was to co-operate with an attack in the direction of the Butte de Warlancourt. Lieut. Col. Wagstaff visited the battalions of the 7th Brigade and thoroughly explained the position to them. The officer in charge of tanks reported that the state of the ground rendered their co-operation impossible, a statement that was well borne out by the experience of the 55th and 56th Battalions. They were moved back two and a half miles from the front line to the vicinity of Carlton Trench on the night of the 2nd of November, and the journey took six hours to accomplish and all of the men were utterly worn out at its conclusion. On the night of the 4th-5th of November the 8th and 14th Brigades were relieved by units of the 2nd Australian Division, and on the morning of the 5th the 7th Brigade and the 50th Division carried out the attack. The General Staff of the 5th Australian Division established advanced H.Q. at Carlton Trench for the operation. The attack failed. Good progress was at first made on the right and left flanks of the attacking front, but, the right of the 50th Division failing to make headway, the whole operation collapsed.

Shortly after mid-day General McCay handed over to General Legge, G.O.C. 2nd Australian Division, the command of the sector, General Birdwood, who was present, consenting to the exchange. Meanwhile, the infantry of the 5th Division, gaunt-checked and hollow-eyed, their clothing verminous and caked with mud from head to foot, was picking its way wearily back to the Corps Reserve Area, where, by the 6th of November, they were once more in billets, the 8th Brigade at Buire, the 14th at Ribemont, the 15th at Dernancourt.

Such was the first tour of the infantry in the line on the Somme during the winter of 1916-1917. How had the other units of the Division fared during the same period?

The three machine gun companies of the Division had experienced most of the hardships of the infantry. They moved into the forward area with their respective infantry brigades and suffered equally with them. It was only after extraordinary exertions that the guns, which usually were distributed in the front and support systems, could be got to their positions and the necessary supplies of ammunition maintained near them. All three companies found it difficult to keep the guns in working order, and the emplacements were crude and required constant attention. On their relief from the line all companies spent a few busy days in bringing their guns up to concert pitch again, as the delicate mechanism had suffered considerably from the dampness of the front line.

The Divisional Engineers realised as soon as they saw the sector that they would have a trying and busy time. Lieut.-Col. Carey, in his first survey of the area, reported that the Corps Engineering Dump was 23,000 yards by road from the front line, and that of this distance nearly 7,000 yards lay through communication trenches practically impassable owing to mud. A tramway certainly ran from Longueval to Flers, but it could be worked only by man power. Lorries could go so far as Longueval, but, owing to the traffic on the roads, it took a lorry a whole day to do one trip there from Mametz, a distance of about five miles. In these circumstances, the C.R.E. foresaw the extreme difficulty of securing supplies of engineering material so urgently required in the forward area. Nevertheless, he did all that insistent effort could achieve to expedite supplies, and as the chief need was the improvement of communications, a large proportion of the available engineers was put on road construction, drainage, and general maintenance. The other most urgent engineering requirement was the provision of material for the accommodation of the troops, and building was proceeded with as quickly as the supplies of material would permit. But it was not until the Division's second tour of duty on the Somme that appreciable headway could be made with this. Before this happened, Lieut.-Col. Carey and Major Sturdee were both temporarily detached from their duty with the Division and were carrying out the duties of C.R.E.

Circuit and C.R.E. Roads respectively, working under Corps control. The 14th Field Company (Major Bachtold) was deeply concerned in the preparations for the 14th Brigade operation. In pegging out the overland tracks to guide the assaulting troops to the assembly trenches and in arranging jumping off steps they had an arduous time. When the 14th Brigade was relieved by the 7th, the 14th Field Company was left in the line to perform the engineering duties of the operation and Nos. 2 and 4 sections on the right flank did specially good work. This Company was withdrawn for a rest on the 8th of November after suffering considerable casualties, but the 8th and 15th Field Companies were not relieved with the remainder of the Division. They remained in the forward area and worked steadily at the task of improving its communications and accommodation, and their good work was apparent when the Division returned to the line after its brief rest.

The 5th Divisional Signal Company (Captain R. A. Stanley) was handicapped, like all the other units, by the conditions of the area. Nevertheless, signal communications were maintained satisfactorily throughout the period, but the linesmen, the despatch riders, and the other outdoor *personnel* found that their work was of the most exacting character.

The 5th Pioneer Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Carter) on its arrival at Montauban Camp had a realistic demonstration of the conditions in which it would have to work. One of the company commanders of the Battalion, venturing a few steps off the beaten track, found himself so hopelessly bogged in the mud that he had to be extricated by a mule, to which a tow rope was hitched for the purpose. The Battalion was engaged throughout the period on the work of improving the communication trenches of the sector, and Fish Alley was soon completed to the front line, and many improvements were also made to that unattractive thoroughfare. Two companies were detailed to assist in the work of cutting communication trenches to the captured positions in the operation of the 7th Brigade, but in view of its non-success these were not required. Like the engineers, the pioneers were not relieved on the 4th of November, but remained in the sector and pushed on with the building of a Decauville Light Railway and the draining of roads.

Medical Services found the conditions of the area equally exacting. Colonel Hardy, on his arrival at Fricourt Château, directed the 8th Field Ambulance (Colonel Shepherd), reinforced by the bearers of the 14th and 15th Field Ambulances, to take over the Advanced Dressing Station at Thistle Dump, about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the front line. The 14th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Tebbutt) was posted to Medical Dump, near Mametz, while Lieut.-Col. Horne with the 15th Field Ambulance received instructions to take over the Corps Main Dressing Station at Bécordel. The stretcher-bearers in the forward area soon found that the communication trenches, being knee-deep

in slush, were quite useless for their work and that the "carry" overland was one of extraordinary difficulty. From the regimental aid posts to the Advanced Dressing Station the distance was about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and stretcher cases could be conveyed over this only by numerous relays of bearers, so that thirty-six men were needed to evacuate one wounded man from the regimental aid posts, and it took them about seven hours of the most exhausting efforts to cover the $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of loathsome mud which bogged them at every step. After several days' heroic effort to cope with their work, a large infantry party was supplied to reinforce the bearer divisions, but even with this assistance forward evacuations remained an exhausting process, and all sorts of plans were suggested to facilitate it. Chief of these was the sledge idea of W. O. Roberts, 8th Field Ambulance, a stockman who came from Kongwak, near Korumburra, in Gippsland, and who was versed therefore in the best means of transport over mud. Modifying slightly the vehicle of his home country to suit local conditions, W. O. Roberts, with the enthusiastic assistance of Capt. Irving, devised a sledge in which a patient could be conveyed to the advanced Dressing Station in less than two hours, a stretcher-bearer and a driver being the only *personnel* required for the work. This was so great an improvement on the old system that many sledges were constructed and they did a great deal to relieve the strain of forward evacuations until communications were sufficiently improved. This, however, was not for several weeks. It should be noted here that the medical arrangements for the operation on the 5th of November were in the hands of the A.D.M.S. 5th Australian Division and that the evacuations were satisfactorily carried out by the 8th Field Ambulance.

Like all other transport and supply units, the Divisional Train found the road communications of the area trying in the extreme. Lieut.-Col. Francis's H.Q. were at Bécordel, and, as the railhead was Albert, he drew supplies direct from it by his horse transport and conveyed them to the brigade dumps, where they were collected by the first line transport of the various units. But though the distances were not excessive, the conditions were such that the horse teams were often out till midnight, and in the bitter weather the animals soon commenced to feel the strain. Nothing in the way of warm stables or even dry standings could yet be provided for them, and all ranks of the Divisional Train, as well as its animals, found their work most exhausting. Despite this, supplies never once failed, and Lieut.-Col. Francis even found an opportunity to establish brigade reserve ration dumps at convenient places.

It will be hardly necessary to detail the labours of the veterinary services during this first tour of duty on the Somme. The conditions under which the animals of the Division were forced to live and work have already been sufficiently indicated and Major Henry's graph on page 400 tells more eloquently than any words of the

sufferings of the animals during the period. The War Diary of the D.A.D.V.S. speaks appreciatively of the specially good work done by the transport services of the 60th Battalion, the 56th Battery, and the 28th A.A.S.C. Company in the care of their animals during this trying period.

D.A.D.O.S., as might be expected, was extremely busy throughout the period, and winter issues, including thousands of woollen vests, socks, and horse-rugs, were a welcome feature of his activity. Boots, too, rapidly collapsed under the continuous wet of the trenches, and indents for them were heavy, while the hammers of the boot repairers were kept tapping incessantly. "Gum boots thigh" were at a high premium in the forward areas and no effort was spared to increase the Division's supply of them. D.A.D.O.S. (Captain Rodd) established his *depôt* at Albert during the first tour of the Division on the Somme, and on its relief he moved back with it to the Vignacourt area, where 15,000 sheepskin coats and leather jerkins were distributed among units.

The Salvage Company (Captain Viner) naturally found plenty of room for its energies in this area, and first at Montauban and later on at Albert its time was fully occupied in clearing up thousands of pounds' worth of the material with which the battlefield was littered. Some figures giving an idea of the Salvage Company's work are given later on.

If, so far, nothing has been said of the Divisional Artillery it is because it had not yet been relieved in the Bois Grenier sector. Here, under the New Zealand Division, the gunners spent the whole month of October at their congenial duty of pommelling the enemy trenches. The Artillery Staff had been changed by the appointment of Major Lavarack as Brigade-Major in place of Major Thornthwaite, who now took command of a battery. Major Lavarack was possessed of high professional attainments as his *p.s.c.* degree showed. He soon revealed practical ability of a high order and his *régime* as Brigade-Major was marked by a steady and substantial improvement in the work of the formation. Lieut.-Col. Caddy (13th F.A. Brigade), on leaving General Franks' force, had received cordial thanks for the work of his unit in the Armentières sector. The stay of the 5th Divisional Artillery in the Flanders area was, however, now drawing to a close. About the middle of November it was relieved, and it commenced forthwith a long trek by road to the Somme, where it joined up with the remainder of the Division about the 20th of November, in time to enter the line with it on its second visit to the Somme trenches.

The strain of the Somme winter had been reflected in the rapidly growing sick returns, and many senior officers were commencing to show signs of illness. Col. McGlenn was one of the first to become affected, and was evacuated, seriously sick, on the 5th of November. He did not return to the Division, but his colleagues there were

pleased to learn a little later that he had sufficiently recovered to resume military duty in England. Throughout his service with the Division he had shouldered his responsibilities well and had performed with skill the duties that had fallen to his lot as head of the "A" and "Q" Branches of the Divisional Staff. About this time, too, Col. Hardy, the A.D.M.S., himself far from well, noticed with concern the growing infirmity of General McCay, whose old Gallipoli wound was commencing to give great trouble. Medical skill and the patient's inflexible will combined to check the condition for some little time longer. On the 16th of November, however, Col. Hardy was forced to go to hospital himself, and he never regained sufficient health to return to active service. He had maintained the medical services at a consistently good level since their earliest days and, whether in an Egyptian summer or an European winter, had succeeded in keeping the sick wastage of the Division at a very low percentage. His successor, Col. C. Hearne, who arrived about a fortnight later, soon showed himself a man of equal enthusiasm and professional skill. Tall and slightly built, with a helpful, pleasant manner, he soon became as popular as he was capable. His personal gallantry was of the highest order and his frequent and prolonged visits to the most forward areas excited at once the esteem of all ranks and aroused no little apprehension among his many friends.

The stay of the Division in the Ribemont area was for a few days only, but it served to refresh it very considerably. Clothing was cleaned, the men were bathed at the Corps Baths at Heilly, and equipment and transport and animals all commenced to improve in appearance. On the 8th of November the Division went back some 20 miles farther to the Vignacourt area, travelling mostly by 'bus. Here the 8th Brigade was billeted in Vignacourt, the 14th in Raineville, and the 15th around Flesselles. The rest in this area, which lasted about ten days, was devoted almost exclusively to the energetic training of all arms. On the 11th of November Sir Douglas Haig inspected several battalions of the 14th and 15th Brigades at their work. A fine Divisional School, of which Lieut.-Col. Mason was first Commandant, was opened at Montonvillers on the 17th of November, and Major King, the G.S.O. II, soon had it staffed with efficient officer and N.C.O. instructors. An Aircraft Liaison School at Allonville also helped to train officers and men in the co-operation of infantry and airmen during operations. About this time Major Charteris, who, as Brigade Major of the 14th Brigade, had rendered valuable service to that formation, left his appointment to specialise in machine gun work, and his place was soon afterwards filled by Major L. Dickinson.

The Division's second tour of duty in the Somme trenches opened on the 20th of November and closed on the 23rd of December. From the Vignacourt area units were moved back by 'bus to the Ribemont area about the 17th and 18th of November. The move to

the line was made almost immediately afterwards, the 8th Brigade (General E. Tivey) and the 15th Brigade (General H. E. Elliott) relieving the 1st and 3rd Guards' Brigades on the 21st of November and the 20th of November respectively.

While the Division had been out in rest a readjustment of Corps fronts had taken place and I A.N.Z.A.C. now held, in two divisional sectors, a front of about 4,000 yards, lying just before Gueudecourt and immediately to the right of the Flers sector, which the Division had held on its first tour of duty on the Somme. Of the two divisional sectors on the Corps front, the 5th Division was now ordered to hold the right with two brigades in the line and one in reserve. The 8th Brigade took over the right brigade front of the new sector, and General Tivey established his H.Q. near Waterlot Farm. General Elliott, in the left brigade sector, had his H.Q. near the batteries in Gun Valley, just in front of Delville Wood, where the shelling was frequent and heavy. The prospect of relieving the Guards' Division, the *corps d'élite* of the British Army, had occasioned some little curiosity as to the state in which they would hand over the sector. The Guards certainly astonished everybody by the almost immaculate cleanliness of their uniforms and equipment, which showed surprisingly few traces of the Somme mud, but there was nothing else in the relief that excited attention. The sector was just the same as any other sector, with its defences and trenches and roads in a deplorable condition and with much hard work calling for immediate attention. The 8th and 15th Brigades at once set about linking up the shell-holes of the front line and otherwise improving its defences and communication.

The frontage of the new divisional sector lay between Gueudecourt and Les Bœufs, and about half a mile in advance of those demolished villages. Its front line, comprising Shine, Cumulus, Monsoon, Zenith, and Spring Trenches, faced north-east towards Beaulencourt and Le Transloy on a slight forward slope. The enemy trenches in the sector were known as Stormy, Sunray, Moonray, and Finch Trenches. Our front line system included also support trenches, Rainbow, Gusty, and Spectrum Trenches, while a reserve line called Rose Trench lay about 1,000 yards behind the front line. Another 1,000 yards behind Rose Trench lay a second important support system held chiefly by a machine gun garrison, and including Needle and Carlton Trenches. A third defensive line known as Switch Trench lay about a mile farther to the rear. Cocoa Alley and Eastern Lane were the chief saps leading to the forward system, but duckboard walks were being pushed forward and, in all but the most advanced areas, these were generally used in preference to the communication trenches.

As the conditions experienced in this sector were much the same as those already described in the Flers sector, it is not proposed to mention in detail the events of the next month. It appears un-

grateful to pass thus rapidly over a period fraught with so much hardship and bitter suffering to the Division. The reader should remember that every hour of the 30 days' duration of the tour was one of cruel discomfort, and often worse, to the thousands of brave infantry, machine gunners, and L.T.M.B. *personnel*, who, in the foremost zone of all, endured with uncomplaining stoicism all that a terrible season and an active enemy could inflict upon them. The artillery, pioneers, engineers, medical and supply services, while they too worked under severe conditions and often in considerable danger, had at least two big advantages over the men in the front trench. They generally had some form of cover under which to sleep, and they had what was a greater boon still, the power of moving about freely, and of maintaining by active physical exertion the circulation of their blood through their limbs. This was impossible in the front line and was equally responsible with the exposure for the high sick rate there and the heavy toll of Trench Foot.

The only infantry action of the period was the twelfth raid of the Division. This was carried out by the 8th Brigade at 10 p.m. on the night of the 8th of December. Lieut. Crane led a platoon of the 32nd Battalion against an enemy position in Finch Trench on the extreme right of the Divisional sector. The raid was not an unqualified success, for, although twelve Germans were killed, our own losses were also severe, due in part to inefficient artillery arrangements.

The 15th Brigade was relieved in the left sector by the 14th Brigade on the 30th of November after a ten days' tour, and it relieved the 8th Brigade in the right sector on the 10th of December after a twenty days' tour. When the Division was finally relieved by the 2nd Australian Division about the 20th of December, each brigade had done approximately twenty days' service in the front line. The total Divisional casualties were 13 officers and 499 other ranks. In the same period 1,450 sick were evacuated and 19 officers and 2,517 reinforcements came to hand. It may be noted here that the established strength of a division was now 733 officers and 18,225 other ranks, and that the actual available strength of the 5th Australian Division averaged about 14,500 during December, 1916.

If the period was uneventful as regards operations, it was a momentous one in other respects. General McCay's continued ill-health had recently become worse, and not even the fortitude with which the sufferings were borne could disguise from his medical attendants the imperative need of a long rest. He was evacuated on the 18th of December, as it turned out, never to return; for though his health eventually recovered sufficiently to enable him to undertake a responsible position in England, it was never afterwards robust enough to permit of his return to service in France. During his leadership of the Division it had made notable progress towards efficiency and had won fine opinions for itself in all that

it had undertaken. His work with the Division is perhaps best summarised as follows:—he took it over as a raw, inexperienced formation and left it well advanced on the way to the extraordinary efficiency that it afterwards attained. Under him it had been established on a sound foundation and the super-structure was now assuming shape. That the whole formation afterwards grew into such perfect proportions was due partly to the early *régime* of General McCay and partly to the high military attainments and the sterling personal character of the man who succeeded him.

Major-General J. J. Talbot Hobbs was born in London in 1864 and was educated at Merton. He had practiced in Perth the profession of an architect and his professional and personal repute were both of the highest. His connection with the Volunteer Forces of Australia was long and distinguished, and promotion had come steadily since the receipt of his first commission in 1889. His versatility was marked and his service in artillery and infantry units enabled him to acquire a thorough knowledge of the two most important of the three arms. He had also served for seven years as staff officer for Engineers. On the outbreak of war he became C.R.A. of the First Australian Divisional Artillery, and his present promotion to the command of a division was the result of his capable and conscientious handling of that formation during all its war service.

To the majority of the officers and men in the Division the new G.O.C. was quite unknown, either in person or by repute. Of somewhat short stature and slightly built, he walked with a stride of a man more used to the saddle than the footpath. From a distance there was nothing imposing in the slight, almost frail, figure. It was when one's eyes rested on his face that one felt the strength and the fineness of the personality behind it. It was the face of a man who had worked at high pressure for many years. Long hours of hard thinking and intense concentration had left their noble lines upon it; the mouth was determined and judicial, obviously not the mouth of a man who would shrink from a decision or equivocate with what conscience or duty dictated. The eyes were clear, quick, and penetrating, yet immediately responsive to humour or to compassion. The brow above them was broad and finely proportioned, and the lines upon it were once again those of deep and long continued study. It crowned the face with dignity and breadth of view and intellectuality, and made it at once impressive and unforgettable. A quick, almost nervous, manner betokened latent springs of energy that soon showed themselves to be almost inexhaustible. From the first moment of his arrival to the day when he left to fill the highest position that the Australian Army offered, the Division became the ruling passion of his life. Every ounce of his strength, ability, and energy, and every moment of his time, were directed to the one supreme end, the efficiency of his

command and the welfare of his troops. Such was the man in whose hands the destinies of the 5th Australian Division lay during the two most critical years in the history of humanity.

An event second only in importance to the advent of General Hobbs was the arrival on the 10th of December of Col. J. H. Bruche, the Division's new A.A. and Q.M.G. Born in Melbourne in 1873 and educated at Scotch College, he had afterwards proceeded to the Melbourne University and had completed his law course there. But the Army appealed to him more strongly than the Bar, and, abandoning his legal work in favour of a military career, he was appointed to a commission on the A. and I. Staff of the Australian Permanent Forces in 1898. He saw considerable service in the South African War, and on his return to Australia made rapid strides in his profession. A lengthy course of training and duty in England in 1910 and 1911 broadened an experience already considerable, and shortly after the outbreak of war he was appointed to the command in Western Australia. It was largely under his *régime* there that the extraordinarily successful recruiting results that made Western Australia famous throughout the Commonwealth and the Empire were achieved. In 1916 he left Australia and now joined the Division after filling for a short time a responsible position on the staff of the A.I.F. Depôts in England.

Perhaps the clearest description of Col. Bruche's personality would be to say that it was ideally constituted to work in harmony with that of the new Divisional Commander. While his great professional ability was accepted on all hands without question, it was eventually the character and broad humanity of the man that made his influence so profoundly and so beneficially felt throughout the Division. His dominant characteristics were his absolute justice and personal integrity, his unswerving devotion to his duty, and his desire to help the units by every means in his power. He commenced work unobtrusively, satisfied for the time being to maintain the "A" and "Q" Branches in the good condition in which he found them until he was sufficiently conversant with local conditions to introduce improvements. From the time of his arrival until after the last shot of the war had been fired the "A" and "Q" Branches of the Division, admirable always, grew steadily under his direction to higher and higher levels.

Other important changes in the Divisional Staff occurred about the same time and may conveniently be alluded to here. On the 19th of January, General A. J. Bessell-Browne succeeded General Christian in command of the Divisional Artillery. General Christian's work with the Divisional Artillery had brought that formation from the rawest recruit stage to a high degree of efficiency in nine months' service. But the rigours of a Somme winter undermined his health and he was now forced to relinquish his command. Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor, whose professional ability had been demon-

strated in his command of the 25th A.F.A. Brigade, suffered similarly from the severe weather and he, too, was forced by illness to relinquish a command that he had held with credit and success. Lieut.-Col. Lucas, of the 15th A.F.A. Brigade, left France about the same time to take up work in an Artillery Training Depôt in England. As the 15th and 25th A.F.A. Brigades were soon afterwards disbanded as such, no notice of the successors of Lieut.-Col. Cox-Taylor and Lieut.-Col. Lucas is called for here.

The new C.R.A. brought to the command of the Divisional Artillery credentials of a high order. Born in Auckland, N.Z., in 1877 and educated at Perth High School, he had early shown the qualities of mind and of character that command success. A typical Australian, loving the saddle and an out-of-door life, he had relished the South African War and its attendant hardships, and had found it a congenial sphere for the exercise of the military inclinations which he had always felt. Returning to Australia with a D.S.O. and an exceptionally fine record, he had actively associated himself with the Militia Forces in Perth, where, as a senior officer in an artillery brigade, he was known as a sound and enthusiastic artilleryman. He had sailed from Australia as a battery commander in the 1st Divisional Artillery, and after winning the warm commendation of his superiors in Gallipoli he now took up duties as C.R.A. under his old artillery chief, General Hobbs. Sturdy and well built in person, he was dispassionate, self-contained, and thoughtful, but enterprising and quick to act when the moment for action came. Something in the quiet composure of his bearing seemed to generate confidence, and his influence in his new command was soon most marked and happy.

Owing to the utter impossibility of carrying out operations on a large scale the Division concentrated its energies in two chief directions :—

(1) Improving the conditions of the area for men and animals, especially in the matter of accommodation and communication ;

(2) Making the stationary but relentless warfare of the front line as expensive as possible to the enemy.

The work accomplished in the first connection is briefly outlined in the accounts of the engineering activities of the period. An idea of the nature of the warfare may best be secured by a perusal of a Divisional Intelligence Summary, which, though it deals with dates a little later than the present, is quite typical of the time. An Artillery Intelligence Report, characteristic of the period, is also included.

For official use only.

5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

From 6 a.m. 31st January to 6 a.m. 1st February, 1917

NOTE.—*Not to be taken into front line trenches*

I. OPERATIONS

Our Artillery fired on enemy tracks and routes used at intervals during the 24 hours.

ATOM and FIRE TRENCHES were shelled intermittently during the day.

Our Artillery co-operated in the bombardment by the Heavies at 1.30 p.m. on enemy trenches in N.21.d. and b. placing a shrapnel barrage over trenches in N.22.c. and d., in order to catch any of the enemy that may have attempted to escape the bombardment by evacuating trenches.

TRENCH MORTARS. At 4 p.m. our medium trench mortars effectively bombarded enemy trenches and wire between N.31.d.9.5. and N.22.c.1.7.

RIFLE GRENADES were fired into enemy wire and trenches throughout the night with good effect.

SNIPING. Our snipers had a few targets in the early morning and at dusk, but few targets were offered during the day.

MACHINE GUNS. Our guns co-operated with Heavy Artillery shoot on enemy trenches in N.21.d.

Indirect fire was maintained on enemy tracks and communications.

Guns on anti-aircraft duty fired on hostile planes at times during the day.

PATROLS. Our patrols were active.

At 12.45 p.m. a listening post detected sounds of working in the enemy lines.

A patrol of 1 officer and 3 men immediately went out from our trenches at N.28.d.4.5. to investigate. They located enemy working parties extending along from MOLTEN to FINCH TRENCH.

Machine guns were turned on the working parties and the work ceased.

It is suspected that the enemy were laying new wire.

II. ENEMY DEFENCES

FRONT AND SUPPORT LINES. New wire entanglements have been located at N.29.a.7.2.

Work was observed going on in ETHER ALLEY at 3 p.m., working party was dispersed by our artillery.

At 8.15 p.m. 8 Germans were observed working at N.11.d.2.7.

III. MOVEMENT IN ENEMY LINES

At 8.10 a.m. horsemen were seen on road at N.11.a.8.3., riding in a south-westerly direction and disappearing into BEAULENCOURT.

At 1.10 p.m. about 10 men were noticed to leave trench at N.23.a.3.1.

They walked in groups of about 3 at intervals of 100 yards and disappeared into a sap at N.18.c.1.2. Another party of 14 were seen at N.23.a.4.1. at 4.45 p.m.

At 3 p.m. a few Germans were seen carrying what appeared to be water-cans at N.24.b.3.1. They walked in a north-easterly direction and disappeared into a house at N.24.b.3.4.

Small parties were observed during the day on track in N.10.c. and d. and N.11.a., also on the BAPAUME ROAD.

At dusk transport seen on road at N.24.a.8.5. was fired on by our machine guns.

IV. ARTILLERY

ENEMY SHELLING. Hostile artillery was active throughout the day.

During the morning a few 8" shells were directed on GUN VALLEY.

From 2.15 p.m. to 4 p.m. GINCHY and GUILLEMONT ROAD and vicinity was intermittently shelled with 5.9" and 4.2".

An ammunition dump in T.S.c. was destroyed by shell fire.

During the day enemy shelled our Right Brigade from line with 77 mm. doing no damage.

ETERNAL ALLEY was shelled periodically doing slight damage.

ROSE, NEEDLE, and WINDMILL TRENCHES also duckboard tracks received the usual attention.

HOSTILE BATTERIES 8" guns which shelled GUN VALLEY were observed from T.8.b.3.8. to be firing from 1 degree 30 min. right of BEAULENCOURT.

Time of flight 35 seconds.

(Sgd.) S. A. HUNN, Capt.
for Lieut.-Col.
General Staff,
5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

From 6 p.m. 26/1/1917 to 6 p.m. 27/1/1917

I. OUR ARTILLERY

Our activity has been considerably above normal to-day.

At 5.30 a.m. our Batteries fired on the enemy's lines from N.35.d.6.2. to N.29.c.3.0. in the first left flank of the XIV Corps barrage. Fire was continued synchronising with XIV Corps barrage until 7 a.m. when it ceased.

From 7 a.m. to 7.10 a.m. a shrapnel barrage was maintained on SUNRAY TRENCH in N.22.c. in conjunction with bombardments by the 14th H.A. Group. Men were observed running from this trench, and suffered casualties by our shrapnel fire.

During the day full advantage was taken of enemy movement seen, particularly of a large body of men at N.23.c.44. A number of casualties were observed, and party dispersed in all directions.

At 1.5 p.m. enemy's movement was reported on the SUNKEN ROAD, running from N.29.d.5.0. to N.30.a.1.4. One Howitzer Battery and one 18-pdr. Battery were immediately turned on to the target and kept up intermittent fire throughout the remainder of the day.

The SUNKEN ROAD from N.16.d.8.0. to N.17.c.35.30. received attention from our fire.

II. HOSTILE ARTILLERY

Hostile activity was above normal.

Enemy retaliation to our bombardment was fairly heavy, and an intermittent barrage was placed in rear of our lines during most of the day. It was noticeable that enemy did not retaliate until almost twelve minutes after our barrage commenced.

During the morning FALL TRENCH in N.35.c. received a lot of attention from 5.9" and 4.2" from BEAULENCOURT, but stopped fire on action being taken by our counter batteries.

This barrage was repeated again during the afternoon.

Our battery positions in T.S.c. were fired on intermittently during the day

with 4", 5·9" and 8" from direction of BEAULENCOURT. Enemy employed aeroplane registration for this purpose and succeeded in obtaining a direct hit.

The CORDUROY Road and Duckboards in T.7.c. also received a lot of attention during the day from the same guns.

MILLER'S SON and SUNKEN ROAD in N.34 a. and b. received the usual attention from hostile fire.

III. MATTERS OF GENERAL INTEREST

Observation was good during the day. Aeroplanes were active on both sides.

At 10.15 a.m. a hostile plane was brought down near MORVAL and at about 2 p.m. another hostile machine was brought down in "No Man's Land" in N.21.a.

At 10.45 a.m. considerable movement was observed on the BEAULENCOURT-LE TRANSLOY Road in N.18.c., our Heavies were informed and dispersed party.

Again at 11.40 a.m. a large party was observed in O.19.d. Our Heavies dispersed this party causing casualties.

At the commencement of our bombardment on the right, enemy sent up yellow lights which burst into clusters of five to seven yellow lights all along the line. His artillery opened fire some minutes later on his barrage lines in rear of our front line.

Between 6 a.m. and 6.50 a.m. enemy sent up numerous red rockets in our Right Sector. No apparent action followed.

(Sgd.) W. B. CHRISTIAN,
Staff Lieut.,

For B.M., 5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.

The Division, less artillery and other units mentioned later was relieved from its second tour in the Somme trenches by the 2nd Australian Division between the 19th and 23rd of December. The infantry was moved back to the reserve area, Ribemont, Buire, and Dernancourt, by train, entraining at Quarry and Willow Sidings near Bernafay Wood. That fact alone will show the great progress that had been made in the communications of the forward area.

Christmas was spent in the reserve area, a bleak, wet Christmas, in surroundings that would depress anybody but Australian soldiers. The villages were here low-lying and damp, their houses neglected and suffering from the continued passage of many thousands of troops, their inhabitants sad and war-worn, and almost crushed by the overwhelming burdens of the war. Despite all these disadvantages, Christmas Day was made enjoyable. Good dinners were provided for all ranks, parcels from the Australian Comforts Fund were distributed, and an Australian mail arrived. The evening was spent in hurriedly improvised concerts and dances. "You are a bonzer dancer, you are," called Private X derisively to his mate, Private Y.

"You come in here and be a bleedin' tart for three hours and see how you get on!" was Y's retort.

It was a merry enough Christmas holiday while it lasted, but it was of short duration. Military matters were pressing, and the

Division had to be bathed and freshened up. Equipment and transport were in a deplorable condition and most of the animals were caked in mud. So that there was little time for merry-making. Nevertheless, sufficient progress was made with the urgent work to enable General Birdwood to grant a complete holiday on New Year's Day.

On the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th of January, 1917, the Division moved by march route to the Vignacourt area, where it spent a fortnight in recreation and training. The weather remained extremely cold. Snow lay thickly everywhere for a considerable part of the time, and this hampered some forms of training. Nevertheless, much good work was done in attack practices, in some of which aeroplanes co-operated in contact patrol work. The Divisional School at Montonvillers continued to do excellent work, and, in addition to it, there were quite twenty other schools throughout France and England to which the Division regularly sent its quota of students. Nothing was more gratifying than the reports from these schools, at which officers and men of all formations in the British Army met on common ground and competed against each other. In a great number of these competitions Australian quotas headed the lists. For instance, the Fourth Army had as one of its training activities a huge musketry camp to which every corps in the Army sent hundreds of men for a fortnightly course in musketry. The results of one of these courses showed:—

29th British Division, 479 firers, average score per firer 107 ;

33rd British Division, 467 firers, average score per firer 115 ;

1st A.N.Z.A.C., 990 firers, average score per firer 128.

The figures are striking, particularly in view of the high position held by both the 29th and 33rd Divisions in the British Army.

Some idea of the great value of the work of the Australian Comforts Fund during the trying winter months was afforded from its grateful recognition in a Divisional Routine Order of 6th January. The list of the articles provided during the period August 1st to December 31st, 1916, was a long and varied one. It included:—

Cigarettes, 360,000 packets.

Socks, 29,460 pairs.

Shirts, 6,325.

Tommy cookers, 1,680.


Gramophones, 48.

Oxo, 83 cases.

Dates and confectionery, 682 cases.

Cases of mixed goods, 2,208.

The A.C.F. representative with the Division was Mr. Campbell. He had come over from Egypt with the formation, and thanks to his ability and enthusiasm the splendid generosity of the Australian public lost nothing in its transmission to the troops. One feels



STAFF OF FIFTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS, 20TH AUGUST, 1917.

Back Row (4).—Capt. J. A. Ridd. Major H. H. Holton. Lieut. M. Mauss. Capt. S. A. Hamm.
Middle Row (7).—Capt. W. L. Hamilton. Major M. Henry. Major F. Langley. Capt. G. D. Smith. Capt. Jennings.
 Major R. S. McGregor. Lieut. M. Hobbs.
Front Row (7). Lt.-Col. A. B. Carey. Lt.-Col. C. M. Wagstaff. Brig.-Gen. A. J. Bessell-Browne. Maj.-Gen. J. J. T. Hobbs.
 Col. J. H. Bruce. Col. W. W. Heame. Major D. M. King.

that the gratitude of the soldiers to the thousands of unknown helpers who worked in Australia for their comfort has never been sufficiently acknowledged. Every contributor either in work or goods or money to the organisations affiliated under the A.C.F. may rest assured that the contributions made were ultimately of the greatest service to the men in the field who were all profoundly grateful for them.

The Y.M.C.A. helpers with the Division had proved equally valuable during the trying days in the trenches. Under Mr. L. Greenberg's stimulating direction, several marquees in the Divisional area provided the men with refreshing hot drinks at all hours of the day and night. Several chaplains, too, rendered services of much value by supervising soup kitchens in advanced areas, where their presence was particularly welcome.

D.A.D.O.S., the Divisional Train (Lieut.-Col. Francis), and the 5th Divisional Salvage Company were three of the units that did not move back to Vignacourt with the Division. Capt. Rodd remained with his depôt at Albert during the period, and the 5th Division was transferred to the 2nd Australian Division for ordnance services in order that its Ordnance Railhead might remain at Albert instead of moving back to Vignacourt. The usual ordnance work was carried on, the only novelties being the issue during January of 100 pieces of light body armour and 90 necklets for trial in the field.

Lieut.-Col. Francis's H.Q. remained at Fricourt through the whole of January. His horses continued to suffer severely. During the absence of the Division in the back areas, the animals and vehicles of the Divisional Train were utilised on road repairs. On the Division's return to its old sector on the 18th of January, the railhead for supplies advanced from Edge Hill to Quarry Siding, and the supply sections of the Train moved to Quarry accordingly. The remainder of the train was kept on road maintenance. Major Berry, the S.S.O., left the Division about this time to go to the 3rd Divisional Train, and Major C. W. Robinson came from the 2nd Australian Divisional Train to take up the duties. He soon got thoroughly into the work and, during the rest of the war, rendered valuable services to the Division as its Senior Supply Officer.

Some idea of the work of the Divisional Salvage Company during this winter may be gained from the records of material salvaged. During December alone, Capt. Viner's little command collected 59,558 18-pounder shell cases from the muddy battlefield, and its collection of other articles was proportionate. The work of salvage was assisted by orders promulgated to all units to assist wherever possible, and empty motor lorries going back from the forward areas all called at a Salvage dump and took a load of material back to railhead.

The Mobile Veterinary Section was another unit that did not

leave the forward area. The loss of animals in the Division during December, 1916, was 479 and in January, 1917, 412, and this despite the unsparing efforts of Major Henry and his staff for their health and comfort. The severity of this period, as illustrated by its effects on the horses and mules of the Division, is admirably shown in Major Henry's graph, reproduced on page 400 of this book. During December Capt. Walters of the M.V.S. evacuated to the Veterinary Hospital no fewer than 828 animals.

The Division left the Vignacourt area about the 14th of January on its way back to the line. It stayed for a day or two in the Ribemont area on the way, and then moved on to its old sector near Gueudecourt with D.H.Q. again at Bernafay Wood. Except for the fact that the boundaries of the sector had sideslipped about a quarter of a mile to the right, there was practically no change in its dispositions since the Division's last tour of duty there. The 8th Brigade took over the right brigade sector from the 6th Australian Brigade, and General Tivey's H.Q. were once more at Waterlot Farm. As a battalion of the 8th Brigade had been employed for a considerable period on road work, the 54th Battalion of the 14th Brigade was attached to General Tivey's command for this tour in the line. Major Davies, the Brigade Major, received his promotion about this time and was now temporarily commanding the 31st Battalion during the absence of Lieut.-Col. Toll, who was ill. His place as Brigade Major was filled by Capt. R. Casey, who soon showed himself an energetic staff officer. Brigade Mining Companies were in process of formation in all three brigades and the 8th Brigade Mining Company under Lieut. Adams soon commenced duty as a unit of the Brigade troops. The mining companies were disbanded after a brief period.

In the left brigade sector the 15th Brigade relieved a brigade of the 2nd Australian Division on the 16th of January, and Brigade H.Q. were established at their old position in Gun Valley. The 14th Brigade, less the 54th Battalion, which did not return to it until the 24th of January, was maintained as Divisional reserve in the Fricourt area until it relieved the 8th Brigade in the right sector on the 27th of January. The 8th Brigade then rested as Divisional Reserve until the 15th of February, on which date it relieved the 15th Brigade in the left sector. An extension of the Division's boundary on the left, consequent on taking over part of the 4th Divisional front on the 24th of February, necessitated the Division's holding the line with three brigades, and the 15th Brigade was accordingly brought in again on the 24th of February, on which date it relieved the 45th and 48th Battalions of the 4th Australian Division. By that time, however, dramatic happenings were afoot which will be referred to in the next chapter.

While the sector was in other respects unchanged, a great difference was occasioned by the weather. The cold, which through-

out December had grown more and more intense, had now thrown a curtain of snow over the whole area, and then had frozen it hard ; so that all water pools were covered with ice many inches thick, and all the mud was frozen into ground as hard as rock to depth of about two feet. There was no wet anywhere. Water-carrying parties went out to their work bearing only picks and sandbags. The water-mains, where they existed, demanded much attention, and large working parties were employed daily in "thawing out" the pipes. But the change was, on the whole, extremely beneficial. While everybody felt the intensity of the cold, there were no longer such things as wet feet or wet clothes, and sickness and Trench Foot diminished greatly. The fatiguing tramps through miles of mud were over—at least, until a thaw set in. The horses and mules found it very difficult to keep their feet, but their work was lightened considerably and their condition improved. Other results which need not be enlarged upon were :—

(1) Better visibility; greater aeroplane, artillery, and sniping activity; duck-walks and paths became clearly visible in the snow to enemy aeroplanes;

(2) More instant detonation of shells on the frozen ground;

(3) Extreme difficulty of all digging operations.

Between the 18th of January and the 22nd of February infantry action was for the most part limited to the ordinary routine duties of the front line. Nevertheless, there were several incidents of greater significance. The first was the co-operation by the 8th Brigade and the 5th Divisional Artillery in a successful enterprise by the 29th Division on our immediate right. This was an attack on a front of 1,000 yards at 5.30 a.m. on the 27th of January, which was very successful and resulted in the capture of six officers and 345 other ranks. General de Lisle, in acknowledging most cordially the assistance rendered by the 5th Divisional Artillery and the 8th Brigade on the left flank of his famous Division, stated that it was owing to the excellence of their supporting fire that Ersatz Point, his chief objective, was gained.

The 15th Brigade was involved, on the 1st and 4th of February, with the minor operations of the 4th Australian Division on its immediate left. The 15th L.T.M.B. supported an attack of the 15th Battalion on the 1st of February, but the operation did not prove successful. The operation was repeated on the 4th of February with most satisfactory results, and the assistance of the 15th Brigade, and notably the work of a digging party led by Lieut. Hooper, 58th Battalion, received warm acknowledgment from General Brand who wrote :—

" G.O.C. 15TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

" Please convey to the C.O. 58th Battalion my appreciation and also that of the C.O. 13th Battalion for the good work done by his

men in pushing forward that communication trench towards the right of our objective.

“It is hoped that the linesman who so speedily restored communication on two occasions between the advanced 13th Battalion H.Q. and 58th Battalion H.Q. will receive some recognition. Unfortunately he was wounded.

“ (Signed) C. H. BRAND, *Brig.-Gen.*”

The name of the linesman referred to by General Brand unfortunately does not appear to have been preserved in the War Diaries. General Elliott in forwarding this communication to Lieut.-Col. Denehy remarked that he knew that whatever work had to be done by the 58th Battalion would be carried out as well as could be done by any troops on the front.

Our artillery assistance in this operation also furnished material for congratulatory notices. “The assistance given,” remarked General Birdwood in a letter to General Bessell-Brown, “is in a great part responsible for the fact that the German counter-attacks were repulsed last night.”

General Elliott's continued ill-health about this time in no wise diminished the offensive spirit which was his most marked characteristic in the field. This was exemplified in two remarkably fine achievements of the 57th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Stewart). The first was a company raid of 120 men, carried out on the 14th of February. This was led with skill and determination by Captain J. B. Laing, with 2nd Lieut. W. Morrow and 2nd Lieut. M. J. Meara as his chief assistants. A Stokes Mortar bombardment of only 1½ minutes' duration was provided by the 15th L.T.M.B., on the lifting of which the assaulters rushed the trench and a fine artillery and medium trench mortar box barrage fell around them, shutting out all hope of enemy interference. One officer and 11 Germans were killed in the trench and several Stokes bombs were thrown into dug-outs the occupants of which had refused to surrender. Twenty-three prisoners of war were sent back under escort, but several showed fight in No Man's Land and were killed. The casualties for the raiding party were only two killed, five wounded, and one missing. Special praise was given to the preliminary work of the 15th L.T.M.B., which in several days' skilful work had damaged the enemy wire at numerous spots along the front without drawing special attention to any particular place. It may be added that the ground was frozen so intensely hard that it took the gun teams twenty-four hours to cut emplacements twelve inches deep to hold the butt plates of the mortars. This fine raid, the 13th of the Divisional series, evoked much laudatory notice and the Divisional Commander's congratulations to Lieut.-Col. Stewart, Captain R. M. C. Aitchison, the O.C. Attack, and the members of the assaulting party, were particularly warm.

An exploit, which cannot be included in the list of divisional

raids because it differed materially from a raid both in its design and execution, was carried out by Lieut. Forrest and a small party of the 57th Battalion on the following night. The enemy, in relinquishing part of his front trench, had established a bomb block to protect the length that he wished to retain, and this block was held by a strong garrison. Lieut. Forrest's party rushed the place, killed nine of its defenders, and then proceeded to bomb farther down the part of the trench held by the enemy. Having occupied another 75 yards of this, they established a new block at a suitable place and the additional trench length passed definitely into our keeping. An interesting feature of Lieut. Forrest's exploit was the trial given by the attacking party to the new body armour recently issued. While it proved admirable for a brief bombing fight, the opinion was formed that it was too heavy for long-continued operations involving much movement. For this reason body armour did not come into general use. Although the tactical importance of exploits like Lieut. Forrest's was usually slight and local, their cumulative moral effect on the enemy after a year or two's fighting can hardly be over-rated. They were of frequent occurrence on the Australian fronts, and this pitiless assertion of the individual ascendancy of Australians over Germans went far to make the final victories of the Australian Forces possible.

Leaving the infantry in its ice-bound trenches, on which for some reason the enemy was now commencing to expend more artillery ammunition than usual, we shall turn for a brief space to the other arms of the Division and see how they were employed during the second and third tours of duty on the Somme battlefield.

The Divisional Artillery had gone into the Somme line on the 16th of November and had experienced in its relief of the 1st Australian D.A. what it meant to move guns into position over the muddy wastes of the area. The casualties among the animals mounted rapidly. Within a week Lieut.-Col. Caddy, of the 13th A.F.A. Brigade, had lost 32 animals, most of which were drowned in the mud. The other brigades were similarly affected and, even where the animals were at rest on their lines, a high sick rate was soon reached owing to the deep, cold mud in which they were forced to stand. All the artillery units tried to improve their horse standings and all found that crumbled bricks from the ruined houses were extremely useful for this purpose. Unfortunately, the supply was unequal to the demand, but a certain amelioration was secured. By the 24th of November the Divisional Artilleries of the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th Australian Divisions were massed on the I A.N.Z.A.C. front, and the 5th and 2nd Australian Division Artilleries formed the Right Group covering the 5th Australian Divisional sector. This was subdivided again into two groups, "M" and "Q," one covering each infantry brigade front. The impossibility of major operations rendered a routine of artillery reliefs possible and, towards the end of November, the 13th F.A. Brigade was withdrawn from the line and sent to the vicinity of

Naours for rest and training. The Divisional T.M. Brigade (Capt. Miles) did not for the present go into the line. The ground was far too soft for trench mortar work, so the officers and men were placed at the disposal of the 5th D.A.C. (Major MacClean) and were used to administer the various dumps of artillery ammunition which were being maintained by that unit. Matters continued much in this way during December, a daily expenditure of about 2,000 shells adding very considerably to the discomfort on the other side of No Man's Land. Liaison with the infantry was developed considerably during the Somme period and F.O.O.'s were constantly on duty in the front line trenches. It was on duty of this nature that Lieut. C. G. Brown was killed in Gusty Support Trench on the 28th of December.

Realising the impossibility of making their own conditions comfortable on Christmas and New Year's days, the artillery decided that the next best thing was to make the enemy's Christmas as unhappy as possible. Accordingly, a two minutes' bombardment of every gun on the 1st A.N.Z.A.C. front conveyed to the Germans the only greetings that it was desired to send them on Christmas Day. It was dispatched at 12.30 p.m. by German time and it was hoped that they would get it with their Christmas dinner. Similarly, the New Year was auspiciously ushered in on a cloud of screaming shells, dispatched exactly at midnight by German time, on the 31st of December.

The 13th A.F.A. Brigade returned from its training at Naours and was followed there by the 14th A.F.A. Brigade towards the end of December. Enemy shelling with high velocity guns was becoming very pronounced in the sector and the artillery, in common with other units, suffered somewhat from it. The shells from these guns travelled more quickly than the sound that they made in coming through the air and consequently burst without preliminary warning. They were soon popularly known as "rubber guns."

An artillery reorganisation of a far-reaching nature was given effect to about the 22nd of January, 1917. Experience had shown that that a four brigade divisional artillery was a rather cumbersome organisation. It contained more guns than were necessary when no operations were in progress and yet not enough to support a division's infantry in a major operation. It was also cumbersome and expensive from an administrative standpoint. It was decided therefore to reduce divisional artilleries to a two brigade formation, each brigade containing three six-gun 18-pounder batteries and one six-gun 4.5-howitzer battery. This would leave a surplus from each divisional artillery of an equivalent of two six-gun 18-pounder batteries.

It was considered also that a large proportion of the existing artillery should be at the disposal of Army H.Q. in order to be available for use on whatever part of the Army front additional artillery might be required. It was accordingly decided to organise the surplus

batteries into Army F.A. Brigades and, as additional howitzer batteries were already formed in England, these were to be posted with the howitzer batteries in France in order to make all artillery brigades uniform in strength, that is, three six-gun 18-pounder batteries and one six-gun 4·5-howitzer battery. The effect of this on the 5th Divisional Artillery is shown hereunder :—

COMPOSITION OF 5TH D.A. UP TO 21ST JANUARY, 1917.

13th A.F.A. Brigade, 49th, 50th, 51st 18-pounder Batteries and 113th Howitzer Battery.

14th A.F.A. Brigade, 53rd, 54th and 55th 18-pounder Batteries and 114th Howitzer Battery.

15th A.F.A. Brigade, 57th, 58th, 59th 18-pounder Batteries.

25th A.F.A. Brigade, 52nd, 56th, 60th 18-pounder Batteries and 115th Howitzer Battery.

COMPOSITION OF 5TH D.A. AFTER REORGANISATION.

The 13th and 14th A.F.A. Brigades retained the same batteries, but with the gun establishment of each increased by 50 per cent.

The 15th and 25th A.F.A. Brigades were disbanded and utilised as shown :—

Half 52nd Battery brought 49th Battery up to new establishment.

“	“	“	“	50th	“	“	“	“
“	56th	“	“	51st	“	“	“	“
“	“	“	“	55th	“	“	“	“
“	60th	“	“	54th	“	“	“	“
“	“	“	“	53rd	“	“	“	“

Thus the 18-pounder batteries of the 13th and 14th A.F.A. Brigades were brought to their six-gun establishment by the absorption by each of half of the three 18-pounder batteries of the 25th A.F.A. Brigade. The 113th and 114th Howitzer Batteries were similarly brought to a six-gun establishment, but not till the 2nd April, by the absorption between them of the 115th Howitzer Battery. The 57th, 58th, and 59th 18-pounder Batteries, which had constituted the old 15th A.F.A. Brigade, were utilised in the formation of the 3rd and 6th (Army) A.F.A. Brigades.

The sum total of all this was to reduce each Divisional Artillery to a gun establishment of 36 eighteen-pounders and 12 howitzers, (instead of 48 eighteen-pounders and 12 howitzers as formerly) organised into two artillery brigades, and to create a number of Army field artillery brigades which could be allotted by Army where they were most required. As the divisional ammunition column of each division had now more vehicles and animals than were necessary for the supply of the reduced gun establishment of a divisional artillery, the B echelon of each D.A.C. was reduced, and the surplus sent to

form the nucleus of a B.A.C. for an Army field artillery brigade. This is not the place to discuss the many interesting questions that arise regarding the administration and employment of artillery in warfare of the type in which the Division was then engaged. Some of the immediate domestic effects of the reorganisations should however be noted :—

(1) Establishment of D.A. (exclusive of Trench Mortar Brigades) was reduced from 111 officers and 2,988 other ranks to 70 officers and 2,239 other ranks.

(2) Animal, vehicle, and gun establishment of D.A. also reduced ;

(3) C.R.A. had for a time a number of surplus officers ;

(4) Horse surplus created by reorganisation was useful in making up deficiencies in other units ;

(5) D.A.D.O.S. had much work in checking surplus equipment returned to him.

The brigades to be disbanded were withdrawn from the line for that purpose and those to be reconstituted as Army A.F.A. Brigades departed to Buire and returned a few days later as cheerfully as ever, but now forming part of an Army A.F.A. Brigade in going order. For the time being, at any rate, the Army command allotted its new artillery to Corps for employment, and Corps seemed to think that they should take up their share of the routine work of their comrades, the divisional artilleries. The 25th A.F.A. Brigade kept its fine war diary going right up to the very day of disbanding, and there is a touch of sadness in the curt " volume closed " which is the only entry for that date. Whether the 15th A.F.A. Brigade became moribund before its decease, or whether its diarist was too overcome with emotion to do the subject justice is not clear. But its war diary ceased some days before the 22nd.

The Artillery continued its daily work in the sector during January and February. By this time the hard frost had made the ground suitable for Trench Mortar work and the Divisional T.M. Brigade had moved into the line, and in some places into No Man's Land, and had made itself extremely unpopular with the enemy. The introduction of the Temple Silencer for the mortars about this time considerably reduced the risk of the enemy's locating them, even in the most advanced positions. Unfortunately, Capt. Miles, the D.T.M.O., became ill on the 22nd of February, and died on the 26th of cerebrospinal meningitis. He was an able and gallant officer and his death was deeply regretted throughout the Division. His place as D.T.M.O. was filled after a few weeks by Lieut. Wallis, who came from the 1st D.A. with high credentials, which he soon fully justified.

The only other event of importance during the period was the attachment between the 11th and 26th of February of the 14th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Phillips) to the artillery of the 2nd British Division then operating north-east of Albert. At the conclusion of

the operation on that front the Brigade was withdrawn to rest, but it returned to the 5th Division during March, in time to participate in the stirring events of that month.

The work of the 8th, 14th, and 15th Machine Gun Companies was incessant and most useful. Our machine guns played havoc with the enemy working parties which, like our own, were often forced to leave their communication trenches owing to the mud in them, and walk for a few yards along the top. These spots were carefully marked and guns were kept trained on them, and numerous casualties were inflicted in consequence. Late in November the 8th M. G. Company (Major Marsden) allowed a fatigue party of 30 Germans to walk right up to one of its guns. Twenty-nine were killed and the other was taken prisoner. Capt. Muirson's Machine Gun Company (the 15th) succeeded in getting a bunch of eight Germans near Finch Trench in January, and many other casualties were caused by the same Company. The 14th M. G. Company (Capt. Spier) was not less busy and the vigilance of its guns kept enemy sniping at a low ebb. An unlucky shell in February knocked out a 14th M. G. Company post, which it hit directly. One sergeant and three other ranks were killed instantly and the gun was destroyed.

It would serve no good purpose in a book of this nature to trace in detail the movements of the engineer companies of the Division throughout the second and third tours on the Somme. The amount and variety of the engineering work urgently required imposed on the field companies the most strenuous time that they experienced during the war. Their work fell mainly into three chief branches, communications, accommodation, and defences. Some idea of the work done by the engineers and by infantry parties under their supervision may be gained from the following figures:—

176 Nissen Huts, that is, accommodation for 6,000 men, were erected in the area before the end of December. These huts were grouped into camps and Lieut. D. G. Toohey, acting as Commandant of the camps, rendered admirable service to all the infantry formations in his careful supervision of them.

Several miles of duckboard track were laid and covered with wire. Block foundations had to be made for a great length of these tracks.

Many hundreds of yards of trench were cut, revetted, and duckboarded.

Drying sheds for clothes and gum-boots, deep dug-outs, platforms for supply dumps, machine-gun shelters, cupola shelters, carpenters' shops, horse standings, advanced medical posts, hot food containers, were all constructed before the end of December. By means of the last mentioned article it was possible to provide the men in the front trench with hot meals every day, a fact which considerably assisted the fight against Trench Foot. All this work was accomplished by the engineers only after many weeks' effort at high pressure with practically no rest at all in the back areas. The Engineering services,

however, had the consolation of seeing the vital communications improving, the waste spaces of the battlefield gradually growing habitable, and of feeling that everybody was benefiting directly by their labours.

The 5th Divisional Signal Company lost for a time the services of Captain R. A. Stanley, who was evacuated sick on the 10th of December. Administration of the Company fell, however, under the capable direction of Capt. Hamilton, the second in command, and the high standard of signal work in the Division was fully maintained. A hop-pole route of six pair cables was established between D.H.Q. and Right Brigade H.Q. near Waterlot Farm, and the usual activity in cable burying in the forward areas was maintained. In order to save the great labour entailed in digging a trench six feet deep, it was decided for a time to utilise wherever possible old trench systems in which to bury the cables. It was found, however, that the floors of these were generally paved with old bombs, often in a sensitive condition. After one working party had suffered several casualties from the explosion of such a bomb it was considered advisable to revert to the old practice of digging new trenches for the cable routes. During January new signal offices were erected at D.H.Q., and the change over from the old building was effected without a moment's interruption to signal traffic. Brigade Signal Schools kept the *personnel* of the Company in a state of high efficiency and a Signal Instructor was also proved for the Divisional School at Montonvillers.

The 5th Pioneer Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Carter) spent the months of December and January at Waterlot Farm, and the severity of its experience there was equalled only by the fine work that it accomplished. Despite a camp that was frequently shelled, despite an average daily sick parade of over 100 men, despite frequent casualties among its working parties, this fine unit kept steadily at its allotted tasks. Never did the pioneers better deserve their reputation as the handy men of the Division. They drained and corduroyed roads; they helped Lieut.-Col. Fewtrell in his heavy undertaking in establishing the Anzac Light Railway System in the forward areas; they dug communication trenches through the sodden mud, and kept them drained and cleared for the passage of the infantry; they duck-boarded Eternal, Endless, and Energy Alleys, important communication trenches in the forward zone. On the 28th of December a very heavy rainstorm caused all the trenches constructed at such effort to crumble in and become useless. But at dawn on the next morning Lieut.-Col. Carter had his entire battalion working at them and in a few hours the road to the front line was free again. 1,100 yards of Eve Alley were dug in three days through an area under steady shell-fire. After 46 days' constant effort, B and D Companies went to Franvillers for a brief rest and ten days later they were succeeded there by A and C Companies. Like the engineers, the

pioneers had the satisfaction of knowing that their exertions were warmly appreciated by their comrades in the infantry battalions, whose lot was materially improved by their devotion.

Between the 16th of November and the 17th of February the medical services were preoccupied mainly with the evacuation of forward casualties, with the fight against Trench Foot, with the treatment of colds, and the respiratory complications that arose from them, and with the sanitation of the area. During the second Somme tour (November 20th to December 21st) the A.D.S. at Bernafay Wood was staffed by the 14th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Tebbutt). The 8th Field Ambulance (Col. Shepherd) remained at the Divisional Rest Station at Olincourt Château in the Vignacourt area, while the 15th Field Ambulance administered the Corps M.D.S. at Bécordel. But the bearer divisions of both the 8th and 15th Field Ambulances were kept in the forward area, where, attached to the 14th Field Ambulance, they assisted in the work of evacuation. There were still many stages in the passage of a casualty from the front line to the A.D.S. at Bernafay. Regimental stretcher-bearers carried him as far as the Regimental Aid Posts. From the R.A.P.'s ambulance bearers took him to the Forward Collecting Posts; thence other relays of ambulance-bearers got him to the wagon loading posts, whence he was conveyed in a horse ambulance to the A.D.S. at Bernafay Wood. From the A.D.S. ordinary cases were evacuated to the Corps Main D.S. at Bécordel by trains from Quarry Siding, but severe cases were dispatched to Bécordel directly by motor ambulance. The succeeding stages were to the Casualty Clearing Station at Meaulte, to the base hospital (Abbeville or Rouen) in an ambulance train, thence, if necessary, by boat to England, and by ambulance and railway train to a military hospital there. Of course, Divisional responsibility ceased at the Corps M.D.S. The succeeding stages have been mentioned merely to give the reader an idea of the organisation entailed by the daily evacuation of many hundreds of sick and wounded from the front of the British Armies in France.

Trench Foot, despite all the measures taken against it, remained a serious menace to the efficiency of the Division during its second tour of the Somme trenches. For instance, for the week ending the 4th of December, 1916, six officers and 650 other ranks affected by it were passed through the A.D.S. at Bernafay Wood, which became crowded with cases. "To me," wrote Major Parkinson, M.C., later D.A.D.M.S. of the Division, "it was perhaps the most harrowing scene of the war. Scores of the same fine men who were seen silently suffering the most awful wounds writhed and groaned and wept as children. The men experienced, besides, a curious physical and mental loathing of the disease, as of a rottenness or putrefaction."

The wastage caused by Trench Foot in the Division, though it was high, was small in comparison with what many divisions in similar circumstances experienced. By dint of the utmost vigilance of

medical, company, and platoon officers, backed by the co-operation of the Divisional Staff in securing whatever supplies were likely to assist the campaign against the disease, it was kept within moderate limits. The whale oil treatment was continued and, thanks mainly to the fine "Q" organisation, and the splendid co-operation of battalion quartermasters, hot meals and hot drinks were provided in the front trench, as well as daily changes of socks, and benches for foot massage. These measures limited the prevalence of the disease and mitigated its severity very considerably, so that its effects in the 5th Australian Division were considerably below the average. When the Division came into the line again on the 18th of January for its third tour on the Somme a new method of treatment, discovered by French doctors, was prescribed. Its main feature was the use of hot foot-baths followed by massage with a powder composed of talc, camphor, and soft potassium soap. Medical experts spoke most favourably of it, and during the period of its application Trench Foot practically disappeared from the list of serious ailments. It should be stated, however, that the ground was then frozen hard and that the wonderful diminution in Trench Foot was doubtless partly due to the absence of wet.

Gratifying evidence of the efficiency of the medical services was forthcoming about this time in the promotion of Major Follitt, the D.A.D.M.S., and Majors Newell and Williams of the 8th Field Ambulance and Major Black of the 14th Field Ambulance to the rank of Lieut.-Col. and to the command of field ambulances in other divisions of the A.I.F. Major Follitt's successor was Major R. S. MacGregor, an officer whose professional ability and personal charm soon won him an enviable standing on the staff and among the units of the Division. Capt. Mattei, O.C. 5th Sanitary Section since its formation, was evacuated to hospital during December. His place was filled temporarily by Capt. A. M. Langham and then permanently by Capt. J. H. Grieve, who each maintained the standards which Capt. Mattei had created. Sanitation of the area, with its hundreds of decaying bodies, its foul water, and its early lack of sanitary conveniences, was a difficult problem which the work of the Divisional Sanitary Section did much to solve. For the disposal of dead bodies it became necessary some little time later to appoint a Divisional Burial Staff. Lieut. Seymour was the first Divisional Burial Officer and he and his small staff rendered good service by burying many hundreds of corpses in the stricken area.

The medical dispositions during January and February underwent considerable modification. The 15th Field Ambulance took over the A.D.S. at Bernafay Wood, and all the forward medical posts. The Decauville Railway had been considerably advanced during December and January, and before the end of the period forward evacuations were much facilitated by its use. Before the end of January the 14th Field Ambulance was established at Buire in charge of a Corps

Scabies Hospital, where hundreds of scabies patients were assembled. The 8th Field Ambulance remained at the Divisional Rest Station, where it achieved a great deal for the comfort of its 800 patients. Towards the end of February the 14th Field Ambulance partly relieved the 12th Australian Field Ambulance in the M.D.S. of the 4th Australian Division, also near Bernafay Wood. The remainder of the ambulance took charge of a Corps collecting Station at Becordel.

The long frost continued till about the middle of February, when the thaw commenced. All preparations had been made to meet the occasion. As, during the 48 hours succeeding the thaw, the roads would have collapsed under heavy traffic, a reserve of supplies, known as the Thaw Ration, had been accumulated, and the usual supply traffic was thus able to be suspended. All snow was shovelled out of the communication trenches and the front line, so that they might not become waterlogged by its melting. Steps were taken to meet a probable increase in Trench Foot cases, but before the continued damp had made any considerable impression, other events were happening which finally carried the Division away from the Trench Foot area. Before we pass to a narrative of these events attention may be drawn to a few of the more noticeable effects on the Division of its first three months in the Somme Trenches.

The return of sick and casualties shows :—

	Sick.	Casualties.
November, 1916	927	699
December, 1916	1,450	462
January, 1917	1,133	193
February, 1917	1,055	346

It is worthy of note that in December, the wettest month, the Division, though it was in the line only 21 days, lost more by sickness than it did in February, when it was 28 days in the line and was, in addition, suffering from the accumulated exhaustion of a long winter tour in the trenches. This was due to three chief causes :—

(1) The intense cold of January and February, which froze everything, was more endurable than the mud and rain of December ;

(2) Thanks to the efforts of the Divisional Staff, backed by the fine work of engineering, pioneering, and supply services, both the accommodation of the area and the supply of food to the trenches were steadily improving ;

(3) A new Divisional Commander, a new C.R.A., and a new A.A. and Q.M.G., all particularly keen and particularly efficient, had replaced officers who, however competent, were becoming constitutionally impaired by the continuous strain of service or, in one case, by wounds received in action.

One other point is worth of notice. The Somme conditions were so trying that it was only by the most earnest co-operation of all arms of the service that the Division was able to exist there at all. Fine as had been this spirit of helpfulness at all times, the bitter Somme winter brought home to everybody a realisation of his obligation to other arms of the service than his own. The outside pressure of adversity thus brought all the mechanism of the Division into its exact bearings and the machine commenced to work with a concerted precision that it had not known previously.

CHAPTER VIII

(22nd February—25th May, 1917.)

TO THE HINDENBURG LINE

Important contemporaneous events :—			
Kut retaken by the British	February 24th.
Baghdad captured by the British	March 11th.
Tzar of Russia abdicated	„ 15th.
British attacks on Gaza failed	„ 26th
			and April 17th.
U.S.A. declared war on Germany	April 6th.
Spring British Offensive opened on Arras Front			„ 9th.
French offensive opened on the Aisne front	„ 16th.
Nationalist Party returned in Australian Elections	May 6th.
Successful Italian offensive opened	„ 14th.
Pétain succeeded Nivelle in command of French Army	„ 15th.

DURING the later days of January and in early February there occurred a winter development of the Somme battle which few had anticipated. Sir Douglas Haig in a few well planned and well executed strokes made himself master of the Ancre fortresses that had defied him so long, and he now held positions which rendered extremely difficult the enemy retention of what was still left to him of his old Somme salient. Especially was the flank of his defences on the Bapaume Ridge seriously menaced, and Sir Douglas Haig's successes on the Ancre undoubtedly accelerated, even if they did not dictate, enemy plans for a general withdrawal on a very wide front.

However well informed the army chiefs may have been of the enemy intention, it came as a surprise to the majority of the officers and men of the Division. On the 22nd of February one of those indefinable impressions, mysterious in origin yet startling and convincing, swept like a flame through the troops. They felt that momentous developments were afoot on the other side of No Man's Land. All ranks were electrified. Curiosity was raised to the highest pitch, and hundreds of eyes sought hourly to penetrate the baffling mists which hung like a veil over the enemy movements. But, for the moment, nothing was revealed. The brief hours of clear weather

disclosed the enemy ground apparently in its normal condition. His machine-guns swept our forward zones with intermittent bursts of fire; his snipers were quick to resent undue curiosity; his artillery played on our dumps, and duck-walks, and trenches, as always; his lines remained as we had known them, sinister, inscrutable, pregnant with death.

But the premonition was too convincing to be abandoned, too universal to be lightly ignored. The 23rd was another day of growing tension, of fleeting rumour, of deepening conviction. On the 24th came confirmation. The Division received official news of the occupation by British troops of Miraumont and Pys, two villages some four or five miles to the left of the divisional sector, in circumstances that admitted no doubt of a local enemy withdrawal. Two burning questions immediately arose—over what front would the withdrawal take place, and to what depth would it extend? Time alone could determine the latter question, but there were some prospects of getting immediate information about the former. General Hobbs and Lieut.-Col. Wagstaff were in close and continuous consultation, and the signal offices buzzed with the receipt and dispatch of messages. It was decided to feel during the night the enemy front at numerous places, and to occupy by strong fighting patrols any sector of the enemy trenches which was insufficiently garrisoned. The infantry brigades were instructed accordingly, and commanding officers of front line battalions were soon busy arranging for the patrols and allotting to each its area of operations. At this time the 14th Brigade (General C. J. Hobkirk) held the right half of the Divisional front just before Les Bœufs and looking north-east towards Le Transloy, about a mile distant. The left half was held by the 8th Infantry Brigade (General E. Tivey). The result of the night's patrols was awaited with the deepest interest by formations far higher than the Division itself. The patrol reports came back clear, concise, accurate. Every yard of the enemy's well-constructed trench on General Hobkirk's front was vigilantly guarded by strong garrisons. The wire was thick and impenetrable, and the trench could be taken only by heavy infantry attacks after a long artillery preparation. On General Tivey's front the conditions were found to be entirely different. The patrols found a considerable length of Sunray Trench unoccupied. It was immediately entered and followed up for 500 yards until strong opposition was encountered. Here a bomb block was established and parties were soon at work linking up Sunray Trench with our late front line. The reports from the Divisions on our right and left confirmed the experiences of our men. Those on the right could make no progress whatever; on the left, gains of considerable extent were made without serious opposition.

On the 24th the 15th Brigade (General H. E. Elliott) relieved the 12th Brigade of the 4th Australian Division on the immediate left of the 5th Divisional sector. The 5th Divisional frontage was

by this increased to over two miles in length and its three brigades were now in the line in order 14th, 8th, and 15th from right to left 15th Brigade patrols on the 25th found Pork and Barley Trenches of the enemy front system unoccupied, and they were immediately seized and linked up with our old front line.

The bare narration of these facts can give but little idea of the intense interest they awakened at the time of their occurrence. The Division had now been in France eight months, during which time it had grown insensibly into the habits of a fixed trench warfare. Its old conceptions of a war of movement had gradually become atrophied. Not unnaturally, war had come to signify a monotonous routine in trenches, without the prospect of material change and with the comparative elimination of individual enterprise. Just as the infantry had grown accustomed to the idea of fixed trench positions so the artillery had in spirit become immobile and habituated to the idea of fixed battery positions and fixed ammunition dumps. The medical services, too, had their allotted posts and regular routes of evacuation in every sector, and the ammunition and other supply organisations had their mammoth dumps in and near the line, and now rarely thought of the day when dumps should be abolished and supplies maintained entirely on wheels. Indeed, as we have noticed from time to time, many of the vehicles and animals provided for this purpose had been temporarily diverted to other uses. And quite properly so, provided they were ready at a moment's notice to take up their *rôle* in a fluid warfare.

The indications of a substantial enemy withdrawal, which, of course, would be pressed and harried to the uttermost, now opened up prospects of a wonderful awakening from the torpor of trench warfare. Every officer and man in the Division responded to the spiritual thrill of it, but it was the duty of the Divisional Staff to see that the response was also put on a sound practical footing. General Hobbs's first consideration was to assure himself that his command was absolutely mobile; that the regimental reserves and echelons of ammunition were fully stocked, and that each transport organisation was prepared to move at an instant's notice. On the "G" side of the Staff Lieut.-Col. Wagstaff had never failed to inculcate the teaching that trench warfare was an artificial and stagnant phase of hostilities, and that the decisive moments, when they came, would be characterised by rapid movement, where much would depend on the knowledge and initiative of subordinate commanders. No doubt was felt that this teaching would have its due result when the time came. In "Q," Colonel Bruche rapidly assured himself that all was in order with the supply services. Reserves and echelons that in a long period of desuetude had ceased to function fully as such were immediately brought up to establishment and kept in a position of readiness for an immediate move. General Hobbs stopped at once all work on deep dug-outs and other defences of

the area, as well as on cable burying and the erection of accommodation. Working and other detached parties were hastily returned to their units. In a few hours the trench torpor of months was entirely thrown off and the Division stood ready for anything that Hindenburg or Heaven might bring forth.

These high expectations were not immediately fulfilled. It was daily becoming more and more apparent that, however rapidly the enemy withdrawal to our left was developing, his front in the neighbourhood of Le Transloy was, if anything, more firmly held than formerly. Using Le Transloy as a pivot, he was, in fact, swinging back the whole of his Somme line to the right of that village in order, presumably, to bring his front at right angles to the main Bapaume-Cambrai road, which he could then use as the main channel of his retirement to the Hindenburg Line. Thus, although his front on the 5th Division's sector was tested nightly by strong patrols, it yielded but slightly and then always on our left, that is, the part farthest from Le Transloy. By the 2nd of March the advance here was about half a mile. Our infantry immediately consolidated the ground from which the enemy was ejected, or which he had vacated, and our Left Artillery Group, after a Herculean struggle through the mud, advanced its batteries to the neighbourhood of Flers and Gueudecourt.

Partly to test the nature of the enemy resistance more thoroughly than was possible by night patrolling, and partly to secure valuable ground, an operation of a more ambitious nature was undertaken by the 29th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Purser). It was decided to storm down Sunray Trench from the bomb block that had been established in it, and to seize another 250 yards of the line, where its tactical importance was considerably greater than at the part voluntarily vacated by the enemy. The assault was entrusted to B Company (Capt. C. A. M. Derham) and the officers most prominently engaged in the assault were Lieuts. Whitelaw and Lacey. A two-minute shoot by the mortars of the 8th A.L.T.M.B. was the only preliminary bombardment. The enemy stoutly resisted the intrusion, but the attackers, wading knee deep through the mud, made good their objective after some stubborn bomb fighting. Fourteen prisoners and a machine-gun were taken and 50 Germans were killed. The position was hurriedly consolidated and two counter-attacks were beaten off. One of these, originating from Atom Trench, was of unusual strength and was smashed by our artillery in response to Capt. Derham's S.O.S. Having failed in his counter-attacks, the enemy maintained on our new positions very heavy gunfire in which more casualties were suffered than in the attack itself. Despite this, the great losses inflicted on the enemy made the affair a severe blow to him, and General Tivey received many congratulations on the fine work done by all ranks concerned.

One important feature of the operation was the determination

displayed by the enemy to resist any further encroachments on his defences in that sector. It was obvious from this that, for a time, at any rate, progress in the direction of Le Transloy could be achieved only after heavy general fighting, for which the conditions of the ground were still most unsuitable.

For the next two weeks nothing of importance happened on the Divisional front. The utmost vigilance was maintained and the Division's patrolling reached the highest level it had yet attained. It will be readily understood that patrolling No Man's Land was a disagreeable and dangerous duty, especially as investigations were invariably carried right up to the enemy wire, and as the enemy was vigilant and determined. On the night of the 15th of March the adventurous patrols of the 15th Brigade alone sustained eleven casualties. Many extraordinary incidents took place in these enterprises, of which it is possible here to record only one. A patrol of six found itself surrounded and cut off by an enemy party of forty. Hiding in shell-holes, the men tried to escape detection, but were observed and captured. Their captors proceeded to return with them to the enemy trenches, and the prisoners, who still had their Mill's bombs in their pockets, anxiously watched for a chance of escape. The German patrol missed its direction somehow, and, after walking for a considerable distance, the party was challenged in good unmistakable Australian and some rifle shots rang out. Realising that they had stumbled on a friendly trench, the captives suddenly threw their bombs among the Germans. Bewildered by this untoward turn of events, the entire enemy party was promptly rounded up and ushered unceremoniously into the trench held by a company of the Australian division then on our left.

The 14th Brigade lost several good officers about this time. Capt. Francis (53rd Battalion) was killed on the 14th of March. Capt. H. L. Palmer (55th Battalion) was killed in the front line by a minenwerfer, and no battalion ever lost a more devoted or gallant officer. On the 12th of March Capt. P. W. Chapman, M.C., also of the 55th Battalion, went out into No Man's Land presumably to search for the position of the mortar which had killed Capt. Palmer. He did not return, and four days later his dead body was discovered near the enemy trench where he had been killed in the course of his courageous reconnaissance. A group of dead Germans around him testified to the fate of the enemy party that had endeavoured to take him prisoner. It was during this tour in the line that the temporary command of the 55th Battalion passed into the capable hands of Major P. W. Woods, M.C. Ill-health necessitated the departure of Lieut.-Col. McConaghy, under whom the battalion had done consistently good work for a considerable time. Major Woods's ability and personal popularity were soon demonstrated, and the reputation of the battalion was destined to be still further enhanced under his long and successful direction. By sheer ability,

gallantry, and devotion to duty, Major Woods had risen from the ranks to the position of battalion commander in about two years of warfare.

On the 7th of March the 8th Brigade was withdrawn from the centre sector into Divisional reserve. The relief was effected by the 14th and 15th Brigades, which extended inwards and shared the central sector between them. The rest of the 8th Brigade was of brief duration, for, on the 11th, the 5th Division was instructed to take over the right sector of the 2nd Australian Division, which was then on our left. The 8th Brigade accordingly relieved the 5th Brigade on that date, and it thus became the left brigade on the 5th Divisional sector. Bapaume was now right in the path of any advance it might be called upon to make, and, owing to the depth of the gains on the left front, the town was barely a mile away. It was just at this time that news was received of the fall of Baghdad, and this, coupled with the continued withdrawal of the enemy on a large part of the Somme front, brought all ranks of the Division to a pitch of high enthusiasm. Battalions went to the front trenches with eagerness and left them with reluctance. It was felt that stirring developments on the Divisional front could not be delayed much longer, and all units wanted to share the honour of leading the Division in any advance that might be made. The 8th Brigade in particular, fired by the prospect of capturing Bapaume, was pressing on relentlessly and, after capturing successively Warlen-court Trench, the Brickfields, and part of Till Trench, stood on the 15th of March at the very gates of the town itself. Heaven and Atom Trenches, on other parts of the Divisional front, were reconnoitred nightly, but up to the 16th of March were invariably found to be strongly held. The volume of the enemy artillery fire was noticed now to be steadily waning, and many of the shells that fell in the sector obviously came from a long range.

Our own artillery had co-operated heartily with the other arms throughout this period of great activity, and the accuracy of its continual shooting was an additional inducement to the enemy's steady withdrawal. The Trench Mortar Brigade was especially active, and from the most advanced positions it was able to inflict great loss on the enemy. A good deal of retaliation naturally came its way, and the mortar crews had many exciting experiences. The following extract from its diary of the 15th of March will give the reader an idea of the conditions under which their heroic work was carried out. (The occasion was a shoot at Atom Trench):—

“ At 10.5 p.m. the elevating screw of No. 1 gun was severed by a piece of high explosive. No. 3 gun turned turtle owing to irregular shrinkage. No. 3 gun, however, was got into action again within forty minutes. At 12.5 a.m. No. 2 gun had a hang-fire, blowing out the rifle mechanism and causing a short round and a considerable flash. This was observed by the enemy and his retaliation became

heavier, consisting of 5.9, 4.2, and 77 cm. and medium and heavy minenwerfer. The trench was destroyed."

Between the terse lines of this report the imagination of the reader will read much.

The night of the 16th of March was an eventful one. Towards dawn enemy fire of all kinds ceased utterly. An unnatural stillness brooded over everything on the enemy side of the line. The vigilant patrols, hovering unceasingly around the enemy trenches, were quick to push their investigations forward. On every brigade front the enemy line was deserted. The reports flashed back to D.H.Q., to Corps and Army H.Q., to G.H.Q., and thence to the world. Battalion commanders in the line gave effect to their long-prepared plans for a general advance. The whole Divisional front was in motion. On the right, the 14th Brigade was soon in Le Transloy. The 15th was heading fast for Beaulencourt, the 8th had passed the Old Factory and was on the point of entering Bapaume. A squadron of the 13th Light Horse under Capt. Ferran, held in readiness for the occasion, was threading its way through the muddy wilderness to fulfil its rôle as screen to the advancing infantry, to harry the pursuit, and to ascertain the next enemy line of resistance. At 7 a.m. the 30th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. J. W. Clark) was in Bapaume, pressing so hotly on the heels of the retiring enemy that it cut off small parties, which resisted ineffectually in brief street fighting. The Division's elation at being first into Bapaume was considerably less than one might have imagined from the chorus of triumph which was sounded at the time by the Press of the allied countries. For months the public, misled by the fictitious value attached by their daily papers and their so-called military experts, had regarded the fall of Bapaume as almost synonymous with the end of the war. The men on the spot knew better, and beyond a little local excitement and natural gratification, General Tivey's men attached no especial importance to the success, which was, in truth, one of the lesser things accomplished by the brigade in the war. Its moral effect on the great misguided publics of the contending Powers, both enemy and friendly, quite overshadowed its tactical importance in the particular circumstances of its capture. The town was found to be burning in many places and the work of demolition in it had been well done. Lieut. Mauss, the head of the French Mission with the Division, was among the very first to enter Bapaume, and his report, compiled before the enemy was entirely cleared from the outskirts, was doubtless of considerable value to the French authorities.

Altogether, the 17th of March was a notable day and the many fine Irishmen with the Division thought it only a fit and proper recognition of St. Patrick. The average advance made was about two miles, and before night the front lay everywhere well beyond the Bapaume-Le Transloy Road over a distance of about four

miles. On the right, the 14th Brigade, after occupying Le Transloy, had pressed on to Villiers au Flos and Riencourt. Beaulencourt and Bancourt also fell, and an outpost line connecting these villages was established overnight.

With the enemy rearguards in rapid retreat, General Hobbs decided to constitute a strong mobile advanced guard, composed of all arms at his disposal, behind which the remainder of the Division would advance on a two brigade frontage. As we have, in the operations of the next three weeks, a classical instance of the tactics of both advanced and rearguards, a brief explanation of their functions may not be out of place.

When a force is advancing against a retreating enemy as here, the chief duty of the advanced guard is to protect the main force behind it and to facilitate its progress by every possible means. It should keep in touch with the enemy and be always aware of his rear dispositions. To do this it is generally necessary to overcome the resistance of the thin screen of covering troops with which the enemy will usually protect his rearguards. These are, generally speaking, the chief duties of an advanced guard to a force pursuing a retreating enemy. Special local circumstances may necessitate special instructions. For instance, the intensity of the pursuit may vary, or elaborate flank protections may sometimes be necessary. The commander of the main force will acquaint the commander of his advanced guard with his intention, and the latter will regulate his actions accordingly. The advanced guard is usually subdivided into the vanguard and the main guard. The vanguard consists of the leading troops of all, and as its special duty is reconnaissance and its special requirement mobility, it usually includes a large proportion of mounted troops. It was, broadly speaking, an advanced guard of this nature, with duties as outlined above, that General Hobbs now decided should lead the Division in the pursuit of the enemy.

The function of the enemy rearguards was to delay our advance as much as possible so that his main forces might retire without interference or undue pressure. This is usually carried out by taking up a series of defensive positions of sufficient strength to cause the pursuers to deploy before each and to spend time in preparations for a set assault. Unless the position of the main body is critical, the commander of the rearguard will not hazard a general engagement, but will rapidly vacate his position at the moment when the pursuers' plans for its capture are complete. To do this, his rearguard must be mobile. He then takes up new defensive positions in turn, making a maximum display of force at each, in order to check the pursuers and to waste their time in deployment. Destruction of roads and bridges is naturally an important part of the duty of a rearguard, and the nicest judgment is necessary in determining the right moment to vacate each position so that the maximum delay

may be caused to the pursuers without running the risk of becoming seriously involved.

Brigadier-General Elliott was appointed to command the advanced guard, and it passed through the outpost line before mentioned early on the morning of the 18th. Its composition was as follows:—

Advanced Guard Commander Brig.-Gen. H. E. Elliott.

H.Q. 15th A.I. Brigade.

C Squadron 13th Light Horse.

54th Battery A.F.A.

Half the 14th Field Company Engineers.

59th Battalion.

60th Battalion.

15th Machine-Gun Company, less 2 sections.

1 Tent Sub-Division, 15th Field Ambulance.

1 Bearer Sub-Division, 15th Field Ambulance.

Half a Brigade section of S.A.A. Section of D.A.C.

It will be noticed that the Staff and most of the troops were supplied by the 15th Brigade Group. The 8th Brigade on the left of the sector, and the 14th Brigade on its right, extended inwards and covered the central sector vacated by the troops of the advanced guard. The remainder of the 15th Brigade, including the 57th and 58th Battalions, was kept in the rear of the rest of the Division. It was placed under Lieut.-Col. Stewart, and was, in consequence, known as Stewart's Force. Its duties as the rearguard of the Division were nominal and it was regarded rather as a source of supply of reinforcements or reliefs for the advanced guard. As may be imagined, the artillery and the transport units of the advanced guard had the utmost difficulty in crossing the broad belt of devastated land that lay between Longueval and Bapaume. Major Wieck, General Elliott's Brigade Major, misled by a poor road reconnaissance, tried to get his long line of advanced guard transport to Bapaume via Flers and Luisenhof Farm. The road proving utterly impassable, he was compelled to reverse the whole line and to send it back via Longueval, Bazentin, and Martinpuich, and then on to Bapaume. Though long, the route was practicable, and the transport reported in due course and before any serious inconvenience had been experienced by the troops.

The wide screen of light horse patrols, spread fan-wise over the Divisional front, passed through the outpost line at 6.30 a.m. on the 18th and commenced its adventurous work of reconnaissance. With the 59th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Layh) as its infantry support, it constituted the vanguard of General Elliott's advanced guard. For a time all went well and rapid progress was made. Opposition was encountered at Fremicourt, but it was brushed aside by the light horse and by C and D Companies of the 59th

Battalion who, in a brisk fracas, captured a few prisoners and occupied the village before noon. A strong post at Delsaux Farm, about four miles east of Bapaume, was more troublesome. Machine gun and rifle fire prevented the light horse from coming to close quarters, so, at 12.30 p.m., the 59th Battalion was forced to deploy and reduce the position by working round its flanks. This was accomplished by A and B Companies at 3.45 p.m., and among the dead Germans was found an officer whose pocket contained a document of considerable importance. It was an outline of the method of the enemy retirement in the sector in which I A.N.Z.A.C. was operating. To the south of Delsaux Farm, Major Wieck, riding alone between the units of the wide front, found Haplinecourt unoccupied and he sent a party to garrison the village. About the same time Beugny, on the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, was captured, and an outpost line, connecting it with Delsaux Farm and Haplinecourt, was established for the night. The day's advance had been considerable. Despite disagreeable weather and the heavy strain of the operations, all ranks were in excellent spirits and were thoroughly imbued with the vigour and enterprise of their leader, General Elliott. Meanwhile, in the rear of the fighting forces, tremendous efforts were being made to improve the communications between railhead at Quarry and the advanced guard. Colonel Bruche, ably seconded by Capt. Smith, was perfecting the staff arrangements for forward supplies of food and ammunition. Pioneers, engineers, and all available infantry *personnel* were working on roads and light railways. Lieut.-Col. Francis and his men, realising that on their efforts depended the maintenance of the forward fighting forces, were working night and main to deliver their food and forage to Bapaume, while the first line transport of the troops engaged was not less active. The artillery, all its targets suddenly vanished out of range, was struggling to get its guns forward through the sea of mud, and to get into range of its elusive enemy again. This was accomplished within a few days, but during that time the artillery diaries all regretfully chronicled "expenditure of ammunition—NIL." In G Branch at D.H.Q., Lieut.-Col. Wagstaff was in constant touch with every part of his own formation and with the Division's on either flank. Under his sure hand and discerning eye the details of the operations were regulated on sound lines and the Division's dispositions were ready at all times to meet any of those emergencies which arise so swiftly from out the "fog of war." And above all was General Hobbs himself vigilant, indefatigable, inspiring, his hands at every lever of the huge machine he was directing, his mind, versed in the duties of all arms, ever evolving new means for their better direction and co-ordination.

The 60th Battalion (Major Cameron) relieved the 59th in the vanguard on the morning of the 19th, and the light horse patrols in their early morning reconnaissance found that the enemy's new line



A STRETCH OF THE COLDUROY TRACK LEADING UP TO WESTH OEK RIDGE, OCTOBER, 1917.


of resistance lay approximately from the Beetroot Factory south of Morehies, to Lebuquière and Velu, whence it swung suddenly forward in the direction of Haplineourt. Shortly after mid-day, the 60th Battalion, moving forward in four columns, came in contact with this line and progress commenced. A brief fight occurred at a tiny wood east of Haplineourt and another at Lebuquière, which was surrounded and occupied at 4.15 p.m. Velu gave more trouble, but the advanced guard artillery astonished its garrison with a pretty bombardment and it fell to infantry attacks at 4.30. The enemy's surprise at finding that part of our artillery had been got forward over the zone of devastation so quickly was doubtless very great. The outpost line for the night of the 19th was approximately the line given above as the enemy line of resistance in the morning.

The morning patrols on the 20th encountered heavy fire from Morehies and Beaumetz, and it was becoming obvious that our rate of advance was causing the enemy considerable concern. Our right flank, which was delayed somewhat by the slower progress of the 20th Division on our right, was advanced considerably by the occupation of Bertincourt by our light horse at 9.30 a.m. The place was handed over to the cavalry of the 20th Division, who, later on, appear to have withdrawn from it. At 11 a.m. parties of the 59th Battalion were advancing on Morchies, which they captured at 1 p.m., and established communication with the Australian Division on our left. The 60th Battalion, advancing on Beaumetz, saw that the enemy was reinforcing its garrison. At 3.30 p.m. the 4th Battery A.F.A. bombarded the village and the 60th Battalion commenced to work round it. The process was almost completed when signs of an impending enemy attack on our unprotected right were seen developing in Hermies. This, coupled with the fact that Beaumetz was still strongly garrisoned by the enemy, rendered advisable the postponement of an attack on the village. The 60th Battalion accordingly withdrew slightly and established its outpost line for the night about half a mile on our side of Beaumetz. North of this the outpost line ran just east of Morchies and, to the south, it stretched to the vicinity of Bertincourt. During the evening, the 60th Battalion, now completely tired out by its fine efforts, was relieved in the outpost line by the 29th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Purser), which had been sent to reinforce the advanced guard. The 59th Battalion was similarly relieved by the 30th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Clark) on the 21st. It included among its casualties for the period Capt. C. I. Hughes, the Regimental Medical Officer, whose death was greatly regretted throughout the battalion.

The 21st passed rather uneventfully. Patrols of the light horse and of the 29th Battalion found Beaumetz unoccupied at 7 a.m. and the village was at once entered and incorporated in our outpost system. The reader will do well to remember that the Divisional front now extended over four miles in length and that, as the outpost

line was supplied from only two battalions, it was by no means continuous, being, in fact, only a chain of posts separated in places by considerable distances. Behind it lay the main guard of the advanced guard and behind that again came the 8th Brigade, now less two battalions, and the 14th Brigade. On the 21st, the advanced guard artillery was reinforced by the arrival of the entire 14th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Phillips) of which the 55th Battery came into action on that date. A half company of the I A.N.Z.A.C. Cyclist Battalion was also sent forward to General Elliott to facilitate the work of patrolling and communication.

No events of importance occurred on the 22nd, but the morning of the 23rd brought ample evidence that the enemy was feeling



keenly the pressure exerted by General Elliott's troops. At 4.30 a.m. a vigorous enemy bombardment of Beaumetz warned its small garrison of an impending counter-attack. Within a few minutes some hundreds of storm troops, specially selected for the operation and brought up from Cambrai, about 15 miles away, advanced to the attack of the village in three distinct columns. A northern column came straight down the main Cambrai Road and endeavoured to encircle the village from the north. A central column approached by a direct route the eastern side of the village, where it halted, apparently to allow the flanking columns to get into position. The third column, penetrating a gap in our outpost chain, passed to the south of the village and now was approaching it from the rear. The attack was skilfully planned and boldly executed, and it met with a temporary measure of success. The northern column was

surprised and disconcerted when it encountered a 30th Battalion fighting patrol which happened to be getting into position for an attack on the Farm on the main road about half a mile north of Beaumetz. After a brief affray it changed its direction and inclined south directly towards the village, but its action henceforth seems to have become somewhat irresolute. The central column for the time being also remained inactive, but complete success attended the attack of the southern column. It entered the village from the rear, surprised and overwhelmed its little garrison, and, for a brief space, remained in possession. But neither Lieut.-Col. Purser, nor Lieut.-Col. Clark, who was in charge of the outpost line as a whole, was likely to tolerate the intrusion for long. Counter-attacks were immediately ordered and subordinate commanders near the spot were already on their own initiative organising similar measures. Small parties of the 29th Battalion, hastily gathered, were soon heavily engaged against greatly superior numbers, and Lieut. H. Harrison, at the head of a dauntless little band, again and again faced and routed superior numbers. The support companies of the 30th Battalion were not less prompt, and their counter-attacks, pressed with great spirit from the north-west part of the village, completed the enemy discomfiture. Forced from the shelter of the houses, the enemy detachments came under heavy fire from the Lewis guns of the 29th and 30th Battalions as well as from the Vickers' guns of the 15th Machine Gun Company (Capt. Muirson) and they suffered heavily. By 5.30 a.m. the village was cleared, and by 8 a.m. our outpost line beyond it was entirely restored. The severity of the fighting was revealed in the numbers of enemy dead left in the village, where 59 bodies were counted. His additional losses in the withdrawal made the operation a disastrous one for him. Our losses were 12 killed and 38 wounded.

The fine gallantry of Lieut. Harrison, who had continued to fight on though badly wounded, was paralleled on the morning of the 23rd by Lieut. R. Trevan (15th Machine-Gun Company). He was proceeding to relieve a machine-gun post in the outpost line when he and his little party suddenly found themselves surrounded by about 50 of the enemy. With wonderful dash and presence of mind the party charged through the Germans and extricated both themselves and their gun from an apparently hopeless position. Lieut. Trevan's second gun crew opened fire on the Germans immediately afterwards and did much execution. With subordinate officers like Harrison and Trevan a position might often be desperate but never hopeless.

Severe as was the lesson of the 23rd, the enemy concern at the rapid progress of our advance prompted him to make yet another attempt to recapture Beaumetz. The 29th Battalion was relieved during the 23rd by the 57th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Stewart, whose force was now disbanded as such, and was once more in its usual place in the brigade). At 3 a.m. on the 24th, after a heavy bombard-

ment, another enemy party drove back our thin outposts and secured a temporary lodgment in the village. Capt. P. W. Trainor, who commanded the 57th support company near it, immediately counter-attacked with great spirit and recovered the village except the very last house, where a party of the enemy took cover and resisted stoutly. Later in the day our artillery was turned on to the place and the house was completely demolished. A larger counter-attack at 4.30 a.m. failed to reach the village at all, machine gun and Lewis gun fire smashing it with heavy losses. The survivors took refuge in shell-holes which Lieut.-Col. Phillip's artillery promptly searched with shrapnel. Here again the enemy killed were over 60. Our losses were four killed and 21 wounded.

At 3.45 p.m. on the same day the 59th and 60th Battalions moved out from Velu and Lebuquière and completely broke strong enemy opposition on our right front, which was still bent back somewhat owing to the slower progress of the Division on our right. Some hundreds of the enemy were dislodged from these positions and the line was materially improved. At 9 p.m. a party of the 57th Battalion occupied the farm on the main road north of Beaumetz and beat off an enemy counter-attack on the place at 2 a.m. on the 25th. The remainder of the 25th passed quietly enough, but the 26th saw some sharp fighting at various parts of the line. On the left, where the 58th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Denehy) had relieved the 30th Battalion on the 23rd, a useful advance was made at 5.15 a.m. The 59th Battalion became involved in the second Australian Division's operations at Lagnicourt, and at 11.15 a.m. and at 1.5 p.m. repulsed two counter-attacks that were threatening that village from its right flank. At 10.45 p.m. the enemy bombarded the much disputed farm north of Beaumetz and occupied it after completely wrecking it. Within half an hour a 59th Battalion party had counter-attacked and retaken the place.

The 27th of March brought with it another useful advance on the part of the 58th Battalion. During the day General Sir Hubert Gough, commanding Fifth Army, visited General Elliott's H.Q. and personally congratulated him on his fine work in command of the divisional advanced guard.


The 28th was a comparatively uneventful day, and on the 29th the 14th Brigade (General Hobkirk) relieved the 15th Brigade as advanced guard and General Elliott's men, thoroughly tired out but in high spirits, passed back to the comparative rest and comfort of the rear. The 59th and 60th Battalions had experienced the hardest time, and they had risen splendidly to the demands made upon them. Many sick men had stayed on to see the operations through. The brigade casualties had averaged about 30 a day, a remarkable testimony to the skill of the subordinate officers and men in the methods of open warfare. So far the Australian advanced guard had completely out-fought the rearguards of the enemy. The Germans had been

forced to reinforce their rearguard with heavy detachments from the main body, which is the last thing a successful rearguard should require. Furthermore, this sacrifice of men had brought him no commensurate advantages. Nor can it be overlooked that by now six battalions of the 5th Division had been engaged, and the operations were commencing to assume the character of a series of pitched battles. This was the object most sought by General Hobbs and most avoided by the enemy.

The enemy rearguard, forced from its strong Beaumetz line of resistance, took up a position of even greater strength on the Louverval-Doignies line. The reader will see that the direction of his retirement was along the Bapaume-Cambrai Road astride of which our advance was taking place. As this was by far the most important road in the area, it was natural that along it his resistance was stoutest. Louverval, with its wood and château, lies about half a mile north of the main road and within two miles of the Hindenburg Line in front of Pronville. Doignies, a more substantial village, lies about three-quarters of a mile south of the road. Between the two villages and on the main road itself was a large factory for the manufacture of sugar from beetroots. Like the beetroot factory near Beugny and the farm near Beaumetz its position on the main road gave it considerable tactical importance, which was increased by the fact that it stood on high ground. The factory was linked up both to Louverval and Doignies by defensive works and altogether the position was a strong one. General Hobbs had decided to assault it, and on his instructions General Hobkirk had spent some days in a consideration of the problem it presented. He entrusted the operation to the 55th Battalion (Major P. W. Woods) and the 56th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. H. Scott).

It was originally decided to encircle Louverval from the north and Doignies from the south, but this plan would have exposed the southern column to the menace of a flank attack from Hermies, known to be a centre of strong enemy concentration. So, acting on General Hobbs's advice, General Hobkirk substituted for this a more original and less risky plan of attack. The 56th Battalion was to set out with the 55th Battalion in its immediate rear. The 56th would take the factory and then proceed in three columns to attack Louverval, partly by a direct assault and partly by a strong encircling movement through the wood on the north of the village. The 55th Battalion was to pass through the 56th as soon as the factory had been taken and incline to the right against Doignies in a three-column formation. One column would attack the north-west corner of the village, another, going farther forward, would come in on the north, while the third, by a still longer detour would encircle the village and enter it from the north-east. The 31st (Lieut.-Col. Toll) and 57th Battalions were to assist by holding our main advanced guard line throughout the operation, while "A" squadron of the

13th Light Horse was held in readiness south of Beaumetz to deal with any trouble that might develop on the right flank. As this was still the most exposed part of the position, the 31st Battalion and the Cyclist Battalion Detachment were also instructed to watch it



carefully. The I A.N.Z.A.C. Heavy Artillery detailed the 26th Heavy and the 78th and 88th Siege Batteries to support the operation by bombarding enemy approaches, while the 14th F.A. Brigade, which at the time had the 7th and 50th Batteries A.F.A. attached to it, stood in readiness to deal with counter-attacks and the massing of enemy troops. No preliminary bombardment was used, General

Hobkirk preferring to rely on complete surprise. As our assembly had to be done over strange country and entirely in the dark, it was arranged that the scouts who were to lead the columns should have luminous patches painted on the backs of their tunics. A system of posts painted luminously on the side facing our advance was also provided to assist in maintaining direction. The 3rd Squadron R.F.C. provided the contact patrols to keep the rear informed of the progress of the advance troops, and to give warning of enemy concentrations for counter-attack.

These plans were carried out as admirably as they had been conceived. At 2 a.m. on the 2nd of April the 56th Battalion was in position on the reverse of the slope which, from the north of Beaumetz, overlooked the area of assault. "D" Company was on the right, "B" Company in the centre, and "A" on the left. "C" Company was kept as battalion reserve. The 55th Battalion was on the right rear of the 56th and, through snow and rain and a piercing wind, the advance commenced, to the accompaniment of a slight 77 cm. barrage with which a little rifle and machine-gun fire was mingled. The Beetroot Factory was occupied without much trouble and a few prisoners were taken from it by "D" Company of the 56th which, leaving a garrison there, pressed on towards the southern extremity of Louverval. In the centre "D" Company was already heading for the western edge of the wood, while "A" Company on the extreme left was making good progress in its sweeping movement to the north-west of the wood. By this time the enemy garrison was thoroughly aroused, and brisk opposition developed in several parts of the battle. From his advanced H.Q. almost on the scene of the fight, Lieut.-Col. Humphrey Scott watched the progress of his columns and directed their movement with coolness and skill. All companies pressed onwards with great dash and gallantry and by noon Lieut.-Col. Scott was able to report to General Hobkirk that his objectives were all taken and were being consolidated. Lieut. W. E. O'Halloran and 2nd Lieut. Chauncey were killed during the attack, and the heavy artillery barrage which the enemy now threw over his lost positions was taking its toll of the troops holding them. Capt. Roberts, whose work had been splendid right through the operation, and Capts. Thomson, Smythe, and Mann directed their commands with fine ability and resolution and, though the two last named officers were wounded, their senior subalterns took their places and the work went on. Lieuts. A. E. Hicks and J. C. Watts also did conspicuously good work, and the steadiness of the N.C.O.'s and men was beyond praise. By 9.30 p.m., when all enemy counter-attacks to retake the position had been broken, the line was linked up with positions on its flanks and the fight was over. The losses in Col. Scott's battalion were two officers and 49 other ranks killed, eight officers and 147 other ranks wounded.

Meantime Major Woods's enterprise against Doignies had been

equally successful. The early stages of his advance disturbed a dog, the barking of which alarmed the Germans in its neighbourhood and caused some little fighting in the vicinity of the Factory. "D" Company of the 55th attended to this and then, reforming on the main road, headed for the north-east corner of Doignies, nearly 2,000 yards distant, by the encircling route which was followed. "B" and "C" Companies entered the village on its north and north-west edges as "D" Company appeared on its north-east corner. Taken thus in flank and rear, the surprised garrison could make little resistance. Seven or eight enemy mines exploded as the attackers dashed through the streets but the resultant casualties were few and the vigour of the assault was not impaired. The position was consolidated early, but the heavy shelling to which it was subjected later on caused many casualties. Major Woods's troops, however, were easily equal to the demands made upon them, and Capts. E. W. Stutchbury and H. A. Wyllie, the Regimental Medical Officer, and Lieuts. W. B. S. Morgan and A. A. Duprez rendered conspicuously fine service at various phases of the operation. The 55th casualties for the day were seven officers wounded, 33 other ranks killed, and 143 other ranks wounded.

The counter-attacks against the new 55th and 56th Battalion positions were numerous and heavy throughout the 2nd. No less than seven were launched and a number of others were broken before they got properly under way. That not one of the counter-attacks seriously embarrassed the infantry was due to the fine work of the F.O.O.'s, the R.F.C., and Col. Phillips' artillery, the co-ordination between all of whom was admirable. The communications over the fighting area were well maintained, thanks especially to the brave linesmen who repaired the wires as quickly as they were cut. The 14th Machine-Gun Company (Capt. Spier) was equally helpful in checking counter-attacks, although the exceptionally fine artillery work considerably reduced its opportunities. The attached cavalry and cyclist units were not called upon for any special fighting, but they carried out their mission of flank guards and helped materially the communication with flank units. This well-designed and well-executed battle deprived the enemy of his last remaining position on the left of the 5th Divisional sector on which he might maintain himself in front of the Hindenburg Line, and the 14th Brigade richly merited the thanks which General Birdwood and General Hobbs tendered so cordially.

The Division was relieved by the 1st Australian Division on the 6th of April. Up to this time General Hobkirk's brigade had continued to supply the advanced guard. Although there was no further heavy fighting during the period, the battalions of the 14th Brigade were naturally somewhat weary before the tour closed, and General Tivey sent both the 29th and 31st Battalions to assist for a few days in the work of the front line. Thus, though the 8th Brigade

as such took no tour of duty as divisional advanced guard, its units rendered valuable assistance to both the 14th and 15th Brigades and, especially at Beaumetz, bore the brunt of some of the heaviest fighting of the period.

The reader will have long since surmised that the great difficulty of communications in the rear had been successfully overcome; otherwise, the fine advanced guard work would have been quite impracticable. That it was surmounted was due largely to the fine engineering and pioneering work done under the guidance of Lieut.-Col. Carey and of the Divisional Staff. The great problem was how to convey across the trackless waste of shell-hole country that intervened, water, food, and ammunition for the forward troops. For at least three miles the whole area was a morass of mud in which wagon loads of brick and stone rubble sank completely out of sight in a few minutes. The only road made available to the Division was useless, as it was already overcrowded with the transport of other formations. It was of paramount importance to get road and light railway communications through to the advanced guard, and at first glance the work seemed hopeless. For a few critical days the success of the whole Division had depended entirely on the engineering and pioneering and transport services—and those services succeeded.

Almost from the moment of the enemy withdrawal from the Le Transloy line the three field companies were hard at work on road construction across the devastated area. Many thousands of square yards of corduroy road were laid in a few days; many hundreds of loads of brick rubble were carted; many craters were filled; hundreds of yards of drains were dug. Every well was tested as soon as the enemy had vacated its immediate vicinity. The 8th Field Company worked especially on the Flers-Factory Corner road, the 14th Field Company between Gueudecourt and Beaulencourt, the 15th Field Company cleared the roads between Beaulencourt and Haplincourt. The area was sown with enemy mines and booby traps of all descriptions and the 15th Field Company alone withdrew 234 of these deadly contrivances. The mines under the Bapaume Town Hall escaped detection and exploded on the 25th of March, over a week after the enemy had vacated the place. There was some loss of life and two brave members of the French Chamber of Deputies, who had hurried to their constituency as soon as it was possible to do so, lost their lives in the explosion. Half of the 8th Field Company was engaged all night in the work of rescuing the buried.

In the area much German engineering material was salvaged and employed in various ways. With the assistance of the 15th Field Company, Capt. W. L. Hamilton, the Camp Commandant, soon had a commodious headquarters ready near Beaulencourt for General Hobbs and his staff, and almost the entire Divisional Staff was able to move forward before the end of March. Much advantage resulted from the better supervision that was possible from the new

H.Q. As soon as the water and the communication problems were solved, the Divisional Engineers concentrated their energies on the digging of rear and intermediate defensive systems, a work of the first importance. About this time the services of Major V. A. H. Sturdee, O.C. 8th Field Company, were temporarily lost to the Division. He was promoted to the command of the 4th Pioneer Battalion. The Division parted with this popular and capable officer with reluctance, but he came back smiling in a year or so to succeed Lieut.-Col. Carey as its C.R.E. Command of the 8th Field Company passed, after a few weeks in keeping of Major Vincent, to Capt. Farquhar, who had long been Major Sturdee's second in command.

The work of the Signal Company under the temporary command of Capt. R. G. Hamilton had been literally electrified by the increase of work necessitated by the sudden moves and the fighting of the period. Without going into details, most of which are somewhat technical, it will be sufficient to say that communications stood splendidly the strain of the period, and the promptness and reliability of the signal services rendered possible much of the fine work that was accomplished. The sudden and great increase in the area over which the Division was operating during March and April necessitated an extraordinary increase in the length of signal wire required for communications. It is difficult to see how this would have been obtained had not the enemy obligingly left much signal wire in his hasty retreat. A hundred and twenty miles of this were salvaged and largely by means of it communications were admirably maintained. Major R. A. Stanley returned to the command of the 5th Divisional Signal Company in the early part of April.

The 5th Pioneer Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Carter) in the early days of the advance spent all its energies on the task of getting the light railway system through to Beaulencourt. No less than 1,215 yards of this light track were laid on the 23rd of March and within a week from its commencement the entire work was completed and trucks were being run through by mule haulage. The line was soon carrying 100 tons a day. This greatly relieved the over-worked transport of the Division. On completion of this pressing work Lieut.-Col. Carter's command moved up to the advanced areas to assist in forward road and defence construction. By the 21st of April this fine unit had completed six months' duty on the Somme with only the one brief rest at Franvillers already mentioned. It was a splendid record of hard and useful work.

During March and April the 8th Field Ambulance (Col. Shepherd) remained at the D.R.S. at Bellevue Farm. Admissions averaged about 100 a day and the station proved of great benefit to numerous officers and men who required a rest but who were not so badly incapacitated as to need evacuation to a hospital. The 14th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Tebbutt) continued to administer the

A.N.Z.A.C. Collecting Station at Bécordel until the 6th April when it relieved the 1st Field Ambulance at the Corps Scabies Station at Aveluy, where accommodation for 232 scabies patients was provided.

But Col. Hearne's chief attention was naturally focussed on the forward medical work, which was carried out mainly by the 15th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Horn). A section had moved out with the advanced guard on the 18th of March, and stretcher-bearers and horse ambulances easily coped with the few casualties of the first days of the advance. Meantime the improvement in the rear communications rendered easier every day the work of evacuation from the dressing station at Bapaume. Cases were taken either down the main Albert Road to Pozières or else back to Bernafay, whence they were conveyed by rail or by motor ambulance to Edge Hill near Albert. As the fighting troops got ahead, an A.D.S. was established at Fremicourt, and on the 24th of March this was pushed on to Beugny, which the handy Ford ambulances had been reaching for a couple of days. Throughout all the operations described the work of the 15th Field Ambulance was very fine, and the wounded received as much attention as they would have got in a long-organised sector. This result was secured by the perfect and enthusiastic co-ordination of all the services of the Division working to a common end.

Another important medical work of the period was the analysis of samples of water from the many wells of the area. Lysol was found in some of these and many were befouled in various ways. By the 26th of March two depoisoner laboratories were established in Bapaume and these were of great use. Largely as a result of the strain and responsibility of his work, Lieut.-Col. Horn's health failed during April and he was compelled to retire permanently from service in the field. Lieut.-Col. J. M. Y. Stewart, an officer of considerable experience and fine personality, succeeded him.

The unremitting work of the supply services has already been mentioned. Lieut.-Col. Francis detailed fifty wagons to supply the advanced guard in its early operations. From railhead at Quarry Siding to Bapaume was a far cry, and over the early difficult roads it necessitated a two days' journey. An advanced supply dump was established at Bapaume a day or two after the enemy withdrawal and was admirably managed by Lieut. C. W. Laity of the 5th Divisional Train. On the 29th of March railhead changed to Bazentin and the Decauville Railway was thereafter utilised for the carriage of supplies to Beaulencourt. Capt. Rodd, too, established an advanced ordnance dump, first at Bernafay, and then on the 1st of April at Bapaume. Railhead for supplies changed to Bapaume on the 7th of April and the entire D.A.D.O.S. organisation moved there on the 9th. This advance of railhead enabled Lieut.-Col. Francis to increase still further the number of his vehicles detached for the work of road construction. No fewer than forty wagons of the Divisional Train were diverted to this all-important work, and the essential com-

munications of the Divisional area progressed rapidly. It was well that they did so, for from the very outset of the advance the Division had been most unfavourably situated in regard to the forward roads allotted to its use.

A certain improvement in the weather and the transference of operations from mud-fields to firm ground tended to reduce animal wastage during March and April. Nevertheless, the great strain imposed by the sudden increase of transport in those months was reflected in the wastage returns, which showed 168 for March and 232 for April. The devotion of all ranks of the veterinary services kept the wastage within bounds and contributed a great deal to the success of the Division in its first experience of open warfare. Not less satisfactory was the casualty return for the period. This amounted during March to 35 officers, 1,014 other ranks, and during April to 16 officers and 543 other ranks. The sick for each month amounted to slightly over 1,100. Considering all that had been done these returns were most gratifying, and it is no wonder that Sir Douglas Haig telegraphed to the Division his appreciation of the "great gallantry and skill displayed by it during the advance."

When the Division was relieved by the 1st Australian Division on the 7th of April it remained near Bapaume in Corps reserve for fourteen days. The reader will know by now how such a period would be occupied, in re-fitting, training, and perfecting the reserve system of defences. One incident alone will be referred to—that of the dramatic enemy break through on part of the front occupied by the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions on the early morning of the 15th of April. Shortly after 6 a.m. the Division was awakened from its slumbers by the astounding news that the enemy, in an attack of great strength, had pierced part of the front held by these Divisions, and had already penetrated as far as the battery positions. Within an hour all three infantry brigades of the 5th Division were pouring forwards in fighting order to check the onset. It was unnecessary. The local reserves of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions had restored the positions and, even as the 5th Division hurried forwards, the beaten enemy was streaming back towards the Hindenburg Line, trying in vain to get through our artillery barrage. He paid bitterly for his rash adventure, and few finer collections of dead Germans have been seen on the Western Front than that which existed near the Hindenburg Line in front of Quéant on the morning of the 15th of April. The 5th Divisional Artillery, which had not been relieved with the rest of the Division, played a large part in inflicting these losses, and the report of one of General Bessel-Browne's F.O.O.'s on the occasion is here included to give the reader an idea of the excellence of the artillery work, and of the means by which it was secured. The enemy was reported to have lost 2,000 killed in addition to several hundreds taken prisoners.

114th HOWITZER BATTERY, A.F.A.

*April 15th, 1917.**Report of F.O.O.*

Under orders from Major Edmonds, O.C. of this Battery, I proceeded to the Battery O.P. (Observation Post) at C.28.a.8.5. about daybreak as heavy firing on our left front was taking place and information had come through that enemy had broken our front line.

This locality was shelled heavily by 5.9 and 4.2 H.E. and shrapnel and the line to O.P. was broken in many places so that communication could not be obtained at first. The linesmen kept going and mended all breaks despite hostile fire and kept communication till enemy had been driven back to his own front line again.

When I reached O.P. I could see enemy in possession of Lagnicourt, and the Battery positions of 2nd A.F.A. Brigade. Our infantry were advancing to the cross-roads in C.29.a. They reached the shelter of the sunken road here and were immediately attacked by enemy forces from Lagnicourt. At the same time I could see our infantry advancing across the ridge beyond the Lagnicourt-Vaux-Vraucourt Road in C.16 C.22. This information I instantly passed back to my O.C. At the same time Major Edmonds turned the guns of the 114th Battery on to C.23.b. and Lagnicourt at gunfire. The effect seemed splendid and I am informed since by infantry who came from this locality that there were about 40 dead Huns about C.24.a.6.7. many of whom seemed to have been killed by shell fire.

The enemy attack on our infantry at the cross-roads at C.29.a.33. did not succeed and about 20 minutes later our infantry made a very spirited attack and gained the left edge of Lagnicourt and the gun position in C.23.b. and the Lagnicourt-Vaux-Vraucourt Road. I instantly communicated their progress to Major Edmonds, who placed his barrage between Lagnicourt and the enemy front line between Quéant and Pronville, where enemy troops could be seen debouching from Lagnicourt in some disorder across the open ground. Here they got into a barrage which seemed most effective. They continued to retire in waves from Lagnicourt towards their front line. I estimate that I saw over 2,000 of them go across. They were harried by our artillery. I advised my O.C. of this and got the guns switched on to some of the thickest groups with good effect. I then asked for the guns to fire on to enemy wire and they did. Also the heavy guns and other batteries appeared to have concentrated here. They put up a splendid barrage and the enemy had to go through this. I should think the casualties would be very heavy here. In places I could see enemy troops running up and down the wire in this barrage evidently looking for a track through. It appeared as though these troops had come through the Hindenburg Line more to the left and had been driven back on to a part of their own line new to them.

This battery obtained good effect on a large body of hostile infantry retiring towards enemy lines in D.18.c. a section getting right into them with gunfire.

The enemy appeared to frequently shell his own troops and had a barrage in front of his own lines before all his men had got across.

I received orders to watch for a hostile battery at D. 13 Central. This I could not see from my O.P. It was probably concealed in a hollow, but it must have had a bad time as our fire was very heavy there for a while.

* * * * *

I regret that I have been unable to give exact times, but I broke my watch before I got to the O.P. this morning.

At 10.30 a.m. I was relieved by Lieut. McLeod of this Battery.

(Signed) NORMAN A. NICOLSON, Lieut.,
114th How. Battery.

The remainder of the period in Corps reserve near Bapaume passed without important incident. Cheering news of the success of the British spring offensive near Arras continued to come through, but it was soon seen that no decisive result was likely to be achieved in that theatre. On the 20th of April the Division was relieved in its reserve position by the 20th British Division, and moved, less its artillery, to "The Dingle" and the camps around Mametz, Fricourt, Bernafay, and Montauban. "The Dingle" sounded an alluring name and conjured up visions of woods and waterfalls. It turned out to be a large and moderately comfortable huddled camp built near Bécourt among the shell-holes and ruined trenches of the Somme battlefield. The closing April weather was beautiful and the fortnight spent in this area turned out to be a most enjoyable one. The time was passed in relaxation and training. Grand Divisional sports were held on the 4th of May, and a still grander horse show on the 5th drew a large crowd, including the Army and Corps Commanders, to Tara Hill. The list of prize winners hereunder will give the reader an idea how universal was the interest and emulation through all ranks and units of the Division. Competitions of this nature served an important double function. They provided interesting recreation for all ranks and they were of incalculable benefit to the animals and transport of the Division. Horses and mules, harness and saddlery, cookers and limbered and general service wagons all showed marked improvement as the result of these "horse shows." So keen was the competition that even rivets were polished, and the competing vehicles were brought into the show ground on other vehicles so that they might not lose their immaculate polish before coming under the scrutiny of the judges.

PRIZE WINNERS AT 5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION HORSE SHOW
5TH MAY, 1917

Class	Event	Winners
1. G.S. Wagon and pair horses.	1st Prize. 29th A.A.S.C. 2nd Prize. 10th A.A.S.C. 3rd Prize. 10th A.A.S.C.	L.Cpl. C. W. Belling. L.Cpl. E. J. Fitzpatrick. L.Cpl. E. J. Fitzpatrick.
2. G. S. Limb. wagon and pair mules.	1st Prize. 55th Battalion. 2nd Prize. 30th Battalion. 3rd Prize. 15th Bde. H.Q.	Dr. H. Hodges. Dr. W. Thompson. Dr. L. Taylor.
3. G.S. Wagon and pair mules.	1st Prize. 8th Field Coy. 2nd Prize. 5th D.A.C. H.Q.	Dr. W. Satterwait. Dr. C. M. Olson.
4. G.S. Limb. wagon and pair horses.	1st Prize. 10th A.A.S.C. 2nd Prize. 28th A.A.S.C. 3rd Prize. 55th Btn.	Dr. H. B. Cook. Dr. C. Briggs. Dr. J. R. Kay.
5. Pack animal with S.A.A.	1st Prize. 56th Btn. 2nd Prize. 59th Btn. 3rd Prize. 15th Field Coy.	Dr. J. H. Miller. Pte. Angove. Pte. S. V. Romakedis.
6. Field Ambulance Wagon and pair horses.	1st Prize. 15th Field Amb. 2nd Prize. 14th Field Amb. 3rd Prize. 8th Field Amb.	Dr. J. C. Sutherland. Dr. R. Boots. Dr. B. Munro.
7 Travelling kitchen and pair horses.	1st Prize. 55th Btn. 2nd Prize. 5th Pioneer Btn. 3rd Prize. 30th Btn.	Dr. J. C. Sutherland. Dr. W. Romley. Dr. L. Tripp.
8. Best Officer's Charger.	Special Prize.	Lieut.-Col. Wagstaff's RUFUS.
9. Jumping competition for mules.	1st Prize. Dr. A. C. Neat's BOB. 2nd Prize. Dr. Windbank's OLD GLORY. 3rd Prize. Dr. Prisk's ALEC.	5th D.A.C 60th Btn. 5th D.A.C.
10. Officer's jumping competition.	Special Prize.	Capt. Finlay's FLEURBAIX.
11. N.C.O.'s and men's jumping competition.	1st Prize. W. O. O'Neill's JERRY. 2nd Prize. Tpr. Cowan's CHARLIE. 3rd Prize. B. S. M. Thompson's LA FRANCE.	
13. Log chopping contest.	1st Prize. Cpl. T. A. Buckingham. 2nd Prize. Pte. C. R. Cox. 3rd Prize. Pte. M. Dillon.	55th Btn. 15th M.G. Company. 29th Btn.
14. Open jumping competition, Officers.	Special Prize.	Capt. Finlay's FLEURBAIX.
15. Flat race.	Special Prize.	Lieut. Freer's MAD MICK.

The second anniversary of the Anzac landing at Gallipoli was celebrated enthusiastically, and many dinners were arranged in honour of the event. The mess of which Professor Mauss was a member was one of many to entertain visitors and it prepared an elaborate menu for the occasion. The Professor, who was naturally something of a gourmet, undertook as a very special favour to prepare two sauces for the banquet, one for the fish and one for the pudding. At the dinner the mess servants, perhaps not entirely unaffected by the convivial occasion, inadvertently served the pudding sauce with the fish. The Professor preserved a horrified silence when he saw what had happened, but was greatly relieved when the guests in turn congratulated him on the modern gastronomic harmony which his efforts had produced. Before the pudding stage was reached it is possible that the risks of detection were considerably lessened.


Another diversion from military routine was provided by the polling for the Australian General Election towards the end of April. The matter aroused little interest and no enthusiasm. The 5th Divisional School at Montonvillers was disbanded about this time. Under Lieut.-Col. C. C. Mason and his staff it had done consistently good work in a wide scheme of training; but a new training organisation providing for Corps Schools with a Divisional Wing for each Division in the Corps superseded the old arrangement. It had the effect of centralising and co-ordinating the training throughout the Corps, and of economising in the instructional staffs necessary. A system of brigade classes of instruction became henceforth the chief training activity within the Division, and as time went on fine schools under brigade organisations were created.

The glorious weather, the comparative relaxation from work, and the round of sporting fixtures soon brought all ranks of the Division to a fine pitch of fitness and good humour. They felt that they would soon be in the line again and made most of the present opportunities for enjoyment, as well as going through their training with zest and interest. But the guns still thundered insistently and everybody knew that a bitter fight was raging in and around Bullecourt. On the 7th of May the call came and the 14th Brigade Group entrained from Albert and reached Beugnatre via Bapaume on the same day. I A.N.Z.A.C. wired the same evening that another brigade was immediately required, and the 15th Brigade Group travelled by train to the same vicinity on the 8th. On the 9th the 8th Brigade marched to the Favreuil area, and on the 10th D.H.Q. moved forward in two echelons, an advanced one, consisting mainly of the G.O.C., the General Staff, and a few clerks, going to fighting H.Q. at Vaulx-Vraucourt, and the remainder going to a camp at The Monument, near Favreuil just off the main Bapaume-Arras road. The Monument took its name from the marble shaft erected there to commemorate a French success in the war of 1870-1871.

The new Divisional sector constituted the left of the I A.N.Z.A.C. front, which had undergone important changes since the Division left the front line on the 7th of April. Over the whole front, the enemy rearguards had been pushed back into the Hindenburg Line, which here consisted of two parallel lines of extraordinarily well constructed trench about 200 yards apart. Each trench was provided with numerous concreted dug-outs, machine-gun and minenwerfer positions, and was protected by elaborate wire fortifications many yards in width. The two villages nearest the line on our side were Noreuil and Lagnicourt, on the enemy side Quéant and Pronville. Bullecourt lay just to the left of the new Divisional sector. The 4th Australian Division on the 11th of April had stormed the Hindenburg Line in the vicinity of Bullecourt and, though all the gains then made were not maintained, subsequent fighting had secured an important sector of the Hindenburg defences. Some hundreds of yards of the captured Hindenburg trenches were included in the front taken over by the Division. These constituted a marked salient in our front line dispositions, and, needless to say, it was heavily enfiladed by enemy guns on both flanks. Bomb blocks in the captured trenches marked the limits right and left of our penetration. In front of the right bomb blocks our front line bent back from the Hindenburg system and ran south-west in advance of Noreuil and Lagnicourt to a point about a mile to the east of the last-named village. This was the extreme right of the 5th Divisional sector. Over the right half our front line lay at an average distance of 500 yards from the Hindenburg Line. The total length of the new Divisional front was about 6,000 yards, of which a few hundred yards only on the extreme left rested on the captured Hindenburg defences.

The 14th and 15th Brigades took over the central and left sectors of the front line on the 9th of May, the 8th Brigade coming into the right sector on the night 11th-12th. A continuous artillery battle raged along the whole front, but especially on the left, where the penetration of the Hindenburg defences rendered the position extremely sensitive. The enemy had lost no guns in his retirement from the Somme, and it is probable that his entire artillery from the old Somme battle with, possibly, later additions to its strength, was now defending the Hindenburg Line and concentrating particularly on the threatened sector near Bullecourt. Not only were our front lines pommelled day and night, but every approach to them, especially from Vaulx-Vraucourt through the well-named Death Valley to Noreuil and thence to the Railway Cutting, was swept with a fine impartiality by an almost constant stream of high explosive, shrapnel, and gas shells. Units going to and from the trenches invariably incurred casualties from this fire and three officers of the 14th Brigade, Capt. A. R. Gardner (55th Battalion), 2nd Lieut. T. Kerr (55th Battalion) and Lieut. T. J. Jefferson (53rd Battalion) lost their lives through it near Noreuil about the 9th. Apart from

the artillery fire, the infantry was kept under the constant strain of expecting heavy infantry attacks, as it was felt that our partial hold on the Hindenburg Line was a menace to the enemy too grave to be endurable. No enemy attempt was immediately forthcoming except a momentarily successful rush on the left bomb block at noon on the 10th. The 58th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Denehy) restored the position within twenty minutes and the situation remained as it had been. Meanwhile active steps were being taken by the 7th Corps on our immediate left to increase the hold on Bullecourt, and a major operation was planned for the 12th of May by which it was hoped that our gains there would be materially increased. I A.N.Z.A.C. was not itself attacking, but it instructed the 5th Division to co-operate by



advancing its line on the left sector to conform with the advance of the 7th Corps. This involved the left battalion, the 58th Battalion of the 15th Brigade, and Lieut.-Col. Denehy made careful preparations to carry out the task allotted to him. Its nature will be best understood from the above sketch. The positions of the 58th Battalion before the operation are shown in dark shading. The task was a three-fold one. The strong machine gun defences (*M.G.*) had first to be taken. This work was allotted to Lieut. R. Moon's Platoon of "A" Company. It took up the lie position (*L.P.*) before Zero. The enemy trench was to be stormed from the bomb block (*B.B.*) to the Cross-road. This was allotted to "B" Company (Lieut. N. Pelton). The trench and dug-out system (*T.*) beyond the Cross-roads was also to be captured. This work was entrusted to "C" Company (Lieut. Topp).

Zero for the main operation was 3.40 a.m. on the 12th of May and 14 minutes later Lieut. Moon and his platoon dashed forward to assail the machine-gun post. A stout resistance was made, but after ten minutes' bomb fighting the position was taken. Lieut. Moon was wounded, but he continued to direct his men in the work of consolidation. Meanwhile "B" Company was encountering determined opposition in its attempt to storm down the enemy sector of the Hindenburg Line. Despite its reinforcement by two platoons of "A" Company the progress made was slow, and constant counter-attacks were directed on each gain as soon as it was made. Things were in this state when Lieut. Moon, his own objective being sufficiently consolidated, headed a spirited attack over the open on to the enemy's right flank. Moon received a further wound, but the astonished enemy, thus surprised on his flank, was in no mood for further resistance. Forced out of the trench on to the road, over a hundred Germans held up their hands and were marched to the rear as prisoners of war. The way was now clear for the attack of "C" Company on the position beyond the cross-roads. In their assault Lieut. Topp's men were hampered considerably by fire from the left flank, where the Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment had not progressed so rapidly as the 58th Battalion. Nevertheless the position was secured, and with it another large haul of prisoners. In this, too, Lieut. Moon and his handful of men rendered invaluable assistance. Meanwhile Lieut. Gannon (60th Battalion) had brought some bombing and rifle grenade teams to assist the 58th, and the officers present held a consultation to decide on the best line for the final consolidation. During this conference a rifle bullet shattered Moon's jaw, but not even that injury could force him from seeing the whole fight to a satisfactory end. Roughly binding his wound, he continued to assist with the consolidation and only when the position was finally secured would he consent to his removal to the rear. His skilful leadership and splendid heroism brought its fitting award and the whole Division was delighted a few days later to learn that he had been awarded a V.C. Hardly less worthy was every officer and man in this bitter fight. For three days they had endured a concentrated shelling that would have left most soldiers exhausted and unfit for employment in an operation. But the 58th officers and men carried it through with all the dash of fresh and vigorous troops. Congratulations poured in to Lieut.-Col. Denchy, and General Elliott and the Brigade Staff were equally gratified at the fine performance of all ranks. One hundred and eighty-three prisoners had been taken in addition to five machine-guns, three minenwerfer, and two pineapple bomb-throwing machines. Over 150 dead Germans were left on the field. Our casualties, though heavy, were considerably lighter than the enemy's. The brave commanders of "B" and "C" Companies, Lieuts. N. Pelton and Topp, were both killed and with them Lieut. W. G. Barlow, the battalion bombing officer.

Lieut. Fraser, and Lieut. Leslie (60th Battalion) all of whom had acquitted themselves with skill and courage. Thirty other ranks were also killed, and six officers and 78 other ranks were wounded. The assistance of the 60th Battalion party was most timely and its leader (Lieut. Gannon) distinguished himself by his cool and courageous handling of it. The 15th Light Trench Mortar Battery (Capt. Freeman) and the 15th Machine Gun Company (Capt. Muirson) co-operated most usefully and three of the captured machine-guns were used against the enemy. The power buzzer¹ was the best means of communication. Capt. W. Keen, the brigade bombing officer, was delighted with the fine work of his bombing teams. Sir Douglas Haig, in a message sent through Army and Corps on the 13th, said, "I congratulate all your troops on the complete success of the various attacks made yesterday morning. These successes are very satisfactory, not only in themselves but as showing that the enemy is beginning to weaken under the repeated heavy blows inflicted on him during all the hard fighting of the past five weeks."


The artillery fire following the battle on the morning of the 12th was of the heaviest nature and the casualties for the day in the 15th Brigade Sector alone were 18 officers and 330 other ranks, including those sustained in the battle. The railway embankment, which was used as a point of concentration for support troops, was specially dealt with and 59th Battalion H.Q. received a direct hit and all the occupants were killed or wounded. Lieut.-Col. Layh was one of the wounded and Lieut.-Col. C. C. Mason, late Commandant of the Divisional School, took over command of the 59th Battalion. It may conveniently be noted here that Lieut.-Col. N. Marshall received the command of the 60th Battalion early in May. Lieut.-Col. Duigan's constitution had proved unequal to the strain of the Somme winter, and that popular officer had unfortunately become unfit for general service. Lieut.-Col. Marshall was already widely known throughout the Division for his utter fearlessness. He had left Australia in the ranks and his rapid promotion was the result of sheer hard work and fine fighting qualities.

On the night 12th-13th the 15th Brigade was relieved by the 173rd Brigade and what had been the left brigade sector of the Divisional front passed forthwith into the keeping of the 5th British Corps. The Division was thus left holding the line on a two brigade

¹ By means of it messages were despatched along short wires that led into the ground a few yards away from the buzzer. The earth itself caught the currents and conducted them, very faintly, in all directions. These currents were "picked up" in the rear and magnified by an instrument called an amplifier so that the signals again became audible. Of course, messages so sent were always in code. Except for a direct hit on the power buzzer itself, or on its wire "leads," this installation was immune from the effects of shell-fire, but the Germans used to "jamb" the buzzer by transmitting simultaneously into the earth other currents which mutilated the message and made it undecipherable.

frontage, the 8th Brigade on the right, and the 14th on the left. The 15th Brigade on its relief was concentrated at Beugnatre as Divisional reserve. On the 22nd it moved to Biefvillers where it remained till the end of the month.

On the withdrawal of the 15th Brigade, the 14th Brigade found itself in the sector of greatest tension. The front of its left battalion lay across the two captured systems of the Hindenburg Line and, on the right of that battalion frontage, only the two bomb blocks already referred to separated our men from the enemy. A communication trench, connecting in the vicinity of the bomb blocks the two trenches, was in reality our front line. Our salient was therefore dangerously accessible to attack on its right flank, where the enemy could at his own free will mass hundreds of troops in the Hindenburg Line within a few yards of our position across the bomb



block. In addition, our line there was readily enfiladed from the direction of Bullecourt on the left and of Quéant on the right, and the enemy had also a large number of minenwerfer of all calibres within easy range. Altogether, our position was too tempting to escape attack. The enemy made his preparations thoroughly but unostentatiously. Many new minenwerfer were moved into position and provided with ample supplies of ammunition. Special storm troops were trained for the operation and every gun that could reach the position the enemy desired to capture was trained upon it. At 1 a.m. on the 15th of May the storm broke.

The nature of the fight can best be followed from the approximate sketch on this page. The 54th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Midgeley) held both the systems on the Hindenburg Line left of the bomb blocks (B.B. 1 and B.B. 2). The communication trench (C.T. 1) on the extreme right was thus virtually a part of our front line.

The other communication trench (*C.T.* 2) was important because it afforded our counter-attack party a route to the front trench and also provided positions for our three Stokes mortars (*T.M.* 1, *T.M.* 2, and *T.M.* 3).

The battle opened with a long and fierce minenwerfer bombardment of our forward system in the salient. This lasted for two hours and gave sufficient warning of the enemy's offensive intention to enable our artillery to have everything in readiness. General G. Johnston, C.R.A., 2nd Australian Division, was in command of the group artillery at the time, and a careful scheme of artillery fire had been evolved to meet just such an emergency as was now arising. At 3 a.m. the enemy artillery joined in with the minenwerfer bombardment and under the combined fire even the stout Hindenburg Line defences crumbled up and almost every officer and man in the front line became a casualty. The enemy was jamming our power buzzers¹ and communication to the rear was uncertain for some time. The fire grew in fierceness until 3.40 a.m. when it suddenly lifted on to our support system and the enemy infantry attack was launched in three strong parties (Arrows *A.B.C.*) upon the now obliterated positions. Our artillery barrage was already falling accurately on S.O.S. lines and its effect on the advancing enemy masses was very considerable. This, combined with the vigorous musketry of the few survivors in the front line, beat off the attack on the left (Arrow *A*). The attacks on the right flank were much heavier and were delivered in mass formation. Despite the disorganisation caused by our artillery they pressed on. On the extreme right the attack (Arrow *C*) met with spirited rifle and Lewis gun fire from parts of our defences not so heavily damaged as the front trench. Here, too, the attack was beaten. But in the centre (Arrow *B*) the enemy streamed over the advanced bomb block (*B.B.* 1) and poured in large numbers along both our front line and the communication trench (*C.T.* 1) leading to the rear. The approximate limits of the enemy penetration are shown in the shaded parts of the two trenches.

The senior officer present was Major Lecky and he was already wounded. Notwithstanding this, he continued in charge of the defenders, and soon had accurate information of the extent of the enemy gains. Assisted by the valuable co-operation of Lieut. D. MacArthur and other officers, Major Lecky soon launched a fine counter-attack, which was supported by Stokes mortar fire from the mortars in the communication trench (*T.M.* 1, *T.M.* 2, *T.M.* 3). Two parties stormed along the front line and the communication trench in the direction shown by the arrows *X* and *Y*. Forced back by these, the enemy became thickly crowded in the corner of the position where the communication trench (*C.T.* 1) entered the Hindenburg Line. A third counter-attacking party (Arrow *Z*) now delivered an assault across the open. Caught between these con-

¹ See footnote, p. 204.

verging thrusts, while our artillery barrage still fell thickly in their immediate rear, and our Lewis guns and sharpshooters shot down all who showed their heads above the trench, the enemy found himself in a hopeless position. Despite this, a stubborn resistance was maintained to the end. A few may have escaped our musketry and our artillery barrage, but it was improbable that any did so. A company of the 55th Battalion arrived on the scene during the counter-attack stage and gave useful help. Within half an hour the enemy was completely ejected or destroyed, and 250 dead Germans in and around the ruined trenches were soon the only traces of the ghastly failure of the two specially selected enemy battalions that had carried out the attack. Our own casualties were moderately heavy, 70 other ranks being killed and four officers and 200 others being wounded. Almost all these losses were suffered in the preliminary bombardment.

General Birdwood's congratulations came promptly to the gallant battalion. "Please convey to Major Lecky and all ranks of the 54th Battalion and others of the Brigade who assisted my congratulations upon the excellent work they did in repelling with such heavy loss to the enemy the counter-attack on our position this morning." These congratulations were heartily re-echoed throughout the whole Division. General Hobbs was naturally delighted, not only at the fierce retaliation of the battalion after it had endured for so long a concentrated bombardment, but also because the artillery dispositions which he had arranged beforehand had contributed so greatly to the success. The fine artillery work was carried out chiefly by the 14th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Phillips). Taken altogether the operation was one more testimony to the careful co-ordination by the Divisional Commander of the work of all arms of his formation. Largely owing to this, the enemy plans were defeated with such promptness and thoroughness. The result also showed in a most favourable light the soundness of all the brigade and battalion dispositions for repelling attacks, and the enterprise and tactical skill displayed by all ranks in dealing with a dangerous position.

The Division remained in the sector until the 25th of May. During this time no event of outstanding importance occurred. The 8th Brigade on the right carried out a series of very successful L.T.M.B. shoots under the direction of Capt. Mulvey. Their patrols, too, had some lively encounters with enemy patrols and much work was done on the sector defences, 1,150 coils of wire being erected on the brigade front. General Tivey's men suffered very little from artillery fire, not because the fire was light, but because our forward dispositions on the sector were admirably concealed and the enemy wasted much ammunition in searching for them. At 2 a.m. on the 24th of April a fine discharge of cloud gas was effected on the Divisional front by "Z" Company of Special R.E. One thousand five hundred cylinders were exploded electrically in one discharge.

They went off with a fine flash and a bang and Licut. Barclay, the Divisional Gas Officer, was delighted with the performance. The cloud kept very low and swept over the enemy lines exactly as was desired.

The fine work done by the Divisional Artillery throughout the period has been sufficiently noted, and it should be remembered that the Divisional Artillery often co-operated with the infantry operations of other divisions. Despite its long tour in the forward area, the artillery recorded light casualties. For instance, the total casualties of the Division for May, 1917, were approximately 1,500, of which 750 were suffered by the 14th Brigade, over 400 by the 15th Brigade, over 120 by the 8th Brigade, over 50 each by the medical and engineering services, and about 30 by the Artillery. The three machine gun companies, which had all been concerned in the heavy fighting, suffered severely, the casualties in the 14th M. G. Company alone amounting to 40. All Major Marsden's 16 guns co-operated with the 2nd Division's attack on the 3rd of May, and Captain Muirson's unit had also been heavily engaged. The three L.T.M.B.'s, like the infantry, were always in the thick of whatever fighting was in progress. The engineer services had been pre-occupied mainly with the construction of defensive lines and deep dug-outs in the new area, while the pioneers had carried the light railway forward to Noreuil. The amount of road making, road-repairing, and wiring carried out was also very considerable. Lieut.-Col. Carter's battalion continued to experience bad luck in its camps, a shell on the night 9th-10th killing 12 of his men and wounding 23.

As the casualty returns indicate, the medical services passed through a dangerous period. Col. Shepherd, in charge of the most forward dressing station near Beugnatre, had his camp persistently shelled by long range enemy guns. Capt. Minty and Capt. Young who, with 90 bearers of the 15th Field Ambulance, attended to much of the forward evacuations throughout the period, rendered fine service. For many days they worked continuously with their brave bearers in heavily-shelled areas.

The Divisional Train, in addition to its ordinary supply work, had carried forward many hundreds of gas cylinders and had once again shown its readiness to adapt itself to any work that could be required of it. Bapaume continued to be the railhead for supplies and the work of all transport units was facilitated by the improvement made in the condition of the animals. This was the result of the abundant green food in the fields beyond Bapaume. The animal wastage for May was only 60.

The Division was relieved between the 24th and 26th of May by the 20th Division and passed to the immediate rear as Corps Reserve with H.Q. at Bancourt. It was over seven months since its arrival on the Somme and of this time almost five months had been spent in the front line, where many momentous things had happened.

During the whole of this period not a single incident had occurred to disclose any weakness in its direction or administration. In a theatre of war where reputations were ruined daily, and where many others deserved to be ruined but were not, the fact is sufficiently significant to stand alone without further comment. Despite a terribly trying winter, a long tour in the line, and the sudden change from trench to open warfare, the Division had passed from success to success, and had steadily gained confidence in itself and in the brains that were directing it. All felt that a probationary period of singular difficulty and exceptional length was safely passed and all awaited, in a spirit of confidence that nothing henceforth would shake, whatever experiences might befall.

CHAPTER IX

(25th May to 20th September, 1917)

RESTING

Important contemporaneous events :—

Successful British attack on Messines-Wytschaete Ridge	June 7th
Constantine, King of Greece, abdicated.	„ 12th.
Leading contingents of U.S.A. troops reached France	„ 26th.
Successful offensive by Southern Russian Armies	July and August
British offensive against Passchendaele Ridge opened	July 31st.
Italian offensive made good progress	August
Canada passed Conscription Bill	„ 19th.
Successful French operations near Verdun	„ 20th.
Germans captured Riga	September 3rd.

THE period spent by the Division as Corps Reserve in the Bancourt-Bapaume area commenced on the 25th of May and came to an end on the 15th of June. In addition to carrying out a good deal of work on the reserve defences, the Division busied itself in cleaning and refitting the men and in getting its organisation for training into going order. By this time the spring season was thoroughly well-established and the weather was gradually merging into the full glory of a French summer. The countryside beyond the areas of pitched battles was radiant, and men and animals alike responded to the beauty of the season and the magic of the sun. Everybody was in high spirits, due partly to the natural reaction after the gloom of winter, partly to the satisfaction springing from the consciousness of work well and truly done, and partly to the prospect of a long period of well-earned rest. Command of the Fifth Army front passed at 10 a.m. on the 31st of May to the Third Army, and, a week or two later, came news of the Division's early withdrawal to the Rubempré area for rest and training. The move, less Divisional Artillery, was carried out by rail from Bapaume on the 15th, 16th, and 17th June, and, thanks to good administrative arrangements, was completed entirely without discomfort.

The new area was a large one, extending some twelve miles west

from the vicinity of Albert to the village of Rubempré, at which latter place D.H.Q. and 15th Brigade H.Q. were established. Fourteenth Brigade H.Q. were fixed at Warloy, and 8th Brigade at Senlis. The accommodation of the area was good, and the growing warmth and the absence of heavy rain greatly contributed to the comfort of all ranks. Many officers and men who had good billets preferred to take their blankets out and pass the pleasant summer nights in the orchards, or perhaps in tents. Railhead was at Albert and the 8th and 14th Brigade Groups, which were fairly near that town, were supplied direct from railhead by their affiliated A.A.S.C. Companies, the 18th and the 28th respectively. As the distance to the 15th Brigade was too great for a similar arrangement, that formation's supplies were brought to Rubempré from Albert by motor lorries, and were thence distributed by the 29th Company A.A.S.C. Major Robinson, in his capacity as S.S.O., was able to make admirable arrangements for the purchase of fresh vegetables, and the health of the troops benefited accordingly.

It was an ideal opportunity for the training of all arms, and Major King, who, as G.S.O. II was the General Staff Officer responsible for training, applied himself with characteristic energy to the work of its organisation and direction. There was some expectation that the Division might soon be used in an army of pursuit, where the long marches and constant vigils of open warfare would impose a severe strain on the men. The training was influenced to some extent by this possibility and, though the pursuit did not eventuate exactly as anticipated, the fitness gained proved invaluable later on.

No useful purpose would be served in a story like this by describing in detail the many-sided training activities of the Division during the period. It will suffice to say that all ranks were first brought into a thoroughly fit and healthy condition, and that this was effected rather by encouraging relaxation and games than by more formal training. By the time a sufficient degree of physical fitness was attained the purely technical organisation was ready to commence work, and soon every soldier of the Division was receiving valuable instruction in whatever capacity he might be called upon to act in future operations. The chief difficulty was that of securing fields suitable for the work required. Owing to the fact that the cultivated ground was all bearing its annual crops, and also because the meadowlands were rich in long grass, the French owners were naturally averse to making them available for troops, whose use of them inevitably caused a certain amount of damage. This difficulty was almost entirely overcome, thanks largely to the sympathetic and tactful assistance of Lieut. Mauss's staff of interpreters. These were indefatigable in their efforts to secure whatever the military authorities deemed necessary for their work, and this, combined with the cordial feeling existing between the civilians and the Australian soldiers, generally effected an arrangement that was mutually satis-

factory. It is interesting to notice that over 100,000 hours of harvesting work were performed gratuitously by soldiers of the Division in the Rubempré area.

The progress of the troops in speaking French, checked during their last long tour in the forward areas, now made considerable strides. Before their long resting period was concluded many of them could say "Allieman no bon" and "Australian très bon," while all of them had mastered the handy phrase "Promenade avec moi." It may be mentioned that the invariable response to this invitation was "Après la guerre, M'sieur"—given demurely and prettily in a way that often made people wish more heartily than ever that the war was over.

The competitive spirit in the military aspects of the training was admirably evoked by a series of competitions, of which the three chief were a Company Field Firing Competition, an Assault-at-Arms, and a Military Tournament, the last-mentioned being arranged to celebrate the visit of his Majesty the King to the Division. The Company Field Firing Competition was decided at Thiepval on the 2nd of July after the brigades had held a long series of eliminating tests. The champion company in the Division in this particular exercise proved to be "C" Company of the 57th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Stewart) which won largely because of its more accurate shooting. The exercise was really a mock attack, in which musketry, Lewis guns, and rifle grenades were used in co-operation. The training value of the competition was very great, and the distinction of winning it was highly coveted. The evening of this day was saddened by receipt of the news of the death in action of Major-General Holmes, G.O.C. of the 4th Australian Division. The deceased officer's reputation for gallantry had spread far beyond the limits of his own Division, and profound sympathy was felt throughout the 5th Division for the loss which its sister formation had undergone.

The assault-at-arms was held at Henencourt Wood, about four miles west of Albert, where the 5th Pioneers had constructed an excellent sports ground. The name of this function is something of a misnomer, for it was in reality a series of competitions in which assaults were conspicuous by their absence. The list of winners is given herewith, and the reader will hardly fail to notice how evenly the honours were distributed throughout the Division.

5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

ASSAULT-AT-ARMS (Wednesday, 4th July, at Henencourt Wood).

LIST OF WINNERS.

Bayonet Fighting Team Contest.

- 1st. 8th Infantry Brigade (29th and 32nd Battalions).
- 2nd. 15th Infantry Brigade (60th Battalion).
- 3rd. 14th Infantry Brigade (54th Battalion).

Best Drilled Company.

- 1st. 14th Infantry Brigade (55th Battalion).
- 2nd. 8th Infantry Brigade (32nd Battalion).
- 3rd. 5th Pioneer Battalion.
- 4th. 15th Infantry Brigade (59th Battalion).

Marching Order Race over Obstacles.

- 1st. 15th Infantry Brigade (60th Battalion).
- 2nd. 8th Infantry Brigade (32nd Battalion).
- 3rd. 14th Infantry Brigade (53rd Battalion).

Inter-Company A.A.S.C. Competition.

- 1st. 18th A.A.S.C. (8th Brigade).
- 2nd. 10th A.A.S.C. (14th Brigade).
- 3rd. 28th A.A.S.C. (14th Brigade).

Inter-Section Rapid Signal Communication Competition.

- 1st. No. 4 Section. 5th Divisional Signal Company.
- 2nd. { No. 2 Section. " "
- { No. 3 Section. " "
- 3rd. No. 1. Section. " "

Field Ambulance Competition.

- 1st. 15th Field Ambulance.
- 2nd. 8th Field Ambulance.
- 3rd. 14th Field Ambulance.

The Military Tournament, which was held on the 12th of July, also at Henencourt Wood, passed off splendidly under the direction of Major King. As his Majesty stepped on to the dais that had been erected for his reception the four companies that had contested the final in the Divisional Competition for the best drilled company presented arms from the arena. As they marched off, 320 men in physical training dress went through a series of exercises with a precision and verve that left nothing to be desired. Hardly had that concluded when several artillery sections wheeled into the arena at a gallop and came swiftly into action, firing blank rounds. They departed as rapidly as they had come, and just in time to clear the ground for an infantry race in marching order over a very stiff obstacle course. This aroused much interest and was succeeded by a splendid wagon demonstration by a detachment of the 5th Divisional Train. In an incredibly brief space of time the apparently cumbersome and solid vehicles were dismantled and then re-assembled, and they moved off to the accompaniment of loud applause from all the spectators. At this stage his Majesty was reluctantly compelled to leave. He cordially thanked General Hobbs for his splendid entertainment, an officer of the Royal Staff adding that it was the best of its kind that the King had yet seen. Before finally leaving the Divisional area his Majesty presented a number of decorations, including a C.M.G. to Colonel Bruche, an honour that was as popular

as it had been thoroughly well earned. The remainder of the afternoon of the 12th of July was devoted to transport competitions and mounted events, the results of which are appended.

WINNERS OF EVENTS.

5th Australian Division—Military Tournament, Henencourt, Thursday, July 12th, 1917.

EVENT.	WINNERS.
<i>Class I.—G. S. Wagons and pair horses.</i>	1. 28th A.A.S.C. (14th Inf. Bde.). 2. 18th ,, (8th Inf. Bde.). 3. 10th ,, (H.Q. Coy.).
<i>Class II.—G. S. Limb. Wagon and pair mules.</i>	1. 55th Btn. (14th Inf. Bde.). 2. 31st ,, (8th Inf. Bde.). 3. 5th Div. Signal Coy.
<i>Class III.—Field Cooker.</i>	1. 55th Btn. (14th Inf. Bde.). 2. 29th ,, (8th Inf. Bde.). 3. 60th ,, (15th Inf. Bde.).
<i>Class IV.—Field Ambulance Wagon.</i>	1. 8th Field Ambulance. 2. 15th Field Ambulance. 3. 15th Field Ambulance.
<i>Class V.—Cable Detachment.</i>	1. 5th Div. Sig. Coy. No. 3 Detach. 2. 5th ,, ,, No. 1 ,,
<i>Class VI.—Brigade Machine Gun Company.</i>	1. 15th Machine Gun Company. 2. 8th ,, ,, ,, 3. 14th ,, ,, ,,
<i>Mounted Tug-of-War.</i>	1. 28th A.A.S.C. (14th Inf. Bde.). 2. M.M.P.
<i>Wrestling on Horseback. Best Officer's Charger.</i>	1. 18th A.A.S.C. (8th Inf. Bde.). 1. Brig.-Gen. C. J. Hobkirk, D.S.O. (14th Inf. Bde.). 2. Capt. C. B. Grieve, M.C. (Div. Train). 3. Capt. G. F. Finlay (A.A.V.C.).

If, in this big series of competitions, the Division's training activities came to something of a public climax, there was in the units no diminution of enthusiasm after they were over. The Brigade Majors of the time, Major Casey, Major Dickinson, and Major Wieck were indefatigable in devising means to demonstrate the practical application of theories and principles taught on the parade ground and in the lecture tent. Field days and night operations were organised. The ground at Mailly Maillet, and also the Engelbelmer Plateau, were used on these occasions, and the tactical lessons learned proved of great value later on.

The Divisional Engineers moved during the period to Corbie on the Somme for the purpose of practising bridging and the handling of pontoons. A great deal of instructive work was accomplished and the lessons learned proved of value near that very spot a year later. The Engineer Sports had been held at Bancourt just before the departure to the Rubempré area, and the 14th Field Company had carried off the all-round championship.

The medical services had taken an active part in many of the competitions previously referred to, and they were present during field operations, and their co-operation with other arms in moving warfare became much better understood. The health of the Division was naturally very good during the period, the only serious infection being an outbreak of the so-called Trench Fever which was handled by the medical services with characteristic success. Ten per cent. of the troops were granted daily leave to Amiens and a medical dépôt was established there at which early preventive treatment against venereal disease could be obtained. During June Colonel Hearn received a highly congratulatory message from the Director of Medical Services at G.H.Q. for the exceptionally fine work of the medical *personnel* of the Division throughout the trying operations on the Somme and before the Hindenburg Line.

Divisional Routine Orders of the period contained again and again cordial reference to the assistance of the A.C.F. (Australian Comforts Fund) and the Y.M.C.A. organisations working with the troops. Some idea of the A.C.F. benefactions has already been given. In June Mr. Greenberg of the Y.M.C.A., in addition to maintaining two canteens and marquees with writing facilities, distributed 20,000 packets of biscuits, 10,000 packets of cigarettes, and 31,000 mugs of cocoa and many other things as well. The lectures, services, and debates organised by the Y.M.C.A. were also much appreciated. Little comforts of this nature often raised soldiering from the level of barely tolerable to that of almost enjoyable, and the gratitude of all ranks towards the A.C.F. and the Y.M.C.A. was most sincere. The troops were also kept well supplied with money, Lieut. Lawless, the Divisional Paymaster, drawing from the Bank of France some 800,000 francs a fortnight for distribution among the units. The greater part of the money doubtless found its way back to the Bank of France, but the spending of it in the fascinating shops and galleries of Amiens was all part of the beneficial relaxation of the troops. The leave allotment of the period was liberal, between 50 and 100 officers and men departing daily on leave to the United Kingdom. A generous allowance of Paris leave, most of it for a four days' period, was also made, and with many it was even more popular than English leave. During the period the Division grew gradually to its full numerical strength again, and the effects of the Battle of Fromelles thus finally passed away.

The Divisional Artillery meantime had not been enjoying the

good fortune of the remainder of the Division. It was kept in the line for many weeks after the other arms had been withdrawn, but towards the end of June it came out for a brief rest, which was spent in the vicinity of Beaucourt. It was soon under move orders again. A highly successful operation, in which the 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions had participated, had resulted in the capture by the Second Army of the Messines and Wytshaete Ridge early in June. This success opened the way for the great operations which had long been contemplated in the vicinity of Ypres, of which the object was the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge and ultimately the clearing of the enemy from the Belgian coast. Arrangements for the opening of this great offensive were already well advanced, and as an overwhelming artillery preparation was part of the plan, all available artillery was now being concentrated in the sector. The 5th Divisional Artillery, accompanied by its affiliated supply company, the 10th A.A.S.C. (Major Brazenor), accordingly trekked away north, and by the middle of July had arrived in the vicinity of Ypres, where it came under the 15th (British) Division for the opening of the attack of the Fifth Army. The first infantry assault took place on the 31st of July, and a second advance on a large scale was accomplished on the 16th of August. Our artillery co-operated with great success in both operations, fighting near Bellevarde Farm, just south of the Ypres-Roulers railway. Lieut. R. A. Bennet (13th A.F.A. Brigade) did particularly fine work on the opening day of the attack, and later on in the operations Lieut. E. H. Booth, of the V. 5A. Heavy Trench Mortar Battery, rendered distinguished service. Counter battery work here came into great prominence and casualties in the artillery mounted very quickly. This was accentuated by the fact that in our long struggle up the Ridge our artillery was forced to seek battery positions in ground utterly devoid of cover and under constant enemy observation. The 5th Divisional Artillery received the warmest thanks from the formations which it covered, and the Trench Mortar Brigade (Capt. W. D. Wallis) and the 5th D.A.C. (Lieut.-Col. Hughes) shared fully the gratitude of the units they assisted. This fine work was achieved only at heavy cost. "It's all in the luck of the game," said Capt. W. Knox, M.C., as he lay dying in the arms of his sorrowing men, and they remembered the words and carefully inscribed them on his memorial cross. He had commanded his battery with conspicuous success, and no officer in the whole Division was more loved by his subordinates or more highly regarded by his superiors. Capt. F. E. Gatliff and O. L. Steele, who were killed about the same time, were also among the very best of General Bessell-Browne's officers, and their loss was deeply felt. Many subalterns were also killed, and Lieuts. S. H. O. Wiltshire, Barron, Gammon, R. H. Blashki, J. S. Hopper, and I. F. Pascoe-Webb left behind them a record of good work bravely done. Lieut. Reid, an officer of the 5th Divisional Signal Company, attached to



BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. C. STEWART, C.M.G., D.S.O.

the signal section working with the artillery, was also killed in the brave performance of his duty. The total artillery casualties for August amounted to over 160, and it was seen that the rate was likely to increase in subsequent operations. On the 8th of September the 5th Divisional Artillery was withdrawn from the line to Saint Momelin for a well-earned rest. "They have had a most strenuous time," telegraphed Sir Hubert Gough, commanding Fifth Army, "and have earned the admiration and praise of all. Please thank them for me."

Between the 25th and 29th of July, the Division was moved north by train from the Rubempré area to the reserve area of the Second Army, and much interest was excited when it became known that its destination was once again the Blaringhem area. Many warm friendships with the French people had been generated during the Division's stay there thirteen months ago, and many officers and men looked forward with keen interest to renewing them. The 8th Brigade Group entrained at Aveluy and detrained at Saint Omer; the 14th and 15th Brigades entrained at Puchevillers and Belle Eglise respectively and detrained at Arques and Steenbecque. Each unit's supply wagons carrying a day's supplies accompanied it on the train, and Staff Captains and billeting parties for the whole Division left by an early train in order to make the necessary arrangements for settling down in the new area. In this way each unit on its arrival was directed promptly to its billets, and the accommodation of the Division was speedily effected. It may be of interest to note that 24 trains were used in this move. Each train was composed of two officers' carriages, 30 box trucks to carry 40 men each, and 17 flat trucks, each with accommodation for four axles. After detraining, the troops moved by march route to their billets. The brigade group principle was again employed, and the 8th Brigade Group was allotted Racquinghem area, the 14th Brigade Group Lynde, and the 15th Brigade Group Sercus. D.H.Q. was established at Blaringhem, and throughout the Divisional area all ranks soon settled down after a particularly comfortable move.

It is not proposed to relate in detail the incidents of the seven weeks spent in this area. The weather remained beautiful for the most part; the training activities of all arms never for a moment flagged; everybody was very happy and the French residents were as unfeignedly delighted to see their old friends again, as they were profoundly grieved over the faces that were missing.

News of the offensive operations in the Ypres sector was eagerly awaited, and it soon became apparent that the defence methods of the enemy were in that sector fundamentally different from what they had been on the Somme. There, the enemy's defences were arranged in a series of extremely strong lines without serious obstacles between them. As this system had failed to stop the British advance, the Germans had here adopted the plan of fortifying whole areas instead of lines. This result was obtained by constructing hundreds

of concrete blockhouses, soon known as pill-boxes, which were dotted thickly over his forward area, and extended behind it to a great depth. In these his men were not only safe from the artillery barrage, but they could sally out from them much more quickly than from the long galleries of dug-outs twenty and thirty feet under the ground. Each pill-box could hold a garrison of from 12 to 40 men and each could support with its machine gun fire the other pill-boxes in its vicinity. Machine guns naturally played the largest part in this defensive arrangement. This method of the defence, known as defence in depth, had many advantages over the old system of defensive lines, in which the defending force was pinned to a definite series of lines, well known to the enemy and often exposed to his artillery fire. The attackers were now never sure exactly where the enemy strength was concentrated. The artillery, therefore, was compelled to bombard whole areas instead of lines, and the bombardment did not usually do much damage to the pill-boxes. But it was in the matter of counter-attacks that the greatest benefit was secured by the system of defence in depth. For wherever the attackers stopped to consolidate—and it should be remembered that they were few and weary by the time the final objective was reached—there was always in the pill-boxes just beyond the objective a larger enemy force which could make an immediate local counter-attack. In the old system of defensive lines counter-attacks could be originated only from the next line beyond the captured one, and this, as likely as not, was 500 yards away with a clear field of fire between. One wonders how the great German offensives of 1918 would have fared had the British defences been as highly organised as those which now confronted the British Armies east of Ypres.

After one or two smart experiences in attacking the new systems, the British General Staff evolved a partial solution of the problem. Its salient features comprised :—

(1) A creeping barrage to which the infantry kept so close that the pill-boxes could be overwhelmed before their garrisons could get out ;

(2) Special training in the reduction of pill-boxes that might not be captured as indicated in (1), *e.g.*, engaging from the front with rifle grenades while parties worked round the flanks ;

(3) Consolidation in depth, so that even if local counter-attacks drove in the advanced posts of the new line the greater part of the gains could nevertheless be permanently held.

This little outline of the new defensive and offensive tactics has been given here because it coloured the entire training of the Division in the Blaringham area. General Hobbs was the first to recognise the great importance of the new methods, and scores of lectures and demonstrations were given until all ranks were perfectly familiar with even the details of the new warfare. How many casualties this work eventually saved it would be impossible to compute. The men

became keenly interested in the tactical considerations involved. Many of them became anxious to "have a go" at a pill-box and, consciously or unconsciously, their confidence in their leaders was steadily deepened.

Apart from the training the chief incidents of the period were the march past General Birdwood on the 20th of August, a similar parade before General Godley on the 22nd of August, and, finally, a review by Sir Douglas Haig on the 29th. All these ceremonial functions were a great success and General Godley, who had not seen the Division since it left II A.N.Z.A.C. nearly 12 months before, was specially impressed with the great improvement shown in all departments. "I have never seen a finer body of troops," he wrote, "and their turnout and soldierly bearing could not have been excelled by any troops in the world."

The review for the Commander-in-Chief was not less satisfactory. Unfortunately, it was not possible to have the whole Division present, but the 8th Brigade and a composite formation of 14th and 15th Brigade troops under General Elliott represented the infantry, while the 5th Pioneers, a field company of engineers, and a field ambulance represented other services. Sir Douglas Haig was very pleased with the display, and the proceedings passed off without the slightest hitch of any kind. General Hobbs happened to be enjoying a much-needed rest in England at the time of the review, and the command of the Division had passed temporarily to General Tivey, the senior brigade commander.

Railhead during the period was at Ebbingham, from which centre the supplies were conveyed to the Brigade Groups by their affiliated companies of the Divisional Train. Colonel Bruche soon had good baths and a Divisional laundry working under the supervision of Lieut. D. Toohey, who never wearied in his efforts to make things comfortable for the men. The Foden disinfecter circulated steadily among the units, delousing their clothes and thus preserving the men from Trench Fever. The 8th Field Company of Engineers worked for a time under Corps supervision in erecting camps, while the whole of the 14th Brigade was able to spend a period in the training area near Lumbres, where special facilities existed for field firing and musketry generally.

An important administrative event of the Blaringhem period was the formation of a Divisional Pack Transport Troop. This was a large troop of about 300 pack animals, and the necessary animals and *personnel* were secured by uniting under one organisation detachments of men and animals from the whole of the transport units of the Division. The idea was to centralise all forward pack transport under one control in order to ensure equal distribution in the work of supply in the forward areas. Under the old arrangement, which worked well enough in easy sectors, it might happen that a brigade in the line had so many casualties in its pack animals, or

might so overwork them, that its forward supplies would partially break down, while the pack animals in another brigade in reserve would be having very little work to do. Centralising the pack animals of the entire Division under one control would obviate any danger of this and would also secure equal distribution of work to men and animals. The chief argument against the innovation was that transport *personnel* would work better if they felt that they were labouring for their own units, instead of partially losing their identity in a Divisional Troop. General Hobbs and Colonel Bruche weighed the matter carefully, and decided that the certainty of regular supplies reaching every unit of the Division must be the first consideration, even if a very natural sentimental repugnance existed to a temporary loss of unit individuality. Capt. Curtis (5th Divisional Train) was made O.C. Divisional Pack Transport Troop and under his control it soon became involved in work of the greatest importance.

Another administrative matter of the period was the move of the 5th Divisional Reinforcement Wing from Bécourt to Hazebrouck. The Wing had been formed early in June, before which the reinforcement organisation was controlled by Corps. While the Division was in the Somme area its reinforcements had detrained at Bécourt near Albert, where they were within easy marching distance of their units. Bécourt served equally well for this purpose whether the Division was in the line or resting, as at Rubempré. But Bécourt was now 70 miles away and the Reinforcement Wing was accordingly moved to Hazebrouck, whence the men found no difficulty in joining up their units a few miles away.

Some changes in staffs and in the more important appointments call for notice here. The Division lost Lieut.-Col. C. M. Wagstaff, who left to take up a responsible position with the British Mission with the American Armies. His influence on the Division from its earliest and most impressionable days can hardly be over-rated. Throughout his service with it he had set a high example to all, in his professional zeal and attainments, in his personal integrity, in his tactful and courteous manner, and in his unswerving loyalty to the G.O.C. and the interests of the Division. His departure was universally regretted and even the knowledge of his promotion scarcely consoled the many friends he left behind him. His successor was Lieut.-Col. J. H. Peck, D.S.O., who, since joining the R.A.G.A. at Sydney in 1907, had had a military career of unusual success. From gunner he had passed on to the Instructional Staff in 1910 and had qualified for appointment to the A. and I. Staff of the permanent forces in 1912. He left Australia as Adjutant of the 11th Battalion in October, 1914. Wounded in the Gallipoli landing, he had returned to duty on the Peninsula and had served with success as Staff Captain of the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade and then as Brigade Major of the 3rd, 12th, and, later still, of the 4th Infantry Brigade. A senior staff course at Hesdin had more clearly revealed

his ability and after six months as C.O. of the 14th Battalion he became G.S.O. II of the 3rd Australian Division. This was quickly followed by a transfer to Corps H.Q. and, finally, by his appointment as G.S.O. I, 5th Australian Division. His record left no possible doubt of his professional ability, and perhaps no greater compliment could be paid either to Lieut.-Col. Wagstaff or to Lieut.-Col. Peck than to say that the one succeeded the other and the Division's efficiency underwent no visible change. There were at times differences in the methods of the two men, but there was no appreciable difference of result. Unfortunately, Lieut.-Col. Peck's arduous services had left him an inheritance of ill-health which eventually culminated in an illness that unfitted him for general service, but not before he had been able to render distinguished service to the Division. Other changes on the Divisional Staff were the appointment of Capt. S. A. Hunn as G.S.O. III, Capt. F. W. Robinson as Divisional Intelligence Officer, and Capt. C. R. E. Jennings as D.A.A.G. The last-named officer succeeded Major R. A. Varwell, who left the Division during August to take up a similar position in the 20th British Division. Major Varwell had been with the Division since its formation, and he carried to his new appointment the good wishes of many friends. Lieut. F. Leist, a well-known Australian artist, also joined the Division about this time as its official artist at the front. A group photograph of the Divisional Staff taken during this rest period is inserted.

In the infantry brigade staffs Major Wieck's long term as Brigade Major of the 15th Brigade came to an end, and it has fallen to few officers in the war to do finer service in that position than Major Wieck had done for the 15th Brigade. Everybody regretted his departure, and everybody was delighted soon afterwards to hear of his well-deserved promotion to G.S.O.I. 3rd Australian Division. His place as Brigade Major 15th Brigade was filled by Capt. G. Street, the late Staff Captain of the 14th Brigade, who had recently shown promise as Brigade Major trainee. Capt. R. G. Legge, though still nominally Staff Captain of the 15th Brigade, had been for some months a Brigade Major trainee and Capt. N. B. Lovett, had carried out most creditably the duties of Staff Captain 15th Brigade. Capt. F. A. Wisdom became Staff Captain 14th Brigade in succession to Capt. G. Street, and he soon displayed ability in his new work. About the middle of August Major Dickinson, Brigade Major of the 14th Brigade, left the 5th Division to return to his own unit, and Capt. R. G. Legge was appointed to succeed him. The vacancy of Staff Captain thus created in the 15th Brigade was filled by the appointment of Capt. H. R. Gollan, who had shown ability as a "Q" learner at D.H.Q. and later as Adjutant of the 54th Battalion.

In the artillery, Major Lavarack, after rendering very good service as Brigade Major, was promoted to the appointment of G.S.O. I, 4th Australian Division. After Major Clowes had acted as Brigade Major for a few days, Major H. H. Hulton, R.F.A., exchanged with

him and became General Bessell-Browne's Brigade Major. The appointment was a happy one, and Major Hulton not only maintained the high professional standards of Major Lavarack, but soon became one of the most popular staff officers in the Division.

Early in September the Division lost the services of Col. Sheppard, C.O. 8th Field Ambulance, who received a well-deserved promotion to the position of A.D.M.S. 2nd Division. About the same time Lieut.-Col. Midgeley was forced by ill-health to relinquish command of the 54th Battalion, and was succeeded temporarily by Major Street of the 30th Battalion. About this time, too, command of the 14th Light Trench Mortar Battery passed to Capt. K. H. Brock. The increasing importance of machine gun and musketry training was revealed in the appointments of a Divisional Machine Gun Officer and a Divisional Musketry Officer. The first position was inevitably filled by Major Marsden of the 8th Machine Gun Company, whose long professional training with the machine gun had made him one of the foremost authorities on that weapon in the Australian Forces. Capt. C. H. Holmes succeeded Major Marsden in command of the 8th Machine Gun Company. Major W. Sharp, 31st Battalion, was appointed Divisional Musketry Officer.

Further recognition of the importance of the machine gun was made by the addition of a machine gun company to the establishment of Divisional Troops. The 25th Machine Gun Company joined the Division during this period as its Divisional Machine Gun Company. As such it acted under the direction of the Divisional Commander and could be allotted by him to any particular sector which might happen to require additional machine gun protection. In this development may be seen another illustration of the gradual tendency towards placing the control of the machine gun in the hands of higher formations. The ultimate development of this policy will be noted in due course. Major Wright became O.C. of the 25th Machine Gun Company.

The rest at Blaringhem came to an end on the 17th of September, on which day all units set out by march route to the vicinity of Reninghelst, a shabby, war-begrimed little village about five miles south-west of Ypres and within the Belgian border. D.H.Q. opened at Reninghelst on the 18th. A Belgian Mission under Lieut. Pirmez joined the Division on its arrival in Belgian territory and, functioning in much the same way as the French Mission had done in France, it soon proved itself most helpful to the Division.

The last fortnight in the Blaringhem area had been devoted almost entirely to attack practices, and General Plumer and General Birdwood, who visited the Division occasionally to watch its work, were both delighted with the progress made in the new attack and consolidation formations. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of this training. Had the skill and enthusiasm by which it was directed and sustained been allowed to flag for one single day,

it is inevitable that the proud record of the Battle of Polygon Wood would have been materially different. The influence of this training extended also far beyond the stern fight at Polygon Wood and the success of the Division in the final decisive battles of the war was largely due to it.

The 20th of September marked another important phase of the attack of the Second and Fifth Armies in the direction of the Passchendaele Ridge. The 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions carried out the attack on the I A.N.Z.A.C. front on that day and the 5th Australian Division, as part of the Corps Reserve for the operation, was kept ready all day to move at a moment's notice. But it was not required. By the evening of the 20th it was generally known that the attack of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions had been completely successful. Delighted with this news and in cheerful anticipation of succeeding equally well when their turn came, the officers and men of the 5th Division spent in the hutted camps round Reninghelst the last night of their long and happy rest period.

PART IV
THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER X

(21st September—5th November, 1917.)

THE BATTLE OF POLYGON WOOD

Important contemporaneous events:—

Successful French Offensive at Malmaison	October 23rd.
Great Germano-Austrian Offensive against Italy opened 23rd
General Allenby opened successful operations against Gaza 30th

“Finally, remember you are a better man than the Boche in every way and you are backed by a vastly superior artillery. If you fight with your brains as well as your weapons you must beat him. Remember, you are fighting for an area of country, not for a line—so stick to the job given you and do it thoroughly. When he launches his big counter-attacks we must be holding our area all the way from the front to the rear with a series of fortified posts, each ready to hold out to the bitter end. The distribution in depth is the keynote of success.”

(Extract from General Hobbs's final instructions before the Battle of Polygon Wood.)

In the early months of the war repeated extensions of the fighting line in a northerly direction had established the extreme right flank of the German forces some 30 miles along the Belgian coast, *i.e.*, in the vicinity of Nieuport. About 25 miles to the south of Nieuport lay the town of Ypres, and the line between the two places had become stabilised in a general north and south direction with a considerable British salient before Ypres—evidence of the heroic defence of that place in 1914 and 1915. During the latter half of 1915 and throughout 1916 and in the earlier part of 1917 this sector had remained comparatively tranquil. The northern half of it lay in low marshy ground unsuitable for major operations. The southern half was buttressed by two big natural obstacles, the forest of Houthoult, about ten miles north of Ypres, and the Passchendaele Ridge and its wooded spurs, about six miles east and north-east of that town.

The result of the Anglo-French offensive on the Somme in 1916 had been inconclusive. A substantial gain had been made in

ground, yet the stability of the enemy front as a whole had not been seriously threatened. His huge salient on the Somme had been pushed in and much territory had been redeemed, but it is possible that the enemy's general line, strategically speaking, was sounder at the conclusion of the offensive than it was at its beginning. Perhaps for this reason it was felt that an offensive directed rather at a flank would be productive of much greater results. If the enemy could be forced to give up as much ground on the Ypres front as he had yielded on the Somme, it was certain at any rate that he must relax his hold on the Belgian coast, while communications to his northern Armies would be seriously compromised. Added to this, Ostend and Zeebrugge, two of the seaports on the captured Belgian coast, had long been notorious as submarine bases, and the increasing urgency of the submarine problem lent additional support to any proposal for depriving the enemy of his hold on the Belgian coast.

Accordingly, Sir Douglas Haig, now that the Arras offensive had fulfilled its object, decided to make the Passchendaele Ridge the chief objective of his 1917 offensive operations. In reality these had opened on June 7th with General Plumer's brilliant capture of the Messines and Wyttschaete Ridges. Lying as they did well in rear of the British salient at Ypres and only a few miles south of it, they constituted a grave menace to our retention of the salient and forbade, while they were in enemy hands, any further deepening of that position. However, General Plumer had completely eliminated the menace in his June attack, and the way was thus cleared for operations against the Passchendaele Ridge itself. These had commenced on the 31st of July and reference has already been made to the fine part borne in them by the 5th Divisional Artillery. The new system of enemy defences had proved fairly effective against the earlier infantry attacks, and progress was slow until the tactical problems presented by the defence were better appreciated. That this stage had now been reached was proved by the general success of the big attack of the 20th of September, to which allusion was made at the end of the last chapter.

One French and two British Armies, the Fifth (General Sir H. Gough) and the Second (General Sir H. Plumer), had been instructed to carry out the offensive operations. The French Army and the Fifth Army were operating on the northern part of the sector of attack, and the Second Army, on the southern part, had as its main objective the great southern spur of the Passchendaele Highlands, a ridge stretching from Broodseinde to Beelaere. From the vicinity of Beelaere at the southern extremity of this ridge another pronounced spur ran back in a south-west direction towards the British lines, and it was astride this spur that a large part of the I A.N.Z.A.C. operations was conducted. In addition, the Second Army was to protect the right flank of the Fifth Army by extending the base of the Ypres salient as far south as Hollebeke. I

A.N.Z.A.C. formed part of the southern army and the frontage allotted for its earliest attacks lay between the Ypres-Menin Road and the Ypres-Roulers Railway. These two important communications intersected about a mile east of Ypres at a point known as Hellfire Corner. The name may sound melodramatic, but there were few instances of apter terminology anywhere on the Western Front.

The advance of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions on the 20th of September had carried the I A.N.Z.A.C. front to a general north and south line about a mile in advance of Westhoek. The next phase in the operation aimed at advancing the new line about three-quarters of a mile farther in a direction a little north of east. The 4th and 5th Australian Divisions were instructed to carry out the attack, and the right, that is, the southern sector, was allotted to the 5th Division. The troops on its left were thus the 4th Australian Division, while on its right the line was held by the 98th Brigade of the 33rd (British) Division.


The terrain for the operation of the 5th Australian Division was in the main level with a slight tendency to fall towards the right flank. The greatest part of the area was covered with a wood known as Polygon Wood. In France and Belgium, the word "Polygone" is the ordinary term for an artillery school, and the wood had long been the site of a famous artillery school where Belgian gunners had undergone their training. Associated with the artillery school there seems to have been a riding school, for an oval track or racecourse lay about the centre of the wood. It was about 500 yards in length and not quite half so wide. About 300 yards beyond the north-east extremity of the riding track was a large mound about 30 feet high known as The Butte. Its original purpose was to act as a stop-butt for artillery shooting in days when the range of cannon was still only a few hundred yards. Its height made it a conspicuous object in the generally flat terrain, and its possession was valuable for observation purposes. Polygon Wood had an average length and width of over half a mile, and it provided the enemy with a natural defensive feature of great strength. Although most of the trees had been shot away, there still existed a thick undergrowth about 3 feet in height, through which the remains of old trench systems and wire entanglements ran in all directions, greatly complicating the passage of troops. A little stream, the Polygonbeek, rising near the south extremity of the riding track, passed in a south-east direction across the right half of the 5th Divisional objective area and later joined the Reutelbeek, another tiny stream which flowed east out of the area of the 98th Brigade. On the 98th Brigade front there were, about 250 yards to the right of the 5th Divisional boundary, a sequence of three strong positions known as Jerk House, Cameron House, and Cameron Covert. Although these were far beyond the Divisional area of advance, they eventually played a considerable part in its operations.

Apart from the great natural defensive possibilities provided by


Polygon Wood, there were many minor features of which the local tactical advantages were great. These had all been studiously fortified by the enemy and, in addition, the whole area was covered with concrete pill-boxes, on which the enemy chiefly relied for his means of resistance. But trench systems, although to some extent superseded, were still in existence, and in places formed an important adjunct to the defences of the area. It will thus be seen that the task of the Division was a heavy one, the existence of Polygon Wood making its area of attack the most difficult yet attempted in the offensive.

To reach the front line from Dickebusch (map p. 231) one followed the Ypres Road as far as Café Belge Corner, where the road to the right leading down to Kruistraathoek was usually taken. At Kruistraathoek the turn to the left was followed which led in a north-easterly direction and crossed the Ypres-Commines Canal about a mile south of Ypres. All this was the area of long range guns and giant howitzers, of captive balloons, of artillery wagon lines, and of reserve infantry units. Along the road near the Canal were to be seen several huge shell-holes, said to be the craters formed by the Austrian 17-inch howitzers used against Ypres in the early days of the war. About half a mile past the Canal, Shrapnel Corner was reached, and steel helmets were adjusted before one turned sharply to the right and followed a long corduroy track called Warrington Road leading past many batteries along the north of Zillebeke Lake. After this the track, now only a mule path, led on past Halfway House, Leinster Farm, Yeomanry Post, and to Zouave Wood, about half a mile south of Hooge. It was at Hooge on Saturday, the 31st of October, 1914, that Sir Douglas Haig and Sir John French had stood together under a storm of shell-fire and wondered if their thin line could possibly stand the strain to which it was being subjected. Thanks to General Fitzclarence, it did so. Past Zouave and Sanctuary Woods the tracks crossed the Ypres-Menin Road near Clapham Junction, and led through Glencorse Wood and Nonne Boschen Wood to the front line. From Zillebeke Lake forwards, that is, for the last three and a half miles, the whole area was continuously shelled, and special spots like Hooge and Glencorse Wood and the main roads and tracks were rarely at rest. Another route often used to the front line lay through Ypres itself. One left the town at the Menin Gate and followed the Menin Road past Hellfire Corner, Birr Cross-roads and Hooge, and joined the route already mentioned at Clapham Junction.

The attack of the 5th Australian Division was planned to take place in two phases. The first phase, to the red line (see map page 232) involved an average advance of about 750 yards from the front line established by the 1st Australian Division on the 20th of September; the second phase, to the blue line, was to carry the line another 350 yards forward and included the capture of Joist Farm, Jetty Wood, Jetty Trench, and Juniper Trench. The Division was to



attack on a two Brigade frontage and the 15th Australian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General H. E. Elliott) was allotted the right half of the Divisional attack frontage and the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General E. Hobkirk) the left or northern half. The 8th Australian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General E. Tivey) was to be held in Divisional Reserve. The total width of the



Divisional front was about 1,100 yards which the 14th and 15th Infantry Brigades shared about equally between them.

Absorbing as the study is from a technical point of view, a detailed account of the preparations for this great battle would be out of place in a narrative like this. All that will be attempted will be to give the reader an outline of the chief duties of the various arms as they were set out by Lieut.-Col. Peck in a series of able and concise preliminary instructions. The scope and nature of General Hobbs's plans will be clearly disclosed and to the reader's imagination must be left the task of estimating the amount of work involved in their formation and execution.

The attacking infantry brigades were expected to be holding their fronts each with one battalion. Three-quarters of an hour before Zero this battalion was to be withdrawn to Brigade Reserve, all except a line of shell-hole posts left to protect the assembly of the three attacking battalions of each brigade. The three attacking battalions were to be in the assembly position 100 yards behind the line of posts at 45 minutes before Zero. The line of their assembly was to be laid out with white tapes during the night before the attack and tapes were also to be pegged out forward from these in order to ensure that the right direction was followed in the first few minutes of the assault. One battalion was to be utilised by each brigade in the capture of the red line objective, that is, the area up to and including the red line. These battalions were to attack each on a two company front and connection with flank units was to be established at stated points. A creeping artillery barrage was to protect the whole advance. As soon as the red line was reached the artillery barrage was to halt in front of it for about an hour while the area was consolidated. As the barrage moved forward again towards the blue line the remaining two attacking battalions of each brigade were to pass through the red line battalions each on a one company front and fight their way to the blue objective. Here the barrage would halt again for a long period to allow of consolidation. During the halt an outpost line was to be established by patrols in advance of the final objective while a line of strong points was to be constructed 300 yards behind the outpost lines. The principle of defence in depth, as already explained in Chapter IX, was to be observed in consolidation. Headquarters and one battalion of the 8th Brigade, the Divisional Reserve, was to be established at Halfway House, about two and a half miles from the present front line. The other three battalions of the 8th Brigade were to be kept in the Château Ségard area near Ypres, and all reserve troops were to be held ready to move at brief notice. H.Q. of the 14th and 15th Brigades were to be at Hooze Crater, about two miles behind the battlefield, where deep dug-outs were already constructed.

The nature of the artillery work has been indicated in the preceding paragraph. The creeping barrage was to open 150 yards in front of the assembly line and to move forward at the rate of 100 yards in six minutes as far as the red line. Each gun was to fire three smoke shells when it reached the protective line, there to warn the infantry to commence consolidation. As the progress to the blue line was expected to be slower, the creeping barrage was to move at the rate of 100 yards in eight minutes over the second stage of the advance. The field artillery was divided into two groups, a Right Group consisting of the 3rd, 6th, and 12th Australian Army F.A. Brigades under Lieut.-Col. H. A. Cohen, D.S.O., to support the right brigade, and a Left Group, consisting of the 7th and 8th A.F.A. Brigades under Lieut.-Col. W. G. Allsop, to support the advance on

the left. The 3rd A.F.A. Brigade and two batteries of 6-inch howitzers were placed at the disposal of the Divisional Commander for dealing with special targets as might be required by General Elliott or General Hobkirk. Although most of the artillery belonged to the 3rd Australian Division, General Bessell-Browne and his staff controlled it during its support of the 5th Australian Division. The Divisional Trench Mortar Officer was to provide such assistance as might be required by infantry brigadiers. A very powerful force of heavy artillery under the control of Brigadier-General Coxen supported the advance of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. It comprised 94 6-inch Howitzers, 32 8-inch Howitzers, 30 9.2-inch Howitzers, 36 sixty pounders, 4 12-inch Howitzers, 1 15-inch Howitzer and 8 6-inch guns. This tremendous aggregate of heavy artillery, when contrasted with the few heavy guns that had supported the Fromelles attack, will afford the reader some idea of the extraordinary development in heavy artillery during the war. It will be seen that 205 pieces of heavy artillery were distributed over the 2,000 yards of the I A.N.Z.A.C. attack frontage, that is, a gun to every ten yards. And in addition there were all the 18-pounders and 4.5 howitzers of the field artillery brigades.

All the 64 machine guns of the Division as well as a number of additional guns provided for the occasion were grouped under the control of the Divisional Machine Gun Officer. Of these, 32 guns were ordered to be grouped under the command of Capt. C. Holmes to maintain an S.O.S. barrage. They were arranged in four batteries of 8 guns each and were to be posted about a quarter of a mile behind the assembly line, where they would be ready to drop a machine gun barrage before our front line should our S.O.S. rockets indicate an attack by enemy infantry. Twenty-four other machine guns, working in three batteries of eight each, provided a creeping machine gun barrage group to maintain a moving curtain of machine gun fire before the advancing infantry. They were posted in Glencorse Wood, three-quarters of a mile behind the assembly line. In this grouping and use of the machine gun to provide S.O.S. and creeping barrages the growing tendency towards the employment of machine guns as artillery is clearly apparent. Eight mobile machine guns were allotted to each infantry brigade to move forward with the infantry and to assist in consolidation. Sixteen other machine guns were to be maintained as a mobile reserve to be used as the situation might require. One hundred and twenty-five thousand rounds of S.A.A. were allotted to each battery of the S.O.S. Barrage Group and One hundred thousand rounds to each battery of the Creeping Barrage Group.

Lieut.-Col. Carey ordered the 14th and 15th Field Companies of the engineers to operate under their affiliated infantry brigades. The 8th Field Company and the 5th Pioneer Battalion were held in Divisional Reserve. Officers commanding field companies were to

remain at Brigade H.Q. to assist the Brigadier if required with expert engineer advice. One track was to be marked out to the assembly line on each brigade front with pickets painted white at the top. Signboards were to be erected wherever advisable and drainage of the tracks was to receive attention. A continuous line of French concertina wire was to be erected in front of the outpost line as soon as possible after it was established, and a similar belt of barbed wire apron fence was to be got into position in front of the line of strong points. Bridging material for crossing Polygonbeek was also to be provided. Two strong points were to be constructed behind the red line on each brigade front.

The forms of communication to be employed included telegraph, telephone, visual signalling, wireless, amplifier, power buzzer, pigeons, runners, and despatch riders. The buried cable ran to Hooge and thence cable head had been established within a few hundred yards of the assembly position. A series of visual stations was to be sited at suitable places, and a forward wireless set and power buzzer stations were also to be installed and, in addition, a wireless tank was to be utilised in the forward zone. Runner routes were to be marked out with flag pickets and three pairs of pigeons were allotted to each battalion headquarters, and ten to the artillery F.O.O. Code was to be used in all wireless and power buzzer messages. It will be seen that Major Stanley and his staff on the 5th Divisional Signal Company had much to do in arranging for the maintenance of communication.

A squadron of the R.F.C. provided the contact patrol aeroplanes. Their task was to keep in touch with the advancing infantry and, especially, to be in the air over the various objectives at the times at which the infantry was due to reach them. To distinguish them from other aircraft each contact patrol machine was to carry a black streamer on the rear edge of its left wing. The aeroplanes were to call for signals by sounding a horn or by dropping a light, and the infantry was to answer by lighting red flares which would reveal their position. The aeroplane would note the position and hasten back to the dropping ground at D.H.Q. where it would drop a written message stating the position reached by the infantry.

A troop of the 13th A.L.H. Regiment was to be held for reconnaissance purposes at Zillebeke Bund. Two patrols of this troop were to be employed on each brigade front to count enemy dead.

Elaborate arrangements were made for the immediate collection of information from the battlefield and from prisoners of war. An Intelligence Policeman who could speak German was attached to each infantry battalion to get information of vital local tactical importance as soon as possible after the capture of any prisoners. Each Intelligence Policeman was given four men to assist him in searching the battlefield for important documents. Prisoners of war were to be hurried back to Capt. Robinson, the Divisional Intel-

ligence Officer, at Hooge Crater, where any information likely to be urgently required in the battle was to be extracted from them. From Hooge Crater prisoners were to be handed to the staff of the A.P.M. for transmission to a collecting cage. Officers, N.C.O.'s and men were to be kept separated as far as practicable.

Of all the preparatory measures none attracted more widespread interest than the huge model of the terrain of the I A.N.Z.A.C. advance. This had been constructed near Busseboom, and hundreds of men had been employed upon it. It covered an area of several thousand square yards and every ridge and fold in the ground, and every watercourse and wood and road of the great battlefield, were set out to scale, and the line of the advance to date was recorded. In order that the model might not be destroyed by the inspection of its numerous visitors, large stagings had been erected across it from which a good general view of the whole was obtainable. General Hobbs was so impressed with the value of the model that he gave instructions that as many as practicable of all ranks of the Division were to study it carefully, and arrangements were made accordingly by the commanding officers of all units.

Most of the foregoing matters were the concern of the "G" Staff. "A.Q." Branches were not less busy. There was inevitably a good deal of movement of troops for the few days prior to the battle and the "Q." organisation was kept unusually busy in the changing arrangements for accommodation and supplies. As this was simply part of the ordinary administrative work of the Division, there is no need to make further reference to it. Col. Bruche's chief administrative dispositions for the battle itself may be mentioned under the following heads:—

(i) *Food and Forage Supplies.*—Railhead was at Dickebusch, a village about six miles west of the front line. The Brigade Supply Dumps were in the same vicinity, and the supplies were brought to them by details of the Divisional Train, and the same unit carried them thence to the battalion quartermaster's stores, which were situated in the area south of Ypres. At battalion quartermaster's stores the rations were tied up in bags and loaded on to pack animals of the Divisional Pack Transport Troop which carried them forward almost to the front line. Thence they were man-handled as required.

(ii) *S.A.A. Supplies,* including grenades, Stokes bombs, S.O.S. signals, etc., were distributed in a series of dumps. The Main Divisional Bomb Dump, kept under Corps instructions behind the Ypres-Commines Canal, was located between Dickebusch and Ypres. It was staffed by the D.B.O., and an expert staff of bombers. This dump was in telephonic communication both with D.H.Q. and all Brigade H.Q. The S.A.A. Section of the Third Australian D.A.C. was stationed at the same place with its twenty-five limbers and G.S. wagons and a large number of pack-mules. By means of these ammunition could be dispatched to either of the fighting brigades

almost as soon as the order for it was received. The Advanced Divisional Bomb Dump, staffed by the Reserve Brigade Bombing Officer and his staff, was located at Hooge, and each of the attacking brigades had brigade bomb dumps under the supervision of the Brigade Bombing Officer still farther forward. In practice, the ammunition supplies were usually packed forward by the S.A.A. Section direct to these brigade dumps. Thence they were man-handled to battalion and company dumps by carrying parties of the units concerned.

(iii). *Water Supplies*.—A reserve of two thousand gallons in petrol tins was kept ready for emergency in the Menin Road tunnel near Hooge. Ten one-hundred gallon tanks were located at Hooge. These were kept filled by means of two motor tanks supplied by Corps. Thousands of petrol tins were stocked at the Main Divisional Bomb Dump. These were issued to the brigades as required, and battalion quartermasters usually sent the water forward nightly on pack-mules with the rations.

(iv). *The Divisional Pack Transport Troop* was located about half-way between Dickebusch and Ypres. Staff Captains of brigades intimated daily the number of pack animals required for each unit in the brigade, and these animals reported every evening at the quartermaster's stores of the various units. Here they were loaded up with the next day's issue of food and water and carried it, under the direction of guides supplied by the units concerned, to wherever it was wanted. An officer was detailed to accompany each pack convoy, and he was responsible for the delivery of the supplies at their destination. By means of the Divisional Pack Transport Troop, eighty-four pack animals more were available for the work of supplying the forward units than would have been the case if each unit had worked its own pack transport. This result was attained partly by reason of the fact that the supplies of the reserve brigade could be delivered on wheels by the Divisional Train.

(v). *Ordnance Stores*.—Rear and advanced dumps were arranged, and a reserve of all stores which were likely to be destroyed during the action was secured. By this means, all urgent demands could be met promptly.

(vi). *Traffic Control Posts* to the number of seven under the supervision of Major Langley, the A.P.M., and his capable assistants, Lieuts. Freer and McKay, were established. By these all forward traffic could be regulated so as to ensure a steady circulation. Various restrictions regarding the hours of traffic on certain routes, and the intervals to be maintained between traffic units were observed.

(vii). *R.E. Dumps*.—Five were located at suitable places and arrangements were made for their supplies of engineering material.

(viii). *Burial Parties*.—A sergeant and a number of men were attached to each brigade headquarters for disposal of the dead in the brigade sector.

(ix). *Tactical Working Parties* were arranged for in order to carry out urgent preliminary works, e.g., burying cable, carrying machine-guns, assisting A.P.M. with traffic control, assisting in fusing grenades at Divisional Bomb Dump, maintaining forward roads, working forward tramways, guarding water points, and so on.

(x). Recent instructions had been promulgated that units before going into action should leave behind them a representative nucleus or skeleton, so that, even if the unit was almost annihilated in the line, a framework of it should be left on which it could be reorganised efficiently. For example, a battalion commander and his second in command were not to go into the same fight together, nor a company commander and his second in command. Not more than twenty officers per battalion were allowed to fight in the same engagement, and at least 108 other ranks per battalion, representative of its entire composition, were to be kept out as a nucleus. Nuclei of all units were accordingly withdrawn, and grouped together under the command of Lieut.-Col. P. Denehy (58th Battalion) at Caestre. The Divisional Reinforcement Wing was also established at the same place.

Col. Hearne's medical arrangements for the battle comprised the usual R.A.P.'s just behind the front line, a system of Relay Posts about three-quarters of a mile farther back, a Collecting Post at Hooge Tunnel, Wagon-loading Posts at the Culvert and Birr Cross-roads, and an Advanced Dressing Station at Menin House about half a mile east of Ypres. A Corps Main Dressing Station was established at Dickebusch. A Casualty Clearing Station and a Divisional Rest Station were established still farther to the rear. Regimental stretcher-bearers were to bring the casualties to the Regimental Aid Posts; thence they were to be carried by relays of field ambulance bearers to the wagon loading posts mentioned above. The later stages of evacuation would be by motor ambulance, bus, or train, according to the nature of the casualty.

It may be easily imagined that perfect co-ordination of all these plans could not be secured without numerous conferences, and the days preceding the battle witnessed many of these meetings. Company commanders conferred with their platoon officers, battalion staffs with their company commanders, and brigade staffs with their battalion staffs. There were General Staff Conferences, and "Q." Staff Conferences, and engineering and medical and artillery conferences, and every contingency was discussed until each arm of the service was familiar with the intentions of the other arms as far as they concerned its own functions. On the 24th of September, two important final conferences were held at D.H.Q. The first was a meeting of the Corps Commander with the Divisional Commanders, the Artillery Commanders, and the G.S.O.'s I, of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. Later on, the Army Commander held another conference at which the final arrangements were perfected.

We left the Division at Reninghelst, on the night of the 20th of September, rejoicing over the success of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions, and awaiting with confidence its hourly expected summons to go forward. The 14th Brigade was the first to move, and, on 21st of September, it marched to the Château Ségard Area, near Ypres, where it stayed overnight. On the following night it moved forward into the front line, where it took over the whole of the 1st Australian Divisional sector. On the same night the 15th Infantry Brigade moved forward to the Château Ségard Area. On the 23rd the Divisional Staff moved to its battle headquarters at Walker's Camp, near Dickebusch, and command of the right Divisional Sector of the I A.N.Z.A.C. front passed to it from the 1st Australian Division at 10 a.m. On the night of the 23rd, the 15th Brigade moved forward and took over the right half of the divisional front from the 14th Brigade, thus bringing the two attacking brigades into position for the battle. On the 24th the 8th Brigade moved to its reserve position at Château Ségard, and thus far everything had proceeded according to plan. The enemy shelling of the forward areas was heavy and continuous, and was, perhaps, more severe between Bir Crossroads and Glencorse Wood than in the actual front system, of the precise dispositions of which the enemy was probably not yet well informed. All of the Division's preliminary arrangements were working admirably. Supplies of all kinds were reaching the front line in sufficient quantities, and the men were in high spirits; the artillery practice barrages were working splendidly; the engineers were outlining their forward communications; the machine-gun batteries were in position and were registering on their various lines. In these circumstances, the situation was on the whole eminently satisfactory, and though casualties at the rate of about 100 per day were reported, these were unavoidable, and, perhaps, lighter than might have been expected. On the night of the 24th, General Elliott was holding his brigade frontage with the 58th Battalion (Major N. Freeman) and the 15th L.T.M.B. (Capt. W. E. Freeman). The 60th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. N. Marshall), was quartered in shelters along the road between Hooze and Clapham Junction. The 57th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Stewart) and the 59th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Mason) were in brigade reserve in the vicinity of Zouave Wood and behind it. General Hobkirk was holding his front line with the 54th Battalion (T/Lieut.-Col. Street). The 53rd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Croshaw) which was to be used in capturing the Red Line was in support, the 55th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Wood) and the 56th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Scott), which were to take the Blue Line, being in reserve. The 14th L.T.M.B. (Capt. Brock) was with the foremost troops and the machine gun companies of both brigades, though grouped and operating as already indicated, were in the immediate vicinity of the front line troops.

With the Division's plans so perfectly co-ordinated as they were,

with troops fresh, skilful, and in high spirits, with officers experienced, capable, and fully understanding their special tasks, the reader may imagine that the result of the battle was a foregone conclusion. Had every factor which decides the fate of battles rested within the control of General Hobbs, it would have been a foregone conclusion. But there are two things in warfare which, above all others, remove the issue from the control of any general, however far-sighted and thorough his plans may be. One is the weather, the other the action of the enemy. In this instance, the weather was favourable; but the enemy, by a sudden and heavy blow, succeeded for a time in jeopardising the entire plans of attack. With troops less brave or a commander less resolute, the whole record of the Battle of Polygon Wood must have been materially altered.

Just before dawn on the 25th of September a tremendous concentration of enemy artillery fire fell across the right of the 15th Brigade sector and over the entire front of the 33rd Division on its right. This was followed between 5.30 a.m. and 6 a.m. with heavy infantry attacks in mass, by special storm troops of picked German divisions. Despite heavy casualties from the artillery preparation, the 58th Battalion stood firm. This was due largely to the fine heroism and determination of the front line men, but especially of A Company (Lieut. Boyd), which repulsed the enemy onslaught on the 15th Brigade front. It was otherwise on the front of the 33rd Division, where the greatest weight of the assault fell. The line there commenced to yield ominously. Major Freeman soon realised that his right flank would be in danger and hurried his small local reserves to the spot. These formed a flank facing south, but they were obviously too few to sustain the steadily increasing pressure, especially as enemy machine guns were already installed along the road that was the boundary between the fronts of the 33rd and 5th Australian Divisions. Communications were already extremely difficult. Power buzzer leads were broken again and again, and the pigeons were nearly all either killed outright or rendered unconscious by the concussion of bursting shells. Nevertheless, General Elliott soon got reports on the position and hurried reinforcements to Major Freeman's assistance. Before these could arrive, two platoons from the 58th Battalion's front line had to be withdrawn to man the Battalion's right flank, which became more and more exposed as the enemy penetrations on the front of the 33rd Division deepened. It was twenty minutes past nine before Lieut.-Col. Marshall got word of the position of the 58th Battalion, and he immediately sent his B Company to report to Major Freeman. Lieut. Cahill, who commanded the company, was soon wounded, and other casualties were suffered in Glencorse Wood, but Lieut. Arter pressed on with the company and reached Major Freeman in time to relieve the situation somewhat. Two platoons were sent to build up the attenuated front line and the other two were utilised on the flank defence.

Ten minutes after he had sent B Company forward, Lieut.-Col. Marshall was ordered to dispatch another company to the 58th Battalion's assistance, and Capt. R. Dickson with his A Company at once went forward. During all this time, the bombardment of Glencorse Wood was terrific, and although the troops in it were well dug-in, one company of the 60th Battalion there lost one officer and 33 other ranks in a couple of hours. But the men remained steady through this, the worst ordeal that troops are called upon to face, and one officer even collected his dead and reverently read a burial service over the bodies while the shells screamed overhead and tore the earth to pieces all around. In this furious bombardment, all the dumps of ammunition, stored in anticipation of the battle, were blown up, and C Company of the 60th, employed all day in maintaining forward supplies, suffered heavy casualties. Towards the late afternoon another urgent message from the 58th deprived Lieut.-Col. Marshall of his last remaining company, and Lieut. Beaver took D Company forward at ten minutes past six. Lieut.-Col. Marshall himself had already gone up to render any assistance within his power. At this stage the position was critical on the right flank, but Lieut. Beaver got his men into the gap and, though the gallant officer was killed, the position was once more made secure. As company after company of the 60th Battalion had left their positions in the vicinity of Clapham Junction to go forward, their places were filled by advancing companies of the 57th Battalion, and the 59th Battalion in turn occupied the positions vacated by the 57th. Towards evening it became advisable to withdraw the badly shattered but still heroic 58th Battalion, and Lieut.-Col. Stewart's companies moved forward to assist the 60th Battalion in its task of maintaining the front and right flank lines. All the way forward, but particularly as they passed through Glencorse Wood, the men of the 57th came under heavy artillery fire. Capts. Dickinson and Aram and Lieut. Joynt were all killed, and several other officers were wounded, while scores of the men also became casualties. Despite this, the battalion pressed on with steadiness and resolution and in due course assisted in the relief of the 58th Battalion, which was withdrawn overnight to a position in close support. Meanwhile, several efforts had been made throughout the day by the 33rd Division to recover the lost ground, but so far without success, and the enemy penetration retained a depth of five hundred yards behind that Division's late front line. From this flank, heavy machine gun fire and persistent sniping constantly enfiladed the forward zone of the 15th Brigade sector, and more than once infantry advances were attempted from the same direction. However, these were all repelled and the position remained stationary overnight, the 15th Brigade firing line being thus almost doubled by some 500 yards of right flank defence.

During the 25th information had been received from I A.N.Z.A.C.

that Zero hour for the big attack was to be 5.50 a.m. on the 26th. The anxiety felt at Corps and Divisional H.Q. during the critical hours of the 25th may therefore be easily imagined. The possibility that the 33rd Division might recover the ground to its original front line grew less and less as the day advanced, and as the weight and determination of the enemy efforts were more fully disclosed. It is a dangerous thing to find during an advance that one's flank is becoming exposed; to decide to commence an advance when one's flank is already seriously compromised is an infinitely greater responsibility. Additional ground for anxiety lay in the fact that three battalions of the 15th Brigade, the 58th, 60th, and 57th, had been under the enemy barrage all day, and had inevitably suffered heavy casualties. To expect any one of them to play a leading part in a major operation on the morrow was to ask too much, if not of the spirit, at least of the flesh. The 59th Battalion, however, was still almost intact and could be relied upon to carry out any task entrusted to it. Towards evening on the 25th Corps Headquarters asked General Hobbs for a report on the position and for his opinion as to whether it would be practicable to attack on the following morning. It was a moment of great importance, a decision of the utmost gravity. The Divisional Commander had studied the matter in all its bearings, and promptly gave his opinion that it would be possible to attack successfully as arranged. The decision given, no time was lost in modifying the original plans as necessitated by present circumstances. The Reserve Brigade was available about Château Ségard and Halfway House ready for employment at an instant's notice in the event of just such a contingency as had now arisen. Accordingly, it was decided that two battalions of the 8th Brigade, the 29th (Lieut.-Col. Purser) and the 31st (Lieut.-Col. Toll) should be attached to General Elliott's command for the special task of taking the final objective. To the 59th Battalion the capture of the Red Line was allotted. The special work of guarding the right flank was entrusted to the 57th and 60th Battalions, and the 58th Battalion was also to be kept forward as a local reserve and to guide the three assaulting battalions into their assembly positions.

The decision to attach two battalions of the 8th Brigade to General Elliott's attacking force was delayed as long as possible in order that the latest information regarding the enemy's intentions and dispositions should be available before finally committing the Division to a course of action which it would be difficult to modify after it had been set in motion. Accordingly, although he had kept the 8th Brigade informed of this possible contingency, it was not until late in the evening of the 25th that General Hobbs was able to give General Tivey the precise instructions outlined above. The 29th and 31st Battalions and the 8th L.T.M.B. (Capt. Mulvey) were started immediately and were on the road by 8 p.m. General Tivey had a hasty conference with his battalion commanders and explained to

them the new state of affairs. Capt. Cuming had already hurried forward to secure guides for the ingoing battalions and Lieut.-Cols. Toll and Purser and Capt. Mulvey also hastened on to Hooge Crater to see General Elliott and to get his full instructions for the operations. General Tivey, as soon as his brief conference was over, closed his headquarters at Château Ségard and went forward to Halfway House. The 32nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Davies) was also moved up to the same vicinity and only the 30th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Clark) was now left at Château Ségard. It, too, moved forward shortly after the attack commenced on the 26th.

As the crow flies the distance from Château Ségard to the front line was only six miles and, as over nine hours yet remained before Zero, there seemed to be ample time to complete the assembly of the 29th and 31st Battalions. In daylight and on ordinary roads it would have been a very simple matter. But at night on unfamiliar ground, over roads packed with traffic in the back areas, and along mere mule paths winding through the débris of a battlefield in the forward zones, it was a difficult task. The men, too, had a good deal to carry and the enemy shelling, though it had died down considerably, was by no means over. However, General Hobbs knew to a nicety what could be expected of his troops and no brigade had trained more assiduously and thoroughly than General Tivey's. The men's excellent physical condition brought them to the end of their journey in the early morning. The assembly on the jumping-off line had still to be completed, and the strictest silence had to be maintained lest the enemy's suspicions of the impending attack should be aroused. It was found that an excellent assembly line had been taped right across the brigade front. This had been done by the Intelligence Officers of the battalions of the 15th Brigade, Lieuts. Doutreband, Stillman, and Francis, and the 59th Battalion had already taken up its position along it. Lieut.-Cols. Toll and Purser, who had rejoined their commands at Hooge, soon got their men into position immediately in rear of the 59th, the 31st Battalion taking the right half of the Brigade sector and the 29th the left. The Battalion Headquarters of all three attacking battalions on this brigade front were located at Black Watch Corner, about a quarter of a mile behind the jumping-off line.

If for some time nothing has been said of the 14th Brigade, it is not because that formation has been forgotten or overlooked. The events of the 25th had focussed attention almost entirely on the 15th Brigade and, towards the end of the day, on the 8th Brigade as well. The disturbance on the right, which had caused such profound anxiety to all concerned in it, had not involved the 14th Brigade in any way, and it was able to continue uninterruptedly with its preparations for the battle. The dumps of ammunition and stores were steadily filled, and not infrequently they suffered damage from enemy artillery; but the carrying parties worked on steadily and the lost

material was quickly replaced. Under the superintendence of Major Bahtold, the tape line for the assembly was staked out on the 24th and the tapes were laid during the night of 25th. In order to ensure the absolutely correct position of each assaulting company rectangles ten yards in breadth each to hold one company were also taped out just behind the Assembly Line and these tapes were rolled up at dawn lest they should be observed by enemy aeroplanes. One enemy aeroplane did make a moonlight visit and perhaps saw something, for it dropped a light and flew away and an enemy barrage fell shortly afterwards. But, happily, it fell just behind the assembling battalions and no harm was done. By Zero hour the 53rd Battalion had relieved the 54th Battalion in the front line and the latter unit had passed back to reserve. The 56th Battalion had assembled immediately behind the right half of the 53rd and the 55th Battalion was on the same alignment behind the left half. During the whole of the assembly only one casualty was suffered, a stray rifle bullet striking Capt. Single (56th Battalion) and killing him.

The whole of the assaulting troops of the Division were thus successfully in position before Zero hour. (Map. p. 232). It should be remembered that all these movements had to be carried out in silence, for an enemy barrage along the packed assembly tapes would have destroyed six whole battalions and ruined the operation irretrievably. As Zero hour approached many anxious eyes were watching the sky line from D.H.Q. to see if any unusual enemy artillery activity was in progress. If the tension was great in the rear it was greater still at the assembly tape. For hours the men had been unable to light a cigarette; their nerves were strung up to a high pitch, and every passing moment was adding to the strain. One thing was certain, and that was that the enemy's S.O.S. would warn his artillery almost as soon as our advance commenced, and General Hobbs anticipated that within three or four minutes his barrage would fall upon our assembly position. It was therefore of the utmost importance to get every man of the assaulting formations clear of this danger zone in the few minutes that would elapse before it was smothered in an enemy barrage. Accordingly, the men were all warned to double forward as our own barrage fell and to get as near to it as possible. In this way only could the enemy barrage be avoided.

Punctually to the second at 5.50 a.m., our artillery opened in a single magnificent crash and thousands of shells screamed through the air and burst in a long, straight line of flame and destruction about 200 yards ahead of the waiting infantry. Released simultaneously from the bonds that had held them silent and motionless, the 4,000 men of the six attacking battalions dashed forward at a run. Somewhere behind the line of destruction lay their victims, shuddering in their pill-boxes, staggered by the sudden commotion, dazed by the concussion of the shells, petrified by terror of the gleaming line of bayonets which they knew came grimly on behind the line of fire.

Even now the line of bayonets was crouched within 60 yards of the wall of flame, and every man in it was tense and eager, so eager that some scarcely waited for the barrage to creep forward before they dashed into it and died. But these were few; the rest restrained themselves and lit the cigarette that had long been held ready between the white lips. Hundreds of matches flickered feebly along the line in the misty grey dawn, and keen eyes watched the barrage as second after second of its three minute wait ticked away. Then, slowly, very slowly, it crept forward. A long line of skirmishers disengaged itself from the dense mass of men and followed the advancing screen of shells. Behind it section after section and platoon after platoon took up its allotted position, for not by sheer unthinking courage was this battle to be won, but by skilful formations each in its appropriate place, each carrying out its ordained task with the restraint and skilful ferocity that the work demanded. Above their heads thousands of machine gun bullets cut the air as they whistled shrilly past on their destined way, and the strident din of many Vickers guns throbbed through the troubled morning air. But these were but tinkling wood-wind notes in the hell's orchestra that played about them. For the deafening crash of the rapid firing 18-pounders, the hoarser roar of the scores of heavy guns behind them, and the stupefying concussion of shrapnel and high explosive shells in the barrage in front were by now all mingled in the hideous rhythmical clamour of the perfect drum-fire barrage. Thus, at 5.50 a.m. on the 26th of September, 1917, was the Division launched into the battle of Polygon Wood.

The reader will have long since surmised that the experience of the troops attacking on the right would differ considerably from that of those attacking on the left. We will therefore describe them separately, commencing with General Hobkirk's front where no flank complications existed.

The line of the 53rd Battalion followed closely on the creeping barrage, and almost as soon as the forward movement commenced pill-box after pill-box came into view as the barrage swept slowly over them. It was then a race, a matter of seconds. Would the defenders get into action before the attackers reached the pill-box? Hugging the barrage as they did, the attackers nearly always won. Although the defenders had escaped physical injury in the barrage, their nerves were gone, their *moral* poor. "The object in view," remarks von der Goltz in his observations on battles, "is not so much to destroy the enemy's fighting men as to destroy their courage. Victory is on your side as soon as you have given the enemy the conviction that his cause is lost." The truth of this dictum was proved again and again as the 14th Brigade advance continued. The pill-box defenders in many cases felt that their cause was hopeless. Before they could recover from the stunning effects of the barrage, rough voices at the pill-box door were peremptorily demanding their

immediate surrender. And most of them surrendered eagerly and abjectly. With hands raised and voices mumbling "Kamerad, Kamerad," the long line of Germans with their field-grey uniforms and ashen-grey faces would file humbly out past the three or four grim Australians, whose naked, thirsty bayonets were an eloquent warning against treachery or resistance. Isolated instances of both occurred, and death, sudden and remorseless, was the prompt award.

Some pill-box garrisons, however, perhaps better led or less severely shaken in the barrage, managed to get their machine guns into action. It was then that the Blaringhem training proved its value. Instantly, a couple of Lewis guns would open on the defenders, and rifle bombers would drop their volleys of grenades all around them. Under cover of this fire a couple of parties would work round the flanks of the obstruction and in a few moments further resistance was impossible. It would all happen so quickly that the check to the general advance was imperceptible and touch with the barrage was never lost.

As the red line was approached it was noticed with concern that Lieut.-Col. O. M. Croshaw, D.S.O., the C.O. of the 53rd Battalion, was missing from the position he had taken up in the leading wave, and Capt. T. P. Roberts took charge of the attack. Much regret was felt throughout the whole Brigade when it became known a little later that Lieut.-Col. Croshaw had died of his wounds. This gallant English officer had led his men well and bravely as becomes a soldier, and had died a soldier's death.

As the leading line swept across the riding track, the commanding top of the Butte was clearly visible and the two platoons which had been specially detailed for this strong point manœuvred into position to attack it. As direction through the mist had been well maintained by compass bearings, little readjustment was necessary, and the Butte was promptly rushed and occupied after a brief fight. Numerous dug-outs were found around this position, and sentries were placed at all exits, while parties of moppers-up descended and worked along the galleries and passages with bombs. The occupants were gradually herded up into one corner of the dug-out system where most of them surrendered.

By now the artillery barrage in front had halted and was suffused with thick clouds of smoke from the smoke shells, and all ranks of the 53rd knew that they had reached the red line. It was twenty-five minutes past six and the advance of 700 yards had taken exactly 35 minutes. As the barrage would not commence moving forward to the next objective until Zero plus 100 minutes, that is at 7.30 a.m., there remained over an hour for the consolidation of the red area and for the forming up of the 56th and 55th Battalions to continue the advance to the blue line.

While our men waited on the red line the enemy attempted a prompt counter-attack on the Butte, but, before it developed, several

of our own machine guns and several captured enemy machine guns were installed on that commanding eminence and the attack was easily stopped. In this Major Spiers's machine gunners showed the results of their training with enemy machine guns and, as there was considerably more German S.A.A. in the area at the time than there was British, the ability to use the enemy weapon was an important factor in the consolidation of the area.

But this time the day was sufficiently clear for the employment of aeroplanes and enemy machines and our own were showing great activity. The enemy aviators proved themselves daring and gallant fighters, and again and again flew low over our parties and raked them with fire from their machine guns. The enemy artillery, too, was kept in close touch with the progress of the battle and his barrage crept up steadily behind our own. The men in the front line were thus fighting between two artillery barrages, and, though they were almost immune from artillery casualties for the time, the reserve troops, carrying parties, and runners some distance behind them were suffering a good deal from the enemy guns. German machine gunners in pill-boxes on the fringe of our barrage were also active, and several of these and many individual snipers were dealt with by our patrols during the pause on the red line. Flank communications were also established. A reserve company was got into sheltered positions behind the Butte, and Lieuts. Burrows and Littler of the 14th Field Company were able to report that the construction of the two strong points in the red area was well in hand, and these were soon afterwards wired and garrisoned. Lieut. Fry, of the same unit, was busy meanwhile in extending the Glencorse Wood track towards the Butte, and this important work was completed by nightfall.

Just before 7.30 a.m., our barrage increased in intensity and another line of smoke shells from the 18-pounders warned the waiting infantry that the advance to the blue line was about to commence. Everything was ready and the 56th Battalion on the right and the 53rd on the left moved steadily forward to a repetition of the kind of fighting that has already been described. "For but a short space of time," wrote Lieut.-Col. Woods in his report, "beaters and worm section formations held together, but soon the area was covered with little parties of eight and nine men deployed, each looking for its shell-hole or pill-box full of Boche, and they found him too, but the cringing kamarading Hun was not willing to fight, everywhere surrendering rapidly. Indeed, he did not get much opportunity to show resistance, because our men pounced on him immediately the barrage passed over him. Detachments were left behind to clear each pill-box, and parties of from 30 to 40 from two of these strongholds were quickly escorted to the rear."

It was much the same with the 56th Battalion on the right, but Lieut.-Col. Scott noticed that the 29th Battalion on his right flank was unable to come up immediately. As he knew exactly the

difficult position of the right brigade, he was not altogether surprised that the advance there was not quite so rapid as it was on his own front. Nevertheless, he pressed on to his own objective, taking care to cover his right flank as he did so.

Guided by compass bearings freshly taken during their pause on the red line, both battalions closely followed the barrage, and reached the blue line shortly after 8 a.m. The whole area was thickly covered with strong points of all kinds and the resistance offered during the final phase seems to have been stiffer than that experienced in the advance to the red line. Indeed, that was a recognised part of the enemy's defensive plans and it had been met in advance by the dispositions of General Hobbs, which provided two battalions on each brigade front for the capture of the blue line although the advance to it was only about half of that to the red line, for which only one battalion was allotted on each brigade front.

As the barrage reached its final protective line, smoke shells warned the infantry that the limit of its advance had been reached, and every energy was at once directed on consolidation. The outpost line was taken up beyond the objective, though several pill-boxes had to be dealt with before this most advanced position could be established. The strong point area along and behind the objective was soon under organisation, and such good progress was made with the defensive work that several heavy counter-attacks during the afternoon were repulsed with severe losses. Incredible as it may seem, the whole of the front line and a large part of the support line were wired by nightfall, a tribute not only to the rapid work of the front line troops but also to the supply and communication organisation farther back.

Taken altogether, it will be seen that the 14th Brigade attack both in design and in execution was well-nigh flawless. So careful had been the preparations, so gallantly had all ranks fought, and so free had the left brigade front been from any untoward happenings that a success complete to the smallest detail had been achieved within a few hours. The losses had been light in the actual advance, but the sustained shelling that was encountered for several days before as well as several days after the battle increased them considerably. Between the 22nd of September and the 1st of October the total losses of the brigade, including M.-G. Company and L.T.M.B., were 13 officers and 214 other ranks killed, 26 officers and 850 other ranks wounded, and 49 other ranks missing. Of the four battalions the 56th suffered most severely, perhaps because of its exposed right flank for a few hours. The captures of the 14th Brigade included 14 officers and 425 other ranks, 34 machine-guns, 10 minenwerfer and 7 bomb-throwing machines. The number of enemy dead left on the field was very great. We shall now leave General Hobkirk and his staff and his troops for a little as they push on with the organisation of the new area and reply to the messages of congratulation that are

reaching them from all quarters, to trace the progress of events on the right brigade front.

The experience of the 59th Battalion in its fight for the red area differed in but one important respect from that of the 53rd Battalion. The advance had scarcely commenced before it became painfully clear that the right flank would be very troublesome. The 33rd Division had not yet recovered the ground lost on the previous day and, despite the presence of the 57th and 60th Battalions on the exposed flank, the advancing troops soon experienced heavy enfilade machine gun fire from that direction. While this scarcely delayed the advance in the opening stages, it made it more costly. And the troops did what all good troops involuntarily do in such circumstances—they drifted over towards the danger spot. First one pill-box and then another beyond the brigade's right boundary gave trouble, and parties inclined slightly from their line of advance to deal with the opposition. This not only caused the front of the 59th Battalion to become extended to the right, but it inevitably delayed its advance a little and elements of the leading companies of the 31st Battalion joined in the fighting. Capt. R. K. Hibbs of that battalion had already been killed and Lieut. R. Thompson took charge of his company and attacked one of the strong posts that was causing most trouble on the flank. As a result of his prompt action the pill-box was seized and was found to contain four machine-guns and their crews. This point was over 200 yards beyond the 15th Brigade's right boundary. Meantime, the general advance of the 59th Battalion was progressing splendidly, and the red line was secured, except at the extreme right, almost on time. Lieut.-Col. Mason's officers and men were having an exciting time among the pill-boxes, and Capt. S. W. Neale and Lieut. Macintosh, until he was killed, were leading their men with great dash and skill. Sergeant Facey too, operating on the open right flank near Cameron House, captured several pill-boxes that were impeding the work of consolidation. Lieut. Pentreath, Lewis gun officer of the 59th Battalion, and Lance-Corporal Cronin also did splendid work about the same time and captured many prisoners. For a time the scene was exciting, Germans running in all directions like so many bewildered rabbits, and resolute Australians rounding them up and shooting down those who refused to surrender. Enemy aeroplanes, too, added to the commotion, and one, firing from about 30 feet at a party of men consolidating, was brought down so suddenly by their rifle fire that the men could scarcely dodge the falling machine. The 15th L.T.M.B. sub-sections under Capt. Freeman and Lieut. Gamble were doing excellent work, silencing strong points and, later on, helping to sustain the right flank.

The advance over the blue area was to be carried out by the 31st Battalion on the right and the 29th on the left. In view of the continued exposure of his right flank, where the red objective had not yet been quite reached, Lieut.-Col. Toll thought it advisable to defer

his advance for some time. His reason for this decision was the consideration that the 33rd Division might be able to reach its red line during the pause, and he had been informed that this would be attempted. He knew also that the right flank defences could be made securer during the wait, and that, even if the 33rd Division could not get up, his leading troops would be less exposed to the risk of being cut off by an enemy penetration of the right flank. The 31st Battalion had already done a good deal of fighting, and its casualties were numerous. Lieut.-Col. Purser was influenced by Lieut.-Col. Toll's decision, and both Battalions waited till about noon before commencing progress towards the blue line. Lieut.-Col. Purser, who was the more immune from flank anxieties, then ordered a general advance of his battalion, and, after an hour's fighting, succeeded in reaching the blue line. Although no fewer than six counter-attacks were directed against the 29th Battalion front during the afternoon of the 26th, they were all stopped, in most cases before they developed very far. This was largely due to fine artillery co-operation. Altogether about 120 prisoners and 30 machine-guns were captured by the 29th Battalion.

Lieut.-Col. Toll's advance was conducted rather by cautious patrol work, which steadily ate into the enemy defensive zone. Progress was naturally quickest on the left of the battalion front, where it was in touch with Lieut.-Col. Purser's right flank. From the point of junction of the 29th and 31st Battalions, therefore, the line for the remainder of the 26th bent back sharply to the extreme right flank somewhere in the vicinity of Cameron House, that is, still about 500 yards behind the blue line. The exact line was somewhat obscure, our own posts and those of the enemy in some cases overlapping. Assisted by our progress on its left flank and by our partial overlapping into its area, the 33rd Division had made a fine advance and by mid-day had reached the assembly line, and, before 4 p.m., was in the vicinity of the red line. By 7 p.m. progress for another 150 yards was made, but machine-gun fire from the vicinity of Cameron House held up any further advance.

In order to gain precise knowledge of the position of his line, General Elliott, with characteristic vigour, decided on a personal reconnaissance of the front line, and by 6 a.m. on the morning of the 27th he was on the battlefield proper, visiting the various units there. After the strenuous work of the preceding days both artillery and machine-gun fire had died down considerably and General Elliott at once saw that vigorous action at the moment would secure the final objective with little trouble. As the 31st Battalion had suffered very heavily in the previous day's fighting, he ordered Lieut.-Col. Marshall to bring his 60th Battalion forward from its reserve position on the right flank and to take the ground that still lay between the 31st Battalion right and the blue line. The order had hardly been given before its successful execution was well in hand, and Lieut.-Col.

Marshall led in person the foremost fighting patrol and captured numerous pill-boxes. As the advance continued the resistance grew stronger and greater caution became necessary. The party slipped on, darting from shell-hole to shell-hole, and edging continuously into the enemy area. The 31st Battalion company on their left gradually brought its line up and the 60th Battalion, much helped by Lieut. Gamble's Stokes mortars, was soon on the final objective. Lieut. Banner, who had been leading his men forward with great gallantry, was killed at this stage. A battalion of the 33rd Division was also pressing on finely on the right, and it was becoming certain that the blue line would soon be carried along the entire front. The enemy, unable to bring our penetration to an end by the ordinary means of resistance, organised a formidable counter-attack about noon, but this was scattered by our artillery, and soon after the blue line was everywhere reached. During the night, Lieut.-Col. Marshall handed over to the 33rd Division about 250 yards of the blue line which the 60th Battalion had taken beyond the right of the 5th Division's boundary for the action.

The fight of the morning of the 27th proved once again how great in an indecisive period of a battle is the personal influence and enterprise of leaders like General Elliott and Lieut.-Col. Marshall. Without that final advance the battle of Polygon Wood, though still a fine success for the 5th Australian Division, would have lacked the perfecting touches that made it a complete and splendid victory. Indeed, it was something more than a victory, for the fortunes of war had enabled the Division to lend a helping hand to the formation on its right, which had made a gallant fight against heavy odds.

Of the work of the assaulting infantry battalions it would be hard to speak in sufficiently glowing terms. Officers and men alike were splendid, whether in advancing against heavy opposition or in the deadly work of attacking pill-boxes or in solidly defending positions against enemy attacks. The casualties in the battle were severe, twenty-seven officers and 518 other ranks being killed, 69 officers and 2,234 other ranks wounded, and two officers and 170 other ranks missing, a total of slightly over 3,000. But how different a result from the Battle of Fromelles! Over 2,000 fewer casualties than on that fatal field and a great victory achieved in addition! As was to be expected, the losses of the 31st Battalion were more severe than those of any other battalion engaged. No fewer than eight officers were killed outright in Lieut.-Col. Toll's command, and the gallantry and devotion which incurred such a heavy loss of officers will be readily imagined. It is interesting to note that in a few days prior to the action 25 privates of this battalion who were due for leave to England declined to go in order that they might be able to participate in the action which they knew to be impending. Doubtless there were similar instances in all of the other units. Brave boys!

The individual deeds of heroism performed on the 25th, 26th,

and 27th of September will never be fully told. Many were performed that were not recorded, and the scores of awards made were only a fraction of the total earned. One name only will be mentioned here—that of Private Budgen of the 31st Battalion. After rushing and capturing several pill-boxes almost unaided, he saw in the distance three Germans leading an Australian away as a prisoner of war. Dashing forward away beyond our lines, he shot one of the Germans and bayoneted the other two and then returned with the man he had rescued. Soon afterwards he met his death in some other daring enterprise and thus never lived to learn that his gallantry had gained him the Victoria Cross.

In the four battalions of the 15th Brigade and in the attacking battalions of the 14th Brigade and in the 29th Battalion the casualties averaged about 250 each. The enemy losses were very much greater, and many hundreds of his dead were left upon the field. About 600 prisoners, including over 20 officers, were captured, and scores of machine guns and many *minenwerfer* were also taken. The official *communiqué* dealing with the battle made interesting reading. It devoted 11 lines to the work of the 33rd Division and curtly announced in two lines that Australian troops (that is, the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions) cleared the remainder of Polygon Wood and reached their objectives for the day. The 4th Australian Division had not been engaged in Polygon Wood at all. The violent attack against the 33rd Division front on the 25th of September was mentioned at considerable length in the preceding day's *communiqué* and it was there stated that the line had been "re-established on the whole of the front attacked." This *communiqué* was timed at 9.32 p.m. on 25th; by noon on 26th it was true.

Of the troops engaged with the infantry the 8th, 14th, and 15th L.T.M.B., as well as the mobile detachments from the 8th, 14th, and 15th Machine Gun Companies, deserve the greatest praise. At all parts of the front Stokes mortars were used to bombard pill-boxes and strong points which were locally holding up the advance, and their crews used them with great skill and resolution. The mobile machine gun crews were as useful in defence as the mortars were in attack, and their proficiency with captured German guns was a feature of their work.

Of the troops in close attendance on the front line none deserve greater praise than the carrying companies and the heroic runners, who all crossed and recrossed the heavily barraged areas again and again. The 57th and 54th Battalions provided most of the carrying parties. The casualties among these were very high, but they accomplished their work, and without their support the front line could never have been sustained. The shelling in Glencorse Wood at one stage was so heavy that the men detained there were given shovels with which they could dig out comrades who had been buried by shells. In this way many lives were saved.

The excellence of the artillery work has been noted at different places in the narrative of the infantry fighting, and the infantry of the 5th Division acknowledged most cordially its appreciation of the fine artillery support that was forthcoming at every phase of the operations. One interesting feature of General Bessell-Browne's admirable conduct of the field artillery operations was the arrangement of a barrage to cover the exposed flank of the 15th Brigade. This was done at short notice and proved very helpful.

It is no reflection on the signalling services of the Division to say that forward mechanical communication was often uncertain. The fact is that operations of the kind described present a problem in forward communications that has not yet been solved. "The average life of my signal wires," remarked a battalion signalling officer, "was three minutes." Pigeons were stunned or killed by concussion; power buzzers and wireless sets were wiped out; only the gallant runners were left—and the messages had to be got through.

The nature of the work of the engineers was indicated in the account of the 14th Brigade attack. On the right brigade front the work was carried out equally well and the officers of the 15th Field Company (Major Greenway) rendered splendid service to the infantry. The 8th Field Company (Major Farquhar), being reserve company, was employed chiefly in sending wire and other engineering material forward to roadhead. The 5th Pioneer Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Carter) was employed at pushing roadhead forward, and by 4 a.m. on the morning of the battle it was through Glencorse Wood. It also maintained the Ypres-Hooge Road, which suffered constantly from shelling, and D Company wired the objective line on the right. All of these troops did splendid work.

Although all the advanced ammunition dumps, as well as many of the supply and water dumps, were blown up in the bombardment of the 25th the front line men lacked neither ammunition, food, nor water at any stage of the operations. Simply to record that fact will afford the reader an idea of the excellent work carried out by the S.A.A. Section of the 3rd D.A.C. (Lieut. Collie), the Divisional Pack Transport Troop (Captain Curtis, A.A.S.C.), and the various battalion Quartermasters. All of these worked heroically and devotedly for the interests of the forward troops and the "Q." organisation of the Division came through its ordeal triumphantly. Indeed, on several occasions flank units, whose food and ammunition supplies had failed, were assisted. Col. Bruche was naturally gratified at the success of the supply arrangements, and he gave to Capt. G. D. Smith, the D.A.Q.M.G., who was soon afterwards promoted Major, and to Major C. W. Robinson, the S.S.O., full credit for their great assistance. That the supplies of the 8th Infantry Brigade would be capably handled was a foregone conclusion with an officer like Capt. H. W. Cuming as its Staff Captain, and Capt. F. A. Wisdom and H. R. Gollan in the 14th and 15th Brigades respectively, though newer to the

work, carried out their responsible duties equally well. Captain Gollan's work was ably seconded by Captain Taylor, the experienced Brigade Quartermaster of the 15th Brigade, whose services were always of great value to the formation. A welcome feature of the supply arrangements was the issue, a few hours before the battle, of over 1,000 lb. of chocolate supplied by the Y.M.C.A.

The medical arrangements were carried out under every disability that heavy enemy shelling could effect. One of Col. Hearn's motor ambulances received a direct hit from a shell; his Wagon Loading Post at the Culvert was completely destroyed, and five cupola shelters near it were blown up. Additional bearers were supplied by the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Australian Field Ambulances, and after the battle infantry working parties 200 strong helped with the forward evacuations which had accumulated through the fight. These all did fine work. The A.D.S. and the Forward Medical Posts were staffed by the 14th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Tebbutt), to whom the bearers of the 8th Field Ambulance were also attached. The whole medical services of the Division were saddened by the death in action of Capt. G. S. Elliott, R.M.O., 56th Battalion, and General Elliott received many messages of sympathy for the death of his gallant brother. Capt. Elliott had captained for many years the Melbourne University Football Club and his fine play was well known to thousands of followers of the winter pastime in Victoria.

Looking over the whole panorama of the battle, it is difficult, even after the event, to find a single spot where the conduct of operations could have been improved. Down to the smallest detail everything had been provided for and most of the provisions made were the best that were humanly possible. The work of the 4th Squadron R.F.C., the perfection of the artillery arrangements, the control of traffic, the collection of intelligence information—things apparently so diverse as these all fitted into their allotted places in the scheme of the battle and their co-ordination with the other services already mentioned made a fighting combination that proved irresistible. General Hobbs, proud of the magnificent men who had fought so splendidly, addressed to them a few days after the battle the subjoined message of congratulation and thanks. It summarised in a few words the nature of their achievement and happily conveyed with its earnest message of thanks that sense of comradeship and personal affection which the General always felt towards his men.

HEADQUARTERS,

5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,

30th September, 1917.

Comrades of the 5th Australian Division,

With the invaluable help of our splendid artillery, but under exceedingly trying and difficult conditions, you have during the past week's operations, with complete success, carried out the task assigned

to the Division—and more—and notwithstanding the most strenuous, prolonged and persistent efforts of the enemy to prevent our attack, to defeat it when made, and to rob us of the fruits of our success when our objectives were gained.

We have fought the Boche to a finish, defeated him, inflicting on him very heavy losses.

To good discipline, thorough preparation and training, and, above all, the whole-hearted co-ordination and co-operation of all arms and branches of the Division our success is due, and I take this opportunity of most heartily thanking you all for the long and strenuous work of training and preparation and congratulate you on the victory won, which has earned for the Division the congratulations and thanks of the Commander-in-Chief, the Army Commander, our own Corps Commander and the Commander of the II A.N.Z.A.C. Corps, under which the Division served when it first came to France.

We are justified in hoping that Australia, too, will be gratified and proud of the success that has crowned our efforts.

(Signed) J. T. HOBBS.
Major-General,
Commanding 5th Australian Division.


Although with the battle of Polygon Wood the Division's major operations on the Ypres front were over, it has been thought advisable to include in this chapter a brief outline of its further experiences in that sector. The 30th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Clark) and the 32nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Davies), which had not been employed in the battle, relieved the 29th and 31st Battalions, and the forward troops of the 15th Brigade in the right sector shortly afterwards and General Tivey assumed command of that part of the front. The 32nd Battalion which was allotted the post of honour on the right beat off a heavy counter-attack on the evening of the 29th of September and waited hopefully for the enemy to come again. But they were disappointed. On the following night the Division was relieved without incident, brigades from the 7th and 21st (British) Divisions taking over from the 14th and 8th Brigades. The Division on its relief passed into the reserve area near Reninghelst and, on the 1st of October, D.H.Q. opened at Scottish Lines, a hutted camp between Reninghelst and Poperinghe. The commanding officers of the battalions relieved in the front line had remained behind for an extra 24 hours in order to make their successors more thoroughly acquainted with the sectors. In accordance with this arrangement, Lieut.-Col. Humphrey Scott, 56th Battalion, was showing his successor around the sector on the morning after his battalion had left it when what was apparently a stray rifle bullet, glancing upwards, as was said, from a Tommy's steel helmet, killed instantly both Col. Scott and Col. Turnbull, the relieving battalion commander. Perhaps no more gallant

or gifted battalion commander than Col. Scott ever led Australians in the field, and his loss was mourned throughout the whole Division. That night a devoted party of men set out from 56th Battalion camp and walked many miles through the shelled area to recover the body of their loved C.O. and bring it back for burial. They found, however, that these last sad offices had already been carried out by the British troops there, and the body was left on the field near those of the gallant officers and men it had so lately led to victory. Lieut.-Col. Scott was succeeded in command of the 56th Battalion by Major Simpson, who had been his second in command for a considerable time.

The Division rested in the reserve area till the 8th of October when a forward move was again ordered. On the 4th of October the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions had accomplished another fine advance over a Corps front that had side-slipped north about 1,200 yards. The I A.N.Z.A.C. sector now lay immediately north of Polygon Wood, and it was intended that the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions should continue the advance on that front. As the entire southern spur of the Passchendaele Ridge was now in our hands and as the protection of the northern Army's right flank was already sufficiently assured the need for a further advance was no longer pressing. Winter, too, was coming on apace and operations were becoming increasingly difficult. Accordingly, when, on the night of the 9th-10th of October, the 5th Division relieved the 1st Australian Division on the right Sector of the I A.N.Z.A.C. front, it was known that its activity would be defensive only.

The recent advance of the 1st Australian Division had brought the right of the corps front to the main road between Broodseinde and Noordendhoek (map p. 231) and it was this sector that General Hobbs took over on the 10th of October. D.H.Q. moved to Lille Gate in the ramparts south of Ypres on the same day. The sector was held on a single brigade frontage with the 8th Brigade in the line and the 15th Brigade distributed in support over the Anzac Ridge, Westhoek, and Halfway House areas. The 14th Brigade remained in reserve at Ouderdom. The Division remained in this sector until the 27th of October, and during the whole of the time the enemy waged a constant artillery battle causing heavy casualties to the forward and support troops. The brigades maintained a sequence of reliefs about every five days and the outstanding infantry activity was in patrolling, where much splendid work was done.

To the front line the route now generally followed was along the Ypres-Menin Road, past Hell Fire Corner to Birr Crossroads. Here the road turned to the left and wound as a corduroy track among many batteries north of Belvedere Lake up to Westhoek Ridge, where Brigade Headquarters of the brigade in the line were established in the large pill-box. Thence a track known as Anzac Duckwalk led up past Anzac House and on to the northern part of the front line. A southern path, Helles Duckwalk, passed Retaliation Farm and led



AN INTERESTING EXHIBIT AT "D.A.D.O.S.," FIFTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
MACHINE GUNS, MINENWERFER, ETC., CAPTURED BY 15TH BRIGADE AT VILLERS BRETONNEUX, 25/4/18.

on to the right half of the Divisional sector. All the roads and paths from Hell Fire Corner forwards were kept under persistent enemy shelling and the courageous devotion of the officers and men engaged in engineering and pioneering works and in the medical and supply work of the area cannot be too highly commended. The extent of the enemy shelling may be judged from the casualties suffered. For the six days ending the 18th of October seven officers and 161 other ranks were killed and 25 officers and 619 other ranks wounded, an average loss of over 130 a day. In the following week the total casualties were about 500. Despite all enemy effort, however, our men in the front line never for a moment relaxed their vigilance and their patrolling activity, while the troops behind them saw to it that their supplies were always brought up and that nothing was lacking that might increase their comfort or security. One notice, too, that during October the units between them saved 11,000 lb. of fat, an eloquent testimony to the conscientious obedience of orders in most distracting circumstances.

Sight of the 5th Divisional Artillery has rather been lost for some time. At the end of September the artillery had returned to the line from its rest and had done splendid work in the successful operation of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions on the 4th of October. It was now the right group of the artillery supporting the 5th Australian Division. In all operations with other formations it had invariably received the most cordial acknowledgments of its assistance, a distinction in which Captain Wallis's Trench Mortar Brigade and the 5th D.A.C. were invariably included. Lieut.-Col. F. Derham had recently succeeded Lieut.-Col. Phillips in command of the 14th F.A. Brigade, and Lieut.-Col. Phillips had been promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General and the commander of the 2nd Divisional Artillery. Everybody was pleased at this well-deserved recognition and Lieut.-Col. Derham soon revealed ability and enterprise equal to that of his predecessor. It may be noted that during the latter half of October all four battery commanders of the 14th A.F.A. Brigade were away from their units suffering from wounds. Another change in the artillery was the appointment of Lieut. Booth to succeed Lieut. Christian as Staff Officer for reconnaissance. Lieut. Christian had done good work, but indifferent health now necessitated a long rest.

The Division's continued misfortune in the loss of senior officers was maintained in the October tour in the line by the death in action of Col. W. W. Hearne, its A.D.M.S. He was struck in the heart by a shell fragment on one of his frequent visits to his most advanced posts, and he was killed instantly. No officer in the Division had been more respected than Col. Hearne and his professional services had been of the same high order as his gallantry and personal worth. An impressive funeral service, which was attended by General Birdwood, the Divisional Commander, and many well-known medical officers, was held at Dickebusch, and the mournful notes of the "Last Post"

found an echo in many hearts that day. His successor as A.D.M.S. was Col. M. H. Downey, a South Australian, who came from the 3rd Australian Division, where he had commanded a field ambulance. Col. Downey was quiet and thorough in his administration, and under his direction the medical services of the Division maintained the efficiency to which they had been raised. Col. Downey did not long retain the able assistance of Major R. W. MacGregor, the D.A.D.M.S. His promotion came during November and his successor proved to be Major W. J. W. Close, an officer whose services were soon lost to the Division through ill-health.

On the 22nd of October General Tivey was wounded, happily not seriously, by a shell splinter, and during his absence Lieut.-Col. J. W. Clark (30th Battalion) temporarily commanded the Brigade. The Division was fortunate indeed that it suffered no other casualty among its Generals. Like General Tivey, Generals Elliott, Hobkirk, and Bessell-Browne took no thought of their personal security when work was to be done, and almost daily in a period like this they had narrow escapes from death. General Hobbs, too, was a source of constant anxiety to his staff, and his *penchant* for going forward nearly cost him his life on more than one occasion about this time. However, he suffered nothing worse than a good many mud baths from bursting shells, and, on one occasion, the loss of a large piece of his uniform which a shell splinter carried away.

Other changes of command in the same period were the appointment of Capt. R. G. Hamilton, 5th Divisional Signal Company, to command the 3rd Divisional Signal Company, and the promotion was thoroughly well deserved. The departure of Lieut.-Col. Carey to become C.R.E. of the 47th (British) Division took place in November. Lieut.-Col. Carey had been a popular and extremely efficient C.R.E. of the Division which he left his debtor in many ways. He was succeeded as C.R.E. by Lieut.-Col. V. A. H. Sturdee, who had long been O.C. of the 8th Field Company before his promotion to the command of the 4th Pioneer Battalion. His sound technical and administrative knowledge combined with his common sense and good humour made the appointment a happy one. His position as C.O. 4th Pioneer Battalion was filled by the promotion of Major H. L. Morrison, who had rendered good service as second in command of the 5th Pioneer Battalion. The 5th Pioneer Battalion, it may be noted there, was highly commended by the C.E. Corps for the splendid *moral*, discipline, and courage, displayed in its work on the forward communications of the Ypres Sector.

On the 28th of October the Division was relieved on the Broods-einde Ridge by the 2nd Australian Division and D.H.Q. moved back again to Scottish Lines on that date. The Divisional Pack Transport Troop having admirably fulfilled the purpose for which it was created, was disbanded on the same day and Capt. Curtis and his fine staff were able to look back on a hard task well and faithfully carried out.

Many of their animals had been killed by shells or drowned in the mud and few people in the Division were more familiar than the Transport *personnel* with that hideous road which wound past Hell Fire Corner, Birr Crossroads and Belvedere Lake up the Westhoek Ridge, and thence on to the Broodseinde Ridge. Major Langley and his provost and traffic control detachments, too, and the 5th D.A.C. were on it night and day and the sustained heroism of these men and of the medical and signal details employed in the same area almost equals that of the front line troops.

The October casualties were the heaviest that the Division had ever experienced in a month in which it had not been engaged in major operations. Sixteen officers and 363 other ranks were killed and 76 officers and 1,436 other ranks were wounded. Heavy as the losses were, they were philosophically borne, and the fine *moral* of the Division remained unimpaired. The animals of the Division, too, had suffered very heavily from enemy shelling and bombing and were now 332 below establishment.

The area had been a bomber's paradise and every night dozens of enemy machines had been busy dropping their detestable cargoes all over the place. The searchlights and anti-aircraft guns which were employed against them had little effect on the enemy airmen, who caused numerous casualties. D.H.Q. had some narrow escapes and the 5th Pioneer Battalion camp suffered severely. Several bombs got direct hits on the Divisional Bomb Dump, but the burning boxes were got into shell-holes before the flames could spread. Capt. Rodd's Ordnance Store at Dickebusch was also bombed and some loss of life occurred there. It was not until the middle of the next year that the measures taken against night-bombing became visibly effective.

CHAPTER XI

(5th November, 1917—31st March, 1918.)

THE MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE SECTOR

Important contemporaneous events :—

Cambrai operations opened	November 20th.
Explosion of munition ship at Halifax	December 6th.
Allenby entered Jerusalem	" 9th.
Russia concluded armistice with Germany	" 15th.
Second Conscription Referendum in Australia	" 20th.
Russia concluded Peace of Brest Litovsk with Germany	March 3rd.
Great German offensive opened	" 21st.
Foch assumed control of operations on Western Front	" 26th.
German bombardment of Paris with long range gun opened	" 29th.

THE Division did not remain long at Scottish Lines. By the 5th of November the 14th Brigade was moving south over the Franco-Belgian Border and the remainder of the Division followed shortly afterwards, D.H.Q. being established in Bailleul by the 11th. It was a move of only a few miles, the Division having been ordered to relieve the 30th and 33rd British Divisions in the sector immediately south of the Ypres salient. Here I A.N.Z.A.C. had taken over a new corps front of which the 5th Australian Division was allotted the left or northern half. The sector was of great tactical importance because it included the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, the recovery of which by the enemy would have threatened our retention of the Ypres salient. On the 13th and 14th of November the relief was effected, and D.H.Q. again crossed the border of Belgium and opened at Ulster Camp, Dranoutre, on the 15th of November.

On the 16th of November the Canadian Corps had captured Passchendaele and the last remaining heights of the ridge, so that it may be said that the operations there concluded shortly after that date. Mr. Winston Churchill stated in the House of Commons during 1919 that the total casualties in these operations between the 31st of July and the 18th of November, 1917, were as follows :—

	<i>Officers.</i>	<i>Other ranks.</i>
British Forces . . .	10,796	207,838
Australians . . .	1,289	26,502
Canadians . . .	496	11,917

That is a total of over a quarter of a million casualties. As the wet weather was now too far advanced to permit of the further development of operations against the enemy's possession of the Belgian coast, his submarine bases there were secure from attack by land until the next summer. The initiative passed to the enemy in the meanwhile and practically all the ground won from him in these terrible battles was yielded back to him without a struggle in April, 1918, as the result of his Flanders offensive of that year. It must not be imagined that the casualties were therefore suffered in vain; for the enemy losses had also been heavy, and we had the moral satisfaction of knowing that we accomplished our immediate aim, while the enemy defence of the Passchendaele Ridge had failed. Nevertheless, the final judgment of the value of the Passchendaele offensive, like that of the 1916 Somme offensive, must be left to later historians. "1917," said Marshal Foch, "was a year lost to both sides," and it appears that he had in mind both the Somme and the Passchendaele offensives as well as the Arras and Champagne attacks. The British and French had tried to break a front that could not be broken by the methods they employed, while the Germans spent the time in showy diplomatic and military victories in the East, a theatre which, though important, was inconclusive.

The new divisional sector stretched south from Hollebeke to the vicinity of Warneton, a distance of about 6,000 yards. It was about six or eight miles north of the old Fleurbaix sector, where the Division had had its first experience of the front line. General Hobbs decided to hold the front with two brigades in the line, and the 15th Brigade which, with the 8th and 14th Brigades, had taken over the sector, was relieved almost immediately by the 14th Brigade. This brigade extended left to the northern boundary, making its front 4,000 yards. This it held with its four battalions in the front system. The 8th Brigade held the southern 2,000 yards of the Divisional frontage with two battalions in the front system and two in brigade reserve near Wulverghem. The 15th Brigade was withdrawn to divisional reserve near Kemmel and it relieved the 14th Brigade on the 29th of November. Owing to its shorter front, the 8th Brigade was able to arrange within itself its own reliefs.

The new front was within five or six miles of Polygon Wood, and it was difficult to believe that a front so near that ghastly sector could be so tranquil. On the 7th of June, 1917, it had been the scene of a great battle, and Plumer's mines had torn vast chasms in the Messines-Wytschaete hillside, and his heavy artillery had smashed the two villages into rubbish heaps. But that splendid conflagration had died down almost as suddenly as it had commenced, and much work had been carried out in the improvement of the sector since then. So that by now the rear organisation was well developed and in the forward areas also the conditions were moderately satisfactory.

Two main routes led to the forward areas, one on each brigade

front. The southern road led past Wulverghem and climbed the little wooded rise that lay just east of that village. Right Brigade Headquarters were established in a fine deep dug-out at North Midland Farm on the left of the road, which thereafter continued on towards Messines. About three-quarters of a mile from Messines the road dipped down into the valley of the little Steenebeek and climbed suddenly up the steep rise that constituted the chief part of the much-disputed ridge. Here the attack had battered the road almost beyond recognition. But duckboard paths wound through the shell craters to the various battalion headquarters and thence to the communication trenches that reached the front line.

On the left brigade sector the forward journey usually commenced from Kemmel, a partially destroyed village that nestled under Mont Kemmel, a conical hill of commanding eminence in the relatively flat country around it. While the Division occupied this sector a visual signalling station was maintained on the top of Mont Kemmel and a telephone connected it with Divisional Headquarters. From Kemmel a fine road skirted by a light railway led up in a long gradual rise to the ruins of Wytschaete and branched from there in several directions, so that it was possible to get wheeled transport to within three-quarters of a mile of the front line at several places along the left brigade front.

The 5th Divisional Artillery having received the cordial thanks of the Canadian troops for its support in their Passchendaele operations, left the Ypres sector on the 12th of November and now joined its own Division again. The artillery had suffered very heavily for some months, and its work had been trying in the extreme. It had been much longer in the line than the infantry brigades and it was doubtless relieved to find itself again in a comparatively easy sector. The 13th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Caddy) took up its accustomed station in support of the 8th Infantry Brigade and the 14th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Derham) was grouped on the left front. Capt. Wallis, the D.T.M.O., was quick to get his mortars into position and Kiwi Farm, Angle House, the Twins, The Giant, Rifle Farm, and other enemy strong points in the foremost zone soon commenced to suffer heavily from his solicitous attention. The Light Trench mortar batteries of the infantry brigades co-operated joyously in these operations, and if the enemy front line troops expected us to adopt a passive attitude their hopes were rudely disappointed. The 15th Brigade here lost by death from wounds a valuable officer in Capt. W. E. Freeman, M.C., who had commanded the 15th L.T.M.B. with great ability and courage. The enemy response to our trench mortar activity was generally light, but on the right brigade front strong minenwerfer and pigeon-bomb retaliation was frequent.

In one respect only was the enemy active, and in that but for a little space. For a few nights his patrols in No Man's Land were exceptionally enterprising, searching for our listening posts and our

outpost sentry groups, and endeavouring to cut off and capture their tiny garrisons. Most of these attempts were beaten off with heavy loss, but a post of four men of the 54th Battalion was badly "scuppered," one being killed and the other three taken prisoner. It was found shortly afterwards, however, from a German prisoner taken on the same front, that they had made a splendid stand. The three prisoners were all wounded before they were taken, and the enemy party suffered heavy losses. For a few nights the German patrols made a courageous attempt to win command of No Man's Land, but they soon abandoned a contest in which they were hopelessly outclassed, and No Man's Land was once again Our Men's Land.

In order to give the reader an idea of the daily routine in the front line, a copy of a 14th Brigade Intelligence Summary is here inserted. It is entirely characteristic of the period, the operations of which require no further description.

14TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 5

Period 6 a.m. 17/11/17 to 6 a.m. 18/11/17

I. OPERATIONS.—(a) Our artillery fired intermittently during the day, increasing slightly between 10 p.m. and 12.20 a.m. Visibility was bad, and effect of firing could not be seen.

(b) **PATROLS.**—1. The Right Battalion patrolled from O.29.c.4.3. to O.29 central, to road at O.29.a.8.3. thence to O.29.c.4.8., to O.29.a.4.8. and returned to O.29.a.2.8. Shell holes in the vicinity of O.29 central were examined but no M. G. positions were found, and no enemy was met with.

2. A patrol of the Right Centre Battalion left OLGA TRENCH O.23.c.6.4. at 10.30 p.m. to bomb an occupied enemy post about 60 yards E. of O.23.c.75.20. Eight rifle grenades were fired, three of which were observed to hit position. Sounds of men running away were heard.

3. A patrol left O.23.c.15.70. at 11 p.m. and proceeded to O.23.c.70.75., where they remained for one hour. Talking was heard at O.23.d.1.7., from which spot a M.G. was also heard firing. They returned at 1.30 to O.23.c.8.2.

4. A patrol left O.11.c.8.4. at 7.30 p.m. and patrolled Military Road as far as O.11.d.8.0. Patrol was fired on by a M. G. from THE TWINS O.11.d.95.20. It returned at 9.40 p.m.

(c) **TRENCH MORTARS.** 100 rounds were fired on T.M. and M.G. positions. A M.G. at O.29.c.75.95. was silenced.

(d) **M. G.'s.** Harassing fire was carried out on O.30.d.00.55., O.30.a.30.10. and O.24.c.55.45. Special attention was paid to tracks leading to LAKE FARM O.24.c.55.45. and PILLEGREMS FARM O.24.a.90.20. 3,000 rounds were fired.

II. IDENTIFICATIONS. Nil.

III. ENEMY SHELLING. The enemy artillery was not very active. At 6 a.m. about 30 Pineapples and 25 77's were fired in vicinity of our outpost line in O.17.b. The ridge in O.29.a. and d. was shelled at 8.35 a.m., GUN FARM O.27.a.8.8. and KILO FARM O.28.b.7.1., ROSE WOOD in O.16.a. and RAVINE WOOD O.19.d. were shelled at intervals during the day.

During the night the enemy was fairly active. From 7.30 p.m. to 10.45 p.m. O.28.b. and c., O.29.a. and c., O.15.a., b. and d., and O.26.c. were shelled. Between 11 p.m. and 2 a.m. about 40 Pineapples fell in the vicinity of O.17.d.0.4.

IV. ENEMY ATTITUDE. At 6.30 a.m. 17th inst. a raid was attempted on No. 5 post at O.23.c.75.20. Three men approached the post and were joined by an officer and 6 others. They reached the wire 30 yards from the post, and were fired on by the garrison. Three men fell and the remainder scattered. A little later 4 men were seen and were fired on and one man was hit. Attempts to secure identifications were prevented by M. G. fire.

Two German parties of stretcher-bearers came out to take in the wounded. Enemy snipers were active in the centre of the sector during the night, but M. G.'s were quieter than usual. M. G.'s fired in bursts as flares were sent up.

V. ENEMY DEFENCES. Working parties were heard in the vicinity of THE TWINS O.11.d.95.20. in the early morning and were fired on by Lewis Guns.

An O.P. is suspected at O.24.c.2.5. Men were seen coming and going from this point.

VI. AERIAL ACTIVITY. Both our own and enemy aircraft were very quiet during the day. An enemy plane flew over our lines at 7.45 a.m. 18th inst. and brought down an observation balloon in the vicinity of N.29. The plane was fired on by A. A. guns and M. G.'s but returned unharmed.

VII. ENEMY MOVEMENT. At 8 a.m. parties of enemy were seen in O.29.a. and were fired on, 2 men were seen in the vicinity of BEEK FARM and were killed by Lewis gun fire. During the afternoon a number of men were dispersed by L.G. fire near O.12.c.8.9.

At 3.5 p.m. 4 men were seen digging near O.18.d.25.60.

VIII. SIGNALLING. White flares were fired by the enemy to light up targets for M.G. At 9.10 p.m. a green flare was sent up and immediately a large number of M. G.'s opened fire. This was repeated at 9.30 p.m.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS. Visibility was very poor, except at rare intervals. During these intervals our snipers were active and claim several hits.

X. GROUND. The ground in front is still very boggy.

XI. WORKS. Special report is being forwarded.

XII. LOCATIONS. As for yesterday.

(Sgd.) R. MURRAY, Lieut.

For G.O.C. 14th Aust. Inf. Brigade.

The comparative quietness of the sector permitted a great deal of engineering work to be done. The area was divided up between the 8th, 14th, and 15th Field Companies, and the necessary work progressed rapidly. A guard wire was erected just in rear of our chain of outposts to prevent stragglers losing their way and straying into enemy country. This misfortune had actually happened to several of Capt. Viner's men in the Salvage Company. Trenches were drained and revetted; many strong posts were constructed and wired; over 4,000 yards of duckwalks were laid; forward accommodation was considerably improved; splinter proof dug-outs for unit headquarters and for medical purposes were erected; screening of the forward roads was carried out where required; buried cables were completed to battalion headquarters. The 5th Pioneer Battalion attended to roads, trenches, trench tramways, hutting and stabling. These activities greatly improved the first defensive system, but the reserve defences were so far very backward. The responsibility for the latter was undertaken by Corps.

The supply arrangements of the sector were simple and call for no detailed notice. The fine work of Lieut. Davis in charge of the Divisional Canteen at Kemmel was greatly appreciated by the men,

and his turnover amounted to many thousands of francs daily. The A.C.F. and the Y.M.C.A. were, as ever, indefatigable in their efforts for the troops, while a handsome officers' club at Kemmel provided a welcome social relaxation for the officers of the Division.

The 8th Field Ambulance took over the Main Dressing Station at Yonge Street, and two Advanced Dressing Stations, one in a finely concreted structure on Wytschaete ridge and the other at Kandahar Farm. The 14th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Thomson) was at Locre Hospice and the 15th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Stewart) at Dranoutre. D.A.D.O.S. too, was stationed at Dranoutre, and the veterinary staff of the Division was distributed among the units as usual. The work of all these services was of the kind with which the reader should now be fairly familiar and it calls for no detailed reference.

On the 14th, 15th, and 16th December the 8th and 15th Brigades in the line and the 14th Brigade in reserve were relieved by the 1st Australian Division, and the Division immediately moved by train to the Samer area for its rest and training. Samer, a little village about 10 miles south-east of Boulogne, was about 60 miles from the Messines-Wytschaete sector, and the railway route to it lay through Hazebrouck and Saint Omer. Units entrained at De Kennebek siding and detrained at Desvres, whence they marched to their billeting villages. The railway journey was scheduled to take five hours, but Hazebrouck was under a heavy long-range gun bombardment at the time and many trains were delayed outside that station for several hours. The area allotted to the Division was a large one, covering about 80 square miles of country and the Division was therefore widely scattered. The 14th Brigade Group was centred around Frencq, the 8th Brigade Group round Desvres, and the 15th Brigade Group around Parenty. D.H.Q. opened at Samer on the 17th of December and the 5th Pioneer battalion and other units were located around Hesdigneul. The 5th Divisional Artillery travelled by road and arrived at its destination at Estrée a little after the remainder of the Division. An unfortunate railway accident in the Desvres Station resulted in the telescoping of a carriage of the train which was bringing the 32nd Battalion down. Over 60 men were killed and injured in this distressing incident.

The move to Samer had some interesting features from a supply point of view. It was decided that all transport units should travel by road, a journey of several days. This made it necessary to arrange for supplies for the men who travelled by train and who would reach their destination some days before their ordinary supply transport could reach them. It also necessitated the provision at stages *en route* of food and forage for the men and animals travelling by road. On the trains the men carried with them a day's ration, and rations for the following day were also placed on the trains and distributed on arrival at the detraining point. Meantime, a number of motor

lorries had gone in advance to Samer, which became railhead on the 15th, and there distributed in the various areas to be occupied sufficient food to maintain the troops until their transport arrived. It should be noted that most of the unit cooks and their animals were brought on the trains.

The problem of supplying the transport details moving by road was more difficult, but it was surmounted by providing dumps of rations and forage *en route*. This was done by motor lorries, which travelled in advance of the other transport. For instance, they drew from Ebblinghem railhead two days' supplies which they dumped at Resecure, where the columns picked them up on their second day's trip. The motor lorries then pushed forward and drew from Lumbres another two days' supplies which they dumped at Thiembronne, where they were collected in due course by the horse transport. In this way the difficult problem of feeding many thousands of troops and horses which were strung out over a wide and constantly changing area was successfully solved. It may be noted here that the accommodation for the troops moving by road was secured by a party from each unit riding ahead on bicycles to the village which was to be the halting place for the night. The whole move was another instance of the administrative skill of Col. Bruche and Capt. Smith at D.H.Q., and of the capable executive supervision of Major Robinson, the S.S.O. It may be said here that the long journey of the transport services was rendered doubly difficult by the weather encountered. Rain and snow first made the roads very sloppy and heavy and then a hard freeze rendered them so slippery that the horses could scarcely keep their feet. However, these difficulties were cheerfully faced and all ranks were soon safely installed in the new area.

Lieut.-Col. Ralph, the new D.A.A.G., had gone down in advance of the Division in order to prepare the area for its reception, and his admirable arrangements gave a first indication of his administrative ability. He had recently succeeded Capt. Jennings in this appointment and had won immediate recognition as much by his frank, hearty personality as by the zest and ability which he displayed in his new duties. Although the area was so large, its billeting accommodation was on the whole disappointing and the great cold of December and January made the comfort of the men an urgent and difficult problem. The field companies soon got to work, and, despite scanty supplies of material, improved many of the barns. Over 8,000 palliasses with 8 lb. of straw per palliasse were secured to provide the men with beds. Little training was possible for a few days owing to heavy snow, but all ranks were happily pre-occupied with the arrangements for Christmas festivities.

These passed off with great success. Three days' complete holiday were given by General Hobbs, and as a liberal leave allotment to Boulogne had been approved, supplies of all kinds were readily

procurable. A service of motor lorries between the area and Boulogne was provided for the use of the leave *personnel*. Lieut. Lawless, the Divisional Paymaster, drew over a million francs for the fortnightly pay instead of the usual 750,000, and the men thus had both money to spend and good shops to spend it in. The sympathetic French civilians all lent a cordial hand, and there among the beautiful snowy hills and valleys of north-western France all ranks sat down to the Christmas dinner of their dreams. The telegraph wires were tingling all day with messages of goodwill between the units of the Division, as well as from other Australian formations, and the retrospective survey of the year's work filled all with pride and satisfaction. General Hobbs, happy because his men were happy, addressed to them the following cordial and prophetic Christmas message.

“I wish all my comrades of the 5th Australian Division a happy Christmas—as happy as it can be under existing conditions. I hope indeed it will be the last we shall spend away from Australia.

“I take this opportunity of thanking you all for the splendid and loyal assistance you have given me during the last twelve months. By your gallantry, efficiency, and good discipline you have won for the Division a reputation of which we may be justly proud—a reputation that inspires the hope that in the coming struggle we shall with honour and distinction take our full share.”

The November casualties for the Division had been five officers and 40 other ranks killed, and 16 officers and 144 other ranks wounded. The December casualties were one officer and 35 other ranks killed and four officers and 132 other ranks wounded. On the 1st of November the strength of the Division was 738 officers and 16,167 other ranks, a considerable degree below strength owing to the heavy fighting in September and October. By the 31st of December the strength was 866 officers and 18,156 other ranks, the substantial increase being due partly to the arrival of reinforcements and partly to the return of the slightly wounded. The animal strength of the Division was almost completely restored by the receipt on the 2nd of December of 326 horses and mules. The veterinary services were very busy about this time in partially clipping all the animals of the Division. The results of the second conscription referendum in Australia were known by this time, and they left Australia in the unique position of being the only country heavily engaged in the war whose population was under no liability to serve abroad. With the merits or demerits of the decision this history is not concerned; its effects, however, were soon to be felt, and even now far-seeing eyes saw the shadow approaching.

Some changes in the staff of the Division and in the higher commands occurred during this period. Lieut. J. M. Hobbs, M.C., Aide-de-Camp to the Divisional Commander, left to join the Indian Army and carried with him the best wishes of many friends through-

out the Division. Capt. W. H. De S. Dickenson, R.F.A., for long the sound Staff Captain of the 5th Divisional Artillery, left to return to the British Army, and Capt. B. M. Morris succeeded him on General Bessell-Browne's Staff. Capt. S. A. Hunn, M.C., G.S.O. III, left the Division, where he had worked hard and successfully, to fill the appointment of G.S.O. II Intelligence at I A.N.Z.A.C. Headquarters. He was succeeded as G.S.O. III by Capt. K. A. Goodland, 29th Battalion. Lieut.-Col. McConaghy, who had commanded the 55th Battalion in the old Fleurbaix days, now returned from duty in England and took over from Major Street the command of the 54th Battalion, which Major Street had held temporarily since the departure, due to ill-health, of Lieut.-Col. Midgeley. Major Wright succeeded Major R. Marsden as Divisional Machine-Gun Officer, the latter officer having been selected for a course of staff training. Capt. Muirson, a gallant and gifted soldier, had left the 15th Machine-Gun Company to join the Indian Army, and his successor was Capt. G. F. Fitzgerald, an officer well known and highly esteemed throughout his brigade. Capt. F. A. Wisdom, Staff Captain of the 14th Brigade, became a brigade major trainee about this time, and he was succeeded as Staff Captain by Capt. A. H. L. Godfrey, M.C. Early in December Major D. M. King, who had been G.S.O. II of the Division since its formation, left to fill a staff appointment in an English formation. He had rendered the Division good service for a long time, especially in its training activities, where his energetic personality and organising ability had ample scope. He was succeeded by Major G. Wootten, a Duntroon graduate of proved ability. He was quiet, prudent, and thorough, and had already gained considerable experience of staff work as Staff Captain of the 8th Brigade in its early Egyptian days, and, later on, as a Brigade Major in the 3rd Australian Division. The reader will have noticed in many of the changes of 1917 a marked tendency towards replacing English officers in the Division by the appointments of Australians. It was not that the English officers were in any sense incapable or unsatisfactory. Most of them had, in fact, rendered fine service at a time when the Australian Army contained insufficient officers with the necessary Staff training. But those times were now past or passing, and capable young Australians were available for Staff work and were in most cases able to fill the positions at least as well as their predecessors. English staff officers of experience were also badly needed in their own formations.

The weather showed a tendency to improve as the month of January progressed and the training and sports competitions began to make good headway. The 32nd, 55th, and 57th Battalions proved themselves the champion all-round units of their respective brigades in the final athletic contests. The nature of the country around Samer limited considerably the facilities for big field day

operations, but in musketry, bayonet fighting, and bombing all the infantry had steady practice. The snow-clad hillsides offered inducements for a game new to Australians, and lightly constructed sleighs were often to be seen carcering down the slopes, laden with a happy crew, who were generally tipped out into a snowdrift somewhere or other *en route*. In this, and even in the ordinary movements over the slippery patches in the roads and streets, several limbs were broken. The Divisional concert party, under the able management of Capt. W. L. Hamilton, the Camp Commandant, contributed very greatly to the enjoyment of this rest period. In addition to the numerous entertainments given within the Division, the troupe often toured beyond Divisional boundaries for the benefit of other units. In this way many concerts were given in Boulogne and in the hospitals centred around that base.

A series of ceremonial parades was arranged for throughout the Division, at which General Birdwood, G.O.C., A.I.F., presented decorations recently announced. Hundreds of officers and men were thus honoured and the Divisional Artillery especially received many awards for its splendid work in the Ypres salient. Everybody was glad to see the fine work of the Division's gunners so fully recognised. But the decoration which gave the most widespread satisfaction, and by which the whole Division felt most uniquely honoured, was the knighthood bestowed on General Hobbs. No reward given to any member of the Division was more truly earned, and none could have been more popular and gratifying. Although, by this distinction, the Divisional Commander was raised into the somewhat rarefied atmosphere of Knight Commanders of the Bath, the elevation did not in the slightest degree withdraw him from the affection of his men. He was still fondly known as "the little General," a title which was soon to be supplanted by one still more intimate and honourable. The generic term "Digger" about this time passed into general use among all Australians. One's rank and precedence mattered not at all. If a man was known and respected as a good, stout, true Australian, he automatically became "Digger" So-and-so, whether his rank was Corporal or Colonel. No other considerations whatever were allowed to influence the bestowal of this extraordinary title, and, in the fulness of time, the Divisional Commander, too, was admitted into the freemasonry of this most modern and honourable order. He became to all his men simply "Digger Hobbs" without any surpluses of "Sir," or "K.C.B.," or anything else, and it was as Digger Hobbs that he ruled all hearts in the formation and led it on into the days of victory and of peace.

The new year brought with it an important difference in the administration of the Australian divisions in France. Their distribution into two Army Corps, I A.N.Z.A.C. and II A.N.Z.A.C., was abandoned and the whole five divisions were grouped under one Corps, known thereafter as Australian Corps, with General Birdwood

in command. It was not until five or six months later, however, that the vicissitudes of war permitted the whole five divisions to work in close conjunction.

Towards the end of 1917 a proposal had been approved for the temporary attachment to D.H.Q. of a demonstration platoon. The chief object was to have in the Division a highly trained and organised platoon which would serve as a model to all other platoons in the formation. It was expected to give tactical demonstrations of platoon employment and to serve, to some extent, as a guard for D.H.Q. and as a training ground for aspirant N.C.O.'s. Lieut. Crain (32nd Battalion) commanded the 1st Demonstration Platoon at D.H.Q. He had about 50 men specially selected from every infantry brigade in the Division and from the 5th Pioneer Battalion. The platoon made rapid headway in its training and soon earned for itself the proud title of "The Demons."

During the whole of the rest period a special importance was given to training in defensive tactics. All ranks knew that the withdrawal of Russia from the allied side meant a great accession of German strength on the Western Front, and the passing of the initiative to the enemy. The novelty of acting on the defensive for a change was rather appreciated by the men. In an important conference General Hobbs outlined to the senior officers of the Division the measures which he considered necessary to make the Division as efficient in defence as it had been proved in offence. These had been thoroughly promulgated throughout the entire formation, and all ranks were absolutely confident that no enemy onslaught would ever break the 5th Divisional front.

The Divisional Reinforcement Wing had moved to Samer with the Division and some idea of its work may be gained from the fact that about 300 officers and 4,000 other ranks passed through it during the six weeks it was stationed at Samer. Major Cowey and Capt. Gilchrist took over the principal duties in connection with the Wing about the end of January, the former acting as Commandant and the latter as Chief Instructor in training. These officers were associated with the Wing until the end of the war and under their administration it reached a high level of efficiency.

On the 20th of January the 8th Field Company (Major Farquhar) left for the line, where it came under the command of the C.E. Corps for special work. About a week later the remainder of the Division commenced its move forward to its old sector on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge. It entrained at Samer and detrained at De Kennebek. The Division was moved in brigade groups, on much the same principles that were employed on the journey down to Samer. The transport units again travelled by road, staging at Elnes, Renescure, and Strazeele. The 14th Brigade Group was the first to move. It left on the 29th of January, stayed over-night at Kemmel, and relieved the 1st Brigade of the 1st Australian Division

as the left brigade of the Divisional front. The 8th Brigade followed the 14th Brigade on the 30th of January and relieved the 3rd Australian Brigade in the right sector on the night of the 31st. Owing to a derailed engine blocking the direct line, via Lumbres and St. Omer, to De Kennebek, some of the 8th Brigade trains were forced to make a wide detour and travel by Boulogne and Calais. The 15th Brigade went into Divisional reserve at Kemmel. The 5th Divisional Artillery moved a little later. It travelled by road and arrived in the sector during the first few days of February. The divisional staff moved to its old headquarters at Ulster Camp, Dranoutre. All ranks soon settled down in an area with which they were already familiar. The 14th Field Ambulance assumed the work of the forward evacuations, but was not kept very busy. The enemy attitude was still passive; the Western Front had not yet thrown off its winter lethargy.

A radical alteration in the method of holding the front had been effected by Corps since the Division left the sector in December. The right brigade now held about two-thirds of the sector with all four battalions in the line, the remainder being held by the left brigade with two battalions in the line. That is, the tactical distribution was exactly the reverse of that formerly used when the right brigade held the narrower front. The important tactical considerations involved need not be discussed here, as the Division had left the sector before they were tested in actual battle.

The winter had not been severe and there was every evidence of an early and dry spring, conditions which would strongly favour the side holding the initiative. The continued transference of enemy divisions from Russia made it certain that this advantage would be enjoyed for some months at any rate by the enemy, and all ranks knew that a supreme effort would be made to smash the French and British Armies and dictate peace before the growing force of America would have time to influence the decision. The enemy trumpeted to the world his offensive intentions and drank in advance much adulation from impressionable neutrals. The Press and public of the allied countries affected for the most part to belittle the gravity of the threat. We had tried in vain for two years to break the German front, they said; was it likely that he would now break ours? The soldiers in the field had this confidence, but not its arrogance; they knew that terrible battles would be fought.

Defensive preparations were obviously the most pressing needs and General Hobbs lost not a moment in directing every energy of the Division into this channel. A field company of engineers was allotted to every two-battalion frontage, and the 8th (Major Farquhar), 15th (Major Greenway), and 14th (Major Bachtold) Field Companies divided the sector between them from right to left in the order mentioned. Their chief work lay in the construction

of strong points in the support and reserve lines of the front system. The construction of the second defensive zone remained in the hands of Corps and was known as the Corps Line. The 5th Pioneers were busied with their now traditional task of forward communications, and roads, trenches, and tramways grew quickly into being wherever they worked. The Divisional Commander adopted with excellent results the system known as "task work." Each working party was set a specified amount of work for the night and it went home as soon as that amount was completed. There was thus every inducement for the men to set to work with a will and get home as soon as possible. All working parties also enjoyed a complete holiday on Sundays—a concession that was greatly appreciated by all ranks. Under these conditions the defensive works of the Division went ahead splendidly.

The machine guns of the Division were grouped under group commanders and the machine gun positions were all thoroughly examined and many of them were re-sited in order to ensure that the utmost fire effect could be secured against an attacking enemy. Alternative positions were dug to which the guns could be withdrawn if necessary. The Divisional Artillery plus the 3rd (Army) A.F.A. Brigade was divided into three groups, known as the Messines Group (13th A.F.A. Brigade), Oostaverne Group (14th A.F.A. Brigade), and Hollebeke Group (3rd [Army] Field Artillery Brigade). The Trench Mortar Brigade spent most of its time in pulverising enemy strong points in his forward zone, but also worked energetically on the construction of alternative mortar positions during its spare moments. The signal, medical, and supply services were equally busy, each adapting its activities to its particular requirements in case of heavy enemy attacks.

In order to keep touch with the enemy's movement of troops, it was now absolutely necessary to secure a regular supply of prisoners. For the first few nights these were secured, chiefly on the 8th Brigade front, by the customary patrolling. As this supply tended to fail towards the middle of the month, it became necessary to resort to more violent measures to secure identifications. After some daring reconnaissances by the Adjutant, Capt. N. Lovett, Lieut. Staples, and others, the 54th Battalion carried out on the night of the 19th of February an unusually successful raid on Whiz Farm, a strong point in the enemy front system. After a two-minute bombardment by the Hollebeke Group Lieut. A. G. Bates, D.C.M., and 20 volunteers rushed the position. A German fired point blank at Bates as he led his men in, but fortunately missed and Bates shot the man dead. The enemy was preparing a stout resistance when Private White of the Battalion Intelligence staff called out to them in German to lay down their arms and come out. This they did and the raiders returned triumphantly with seven prisoners and without a casualty. Lieut.-Col. McConaghy and

Major Oatley received many congratulations on this, the fourteenth raid of the Division, one of the neatest and most successful of the series. The 3rd Australian Division, then on the 5th Division's right, had carried out a bigger, but equally successful, undertaking on the night of the 10th of February, in which the 5th Divisional Artillery and the 8th Brigade had given useful co-operation. As enemy identifications were forthcoming in sufficient numbers, no further raids were necessary during February. One of the prisoners captured during February gave an important identification of a division just transferred from the Russian Front.

The numerous raids of the period imposed a good deal of work on Brigade Staffs and the brigadiers concerned were almost daily to be found inspecting the front line positions. Returning late one night from such an inspection, General Hobkirk accidentally trod on the hand of a private who was sleeping on the floor of the trench. The man summed up the situation in an eloquent and carefully-phrased burst of profanity, in which it appeared that his unknown disturber was a "clumsy and lop-sided bloke," sprung from obscure forebears of questionable morality and all the rest of it. Much though he regretted the accident, General Hobkirk's natural distaste for violent language could not be entirely suppressed, and he uttered a sharp "Tut-tut, man, tut-tut." "Tut-tut yourself," retorted the soldier, "What's the good of sounding your blanky motor horn *after* you've run over a bloke?"

March brought with it a perceptible quickening of the military pulse. Our patrols still moved at will about No Man's Land and our artillery lost nothing of its customary arrogance. But the enemy attitude, though still in general passive, took from day to day a more defiant note. A marked tendency was shown to raid our outpost line—the idea of sweeping down in overwhelming force on something small, and presumably almost helpless, retained its old irresistible appeal to the German mind. His artillery, too, often from behind elaborate smoke screens, blazed occasionally into sudden paroxysms of fury and obliterated this or that target in our forward zones. These outbursts though short-lived were extremely violent, and all ranks felt that, if a day should come when the German General Staff desired to consecrate to destruction our foremost defences, there were in the misty fields behind the Ypres-Commines Canal sufficient guns and shells for the purpose. The day did come but the 5th Australian Division was then far away.

The diaries of the period again sparkle with details of our raids. On the night 3rd-4th March, Lieut. Falconer and 40 other ranks of the 57th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Stewart) found the quarry gone when they penetrated an enemy strong point on General Elliott's front; but Lieuts. Slaughter and Hardy, with their party of 35 other ranks of the 58th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Denehy), got the desired identifications without suffering a casualty. On the same night,

the 14th Brigade front was also active, and Lieut. S. Colless, of the 55th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Woods) and 20 other ranks had an extremely successful operation in the vicinity of Whiz Farm. The Division produced few subordinate leaders of greater enterprise or daring than Colless, and he headed his small party into the strong point and killed a couple of Germans who were in the act of firing at him. A sharp fight followed and another eight or ten Germans were killed and two prisoners were secured. When returning across No Man's Land with the captives, Colless observed an enemy party hastening up to cut off his retreat. Retaining half a dozen men to deal with this threat, he hurried the remainder of his men off with the prisoners. The enemy party was gallantly led and actually came into hand-to-hand conflict with the raiding detachment. One German struck Colless—and died the next instant. After six Germans had been killed the survivors of the enemy party made good their escape and Colless and his men returned unscathed. A "Chinese" attack on The Twins was carried out during the raid. Dummy figures set up in No Man's Land and operated by strings were made to rise and fall most realistically and drew the enemy attention from the real point of attack. These three raids were the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth of the divisional series.

On General Elliott's front raiding activity was resumed on the night 11th-12th March, when the 59th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Scanlan) and the 57th Battalion both conducted raids. Lieut. Binder led the 59th party of 20 men. Scrambling through a lot of wire and other obstructions in advance of the remainder of the party, Binder and two other ranks captured three Germans who were so unnerved by the splendid artillery shooting that they were unable to offer any resistance whatever. The party returned without a casualty. Capt. W. E. S. Edgar admirably directed the operation of the 57th raiding party which consisted of Lieuts. Falconer and Muter and 60 other ranks. Three prisoners were taken and numerous dead were left in the enemy trenches, where our artillery fire had wrought great destruction. The party lost two other ranks killed and two other ranks wounded. Body armour was used with satisfactory results in both these raids, the eighteenth and nineteenth conducted by the Division.

Desirous of still further punishing the nervous enemy garrison opposite his brigade front, General Elliott launched two more raids a couple of nights later. The 58th Battalion supplied a large party consisting of four officers, Capt. Ferres, Lieut. McKinnon and 2nd Lieuts. McKenna and Shiells, and 81 other ranks, organised into three distinct detachments each with its special objective. Two of the objectives were successfully reached and Germans were killed at both places. Several prisoners were captured and the party returned, suffering only two casualties. The 60th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Layh) was equally successful in its enterprise, which was carried

out against Rifle and July Farms by Lieuts. O'Connor and Walker and 2nd Lieut. Moore accompanied by 50 other ranks. Rifle Farm was found to be unoccupied, but at July Farm Moore's party secured four prisoners without encountering any resistance whatever. Indeed, not a shot was fired nor a bomb thrown by any member of the entire raiding party, and it returned with only three slight casualties from random machine-gun fire. The 55th Battalion co-operated on the 14th Brigade front with a dummy raid.

It was hardly to be expected that the enemy could continue to endure indefinitely these raids without some attempt at retaliation. But all their efforts against our posts failed badly. "Surrender," triumphantly roared a German officer who with a large party of over 70 had almost surrounded a small 53rd Battalion outpost one night in the early part of March. "Surrender be damned," shouted the N.C.O. in charge of the post, and a storm of rifle and Lewis gun fire opened on the attackers, who suffered numerous casualties and withdrew in haste. A similar attempt on the 9th of March met a similar fate and prisoners were left in our hands. In these attempts the Germans were much like the sheep that went out looking for wool and came home shorn. It was perhaps a moot point whether the enemy was discouraged more by our raids or his own.

On the 15th of March the 8th Brigade relieved the 15th Brigade in the right sector, and General Tivey's raiding teams had trained assiduously to carry on the enterprises. Plans were arranged and the necessary artillery preparations were in progress when startling events occurred which led to a sudden cancellation of all further raiding activities on the divisional front.

It was on an evening towards the middle of March that an enemy long-range gun landed a shell plumb on top of Mont Kemmel and his numerous captive balloons saw that the range was good. That shot seemed to break the spell that had lain so long over the enemy lines; on the 5th Divisional sector it was, in effect, the opening shot of the great 1918 offensive. The gun that fired it had many accomplices, and for the several succeeding days these gradually joined in and placed our back areas under an accurate and steady, though not heavy, bombardment. Villages long immune from shell fire commenced to suffer again, and daring civilians who had crept back hopefully to their little homes now sadly commenced to pack their scanty belongings once again and to trek away to other places beyond the shadow of the coming holocaust. The conditions were reported to be similar along almost the entire length of the Western Front. However, there was as yet nothing more than an attempt to damage our rear communications, and to terrify the innocent civilian populations of villages not tactically significant. But the sudden annihilating barrages in the front areas became steadily more frequent and heavier. It was obvious that the storm of the German offensive was soon to burst. But, as yet, one could only conjecture where.

Those were anxious days for all ranks, but particularly for the men in the forward zones. For they well knew that should the enemy make his big effort in the sector they occupied there was nothing for them to do save to die fighting at their posts.

Sir Douglas Haig's defensive dispositions on the front of the British Armies were simple. On the north the line was so near the Channel ports that he could afford to yield but little ground there. Accordingly, he kept the greater part of his reserves in close proximity to this part of the British front. The Third Army front, which lay near the centre of the British lines, was also strongly held by four Army Corps with a division to every 4,700 yards. On the south part of the British front the line was much further from the vital sea communication, and, furthermore, behind it lay the wide expanse of the devastated areas of the Somme battle of 1916 and 1917. These could be sacrificed without fatal consequences and an enemy advance there would be considerably hampered by the devastation of the country. The four army corps of the 5th Army were therefore allotted a total frontage of 42 miles—about one-third of the total British battle front—and the 11 Divisions in the line on the Fifth Army front held on an average divisional sectors of 6,750 yards. General Gough had in reserve only three infantry and three cavalry divisions.

It should be noted here that a reorganisation of British brigades to contain only three infantry battalions instead of four as heretofore had been effected in February. This reconstitution, which had not yet spread to the Australian forces, naturally reduced the fighting strength of the divisions, while subordinate commanders were as yet unfamiliar with the tactical handling of the three-battalion formation. On the 19th of March Sir Douglas Haig's Intelligence Staff reported that the final stages of the enemy offensive preparations were almost completed and that a heavy offensive on the Arras-St. Quentin front might be expected almost immediately.

Though the main attack was thus expected further south, the northern British Armies were also prepared. On the 5th Divisional front everything was in readiness. The 20th of March passed without special incident. But in the early morning of the 21st the enemy artillery, which had been chafing uneasily for so many days, burst suddenly into what might easily have been the beginning of a bombardment on the grand scale. Lieuts. Hill and Jones, and Lee.-Cpl. Chapman of the 31st Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Freeman) had chosen this unpropitious occasion to spend the night in No Man's Land in close proximity to some enemy posts which they wished to observe carefully throughout the following day. The bombardment caused them to doubt seriously the wisdom of the proceeding, and when they saw a large enemy raiding party approaching our lines in the mist of the early morning they knew that their position was desperate. However, they determined to die

fighting. The officers emptied their revolvers into the approaching party and some bombs were thrown. The Germans were greatly taken aback and, hurling a cloud of stick bombs in the direction of the shots, the hostile party withdrew some distance. Although all three of our men were wounded by the bombs, they took advantage of the enemy's momentary indecision to make good their escape back to our own line. The German raid was not renewed.


But that was the only threat of infantry action on the 5th Divisional front on the morning of the fateful 21st of March, 1918. It was otherwise on the fronts of the Fifth and Third Armies. By 9.45 a.m. on the 54 miles of front between the Sensee and the Oise Rivers, Ludendorff had launched his great offensive with, to quote Sir Douglas Haig, "at least 64 divisions . . . a number considerably exceeding the total forces composing the entire British Army in France." The Third Army stood the shock fairly well, but the lightly held lines of the Fifth Army were unequal to the great strain thrown upon them. For the first day or so the German masses encountered a good deal of opposition in the foremost lines and in the battle zone of Gough's Army. But the local reserves were soon consumed and the front collapsed, and the enemy progress became rapid. Ham and Roisel fell, and names familiar to the 5th Division, like Beaumetz and Louverval and Noreuil, figured in the *communiqués* as having fallen again into the enemy's hands. The men of the 5th Division laughed grimly when they heard of it and said they expected they would have to go down there and get them back. Then Péronne fell and Bapaume, and Flers, and Gueudecourt, and Montauban, and the men said, "Good Lord, they'll be in Albert next!" So they were, and, south of Albert they appeared to be going even farther. Perhaps Amiens might fall! Thus several days passed in rapidly growing tension and in the desire to be up and doing. All leave was cancelled and the great gravity of the situation became daily more apparent. Then came relief. On the night of the 26th, the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions shared the 5th Divisional front between them and the 5th Division hurried back to the entraining stations at Godewarsvelde, Hopoutre, and Caestre, where the 8th, 14th, and 15th Brigade Groups entrained respectively for a destination marked "X" in the earlier orders. For the 8th and 15th Brigades, "X" turned out to be Doullens, and the 14th Brigade went five miles further on to Mondicourt. Both places were in the reserve zone behind the Third Army. It was at Doullens on the 26th of March that Foch and Clemenceau met Sir Douglas Haig, the Commanders of the British Armies, and Lord Milner, and Foch was given powers which virtually made him supreme commander of all the Allied forces on the Western Front. The appointment was everywhere received with heartfelt satisfaction.

The move southwards of the Division was an anxious one, but was carried out with all the skill of veteran soldiers moving under

the direction of an experienced and able staff. The railway was under long-range bombardment at many points, and the 58th Battalion suffered numerous casualties from a 15-inch shell which hit its train near St. Pol. Anti-aircraft Lewis guns were mounted along all the trains, and no one knew at what moment detrainment might be ordered and fighting commence. But nothing of the kind was necessary. Byng's Third Army was in fact bearing the enemy onslaught very well and the troops of the Division detrained in perfect security and marched forward to the Vauchelles area, about ten miles north-west of Albert. They met *en route* thousands of French women and children and old men who, forlorn and anxious but with the unconquerable fire of patriotism shining in their tear-dimmed eyes, had packed their scanty belongings once again and were seeking shelter further back. Everywhere along the roads, too, were thousands of labourers busily engaged in digging trenches and erecting wire, and even as the troops pressed forward defence systems grew into being around them. By the 27th D.H.Q. had opened at the 5th Corps School at Vauchelles, and by the 28th most of the Division had arrived and the infantry brigades were billeted in neighbouring villages before which outpost lines were posted. Orders were received that the Division was to be ready to move at an hour's notice, and the strain of expectancy was great. Meantime, the Divisional Artillery was following the infantry, but its concentration in the vicinity of Authie was not complete until the 4th of April.


The Division had not yet been called upon to participate in the fighting and it was already clear that the area of danger was rather behind the Fifth than the Third Army. What was left of Gough's formation was still falling back before the enemy pressure, and on the 29th of March the 15th Brigade Group was ordered south to the vicinity of Corbie, where the penetration was most threatening. Here General Elliott's Brigade came temporarily under the control of the 3rd Australian Division and was allotted the task of guarding the Somme crossings between Aubigny and Vaux-sur-Somme. At this stage the line reached by the enemy on the sectors with which this narrative is concerned was approximately the old Ancre line about seven miles east of Vauchelles and then south through Albert, Dernancourt, Hamel, and just east of Villers Bretonneux. As a clear idea of the transformation wrought on the Western Front by the several German offensives of 1918 is necessary for an understanding of the final phases of the war, it has been thought advisable to include here a map dealing with the subject.

Before passing to the account of the wonderful doings of the Division's last and greatest campaign, it will be necessary to notice two important alterations in the constitution of the formation. Early in March the Divisional Trench Mortar Brigade was remodelled on a different basis. The X.5A., Y.5A., and Z.5A., M.T.M. Batteries were combined to form two six-gun M.T.M. batteries to be known as



OFFENSIVE OPENED APRIL 9TH 1918.
 " " MARCH 21ST 1918
 " " MAY 27TH 1918 AND
 CONTINUED ON JULY 15TH 1918

AREAS CAPTURED IN THE THREE GREAT
 GERMAN OFFENSIVES OF 1918.



the 9th and 10th Australian M.T.M. Batteries. The V.5A. Heavy Trench Mortar Battery passed under Corps control, perhaps on the analogy of the Corps control of heavy artillery generally. Command of the 9th and 10th M.T.M.B. was given to Capt. A. C. Macallister, M.C., D.C.M., and Capt. E. J. Ferguson, M.C., respectively. By now the M.T.M. Batteries were armed with a six-inch Newton Mortar, a weapon of greater power and accuracy than the old "plum pudding" mortars. The strength of each of the 9th and 10th M.T.M. Batteries was about four officers and sixty other ranks.

About the middle of March, too, the final stage in the war of the administrative evolution of the machine gun was reached when the 8th, 14th, 15th, and 25th (Divisional) Machine Gun Companies were combined to form the 5th Machine Gun Battalion. As all the units concerned were in the line and as the organisation of the battalion was interrupted by the move south, the earlier stages of the work involved considerable trouble, but it was successfully accomplished by Major D. H. Wright, who had been appointed second in command, and by Capt. Berry, the adjutant. Major Marsden, who was away undergoing staff training, was recalled to take command of the new battalion and all machine gunners were pleased at this recognition of his sterling services to the Division. The staffs and *personnel* of the four constituent machine gun companies underwent but little alteration on the formation of the battalion. The companies retained their original names and were commanded by Capt. Bridgford, Capt. Spier, Capt. Fitzgerald, and Capt. Barker.

It may conveniently be noted here that some important modifications of establishments also occurred during March. The strength of a pioneer battalion was raised from about 980 to about 1,200. The strength of a brigade of field artillery rose from about 790 to 850 and the Divisional Ammunition Column also increased its establishment of *personnel* from about 600 to 650.

Several important changes in the staff and higher commands of the Division also occurred during March. Lieut.-Col. V. A. H. Sturdee, the C.R.E., received an important appointment on Sir Douglas Haig's staff at G.H.Q. He was succeeded as C.R.E. by Lieut.-Col. L. F. S. Mather, who came from the 4th Australian Division with a long record of fine service. On the 23rd of March, too, the 14th Brigade said good-bye to General Hobkirk, who had for so long commanded it. He left to take command of the 120th (British) Infantry Brigade which at the moment was fighting with its back to the wall somewhere near Bapaume. He stood very high in the esteem of his men and retained to the last their trust and affection. His successor was Lieut.-Col., soon Brigadier-General, J. C. Stewart, who had commanded the 57th Battalion from its far-away Egyptian days. He was known and admired throughout the entire Division as a fine personality, with a rare knack of handling men and a still rarer gift of clear tactical insight. No appointment

could have been more popular and, though the new Brigadier entered on his duties in the most critical days of the whole war, the brigade's efficiency was fully maintained throughout crisis after crisis of steadily increasing gravity.

In the infantry battalions there were one or two important changes of command. Lieut.-Col. Purser relinquished command of the 29th Battalion at the beginning of March, a command he had held with ability and success since the winter of 1916. He was succeeded by Lieut.-Col. McArthur, who had left Australia as the unit's Adjutant in 1915. Lieut.-Col. McArthur's promotion was the result of long and thorough work and an untiring devotion to the interests of his unit. In the 56th Battalion Major Oatley relieved Major Simpson in the command. Mr. J. R. Campbell, the representative of the Australian Comforts Fund with the Division since May, 1916, returned to Australia about this time after a long period of work that had proved of great value to the troops. He was succeeded by Mr. Guy Sherwood, who soon showed himself an able and enthusiastic administrator in every way worthy of administering the trust that his position conferred upon him. Mr. L. Greenberg, the chief representative of the Y.M.C.A. with the Division, also left it about this time after a long period of very fine work.

The casualties for March had been one officer and 103 other ranks killed, 12 officers and 422 other ranks wounded, and four other ranks missing. The strength of the formation at the end of March was 886 officers and 18,086 other ranks. The Division was thus practically at full strength, its *moral* and discipline were extremely good, and it was in every way ready and anxious to bear its full share of the difficulties by which the allied forces were now confronted. A copy of the order of battle as it existed on Feb. 6th, 1918, is appended.

ORDER OF BATTLE—FIFTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Commander—Major-General Sir J. T. HOBBS, K.C.B., V.D.

A.D.C.—Capt. W. L. HAMILTON.

A.D.C.—Lieut. N. TEMPERLEY.

G.S.O. I.	Lieut.-Col. J. H. Peck, D.S.O., A.I.F.
G.S.O. II.	Major G. F. Wootten, D.S.O., A.I.F.
G.S.O. III.	Capt. K. A. Goodland, A.I.F.
A.A. and Q.M.G.	Col. J. H. Bruche, C.M.G., A.I.F.
D.A.A.G.	Lieut.-Col. E. M. Ralph, A.I.F.
D.A.Q.M.G.	Major G. D. Smith, M.C., A.I.F.
Div. I.O.	Capt. F. W. Robinson, A.I.F.
C.R.A.	Brig.-General A. J. Bessell-Browne, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.E.	Lieut.-Col. V. A. H. Sturdee, D.S.O., A.I.F.
A.D.M.S.	Col. M. H. Downey, A.A.M.C.
D.A.D.M.S.	Major J. A. James, A.A.M.C.
D.A.D.V.S.	Major M. Henry, A.A.V.C.
D.A.D.O.S.	Capt. J. M. Rodd, A.O.D.
A.P.M.	Major E. J. F. Langley, D.S.O., A.I.F.

THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN

INFANTRY BRIGADES.

8TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

A.-Comdr.—Lieut.-Col. J. W. Clark, D.S.O., A.I.F.
 Brigade-Major—Capt. F. Wisdom, A.I.F.
 Staff Captain—Capt. H. W. Cuming, M.C., A.I.F.

29th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. N. Purser, D.S.O.
 30th Battalion, Major P. Charlton, M.C.
 31st Battalion, Lieut.-Col. N. Freeman, D.S.O., A.I.F.
 32nd Battalion, Lieut.-Col. C. S. Davies, D.S.O. (The Leicestershire Regt.).
 8th M. G. Company, Capt. A. K. Flack, M.C.
 8th L.T.M.B., Lieut. H. Walker.

14TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brig.-Gen.—C. J. Hobkirk, D.S.O. (The Essex Regt.).
 Brigade Major—Major R. G. Legge, M.C., A.I.F.
 Staff Captain—Capt. A. H. L. Godfrey, M.C.

53rd Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Cheeseman, M.C.
 54th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. D. M. McConaghy, C.M.G.
 55th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. P. W. Woods, M.C.
 56th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. A. J. G. Simpson.
 14th M. G. Company, Lieut. T. C. Montague.
 14th L.T.M.B., Capt. E. H. Brook.

15TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

A.-Brigade Comdr.—Lieut.-Col. J. C. Stewart, D.S.O.
 Brigade Major—Major G. A. Street.
 Staff Captain—Capt. H. R. Gollan.

57th Battalion, Major R. M. C. Aitchison.
 58th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. C. A. Denehy, D.S.O.
 59th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. J. J. Scanlan.
 60th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. N. Marshall, D.S.O., M.C.
 15th M. G. Company, Capt. G. F. Fitzgerald.
 15th L.T.M.B., Capt. Keys.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY

Brigade Major—Major H. H. Hulton, R.F.A.
 Staff Captain—Capt. B. M. Morris, A.F.A.
 Staff Lieut. for Reconnaissance—Lieut. E. H. Booth, A.F.A.

13TH F.A. BRIGADE

Lieut.-Col. H. O. Caddy, D.S.O.

49th Battery, Major V. H. Gatliff.
 50th Battery, Major F. Thornthwaite, M.C.
 51st Battery, Major E. G. Lister.
 113th Battery, Major C. A. Callaghan, D.S.O.

14TH F.A. BRIGADE

Lieut.-Col. F. F. Derham, D.S.O.

53rd Battery, Major L. E. Beavis.
 54th Battery, Major Kelly.
 55th Battery, Major F. J. McCormack.
 114th Battery, Major N. L. Dreyer.

DIVISIONAL TRENCH MORTAR OFFICER

Capt. W. D. Wallis.

Medium Trench Mortars

X.5A. T.M. Battery, Lieut. H. J. Filshie.
 Y.5A. T.M. Battery, Lieut. A. G. Macallister.
 Z.5A. T.M. Battery, Lieut. E. J. Ferguson, M.C.

Heavy Trench Mortars

V.5A. T.M. Battery, Capt. W. H. Hind.

DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN

Lieut.-Col. F. A. Hughes, D.S.O.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS

8th Field Company, Major W. G. Farquhar.
 14th Field Company, Major H. Bachtold, D.S.O., M.C.
 15th Field Company, Major H. Greenway, D.S.O.
 5th Aust. Div. Signal Company, Major R. A. Stanley.

PIONEERS

5th Pioneer Battalion, Lieut.-Col. H. G. Carter.

DIVISIONAL MACHINE GUN COMPANY

25th Aust. Machine Gun Company, Capt. S. S. Berry.

DIVISIONAL TRAIN

Lieut.-Col. F. H. Francis, D.S.O.
 S.S.O., Major C. W. Robinson.
 10th A.A.S.C. (H.Q. Company) Major J. J. Brasenor.
 18th A.A.S.C. Capt. L. K. Stevenson.
 28th A.A.S.C. Capt. C. B. Grieve, M.C.
 29th A.A.S.C. Capt. A. Matheson.

MEDICAL UNITS

8th Field Ambulance, Lieut.-Col. F. H. Makin.
 14th Field Ambulance, Lieut.-Col. C. W. Thompson, M.C.
 15th Field Ambulance, Lieut.-Col. K. Smith.
 5th Sanitary Section, Capt. V. M. Coppleson.

DIVISIONAL SALVAGE COMPANY

Capt. C. E. Viner.

VETERINARY

5th Mob. Vet. Section—Capt. R. Grant.
 Divisional Machine Gun Officer—Major A. H. Wright.
 Divisional Bomb Officer—Capt. A. D. Ellis.
 Divisional Gas Officer—Lieut. R. M. K. Wilson

6th February, 1918.

PART V
SECOND SOMME CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER XII

(1st April—30th April, 1918.)

VILLERS BRETONNEUX

Important contemporaneous events :—


Second great German Offensive opened between Armentières and
La Bassée April 9th.
British Naval Operations against Zeebrugge „ 23rd.

UNTIL the 4th of April the 5th Division less the 15th Brigade Group remained inactive around Vauchelles. The 13th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Caddy) and the Divisional T.M. Brigade (Capt. Wallis), which had been delayed in the Second Army area somewhat longer than the rest of the Divisional Artillery, finished the journey on this date and the move south of the Division was thus complete. The strain of the week's enforced inaction at Vauchelles was considerable. A certain amount of looting and disorder, the almost inevitable accompaniment of the retreat of beaten troops, was taking place in the area and this was doubtless increased by the civilian disorder which necessarily existed. Sneers at Australian discipline—always a fashionable pastime in some English circles—were rife, and several accusations of looting were levelled at soldiers of the Division. General Hobbs felt the accusations keenly and personally conducted searching inquiries into each case. Every charge of looting preferred against Australian soldiers was absolutely disproved. Indeed, this was only to be expected; the 5th Australian Division was not retreating in disorder from a victorious enemy, and its men had never been out of the supervision and the perfect control of their officers. Lest there may be some readers who are troubled by widely advertised English views of Australian discipline generally, it may be as well to admit candidly that the average Australian private had not the lynx-eyed deference which detects officers from afar, and confers on them an extravagant salute at a range of fifty yards or more. In this respect Australian discipline undoubtedly suffers by comparison with English. Australians, however, have a theory that discipline is tested best by steadiness on the field of battle, and

by reliability in circumstances of great strain and danger. This theory may be all wrong, but, such as it is, Australians stick to it, and invite comparison on that basis with any troops in the world.

At 4 p.m. on the 4th of April the long-expected move orders came. The Division was ordered to proceed at once to the Blangy Tronville area and to relieve the 3rd (British) Cavalry Division and the 14th (British) Division in the area lying south of the Somme and extending roughly from the Somme at Vaire southwards to the vicinity of Villers Bretonneux. As the 8th Brigade Group was embussing, other orders came to hand instructing it to assemble as speedily as possible at the Bois de Gentelles, a reserve position on the Divisional sector to the south of Villers Bretonneux. The order was executed with commendable promptitude and by 9 a.m. on the 5th, General Tivey's Group was completely concentrated at the Bois, where it came under the administration of the 18th (British) Corps. By 10 p.m. on the 4th, D.H.Q. reached Blangy Tronville, a village in the Somme valley about five miles east of Amiens. All the available accommodation was occupied by English troops, and it was 1 a.m. before Headquarters were established in a mean little room off one of the muddy streets. On the next day, the 14th Brigade Group—now the only one left with the Division—arrived at Aubigny, a village about two miles further up the river. By this time the 15th Infantry Brigade had been transferred from the 3rd Australian Division to the 3rd Cavalry Division and had orders to hold the line from the Somme to a point near the south-west corner of Vaire Wood, a front of about 4,000 yards. As another order had now deprived General Hobbs of his Divisional Artillery he protested to General Rawlinson, who had taken over the conduct of operations on this front, against this dispersion of his command. At 4 p.m. on the 5th, the Division received instructions to take over the line from the 3rd Cavalry Division. The 14th Brigade accordingly relieved the 6th Cavalry Brigade from the right of the 15th Brigade to the Villers Bretonneux-Warfusée Abancourt Road. Command of the sector passed to General Hobbs on completion of the relief at 4 a.m. on the 6th. The 8th Brigade and the Divisional Artillery returned to the fold a few days later and the Division was once again a complete formation. The 14th and 15th Brigades were in the line and the 8th Brigade in reserve. The Divisional front extended from just east of Vaire-sur-Somme to just east of Villers Bretonneux.

The sector was absolutely devoid of defensive works. The front line consisted of an almost haphazard series of outposts was connected by trenches and undefended by wire. The area was littered with the bodies of cavalry horses, while several destroyed aeroplanes also testified to the severity of the fighting that had occurred there. This was the sector of the deepest enemy penetrations, and further attacks were momentarily expected. Defensive works were accordingly put in hand with the greatest possible energy.



THE SOUTHERN ENTRANCE OF THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL TUNNEL.

Movement of guns and of transport traffic was restricted considerably by the Somme river, here a strong stream about 15 yards in width, and the engineers and pioneers were soon hard at work erecting bridges at suitable crossing places. The 6th of April passed without important incident. On the 7th, Bouzencourt, a tiny village about a mile in front of our left battalion, was investigated by a 15th Brigade patrol. It was found to be unoccupied by the enemy and some French women and children and several wounded soldiers were rescued from it. On this day and on the succeeding days both the 14th and 15th Brigades made local improvements in our line at various places and the advanced organisation became much more satisfactory.

The 9th was a fatal day for the 54th Battalion. Lieut.-Col. McConaghy, the C.O., his Adjutant, the gallant Capt. Lovett, and his valued intelligence officer, Lieut. Staples all lost their lives from the effects of a 5.9 shell which got a direct hit on Battalion Headquarters. Hardly had this calamity occurred when the battalion was further upset to learn that Major Jack, who was liaising with a unit on the right, had also been killed by shell-fire. It was a heavy blow and the 9th of April, 1918, will for ever remain a black day in the annals of the battalion. All four officers were profoundly admired and their fighting value was recognised far beyond the confines of their own unit. Lieut.-Col. Holland took over command of the 54th Battalion.

The only incident in the local fighting of the 9th of May was a patrol affray at Bouzencourt. Lieut. Staley, arriving at the village with a patrol of the 15th Brigade, found it occupied by an enemy patrol which he forthwith ejected.

The 9th of April was also a momentous date in the history of the war, for on it the second attack of the great German offensive was launched on a front between La Bassée and Armentières, spreading north a little later so as to include the Messines and Wytschaete sector recently vacated by the Division. Perhaps the strategical object of the attack was to create a salient north of Arras which, combined with the Somme salient south of it, would necessitate our withdrawal from the Arras sector. Although this result was not achieved, the offensive made rapid headway. Four sectors which the Division had previously occupied were soon involved and our men were mildly interested to hear that places like Bois Grenier, Fleurbaix, Saily, Armentières, Estaires, and Merville in its first sector had fallen. Later came news that Messines, Wytschaete, Wulverghem, Kemmel, Mont Kemmel, Dranoutre, and Bailleul had also been taken while a British withdrawal from Passchendaele, Polygon Wood, Hooge, Zonnebeke and Westhoek was also necessitated. But the enemy advance got no further and so far both the Somme and the Flanders offensives, though rich in tactical successes, were alike barren of strategic results.

On the 10th of April the 8th Brigade relieved the 15th Brigade in the left sector and the latter formation passed into Divisional reserve. D.H.Q. moved on the 11th and established itself at Bussy les Daours on the north bank of the Somme. During all this time the 5th Australian Division was the left Division of the III British Corps. The 58th Division was now on our right and the 3rd Australian Division on our left, north of the Somme. The strengthening of the sector was proceeding apace, engineers, pioneers, and infantry all working in fine unison, and the tactical position was already much sounder than it had been on the arrival of the Division. Almost daily, reports of imminent enemy attacks on Villers Bretonneux were received through various channels, and the utmost vigilance was maintained along the entire front. Enemy shelling was growing steadily from day to day and the 8th Brigade repulsed a raid on the 13th, but so far no greater events happened. Projected attacks on our side were strongly discountenanced by General Hobbs, who stated that, however fine the fighting spirit of his Division was, he strongly objected to the frittering away of men on operations that could have no decisive bearing on the war as a whole.

On the 20th of April the Divisional boundaries underwent some change. The 25th Brigade of the 8th (British) Division relieved the 14th Brigade of about a mile of its front on the right. This removed the 5th Division entirely from the immediate defences of Villers Bretonneux. At the same time, the Division's north boundary was moved to a point about a mile north of the Somme at Saily Laurette, which front the 8th Brigade took over from the 3rd Australian Division. At 9 a.m. on the 21st the 5th Australian Division passed from the command of the III Corps into that of Australian Corps, which had now arrived in the Somme area.

A notable incident occurred on the 21st. The brilliant German aviator, Cavalry Capt. Baron von Richthofen, with his "circus" of aeroplanes was on this sector at the time and the German Press had recently announced his 80th aerial victory. Richthofen was pursuing a British machine north of Corbie on the morning of the 21st and had it almost at his mercy. The British machine, which was not firing its machine gun, was flying within 50 yards of the ground and was heading straight for the anti-aircraft Lewis gun of the 53rd Battery, A.F.A. These were manned by gunners Evans and Buic. Richthofen's machine was just behind and above the British plane and the gunners could not open fire on him until our plane had passed their line of fire. Richthofen's plane was then only 100 yards from the guns which both opened fire as he raced on towards them at a terrific pace. At the first burst of our Lewis guns the plane turned and staggered as if out of control. The guns continued to fire and the plane veered still further round and crashed a hopeless wreck about half a mile away. Men hurried to the spot

and found the body of their renowned and gallant enemy lying dead among the ruins of his triplane. It bore frontal wounds on the knees, abdomen, and chest. A guard was posted on it, but was relieved a few minutes later by the inevitable German artillery barrage which fell all around the spot. A squadron of enemy aeroplanes hovered lovingly over the place until our men almost reluctantly drove them away with anti-aircraft fire. The R.A.F. made an amazing attempt to claim the shooting down of Richthofen as the work of its machines, but careful investigations established the matter beyond doubt and the credit belongs entirely to Gunners Evans and Buic.

The enemy gas shelling had been increasing considerably during the last few days and from several sources it appeared probable that an attempt would soon be made to capture Villers Bretonneux. As that village was now at least a mile from the 5th Division's right boundary, the Division was no longer frontally implicated in any assault that might be made upon it. Nevertheless, the tactical position was such that the Division kept an uneasy eye in its direction, for its capture by the enemy would turn the right flank of the Divisional sector and gravely compromise all its troops south of the Somme. An incident that created an unpleasant feeling occurred on the 23rd. A motor cyclist dressed like a British officer rode his machine up through our forward areas along the Sailly le Sec-Sailly Laurette road and, though challenged and fired upon, actually dashed across No Man's Land and safely reached the enemy lines. This was an extraordinarily daring feat and it did not tend to lessen the anxiety that was felt about the safety of Villers Bretonneux. So profoundly impressed was General Hobbs with the absolute necessity of maintaining the Divisional front intact that he even went so far as to have constructed a fire trench along the Division's right flank. By means of this it was hoped that, even if Villers Bretonneux was lost, there would still be a chance of maintaining the positions immediately north of it. The instinct which prompted this precaution was prophetic.

It is greatly regretted that no panoramic photograph looking west from Villers Bretonneux can be inserted here so that the reader might see for himself its great tactical importance. It is on part of the western and northern boundary of a local plateau of irregular outline which thence dips suddenly down into the Somme valley. For instance, the village of Fouilloy, only two miles north of Villers Bretonneux, is almost 200 feet lower in elevation, as is also Blangy Tronville, which is about four miles to the west of it. Amiens, about nine miles to the west was still lower and from the western edge of Villers Bretonneux a perfect view over the whole area westwards, as well as of Amiens itself, could be obtained. Through its beautiful basin the Somme river meandered in a series of capricious curves on a general westward course. In such a terrain it would

be impossible to maintain a defensive line east of Amiens against an enemy in possession of the Villers Bretonneux plateau. A little north-east of Villers Bretonneux the plateau rose slightly on to what was known as Hill 104. This was on the right of the Sector held by the 14th Brigade and was, except for its lack of road and railway communications, tactically as important as Villers Bretonneux itself. It should be mentioned that the northern and western edges of the high ground were cut by several valleys, the most important of which was one that sloped sharply up north of Villers Bretonneux in the direction of Hill 104.

While the Division had been responsible for the safety of Villers Bretonneux, the reserve brigade had maintained strong forces just behind it and immediately north of the Bois de l'Abbé, a large wood west of Villers Bretonneux and situated partly on the northern edge of the plateau and partly on the northern face where it sloped away towards the Somme. Through the northern edge of this wood the main Amiens-Villers Bretonneux road and railway both passed. So convinced was General Elliott of his responsibility when reserve brigade commander in this area that he had maintained an entire battalion in close reserve immediately west of Villers Bretonneux. When the front was altered on the 20th of April and Villers Bretonneux passed into the keeping of the 8th (British) Division, General Elliott was amazed to find that this battalion was relieved by a single platoon. He drew attention through the proper official channels to what he regarded as a grave danger on the Division's right flank, but was informed that III (British) Corps was aware of the new arrangement and had given approval to it. Nothing further could be done in the matter, but General Elliott was so certain that a grave position would sooner or later arise in Villers Bretonneux that he and many of his officers devoted much study to the ground, a clay model of which he had had prepared. Conscientious as he invariably was in all his tactical dispositions, General Elliott's extreme punctiliousness in reference to Villers Bretonneux seems almost to have sprung from an inner conviction that his brigade was to achieve immortality there.

On the 23rd the village and the areas around it were again drenched with gas and at 3.45 a.m. on the 24th a heavy enemy artillery preparation along a front of several miles prepared the way for infantry assaults. The main sector of attack lay from the right half of the 14th Brigade front on the north down to Hangard on the south. North of the Somme a heavy infantry attack, evidently a diversion to the main operation, fell on the front of the 8th Brigade. It was repulsed with severe losses by the 29th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. MacArthur). The 54th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Holland) on the right of the 14th Brigade front was heavily attacked. It stood absolutely firm on its vital ground around Hill 104, but was soon conscious of deep enemy penetrations on the 8th (British) Divisional front on its

right. The 14th Brigade line did not yield an inch. The support companies of the 54th Battalion were at once flung along the right flank boundary, facing south towards the danger, and the reserve battalion, the 56th, which Major Cameron was temporarily commanding, soon after prolonged this defensive flank westwards. A long line of naked steel thus marked in unmistakable manner the extent to which General Stewart was prepared to yield ground on the vital right flank. Meantime, the enemy successes on the right were continuing. He had employed a few tanks and was speedily in Villers Bretonneux, the loss of which was definitely communicated to General Hobbs at D.H.Q. at 8.47 a.m. By this time the enemy was over a mile behind the 14th Brigade right flank, which was now being enfiladed, defiladed, and taken in reverse by enemy rifle and machine gun fire. But General Stewart's men held on as steady as rocks, the thought of "conforming" to the withdrawal on the south never once entering into anybody's head.


Meantime, General Elliott, in his château at Blangy Tronville, had felt all his anxieties confirmed by the artillery preparations at 3.45 a.m. As early as 4.10 a.m. he had warned all his battalions to prepare for a counter-attack and had detailed necessary liaison officers. By 5 a.m. a Forward Report Centre was established near Aubigny, and Lieut.-Col. Watson, a newcomer not yet holding any permanent appointment in the Brigade, was instructed to take charge of it. A troop of the 13th A.L.H. was given to him for reconnaissance purposes. General Elliott's plan for counter-attack was for one battalion to fight its way east along the railway, where another force operating from the north should junction with it at a point south-east of the village. This plan was communicated by General Elliott to his battalions, and the whole brigade was soon ready to participate in a counter-attack, which General Elliott naturally desired to launch as early as possible. This, of course, he could not do in the circumstances without the necessary approval, because Villers Bretonneux was now in the area, not only of a different Division, but also of a different Corps, both of which might be presumed to have counter-attack measures in equal readiness. General Elliott, therefore, could do nothing but await instructions. At 9.55 a.m. word came from III Corps that no external action was required at present and, until after three in the afternoon, General Elliott was forced to chafe in comparative idleness with his splendid battalions absolutely ready and only waiting the word to move. His Report Centre, however, was doing good work, and largely through its activities reliable information of the position came regularly to hand. Patrols of the 59th Battalion, too, under Lieuts. Christian and Callender, went far afield and after exciting experiences with enemy detachments returned with valuable and accurate information.

D.H.Q. had watched events with anxious eyes from the beginning,

and General Hobbs, though highly gratified by the sharp check administered to the enemy by the 8th and 14th Brigades, was as eager as General Elliott to restore the position at once. With every passing minute German machine guns and ammunition and reinforcements were being rushed up to Villers Bretonneux, where the enemy was busy strengthening his new positions and preparing measures to meet our counter-attack. But vague reports that the 8th Division was going to counter-attack and that effective measures were in course of preparation by III Corps were the only information that General Hobbs could get. In the early afternoon word was received that the 13th Brigade of the 4th Australian Division was on its way up to the area to assist the 8th Division in a counter-attack. At 2.50 p.m. General Hobbs told General Elliott over the telephone that the 8th Division was to counter-attack along the railway and that we were to co-operate from the north. At 3.10 p.m. definite action was finally announced, when the 5th Australian Division was placed under the command of the G.O.C. III Corps, who told General Hobbs that he required a brigade for counter-attack purposes. The G.O.C. III Corps consulted General Hobbs regarding the best means of recovering the position. General Hobbs at once suggested a converging attack by the 15th Brigade from the north-west and by another brigade from the south-west, to meet at a point east of Villers Bretonneux and thus "pinch out" the village. This was fundamentally the idea which General Elliott had formed many hours earlier, though, as his plans were conceived on the basis of the employment of a single brigade, they were necessarily on a somewhat smaller scale. The G.O.C. III Corps agreed, and the plan was forthwith adopted. After completing all arrangements and providing a programme of artillery fire to cut off as far as possible enemy reinforcements from entering Villers Bretonneux, General Hobbs handed over the 15th Brigade to the 8th (British) Division, in accordance with the instructions he had received from III Corps. The 13th Australian Infantry Brigade was placed under the orders of the 8th (British) Division about the same time.

The arrangements for the attack were simple. There was to be no artillery preparation, as a surprise effect was required. The 15th Brigade was to jump off from the Cachy-Fouilloy Road (map p. 295) on a frontage of about 2,000 yards immediately north of the railway. This frontage was to be shared by the 59th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Scanlan) on the right and the 60th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Marshall) on the left. The 57th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Layh) was instructed to follow in close support of the 59th Battalion and was to come up on its right at the final objective and establish communication with the 13th Brigade at the meeting point on the railway. The advance of the 15th Brigade was to take place in two phases, the first objective being the general line of the Hamelct-

Villers Bretonneux road and the second the line of the Hamellet-Villers Bretonneux road. The right extremity of the 14th Brigade reached to a point on this latter road just south-west of Vaire Wood, and the final objective of the 59th and 60th Battalions was the remainder of the road between the 14th Brigade right and Villers Bretonneux. The 13th Brigade was to make an advance of about equal distance starting from the vicinity of Cachy and junctioning with the 57th Battalion on its final objective, the railway south-east of Villers Bretonneux. The contribution of the 8th (British) Division to the recapture was to consist in the supply of one battalion, the 22nd



Durham Light Infantry (a Pioneer Battalion), which was placed under General Elliott's orders. General Elliott instructed it to enter the village after the counter-attack had enveloped it and to mop it up. Zero hour for the attack of the 13th and 15th Brigades was at first 8 p.m. and was altered later to 10 p.m. The 13th Brigade, which had been out resting when the enemy attack occurred, had marched a long way up during the day to get to its assembly positions. It was therefore somewhat exhausted and the country was utterly unknown to it. The 15th Brigade, too, had been on the alert since before 5 a.m. and many of its units had passed an anxious day under shell, and gas shell, fire and had done a good deal of reconnaissance work. They were therefore also somewhat tired, but a

hot meal to all ranks restored them considerably. General Glasgow, who commanded the 13th Brigade, came and shared General Elliott's Headquarters at Blangy Tronville.

Although the Division was by now thoroughly used to movements by night it had never yet undertaken a major operation in complete darkness. Night operations are so extremely difficult, so liable to fatal complications, and so often unsuccessful, that they are rarely attempted. The advantages are all on the side of the defenders, whose positions are fixed and whose organisation stands solidly on a known basis. The single great advantage that is conferred on the attackers is that of surprise, but the benefits of surprise can never be reaped unless the formation and direction are maintained on a generally sound basis. When large bodies of troops are manœuvring by daylight in ordinary peace training, the maintenance of formation and direction is difficult enough. How much harder is it amid the excitement and danger and obscurity of a night attack, when the commanders of even the smallest units are unable to see their precise dispositions! Two or three circumstances here did something to alleviate the great natural difficulties of a night operation. The frequent raids and constant patrolling of all Australian infantry had done much both in developing the sense of direction in night movements and, what is hardly less important, in training the men's eyes to see well in the dark. The weather, too, was favourable. The moon was nearly full and the clouds were light and fleeting. At 8 p.m. a slight shower occurred, but after that the weather brightened again and remained suitable throughout the rest of the night. Last, but not least, the heavy shelling to which Villers Bretonneux had been subjected had kindled several fires in the village. One of these was of particularly large dimensions and it served as a rough general guide to direction. But as both the 59th and 60th Battalions were to pass to the north of Villers Bretonneux, the fire had to be kept well to the right. Not unnaturally, it had a tendency to draw the men towards it and the attacking lines of the 15th Brigade did shift somewhat in that direction, but not sufficiently to spoil the general disposition of the attack.

The attacking battalions were to cross the assembly line at 10 p.m., and a few minutes after 9 o'clock they set out. So many different orders had reached them during the day that General Elliott had deemed it advisable to detail in a personal conference the precise plans for the attack. This conference, necessary as it was, had consumed some little time, and an unfortunate loss of position by C Company of the 59th Battalion now caused considerable delay. Capt. Bursley, who commanded it, was warned in his march to the jumping-off line not to cross a certain area which was saturated with gas. His company could have crossed it in safety by putting on their gas helmets, but this would have added to their discomfort and to the difficulties of seeing, and Bursley thought it

better to skirt the flank of the gassed area by making a slight detour. This he did, but did not succeed in regaining his exact position again, and, when the formation of the other companies on the jumping-off line was completed, it was seen that this Company was missing. Burseý, in fact, had crossed the line and was now several hundred yards in front of it, wondering why the other units were not assembling near him. After waiting for some time on the correct line, Capt. Smith's company of the 57th was moved up from its support position in rear of the 59th and took the place of Capt. Burseý's company. But all this consumed more time, and the advance of the 59th and 60th Battalions commenced over an hour late in consequence. Capt. Burseý's company was picked up in due course and, as it happened, no serious consequences arose from the unpunctual beginning of the attack.

Once thoroughly started, the assault moved rapidly, and the long lines swept swiftly and silently forward over the 2,000 yards of steadily rising ground that lay between the starting line and the first objective. The advance was astride the deep gully, already alluded to, which scored the western scarp of the plateau and mounted eastwards in the direction of Hill 104. A great part of the attacking lines was therefore in dead ground and, for the time being, was practically immune from enemy fire. It is also probable that the enemy defenders on the north-west of Villers Bretonneux had been withdrawn to the outskirts of the village. At any rate, up to the first objective little opposition was encountered and the Hamel-Villers Bretonneux road was secure by midnight. There was by now some considerable mixing of units. A steady drift from left to right had set in which tended to thicken the texture of the lines near Villers Bretonneux, and tended also to create something of a gap between the left of the 60th Battalion and the right of the 14th Brigade. Absolute rigidity of formation was neither attainable nor expected in an operation of the kind in progress, and company and platoon officers and N.C.O.'s adapted themselves readily to the circumstances, incorporating newcomers into their command with the same *sang froid* with which they noted the loss of other elements. And so, with considerable mixture of details, but unimpaired in its general conformation, the attacking lines crossed the first objective, and with quickened pulses pressed on to the sterner work in front.

The ascent of the plateau side was now almost complete and the next few yards brought most of the units on to the top of the plateau and into full view of the strong enemy line between Villers Bretonneux and Vaire Wood. "A" Company of the 59th Battalion, indeed, came under heavy enemy rifle fire from positions just in front as it reached the first objective line. Without an instant's delay the company charged in the direction of the opposition. Fire was opened almost immediately afterwards on the remainder of the 59th

Battalion and on the 60th Battalion further to the left. Sections and platoons a little to the rear of the advanced line at once dashed up, and Major Kuring, the senior officer on the spot, gave in loud tones the order for a general charge. A wild and terrible yell from hundreds of throats split the midnight air, and the whole line broke into a rapid run and surged irresistibly forwards, bayonets gleaming thirstily in the moonlight. A storm of enemy machine gun and rifle fire was poured into the oncoming ranks, but checked them not at all. A hundred enemy flares lit up the terrible scene in vivid light, in which the Germans read too well their fate. Shriek following shriek marked the toll of the deadly bayonets, and good round Australian oaths were ripped out in quick succession as the panting men plunged forward to the next victims. The German defences were arranged in a series of strong posts distributed in depth as far back as the second objective. They fought stubbornly, but they were hopelessly out-classed. By now the date had slipped from the 24th of April of the 25th. It was the third anniversary of the Gallipoli landing, and payment of old debts due to the Turk was to be made to-day to his esteemed ally and brother, the German. So if for a moment the slaughter slackened, it was only because new victims were wanted and, in the dark, they were not easy to see. But soon the enemy flares would shoot up again from strong points not yet reached. Those flares were the death warrant of many a German that night, for, guided by them, the assailants knew exactly where their enemies lay. Thus one by one the strong post garrisons were captured or exterminated, and the 59th and 60th Battalions, now hopelessly intermingled in *personnel*, but still preserving a general correctness of formation and direction, were resting triumphantly on their final objective. From the moment at which the charge was ordered it had been purely and simply a soldiers' battle, in which victory had been gained by the great dash and fighting superiority of the junior officers, the N.C.O.'s, and men. To them, therefore, the praise.

It was not yet 3 a.m. and the main object of the 15th Brigade was already achieved. But there were still two important tasks to be completed. The gradual drifting of the attacking lines to the right had left a small pocket of German strong posts on the left of the 60th Battalion and between it and the 14th Brigade. The gap was promptly bridged by some men provided by General Stewart, and by two reserve companies of the 60th Battalion, which connected with General Stewart's right, but at a point a few hundred yards behind the general alignment of the remainder of the front. The slight enemy salient here, though undesirable, did not call for immediate correction and the left flank of the 60th Battalion therefore remained bent back for a day or two until it could be rectified at leisure. Its adjustment will be referred to in due course.

On the right flank the position was more pressing. Connection had still to be established with the 13th Brigade at the railway,

that is, at a point about half a mile beyond the 59th Battalion's present right extremity. This was a most essential part of the operation. At 3.30 a.m. 15th Brigade patrols had pushed down to the railway, but had found it strongly held by the enemy and, as yet, there was no sign of the 13th Brigade. From the village itself strong fire was also encountered and there appeared to be no sign of the 22nd Durham Light Infantry which had been instructed to mop it up. Meanwhile, General Elliott had ordered the 58th Battalion up from its reserve position in the Aubigny Line, and it was now moving up into support with a view to carrying out any exploitation that might be considered advisable. By 4.15 a.m. General Elliott was getting anxious at the continued non-arrival of the mopping-up troops, and the G.O.C. of the 8th Division then promised him other troops for the purpose. By 5.37 a.m. General Elliott decided to use part of the 57th Battalion for the mopping-up, and, at the same time, the G.O.C. 8th Division promised to send the 2nd Royal Berks Regiment to assist with the same work.

At 2.15 a.m. A and D Companies of the 57th Battalion had inclined somewhat to the right from their position just behind the 59th Battalion and had consolidated on the north-east outskirts of Villers Bretonneux. Many of the enemy, both in the village and east of it, seemed to be quite in ignorance of the events of the night, and for several hours yet parties freely used the roads and tracks leading east from the village. These parties were all made prisoners by the 57th or the 59th Battalion.

By 6 a.m. the 57th had received its orders to proceed with the mopping-up of the village, and B and C Companies now entered it from the north-east. The enemy garrison, apparently quite unaware that the village was already practically lost, resisted stubbornly, and until 10.30 a.m. stiff bomb and bayonet fighting continued. Both the 22nd Durham Light Infantry and the 2nd Royal Berks Regiment had now reached the village and they gave the 57th Battalion some assistance in the mopping-up. That dangerous work was successfully completed before noon of the 25th, and in it Capt. L. W. Elliot, who commanded B Company in the 57th, displayed conspicuous courage and fine leadership. Major Aitchison and Lieut. Doutreband also did fine work at various stages of the operations of the 57th Battalion. During the enemy bombardment that followed the clearing of the village this battalion lost both Capt. Morgan and Lieut. Muter from shell-fire.

Although the 13th Brigade had not actually reached the railway at this time it was now very near to it. It had encountered very stiff fighting in its progress towards the village and had done splendid work. Monument Wood,¹ a strong enemy position south of the

¹ This wood derived its name from a monument erected near it to commemorate a hot engagement of the 1870-1871 War, where a fierce struggle had resulted from the tactical importance of Villers Bretonneux.

railway, had held up the advance. As the day wore on, however, the 13th Brigade troops gradually got forward and at dusk on the 25th the 57th Battalion reported that it had definitely linked up with the 50th Battalion of the 13th Brigade on the railway embankment. The enemy resistance in the vicinity of the embankment was skilful and protracted, and he was ejected only after stern fighting. His disappointment at the loss of the village must have been very great, for at 2 p.m. on the afternoon of the 25th he counter-attacked in strong force. A splendid artillery barrage completely broke the attack, which, nevertheless, was twice repeated, and each time with the same result. Thanks to the excellence of the artillery work, the tired infantry was not called upon to sustain the burden of further hand-to-hand fighting.

The 26th was a day of reorganisations on General Elliott's front. The 15th Brigade had returned to the control of the 5th Australian Division at 9.40 a.m. on the 25th, and the front commanded by General Hobbs, now with three brigades in the line, reached from the railway embankment south of Villers Bretonneux to a point well to the north of the Somme, a distance of over 10,000 yards. General Elliott ordered the 57th Battalion to hand over its part of the line to the 59th Battalion, while the companies and platoons of the 59th and 60th Battalions were reorganised as far as was practicable. The 57th Battalion on its relief passed into brigade reserve. The enemy was naturally as curious about our dispositions as we were about his, and at 4 p.m. on the 26th one of his aeroplanes, making too close a reconnaissance, was shot down by our Lewis guns.

At 2.19 a.m. on the 27th, the 60th Battalion proceeded to clean out the enemy pocket on its left flank. The enemy strong posts, which were afterwards found to contain 16 Lewis guns captured in the attack on Villers Bretonneux, were doubtless expecting an attack and their resistance was strong. It was another brief and tragic struggle in the darkness. B Company on the right and D Company on the left, the whole under Capt. Nichol, advanced swiftly after a Stokes mortar bombardment of the strong points by the 15th L.T.M.B. (Capt. Keys). An enemy barrage fell just over the attackers' heads as they set out, and heavy machine gun fire fell upon them from in front. But once again the attack was irresistible. The strong points were all taken, and 60 or 70 Germans who resisted to the end were bayoneted. The 60th Battalion lost heavily, 10 officers and 80 other ranks being either killed or wounded in the bloody affray. Capt. Plomley (56th Battalion) gave the 60th Battalion appreciated assistance on its left flank and Lieuts. Gannon and Pizzey, too, saw to it that the junction with the 14th Brigade was perfect on this occasion. At 6.25 a.m. a heavy counter-attack against the new positions was stopped by our artillery and by rifle and machine-gun fire, and for the remainder of the day the baffled

Germans smothered our areas with a furious artillery bombardment.

With the straightening of the 60th Battalion's left flank on the morning of the 27th the Villers Bretonneux fighting may be said to have closed. Thereafter, no German ever set foot in Villers Bretonneux save as a prisoner of war. The reaction of the 13th and 15th Brigades was extraordinarily satisfactory from an Allied point of view, and it is not too much to say that the recapture of this important position was greeted with a sigh of intense relief throughout the Allied countries. It is probable that Ludendorff, whose Flanders offensive had caused him acute disappointment, had ordered the Villers Bretonneux operations as a test of the Allied positions in the Somme area. He was already casting round for a suitable front for his next offensive blow, and the Somme theatre had on paper fascinating prospects. If such was the case, however, the 13th and 15th Brigades had given the answer in unmistakable terms, and the Somme front was thereafter left severely alone. Nevertheless, the decision was perhaps an unfortunate one for Ludendorff, for it was from the very high ground which General Stewart had held, and from the line north and south of it, that a few months later was launched the attack that broke the German lines on the Western Front and definitely won the war for the allied arms.

Considering the work it accomplished, the losses of the 15th Brigade in the fighting on the 25th were wonderfully light—10 officers and 140 other ranks killed and wounded were all the casualties suffered, and, though these figures were increased later by the losses in the 60th Battalion operation on the 27th, and by the sustained enemy shelling, they stand out as a glowing testimony to the superiority of our men in hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy losses both in and north of the village were extremely heavy. In places the ground was covered with their dead, who must have amounted to several hundreds. In addition, 13 officers and 459 other ranks were taken prisoner by the 15th Brigade and many machine guns and some minenwerfer were also captured. The exploit received a flattering notice in Sir Douglas Haig's despatches. Altogether it was a disastrous enterprise for the enemy, and to General Elliott and his staff and to the officers and men of the 59th, 60th, and 57th Battalions there will ever rest the proud knowledge of a difficult and vital undertaking well and nobly done. The work of Lieut.-Cols. Layh, Scanlan, and Marshall throughout the operations was of the highest order and General Elliott recalls with natural pride the fact that two of these officers had received their early training under him in the Militia forces in pre-war days.

Most battle narratives, however harrowing, are lightened up here and there by touches of humour. In this case, it was provided by Headquarters III (British) Corps, which gravely stated in an

official document that "the brilliant idea of the III Corps for the recapture of Villers Bretonneux was ably carried out by the 8th Division, assisted by the 13th and 15th Australian Infantry Brigades." This complacent and extraordinary remark sent a flicker of amusement throughout the whole 5th Australian Division and did much to restore it to its usual condition of cheery good humour.

The work of arms other than the infantry was of the same high order throughout the fight. The 5th Divisional Artillery (General Bessell-Browne) suffered heavily from the shelling that preceded the enemy attack. Driver E. R. Walton displayed much courage in extricating transport of the 13th A.F.A. Brigade from a perilous position, but unfortunately lost his life in the work. The 14th A.F.A. Brigade, in the area between the Somme and the Ancre rivers, also suffered heavily, but, despite its numerous casualties, it maintained a useful protective barrage along the Divisional front during the enemy attacks. The fine work of the guns in breaking enemy counter-attacks has already been noticed, and Capt. Belcher's work as F.O.O. was very good.

The Machine Gun Battalion had provided advanced sections to co-operate with the infantry, and these had given useful assistance. The 60th Battalion found the work of the 14th Machine Gun Company (Capt. Holmes) particularly helpful. The co-operation of the 15th L.T.M.B. has already been noticed. The 8th Field Ambulance which, early in the month, had come under the command of Lieut.-Col. V. Conrick, vice Lieut.-Col. Makin, invalided to Australia, carried out the forward medical services admirably, not only in the Villers Bretonneux fighting, but over the remainder of the Divisional front. The 14th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Thompson) and the 15th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Smith) were stationed at the M.D.S. at Daours and the Divisional Collecting Station at Les Alençons respectively. It was during this period that a surgeon of the 14th Field Ambulance, operating on a patient at the M.D.S., was struck by a shell splinter and wounded. With fine courage and self-control he continued his work and completed the operation satisfactorily.

Number 4 Troop of C Squadron 13th Light Horse did good service throughout the Villers Bretonneux fighting in connection with the Brigade Report Centre, and Lieut. Schroder, in charge of the Signal Section with the 15th Brigade, then, as ever, did splendid work. General Elliott, too, expressed in cordial terms his appreciation of the assistance given by the 14th Brigade in providing guides and in co-operating in every possible way with the work of his left flank.

On the night of the 27th of April the relief of the 15th Brigade on the Villers Bretonneux-Vaire Wood sector was commenced and the frontage of the recent attack was handed over to the 4th Australian Division by the night of the 28th. The remainder of the month passed without incident of note in the Division, save that on

the last day Mr. Winston Churchill, Minister of Munitions, paid a visit to D.H.Q.

Some important changes of command occurred during April, but as these were not officially confirmed until May, they are noted in the chapter dealing with the month. Major Street, who had been for some months Brigade Major of the 15th Brigade, returned to duty with his original battalion in the 1st Australian Division on the 18th of April. Major Close, the D.A.D.M.S., was invalided to Australia during the month and his place was filled by Major J. A. James, who soon proved himself an earnest and capable medical administrator.

With the close of April all enemy offensive action in the Somme valley practically ceased and the three following months marked an interregnum between our purely defensive and purely offensive periods of 1918. They will, therefore, be allotted a chapter to themselves. The persistent gas shelling of April had greatly swelled the casualty list for the month, but a large proportion of the gas cases were able to return later. It should be mentioned that the large number of gas casualties were not to any appreciable extent the result of carelessness or defective anti-gas appliances. The liquid used by the Germans often lay for hours on the cold ground without vapourising, and thus no trace of its presence was discernible. Then a burst of sunshine would suddenly cause the liquid to evaporate and people passing over the area would suffer, long after all effects of the shelling would have normally disappeared. This was the case, too, with the men's clothes, in which the chemicals remained quiescent through the night, but turned into deadly fumes with the warmth of the sun. The casualties for the month were 17 officers and 273 other ranks killed, and 94 officers and 2,014 other ranks wounded. One officer and 23 other ranks were missing. The strength of the formation at the end of the month was 836 officers and 16,146 other ranks, that is, about 30 officers and 2,500 other ranks below strength.

During the month the infantry brigades had easily held the enemy over a wide front and had steadily improved their line. The artillery, machine gun, medical, and supply services were working efficiently, and were easily equal to all demands that had been made upon them. The engineers and pioneers had worked wonders in improving the defences and communications of the area. Months later, when the enemy areas passed finally into our hands, it was noticed that the wire entanglements erected by our engineer and infantry parties in No Man's Land were all splendidly built, despite the fact that they had been constructed by night and under fire. This was typical of the spirit which animated all ranks of the Division. And on that highly satisfactory background stood out in glowing outlines the magnificent achievement of the 15th Brigade in what has already become a classical example of a night operation. Despite its

numerous casualties, April, 1918, was a highly satisfactory month, and the mention of Villers Bretonneux will always recall the dominating presence of General Elliott, never more in his element than when inspiring vigorous offensive action in close contact with a dangerous enemy. With a citation of the French 31st Army Corps Order which conferred on him the Croix de Guerre with star of vermeil this chapter, therefore, may be appropriately closed.

“ Q.G. le 27 septembre, 1918.

Ordre du Corps d'Armée.
No. 297 “ P.”

“ Le Général Commandant le 31 Corps d'Armée cite à l'Ordre du Corps d'Armée

“ Le Colonel (Temp. Général de Brigade) Elliott, Harold Edward, cdt. 15 Brigade d'Infanterie Australienne

“ ‘A montré une grande maîtrise et une remarquable adresse dans le commandement de la 15 Brigade d'Infanterie Australienne, notamment pendant l'attaque du 25 avril, 1918, qui eut pour résultat la reprise de Villers Bretonneux, ainsi qu'au cours des opérations franco-britanniques d'août, 1918, à l'Est de Villers Bretonneux.

“ ‘C'est dans une très grande mesure, grâce à sa personnalité, sa force de caractère, son initiative, et ses talents militaires que la 15 Brigade Australienne a obtenu d'aussi brillants résultats.’

“ Le présent ordre confère l'Attribution de la Croix de Guerre avec Etoile de Vermeil.

“ (Signé) TOULORGE, Cdt. le 31 Corps d'Armée.”



AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPH OF NORTHERN PART OF 5TH DIVISION'S SECTOR IN ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HINDENBURG SYSTEM, 29TH SEPTEMBER TO 2ND OCTOBER, 1918.

CHAPTER XIII

(1st May--31st July, 1918.)

FROM DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE

Important contemporaneous events :—

Rumania signed Peace Treaty with Germany at Bucharest..	May 7th
Obligation for Military Service in England extended to men of fifty years of age	
Third great German offensive opened on Chemin des Dames Sector	„ 27th
Austrian offensive from Asiago to the sea opened	June 15th
Fourth and last of the great German offensives opened east and south-west of Rheims	July 15th
Ex-Czar Nicholas and his son shot by Bolsheviks	„ 17th
Allied Forces landing on the Murmansk coast.. .. .	
Successful French attacks against flanks of the Champagne salient opened	„ 18th

THE enemy's offensive action in the great Somme salient ended with the month of April, 1918. There were no means of ascertaining this at the time and for many weeks yet the Allied divisions committed to its protection strained every nerve to complete its defences. It seemed certain that attempts would yet be made to develop strategically a break through of such great tactical success as that of the March offensive. The enemy still had numerous intact divisions, and the initiative was unquestionably his. It seemed inevitable that another hideous conflict would be waged in and near the Somme theatre, and the strain on its defenders was never for a moment relaxed. Wiring, trench digging, and the construction of strong points went on incessantly and no offensive actions were attempted except such as were urgently required to effect vital local improvements in the front line. For this reason, the months of May and June passed without any very noteworthy fighting on the part of the 5th Division. Conversely, they were the period of the greatest defensive activity in the history of the formation, and some figures will be given later in this chapter to afford the reader an idea of the amount of work done.

During the whole of May the Division remained in the line in

the central divisional sector of the Corps front. The sector lay astride the Somme, stretching from a point about 2,000 yards north of Saily-Laurette back in a general south-westerly direction to a point a little south-west of Vaire Wood. The 8th and 14th Brigades held the Divisional front for the whole month, the 15th Brigade in reserve enjoying such measure of rest as the defensive works' policy permitted. On the 2nd of May an 8th Brigade patrol of two officers and 30 other ranks made a spirited attempt to capture the garrison of an enemy strong point, but though they pursued the elusive Germans a considerable distance into their defensive system, they were forced to return without prisoners. A larger operation was undertaken by the 29th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. MacArthur) on the left of the 8th Brigade front on the 7th of May. The Division on the north was effecting local improvements in its line and four platoons of the 29th pushed forward and advanced our line on an average of 250 yards on a front of about 700 yards. Little opposition was encountered, but 20 Germans were killed and a few prisoners captured. On the 14th Brigade front 2nd Lieut. Neville on the 17th of May, at the head of a patrol of 14 other ranks, gallantly rushed two enemy strong points near Vaire Wood. Several Germans were killed and three were taken prisoner. Neville's party returned without casualties. A certain amount of activity occurred also on the 25th of May when an enemy raid was repulsed with loss, and an 8th Brigade raiding party, after cutting its way through much wire, was detected in the moonlight and forced to withdraw.

If in actual operations there was little fighting to record, the month was nevertheless extremely busy in the routine of trench warfare. Sniping was active all the time, while machine gun fire and the patrolling of No Man's Land were kept up incessantly throughout the night. Threats and rumours of enemy attacks were frequent, and considerable strain was imposed thereby on the staffs, and on the front line troops. Enemy gas shelling was regular and accurate, while the medium and light trench mortars on both sides of the line were steadily active. The artillery, too, was consistently busy. The 13th and 14th A.F.A. Brigades each fired on an average about 1,500 rounds a day. The German artillery was scarcely less active, and, in these circumstances, it was not surprising that the May casualties amounted to 37 officers and 643 other ranks. It is worthy of note that during this month both artillery brigades of the 5th Divisional Artillery were posted north of the Somme river in the vicinity of Corbie—an interesting side-light on the tactical situation of the day.

Every week the field companies erected many thousands of yards of wire and dug many thousands of yards of trenches. Deep dug-outs, shell proof shelters, and gas proof doors for dug-outs were also constructed. Roads were improved, wells were sunk, bridges were made, and a kiln was erected for the extraction of solder from tins

—another of the economy activities of the Division. The 5th Pioneer Battalion worked on the Aubigny defensive system and on Pioneer Switch Trench, both important features of the Division's reserve defences. In addition breastworks were constructed for bridge defences and much valuable salvage was effected in Corbie. In the last-mentioned work the efforts of Major Langley, the A.P.M., Lieut. McKay, the Traffic Control officer, and Capt. Viner, 5th Divisional Salvage Company, were particularly fine.

All ranks of the Division did whatever lay in their power to save civilian property in the threatened areas, and their work in this vicinity resulted in the saving of about 1,000,000 francs' worth of goods and chattels by the end of July, 1918. Lieut. Mauss and his staff of interpreters worked nobly to the same end. In a château in Corbie was a rare and valuable collection of butterflies. This was saved largely as a result of the enthusiastic work of an interpreter, M. Raynaud. Some of the cases came from the Museum National d'Histoire Naturelle and this body, as well as the French Société Entomologique, wrote appreciative public thanks to Raynaud. The only benefit which befel Raynaud in consequence was to get 10 days' arrest from the French military authorities for having disclosed the location of his unit!

The medical dispositions remained substantially as described in the last chapter. The 8th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Conrick) staffed the A.D.S.'s at Aubigny and La Neuville; the 14th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Thompson), being shelled out of the Mairie in Daours moved the M.D.S. to a large factory on the outskirts of the village, while the 15th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Smith) remained at the Divisional Collecting Station in the handsome modern château at Les Alençons. An interesting medical event of the period was Col. Downey's suggestion to have an operating centre as far forward as the M.D.S. He considered that lives could be saved by operation there which would be lost if operation was deferred until the casualty was taken back to the C.C.S. The suggestion met with only qualified approval from the medical authorities at Army Headquarters.

Early in the month Capt. Rodd, M.C., the Division's D.A.D.O.S., received a similar appointment in the 1st (British) Division. He had conducted the Ordnance Services with ability and enterprise since the formation of the Division. His successor was Lieut. Welch, who came with good recommendations from the Ordnance Staff of the 1st Australian Division. About the same time, Lieut. Crain's Demonstration Platoon at D.H.Q. was relieved by another composite platoon under the command of Lieut. Deshon (59th Battalion). On the 8th of May, Capt. H. R. Gollan, who had done good service as Staff Captain of the 15th Brigade, succeeded Major G. Street as Brigade Major of that formation. Major Bachtold, for long the brave and able O.C. of the 14th Field Company Engineers,

was promoted to the appointment of C.R.E. 3rd Australian Division, and was succeeded in command of the 14th Field Company by Capt. J. Coghlan, who came from the 2nd Australian Divisional Engineers. Lieut.-Col. Conrick did not long remain as C.O. of the 8th Field Ambulance. He was required for important work elsewhere and left the Division on the 16th of May. Major A. R. Clayton, who had long been associated with the 8th Field Ambulance, succeeded him in the command.

About this time Australian Corps bade farewell to General Birdwood, who was promoted to the command of the Fifth Army, now being reconstituted after its severe handling in the March offensive. General Birdwood was an able and popular leader, and the steady progress towards efficiency of the Corps, and the success of its operations under him, had set a high standard for whoever was chosen to succeed him. The appointment was given to Sir John Monash and it elicited immediate approval. His great ability was thoroughly well known even in those days, but few of even his most ardent admirers could have anticipated the wonderful results which the new Corps Commander was destined to achieve within the next few months. General Birdwood remained G.O.C. A.I.F. and maintained to the end of its existence the close personal interest in the A.I.F., and the warm regard for its members, which had so happily characterised his long and able command of the I A.N.Z.A.C. Corps.

The promotion of Sir John Monash to the command of the Australian Corps left General Hobbs the senior Divisional Commander in the Corps. Among the several Australian staff officers who received appointments on General Birdwood's Staff at Fifth Army Headquarters was Capt. K. A. Goodland, M.C., whose position as G.S.O. III was filled by the appointment of Capt. L. G. Merkel. Capt. Merkel had graduated to the staff appointment from the Divisional Engineers, his term of service as Lieut.-Col. Carey's adjutant having brought his staff ability into notice. The month of May was fertile also in changes in command of infantry battalions, command of the 53rd, 54th, 56th, 57th, 58th, and 60th Battalions being allotted, in some cases temporarily, to Lieut.-Cols. Holland, Marshall, Cameron, Denchy, Watson, and Layh respectively.

On the 31st of May the relief of the 5th Division by the 4th Australian Division in the central, or "B," Sector of the Australian Corps front was commenced. The Division had been continuously in the line since the 5th of April and had had no real rest since the end of January. Although it had not borne the shock of the massed attacks that had crumpled the Fifth Army in March, it had held a vital sector throughout a period of the deepest anxiety, and in its swift and terrible reaction at Villers Bretonneux had probably contributed to the definite abandonment of the enemy operations in the direction of Amiens. The threat in this sector was by now much less imminent, for, on the 27th of May, Ludendorff had com-

mitted almost the last of his available reserves in an attack by twenty-eight divisions on a front of 35 miles, north-west of Rheims. (Map p. 279.) This front was held mainly by the 6th French Army, but the IX (British) Corps, including the 8th, 21st, 25th, and 50th British Divisions, was also involved. By the 30th of May the centre of the attack had reached the Marne, a penetration of about 30 miles. For the second time in the war Paris was in grave danger, and the whole civilised world watched with bated breath the issue of the terrible conflict. But for the time being the line became stabilised in the vicinity of the Marne, and Foch and Ludendorff strained every nerve to collect yet more reserves for what would inevitably be the last German bid for absolute victory.

On its relief in "B" Divisional Sector of the Australian Corps front the 5th Division less its artillery moved to the Coisy area for a fortnight's rest. D.H.Q. was established at Coisy on the 2nd of June. The 8th Brigade was billeted in and around Rivery, a handsome suburb north-east of Amiens. The 14th Brigade rested in the vicinity of Querrieu, and Brigade Headquarters were established in the fine château there which, in the days of the Division's first Somme campaign, had housed the headquarters of the Fourth Army. The 15th Brigade was located in the Cardonette area with Headquarters in that village, but General Elliott, yielding to the attractions of the beautiful Bois de Mai close by, took up tented headquarters there on the 3rd of June.

The Division lost not a moment of the precious rest period. The weather was glorious and the task of thoroughly cleaning and refitting the formation went rapidly ahead. At the same time, programmes of recreational and formal training were evolved and all ranks were soon immersed in these welcome activities. For recreational training the area was almost an ideal one. The 8th Brigade troops were within easy distance of the fine municipal baths of Amiens, and aquatics naturally occupied a foremost place in their recreational training. The 30th Battalion won the Brigade Aquatic Championship. Although Amiens was heavily shelled and bombed each day, General Tivey's men were distributed on the outskirts and suffered no harm. The Brigade also established a fine Lewis gun, musketry, and bombing school in the famous Citadel d'Amiens, which offered many facilities for such work. The 14th Brigade, too, found in its area many facilities for swimming, and the 15th Field Company, which was temporarily a member of the Brigade Group, won the Aquatic Sports. The 55th Battalion which came second was given the cup, which was offered for competition only to the regular members of the group. It was, nevertheless, a fine performance for so small a unit as a field company to beat several battalions in open competition.

In the spacious Bois de Mai the 15th Brigade units lived the glorious open-air lives of gypsies. There are surely few more lovely

things in the world than a French wood in the height of summer, and General Elliott's men revelled in their leafy surroundings. Canvas accommodation was scanty, but the men made themselves snug little shelters, which they thatched cleverly with the long grass that grew abundantly throughout the wood. Training of all kinds went on successfully and the 60th Battalion won the brigade sports held on the 10th of June. The companies of the Machine Gun Battalion located at Allonville contested a cup presented by Lieut.-Col. Marsden. It was won by the 14th Machine Gun Company. It may conveniently be mentioned here that the final of the Divisional competition for the Army Rifle Association Trophy—a platoon exercise in musketry, Lewis gun work, and bayonet fighting—was won later on in the month by a very fine team from the 58th Battalion. A Corps School for commanding officers opened at Montières during June, and Lieut.-Col. Davies (32nd Battalion) was its first commandant.

In an important conference held by General Hobbs on the 5th of June the lessons learned from the recent tour of duty in the line were discussed and the future policy of the Division was outlined. At these conferences General Hobbs always encouraged full and frank discussion of conflicting views, after which he gave a clear and definite ruling for the guidance of all arms concerned. In this way the maximum benefit was gained, and the fine spirit of mutual help and understanding was increasingly fostered. It is of interest to note that although the Division had been almost continuously employed in active operations since its arrival on the Somme at the end of March, it had found time to carry out the following works:—

Forty-two miles of trenches had been dug.

Twenty-four bridges had been constructed, of which six were pontoon.

Forty-five deep dug-outs were worked on.

235 splinter-proof shelters had been constructed.

4,000 yards of road had been made or maintained.

In these works over 13,000 tons of engineer stores had been used. So true is it that in a war of positions the greatest part of soldiering consists of hard manual labour.

The health of the Divisional Commander gave rise to considerable anxiety during June and General Birdwood, as G.O.C. A.I.F., several times asked him to take a good rest. General Hobbs did go to England for a few days on duty in connection with the "Hobbs Machine Gun Casemate." This was a clever device for the protection of machine guns in battle. It was highly thought of by experts, and Mr. Winston Churchill, the Minister for Munitions, himself inspected it and promised to have it manufactured in large quantities. General Hobbs stayed a few days in England in connec-

tion with the casemate, but steadily declined to absent himself from duty for health reasons unless General Birdwood ordered it or thought that the administration of the 5th Division might suffer in consequence. Naturally, therefore, he stayed on, while all members of his staff joined in a loving conspiracy to ease the burden on his shoulders as much as possible.

The famous Spanish influenza epidemic made its appearance about this time. The men called it contemptuously "dog's disease" and other uncomplimentary names, little thinking that it was to spread throughout the world, even to far-away Australia, and, as pneumonic influenza, to account for thousands of people in many countries. An early report, furnished by Major W. C. Sawers (14th Field Ambulance) set out the chief characteristics as follows:—

Period of incubation perhaps one to three days.

Sudden onset preceded by chilliness, slight rigors, and dizziness.

Temperature 102° to 104° ; frontal headaches, pains in back and limbs.

Four to five days' self-limited course.

Extremely infectious.


Treatment, low diet and rest.

The malady was not generally regarded as serious from the point of view of its mortality rate. It was, however, extremely unpleasant while it lasted and its gravity, from a military point of view, consisted in its extreme infectiousness which, for a time, threatened to reduce the fighting strength of units to a very dangerous level. The medical services grappled manfully with the outbreak and, by a combination of anti-infection measures and careful attention to patients, the Division was safely tided over the critical periods of June and July.

On the 14th, 15th, and 16th of June the Division moved forward again and relieved the 2nd Australian Division in "C" Divisional sector of the Australian Corps front (map p. 312). The new Divisional front was immediately north of the sector vacated on the 31st of May. It extended for about 6,000 yards, from the Albert-Amiens Railway just west of Dernancourt to the point about 2,000 yards north of the Somme at Saily-Laurette which had been the extreme left of the "B" sector. It thus comprised the greater part of the country between the Ancre and the Somme valleys. Morlancourt, on the enemy side of the line, was the chief and most central village of the sector, and it was therefore generally referred to as the Morlancourt Sector. It was also frequently called "the triangle," the front line being the base of the figure, and the Ancre and Somme rivers the arms. The 8th Brigade (General Tivey) took over the left brigade frontage, and the 15th Brigade (General Elliott) went in on the right. Brigade headquarters of both line brigades were established in the badly-shelled village of Heilly. The 14th Brigade (General

Stewart) went into Divisional reserve at Frehencourt, and D.H.Q. opened at St. Gratien on the 16th.

During all this time the process of reorganisation and of regrouping forces was going on busily behind the allied front. The enemy had still sufficient superiority of force to retain the initiative and the policy for the present was one of active defence ; that is defensive in the main principles but offensively so. No large forces were to



SECTOR HELD BY THE 5TH AUSTRAL DIVISION 14TH JUNE - 31ST JULY 1918

■ CAPTURED BY 15TH BOL ON 4TH JULY 1918 ■ CAPTURED BY 8TH BOL ON 19TH JULY 1918 ■ CAPTURED BY 19TH BOL ON 24TH JULY 1918

be committed to operations for the present, but, within that limitation, the enemy was to be harassed by minor enterprises directed at local tactical objectives and aiming generally at reducing his *moral*. Gas projections over the Corps front were of frequent occurrence, and exemplify in one detail the gradual transition in the spirit of the period. A successful operation of the 2nd Australian Division on the 10th of June on the sector now occupied by the 8th Brigade was a further instance of the active defensive policy. In this operation

the 5th Divisional Artillery (General Bessell-Browne) rendered fine co-operation, which General Rawlinson and General Rosenthal cordially acknowledged. Shortly afterwards, the artillery went out for a well-earned rest, but they returned to the line again about the end of the month.

During June, the minor operations of the 5th Division were confined to raids. The 58th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Watson) carried out the twenty-second raid of the Division on the night of 20th/21st of June. The party consisted of 50 other ranks, led by Lieut. H. B. Stanley. In its assault it encountered a large enemy working party which fled into the trench at the very spot where it was to be raided and thus garrisoned it so strongly that the raiders could not secure an entry. After the enemy had suffered heavy casualties, the raiders returned without identifications and with six slightly wounded casualties. On the night of the 22nd/23rd raids were held on the fronts of both the 8th and 15th Brigades. The 59th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Scanlan) sent Lieut. J. H. Wadeson and 30 other ranks, fitted with body armour, against the enemy front line posts. Eight prisoners were taken and six Germans killed. Thanks to the fine co-operation of the artillery and the 15th L.T.M.B., which neutralised all enemy machine gun and artillery fire, the raiders returned without a single casualty. On the 8th Brigade the enterprise of the 30th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Clarke) was rather less successful. Capt. D. Chalmers directed two parties against the enemy trenches, a right, led by Lieut. Hanlon, and a left, by Lieut. Bragg. Hanlon's party got in without difficulty, killing ten Germans and taking two prisoners. Bragg was less fortunate, and his party suffered considerably from well-organised opposition. The total casualties were 23 wounded, almost all of which were suffered by the left party. The greatest courage was displayed by all ranks in succouring the wounded, every one of whom was safely brought in. These were the twenty-third and twenty-fourth raids of the Division.

The twenty-fifth raid occurred also on the 8th Brigade front, Lieuts. F. M. Nelson and C. Taylor of the 32nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Davies) leading over a party of 50 other ranks in the early morning of the 26th. Artillery and trench mortar barrages were again excellent. Twenty-eight Germans were killed and three prisoners and a machine gun secured. Only two other ranks were wounded, but the gallant Nelson, after being hit no fewer than three times during the night, was finally killed by a shell as he was being carried by stretcher-bearers to the dressing-station. It was a fortunate circumstance of this raid that it was directed exactly at the boundary line of two German divisions, both of which were identified in consequence. The French division on the right of the Australian Corps was much impressed by the manner in which the enterprise was conducted, and it sent over a staff officer to get from General Tivey a copy of the orders for the operation.

The twenty-sixth raid was carried out by the 58th Battalion at 1.15 a.m. on the 1st of July. Lieut. Shields and 35 other ranks secured in a well-staged enterprise two prisoners of war, and many Germans lost their lives in our fine artillery and trench mortar barrage. Our casualties were five other ranks slightly wounded. Batteries of rifle grenadiers co-operated usefully with the barrage. It should be added that the only enemy raids of the period were two futile attempts on posts of the 32nd Battalion on the 17th and the 19th of June. Both were beaten back with heavy losses.

The 14th Brigade relieved the 8th Brigade on the 26th of June, and the latter formation remained in reserve at Frehencourt till the 18th of July, when it relieved the 15th Brigade in the left sector. Lieut.-Col. Marsden kept three of his machine gun companies in the line and one in reserve throughout the period. The machine gunners co-operated most usefully with the raids and kept the enemy's communications under harassing fire at all hours of the day and night. If the Division's rôle was temporarily defensive, it was at least a defensive that sparkled with offensive features.

During this tour the engineers and pioneers worked away industriously at their usual defensive and communication labours. In addition, fine Divisional baths were erected at Franvillers by the Engineers. The pioneers worked a timber mill on the Ancre river as an interesting side-line to their many other activities. Timber was felled higher up the stream and floated down with the current to the mill. The power was generated by a huge water wheel, and over 12,000 feet of timber were cut during June. Col. Downey's medical dispositions for the period placed the 14th Field Ambulance in charge of the A.D.S. and forward evacuations, the 15th Field Ambulance at the M.D.S. Querrieu, and the 8th Field Ambulance at the Divisional Collecting Station at Petit Camon, near Amiens. The medical arrangements worked very smoothly over the Divisional area, but the great distance back to the C.C.S. at Vignacourt more than once proved embarrassing.

Leave to the United Kingdom had reopened on the 1st of June after a cessation of about two months. The Division was below establishment at the end of the month, its strength being 886 officers and 16,928 other ranks. In this respect it was probably no worse off than most of the divisions in the British Army, and a temporary reduction in the establishment of infantry battalions to 900 other ranks was approved on the 22nd of June. Some difficulty was experienced in getting suitable reinforcements for the 5th Machine Gun Battalion and a large number of pioneers offered themselves for transfer, and, after passing through a probationary period, were accepted as machine gunners. The casualties for June were five officers and 74 other ranks killed, 19 officers and 409 other ranks wounded, and three other ranks missing. The economy figures were

again exceptionally high, 35,000 lb. of fat being saved by the units and returned to base.

It is necessary at this point to turn for a moment to the plans of the Australian Corps as a whole in order that the Division's participation in them may be seen in its right perspective. For the present it will suffice to say that early in July Sir John Monash had already visualised the great blow which more than a month later was destined to open the stubborn doors of victory on the Western Front. But before any operation on the grand scale was attempted, it was desirable to make some local tactical improvements of the line on the Australian Corps front, and Sir John Monash utilised these preliminaries in his own inimitable way to test and perfect the tactical methods he desired to employ later on.

The most significant preliminary was the Battle of Hamel, fought on the 4th of July by the 4th Australian Division on our right. With the main action this narrative is not primarily concerned, and it will be sufficient to record that the 4th Division won a handsome tactical and moral success at trifling cost. The 5th Australian Division was directed to co-operate in the operations, and the Divisional Commander decided to do so in the following manner :—

(a) The 15th Brigade was to capture the enemy front and second lines east of Ville-sur-Ancre on a front of about 1,500 yards (map p. 312).

(b) The 14th Brigade was to raid the two first lines of enemy trenches on a wide front.

(c) The 14th Brigade was to carry out a "Chinese" raid to divert attention from the other operations in progress. These operations will be described in the order mentioned.

The objects of the operation on the 15th Brigade front were, (1) to help the larger operation of the 4th Division by creating a diversion on our front, and (2) to make important local improvements in the line. The troops detailed for the operation were two companies of the 59th Battalion and one company of the 58th Battalion. One company of the 60th Battalion and one platoon of the 58th Battalion were to be available for counter-attack purposes if required. General Elliott placed the whole of the attack under Lieut.-Col. Scanlan. A model of the ground was constructed and attentively studied by all ranks concerned.

Zero was at 3.10 a.m. on the 4th of July. Two sapheads had been dug out towards the enemy position, and by 2.30 a.m. the tapes were laid. The attack opened admirably and the two 59th companies on the right immediately commenced to make rapid progress. The 58th company, on the left, where the attack was flanked by the Ancre river, had more difficult ground to cross. On the extreme left of this company Lieuts. I. G. Thomson and Willis were doing splendid work, and, despite heavy opposition and a

marshy terrain, the line was steadily carried forward. A German machine gun killed the gallant Thomson, and his infuriated men at once rushed the position and bayoneted the entire crew. At this stage a number of men of the 57th Battalion, which was holding the line just north of the Ancre, seeing the difficulties of their comrades, gallantly swam the river and joined in the fight. A platoon of the 60th Battalion also lent valuable assistance. Meantime, the 59th companies on the right had reached their objective at 3.30 a.m. and consolidation was progressing well. The enemy artillery retaliation was very heavy throughout the operations. The 58th company, on reaching its objective, found a line of enemy strong points just beyond it. These were promptly rushed and cleared, and general consolidation of the whole line was rapidly carried out. A company of the 60th Battalion assisted with this, and the new positions were soon secured. An enemy counter-attack was repulsed, but during it Lieut. S. T. Facey, D.C.M., was killed. The enemy left 120 dead on the field; one officer and 63 other ranks were captured and 16 machine guns were taken. Our casualties in the fight were two officers and 18 other ranks killed, six officers and 76 other ranks wounded. It should be noted that, though our stretcher-bearers worked boldly across the open during heavy enemy sniping fire, the Germans scrupulously respected them in accordance with the laws of war, and they suffered no casualties from sniping. The work of the artillery, Stokes mortars, and machine guns was in every way admirable. Lieut.-Col. Marsden supported the operation with 30 machine guns of his battalion. Their rôle was neutralising fire.

The 14th Brigade raid was carried out by six officers and 192 other ranks of the 55th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Wood) under Capt. K. R. Wyllie. After a three-minute artillery bombardment the first wave rushed the enemy front trench in line formation. It encountered little opposition and made a few prisoners. The second wave, following behind in sections in file, then leap-frogged through the first wave, and fought its way through stiffening resistance to the second line. Lieut. Stafford was one of the first to reach the enemy parapet, and, standing on it, he shot the first two of a party of Germans who rushed him. The third German shot Stafford, and, as he fell, our men streamed into the trench and killed all its defenders. Forty-five of the enemy dead were counted and several prisoners and two machine-guns were taken. In addition to Lieut. Stafford, six other ranks were killed and 29 wounded. Like the 15th Brigade operation, it was a gallant and successful enterprise, reflecting most creditably on all concerned in its organisation and execution.

The 14th Field Ambulance admirably carried out the forward evacuations for both the operations mentioned. Major Beard, Capt. McGlashan, and Capt. Frecker all did particularly good work in one or other of the advanced medical positions. Ford cars, two

of which were hit by shells, proved very useful. The route of evacuation was through Mericourt and Bonnay, and thence to the A.D.S. south of Franvillers.

The "Chinese" raid was managed by Lieut. W. E. Campbell. The figures in No Man's Land were operated for 35 minutes and drew a great deal of enemy fire. Taken altogether, the morning of the 4th of July was an unhappy one for the enemy, and the fine results of all the operations on the 4th and 5th Australian Divisional fronts materially improved the Corps line. The 5th Divisional Artillery had hurriedly been called back from its rest to take part in the Hamel operation, and, as part of the Centre Group artillery, it had earned the grateful appreciation of the troops it had supported in the 4th Division's attack. The counter-battery work of the heavy artillery was so good on this sector throughout the operation that comparatively few of the enemy batteries were able to retaliate effectively, and hence the losses were exceptionally light.

No further operations of importance occurred on the 5th Divisional front till almost the end of July. The 57th Battalion, however, carried out a raid, one officer and 43 other ranks storming two enemy posts on the night of the 11th/12th of July. As the enemy succeeded in getting out of the position a trifle quicker than the raiders could get into it, no identifications were secured. Our casualties were one killed and four wounded. This was the Division's twenty-seventh raid.

Throughout July much gas was sent over from our side of the line and the offensive character of our defence grew steadily more and more marked. The 8th Brigade relieved the 15th Brigade and one battalion of the 14th Brigade in the left sector on the 18th of the month, and repulsed two enemy raids during the first days that followed. American troops were reporting for attachment to units in the line in parties of ever-increasing strength, and, in their courage and in the serious spirit in which they carried out their duties, were winning praise from all the ranks of our forces. M. Clemenceau had paid a visit to the Corps front early in July to thank the Australians for their defence of Amiens, and was delighted to find his own magnificent optimism of those trying days shared by the hardy and cheerful soldiers from the Antipodes.

On the 15th of July the enemy cast, in a last desperate gamble, the whole of his remaining reserves in a tremendous attempt to break the French front east and south-west of Rheims. His idea was to develop his threat against Paris, and it was necessary to widen the base of his Champagne salient before its extension in a southerly direction could be safely undertaken. There passed several days of the utmost suspense. The Germans gained some preliminary successes and crossed the Marne. But then it became clear that the magnificent French army of Gouraud was definitely holding the attempt to widen the base near Rheims and the German armies,

spent and consumed, lay helplessly behind their line on the Western Front, now strategically disfigured by the three huge salients which were the only visible results of their terrible offensive efforts in 1918. Foch had been heroically parsimonious of his reserves throughout the months of tension, but now his opportunity had come. On the 18th of July he hurled against the western flank of the Champagne salient strong French and American forces which rapidly overcame the enemy opposition and threatened with extinction his forces in the salient. The Germans were forced to withdraw hurriedly their foremost troops. For the second time in the war the fatal Marne was recrossed, the Ourc and the Vesle lines were abandoned in turn, Soissons was cleared, and the baffled enemy once again stood sullenly on his Aisne positions. Freedom breathed again throughout the universe.

In the Division attention was divided between the epic struggle further south and an operation which was being prepared on the Divisional front. Towards the end of the month, the 58th (British) Division on the left had taken over about 2,300 yards of the left brigade sector, including the Ancre valley and the positions recently captured by the 15th Brigade. The remainder of the front was now held by the 8th Brigade and one battalion of the 14th Brigade, which occupied respectively about 3,000 yards and 1,000 yards of the front. The main Corbie-Bray road cut this front about its centre, and it was intended to advance astride the road along the whole 4,000 yards of front and to capture the enemy front and support positions to a depth of about 500 yards. As this advance would bring our line to the outskirts of Morlancourt, the operation was generally referred to as the "Morlancourt show" (map p. 312).

On the left, General Tivey entrusted the operation to the 29th and 32nd Battalions, each supported by a company of the 30th Battalion. Other troops engaged on General Tivey's front were two companies of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and the 8th and 15th Light Trench Mortar Batteries. General Stewart gave the operation on his front to the 53rd Battalion, which was again under the command of Lieut.-Col. Cheeseman. In order to get the fullest artillery support for the assault of each brigade, it was decided that the operation of the 14th Brigade would not commence until that of the 8th Brigade was completed. For this reason Zero was at 12.30 a.m. on the 29th of July on the 8th Brigade front and at 1.25 a.m. on the 14th Brigade front.

The 29th and 32nd Battalions attacked in two waves, each on a three company frontage. The artillery programme consisted of a three-minute hurricane bombardment, and, thereafter, a barrage creeping forward at the rate of a hundred yards in two minutes till it passed the final objective, where it halted for 40 minutes to cover consolidation. A standing 18-pounder barrage was thrown across the right flank of the attackers to protect it. Machine guns and

six-inch Newtons assisted powerfully in the covering fire, and the infantry praised unstintedly the support thus provided for the advance. Despite a dull, cloudy night and heavy going in ground softened by recent rain, the attacking waves made splendid progress, moving up to within 50 yards of the barrage. On the right, the 32nd Battalion reached its objective with little trouble, and Lieut. Treasure did particularly fine work. The opposition to the 29th Battalion was stiffer, especially in the final stages, but after half an hour's fighting, in which the bayonet was freely employed, the objective was taken and consolidated. The 8th Brigade losses for the operation were two officers and 16 other ranks killed, three officers and 141 other ranks wounded, and three other ranks missing. Enemy dead to the number of about 200 were left in the sector. In addition, 92 prisoners of war, 23 machine guns and four minenwerfer were captured. Both the officers killed belonged to the 29th Battalion. The whole Brigade deeply deplored the loss of Capt. A. M. Robertson, M.C., who had led D Company to the attack. No more trusted and gallant officer had ever served the Brigade, and his name was synonymous with every principle of honour and integrity. Lieut.-Col. MacArthur recorded a splendid example of devotion to duty given by Private Baulch, a runner of the 29th Battalion. He was wounded, but not incapacitated, in the early stages of the fight and continued his work. Again he was wounded, but still he carried on until, finally, a gas shell burst just before him as he was hurrying down a communication trench with a message for Lieut.-Col. MacArthur. Though completely blinded by the fumes, he never for an instant forgot his duty, but kept on groping his way along the trench by means of his hands. In this condition he was found by Lieut.-Col. MacArthur himself and his first words on hearing his Commanding Officer's voice were, "I have a message for you, sir."

General Stewart's operation was as successful as General Tivey's. B and C Companies of the 53rd attacked at 1.25 a.m. on a two-company front. A beautiful artillery barrage, to which medium and light trench mortars contributed, enabled the infantry to work very close to it and so made progress easy. Flanking tapes guided them to the positions that were to be taken and the enemy was rushed before effective resistance could be developed. The position was soon consolidated and within twenty-four hours four communication trenches had been cut by the engineers and pioneers across the late No Man's Land to the new positions on the 8th and 14th Brigade fronts. Two officers and 63 other ranks were taken prisoner and twenty machine guns and other material were also captured by the 14th Brigade. The enemy dead numbered about 100. The losses of the 53rd Battalion were only eight killed and 14 wounded.

The effect of these two operations was to make considerable tactical improvements in the Division's line. They were both admirably staged and executed, and the results, actual and

moral, must have been as unhappy to the Germans as they were gratifying to the two brigades which achieved them. It was yet another lesson in the perfect co-ordination of all arms which, under General Hobbs's direction, had come to be characteristic of everything that the Division did.

At the end of the month the Division was relieved by the 18th (British) Division and withdrawn for a brief rest period to the Allonville area, with which it was by now so familiar. The 8th Brigade was located in the Bois de Mai, the 14th Brigade around St. Vaast and the 15th Brigade around Montières, the west-end of Amiens. D.H.Q. opened at Allonville on the 1st of August.

The casualties for July had been 12 officers and 141 other ranks killed, 38 officers and 862 other ranks wounded, and 10 other ranks missing. Except for the influenza outbreak, the worst of which now appeared to be over, the health of the men was very good. The supply services had never worked more admirably, and many battalions were able to give their men in the trenches two hot meals a day. Divisional vegetable plots had been established in the Somme valley at Camon, and they helped considerably with the supply of fresh vegetables. Major G. D. Smith the Division's D.A.Q.M.G. since its formation, broke down completely in health and was evacuated on the 19th of July. He had never spared himself in working for the Division and his whole-hearted devotion to its interests left it for ever his debtor. No immediate successor was appointed, the extra work falling for the time being on the broad shoulders of Col. Bruche and Lieut.-Col. Ralph. The only other important administrative change of the period was the promotion of Lieut.-Col. K. Smith to be A.D.M.S. of the 4th Australian Division. He was succeeded in command of the 15th Field Ambulance by Major R. W. Walsh, of the 8th Field Ambulance.

The tour in the line had been eminently satisfactory and the men, though a little tired, had never before felt so strongly their great ascendancy over the enemy. They had felt the gradual transition from defensive to offensive policy, and doubtless divined that big events would soon be brewing. But they little thought that they were within a week of the most momentous offensive battle of the war.



IN FRONT OF ANVIL WOOD,

A WIRE BELT WHICH THE 53RD BATTALION HAD TO PENETRATE, 1ST SEPTEMBER, 1918.

CHAPTER XIV

(1st August—30th August, 1918.)

THE COLLAPSE OF THE WESTERN FRONT

Important contemporaneous events :—

Imperial Council held at Berlin in order to secure peace, August 14th.	
Japanese troops landed at Vladivostock	21st.
British advance towards Bapaume	21st.
British advance east of Arras	26th.

SIR JOHN MONASH'S penetrating vision had not been so exclusively preoccupied with the events of the present as to become blind to the possibilities of the future. Like all the great leaders in the war, he had consistently regarded the warfare of positions as an indeterminate phase of the hostilities from which decisive results could never flow. And of all the Allied commanders he appears to have gauged the most accurately the precise moment at which the development of new weapons and the adoption of new tactics would permit the launching of an offensive of a scope and nature not hitherto dreamed of in the Allied attacks of the past. And so it came to pass about the middle of July that he laid before the G.O.C. Fourth Army proposals for an offensive against the enemy's Somme salient which, in its scope and tactical importance, exceeded anything hitherto planned on the front of the British Armies in France.

General Rawlinson was sympathetic and enthusiastic. He had been considerably impressed by the success of the Hamel operations of the 4th of July where, on the front of the 4th Australian Division, Sir John Monash had tested on a small scale his new theory of the employment of existing weapons in the attack. The swift and complete success of the Hamel operation had demonstrated the great possibilities of the new methods, and the prestige gained in that attack now caused the authorities to regard in a particularly favourable light the further proposals of the Australian Corps Commander.

General Monash had ascertained that the French Army then on the right of the Australian Corps was still committed to a defensive policy, and he had suggested that a good corps, preferably the Canadians, should attack on the right of the Australian Corps and

in conjunction with it. This suggestion was also favourably received and on the 21st of July Generals Rawlinson, Butler, Currie, and Monash had conferred at Flixecourt and had arrived at an agreement on the general outlines of the projected battle. This was modified in certain details later, and it was finally arranged that three corps should attack, the Australian in the centre, with the III British Corps, commanded by General Butler, on its left, and the Canadian Corps, commanded by General Currie, on its right. The whole operation was to be directed by Fourth Army, but it should be stated in simple justice that Sir John Monash played a leading part, both in the conception of the plan and in the selection of the methods by which it was to be executed.

Briefly stated, the plan as ultimately fixed was to break the enemy frontage on a sector of 11 miles and to advance to a depth of between 10,000 and 15,000 yards in a few hours. Absolute secrecy was to be maintained. No preliminary artillery bombardment would warn the enemy of the attack. On the Australian sector the predominance of the part to be borne by Corps Troops in the battle was one of its most interesting features. Lest the reader should have forgotten that a Corps Commander controls many troops additional to those contained in the several divisions of the Corps, it may be advisable to mention here that over 50,000 troops, including tanks, aircraft, artillery, cavalry, armoured cars, and labour *personnel* operated under Sir John Monash throughout the fight. These numbers were additional to the 80,000 men of the five Divisions in the Australian Corps. The artillery, tanks, armoured cars, aeroplanes, and cavalry were, in this battle, to do the greatest part of the fighting, and the infantry was to be used rather to make good what those arms gained than actually to win the ground itself. Alike in scope and in method the new battle plans embodied great and original conceptions which, could they but be translated into actual accomplishment, would radically alter the entire complexion of the fighting on the Western Front.

Such was the general scheme of the Commander of the Australian Corps. It was communicated to the Divisional Commanders concerned at a conference at Corps Headquarters on the 31st of July and they at once commenced their preparations for the great enterprise. While all entered enthusiastically into the work, there were some seasoned soldiers of sound judgment who in their inmost hearts doubted if such an overwhelming triumph as was planned was within the range of human achievement. It must be remembered that these men had been for years hammering incessantly at the German lines and that they knew that hitherto the heaviest shock attacks had merely dented them slightly here and there without once imperilling their general stability. On the Somme and before Ypres mighty armies had dashed themselves for months against the German wall without advancing so far as the Australian Corps were

now asked to go in as many hours. And even if the Germans had not yet had time to construct here the elaborate fortifications of the middle era of the war, that advantage appeared to be more than counterbalanced by the great strain which the British Armies had borne for the past six months. Even if the Australian Corps had not suffered the heaviest weight of the German shock attacks its men had been fighting almost continuously for over six months and might now be presumed to be rather in urgent need of a long rest than in active contemplation of the greatest blow of the war. If, therefore, to some good judges, Sir John's plan seemed that of a visionary, there was, in the light of past experience, much apparent reason for the view. But so quickly had confidence in the new Corps Commander grown that misgivings of the kind mentioned were surprisingly few.

The front of the attack of the Fourth Army was over 11 miles in length, extending roughly from Morlancourt on the north to Hangard on the south. General Debeney's First French Army, which by now had been instructed to participate in the operation, carried the line of assault another four or five miles south to Moreuil. On the British sector the III Corps was to attack over a front of about 5,000 yards north of the Somme; the Australian Corps over about 8,000 yards of front between the Somme and the railway just south of the Villers Bretonneux, and the Canadian Corps on a front of about equal length from south of Villers Bretonneux to the Amiens-Roye road about a mile south of Hangard.

The first phase of the attack of the Australian Corps was to be carried out by the 2nd Australian Division on the right, and the 3rd Australian Division on the left, of the Corps front. A creeping artillery barrage and many tanks were to assist the infantry progress to the green line, an advance of over two miles including, on the 2nd Australian Divisional front, the capture of Warfusée Abancourt. On the green line the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions were to pass through the 2nd and 3rd Divisions respectively and advance as in open warfare to the red line, a distance on the 5th Divisional front of about 6,000 yards. This constituted the second phase of the operation. The third phase consisted of the exploitation by the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions of the success already gained, by advancing the line about another mile to the blue line. On the 5th Divisional front this included the capture of Harbonnières. On the 4th of August the Corps Commander held another conference at which all Commanders were required to state their plans for the attack. These were harmonised where necessary, and the Corps Commander gave decisions on any controversial points that arose, and further regulated the main lines of the conduct of the operations.

General Hobbs and Lieut.-Col. Peck lost no time in evolving plans for the attack on the 5th Divisional front. These were communicated only to those whose immediate knowledge of them was

essential to the conduct of the operation. In a series of about thirty "battle instructions" the entire scope of the operation on the 5th Divisional front was ably and clearly stated. The salient points may be briefly noted as follows:—

Infantry.—The attack was placed in the hands of the 15th Brigade (General Elliott) on the right and the 8th Brigade (General Tivey) on the left. Each was to attack on a two battalion front. The 14th Brigade (General Stewart) was divisional reserve. It was to follow up closely the attacking brigades and to be so disposed as to be able to give immediate assistance if required at any part of the 5th Divisional front. The 2nd Canadian Division was on our right, the 4th Australian Division on our left.

Artillery.—There was to be no barrage on the Corps front before Zero hour. All available guns were to join in a creeping barrage at Zero hour to protect the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions in their advance to the green line. After that the advance of the 8th and 15th Brigades was to be supported by the 13th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Caddy) and the 14th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Derham) respectively. The 4th and 5th Brigades A.F.A., the 6th (Army) A.F.A. Brigade and the 14th (Army) Brigade R.F.A. were also to support the infantry of the 5th Australian Division. Both the 13th and 14th Brigades A.F.A. were to send an advance section of artillery forward to co-operate in close support of the attacking infantry. These sections were to advance in company with the infantry and deal on the spot with local targets arising in course of the fight. The remainder of the supporting Field Artillery would advance by bounds some distance in rear of the infantry. The Heavy Artillery of the Corps was to neutralise as far as possible by strong counter-battery work the fire of the enemy artillery in the opening stages of the battle; later it was to be pushed far enough forward to protect the troops when they had become established on the red line. Medium trench mortars were also to be pushed forward rapidly to assist in consolidation of the new positions.

Tanks.—Nine fighting tanks were allotted to each attacking infantry brigade. Nine carrying tanks were given to the Division for the purpose of bringing up supplies of ammunition, food, water, and engineering material. Eighteen Mark V Star tanks were allotted the task of seizing the exploitation objective. These tanks were to pass through the infantry on the red line and go forward to the blue line. Each tank was to carry a number of machine guns and their crews and these were to hold the blue line until the infantry could come up and consolidate it. Twenty machine guns and 32 Lewis guns and their teams were detailed for employment with these tanks.

Armoured Cars.—Twelve cars of the 17th Armoured Car Battalion were to pass through the infantry as soon as roads for them could be constructed through the battle area of the old front lines. They

were to go out ahead of the infantry and disorganise enemy communication and transport and break centres of enemy concentration. Tanks were to be prepared to haul the armoured cars over the early stages of the battlefield should the cars be unable to negotiate them without assistance.

Cavalry.—The First Cavalry Brigade was to pass through the infantry and screen its advance by patrols and harass the enemy as opportunity offered.

Machine Guns.—The 15th Machine Gun Company (Capt. Fitzgerald) was allotted to the 15th Brigade and the 25th Machine-Gun Company (Capt. Saunders) to the 8th Brigade. The 14th Machine-Gun Company (Capt. Holmes) and one section of the 8th Machine-Gun Company (Capt. Flack) were detailed to go forward with the Mark V Star tanks and hold the blue line against enemy attacks until the position could be secured by the infantry.

Light Trench Mortar Batteries.—These were to go forward in close support of their affiliated Brigades, to assist the advance wherever possible, and to help consolidation.

Engineers and Pioneers.—The whole of these services in the Corps were “pooled” under the control of C.E. Corps and were allotted by him as required. Their chief duties were to get roads across the battlefield as soon as possible in order that the armoured cars, cavalry, guns, and supply transport could get up to support the infantry. Forward road and water reconnaissances were also to be carried out and assistance was to be given to the infantry in consolidation. Engineers’ supplies were to be got forward, strong points were to be constructed, and the new front to be wired. The 8th Field Company (Major Farquhar) worked under the 8th Infantry Brigade, the 14th Field Company (Major Coghlan) under the 15th Brigade, while the 15th Field Company (Major Greenway), though not employed on the 5th Divisional Front, had similar duties with the 3rd and 4th Divisions on our left. The 5th Pioneers were to work chiefly on forward road construction and maintenance.

Medical Services.—The A.D.M.S. of the 2nd Australian Division was responsible for the forward medical services until the green line was passed. After that, Col. Downey became responsible for the medical administration on the 5th Divisional front. On the capture of the green line the A.D.S. was to be moved up to Villers Bretonneux. On the capture of the red line the A.D.S. was to be moved forward from Villers Bretonneux to Warfusée Abancourt. The M.D.S. was at St. Acheul; the C.C.S. at Vignacourt. Tent subdivisions of the 8th, 14th, and 15th Field Ambulances were to be employed at one or other of the Dressing Stations; bearer subdivisions of all three ambulances were to attend the forward evacuations from R.A.P. under the command of Lieut.-Col. Walsh (15th Field Ambulance). The Motor and Horse Ambulances of the 2nd and 5th Australian Division were to be “pooled” for the operation. Ford

and Sunbeam loading posts were to be established at convenient stages of the advance.

Such, in very brief outline, were the chief rôles of the various arms. The General Staff attended to many other things. For instance, every officer and N.C.O. in the attacking troops of the Division was given maps as well as aeroplane mosaics and obliques of the sector of assault. Some thousands of these had to be procured, and it threw a heavy strain on the mapping sections at Corps and D.H.Q. The work of the 5th Divisional Signal Company (Major Stanley) was outlined, and means were taken to ensure effective aeroplane co-operation. Half a platoon of cyclists from the Corps Cycle Battalion was allotted to each attacking infantry brigade, to assist in reconnaissance and communications. A detachment of Australian tunnellers was employed to reconnoitre the deep dug-outs and shelters in the area of the Division's advance.

On the "Q" side, Col. Bruche and Lieut.-Col. Ralph were equally busy. Although the "Q" work was less spectacular, on its excellence depended the effective realisation of the aims of the General Staff. Without regular and sufficient supplies of food, water, ammunition, and battle stores, no troops can be maintained in any position, however admirable it may be from a tactical point of view, and the great responsibility of "Q" was now, as ever, to arrange for supplies at every stage of the operation. The greater the depth of an advance the greater is the strain thrown on the supply and transport organisation, and what was, in terms of distance, a relatively easy matter at Polygon Wood now became an intricate problem bristling with difficulties of detail. Without going into these minutely, it may be mentioned that each brigade was allotted a general service tank-wagon and an extra water-cart. A water-lorry was held full as a Divisional reserve. Every man was given an extra water bottle, and hundreds of petrol tins of water were issued to the brigades to be carried forward by pack or other transport as required. In a similar way, reserves of food and ammunition were accumulated and arrangements made through the Staff Captains of brigades and Quartermasters of battalions for their forward distribution by the ordinary transport of the units concerned. The nine supply tanks were also loaded with precious supplies, and an idea of their carrying capacity may be gained from the following figures, which give the load carried by one of them :—

- 100 rounds Stokes 3-inch shells.
- 26,000 rounds machine-gun ammunition.
- 14,000 rounds rifle ammunition.
- 50 petrol tins filled with water.
- 4 large boxes of food.
- 200 shovels, 100 picks, 5,000 sandbags.
- 300 screw pickets and 50 coils of wire.

With nine tanks similarly laden, it may well seem that the supplies of the forward troops were secure for at least a couple of days until the normal supply services were able to cope with the new position. But Col. Bruche was much too prudent an administrator to commit himself entirely to one source of supply transport, and, even as he superintended the loading of these affectionate monsters, his brain was busily formulating alternative supply measures lest the tanks should fail him.

In the midst of all these preparations the Division had moved forward after its three days' rest in the Corps Reserve Area. Sir John Monash, knowing how much depended on the men being fresh for their attack, had ordered that all Australian troops were to be billeted as near as practicable to their assembly positions and were to be thoroughly rested for a day or two prior to the attack. General Hobbs accordingly located the 8th and 15th Brigades in and around the Aubigny defensive zone, a couple of miles west of the sector of the line which the 2nd Division was to attack. D.H.Q. moved on the 4th of August to the railway cutting about 4,000 yards west of Villers Bretonneux. In its sides rough dug-outs had been constructed of sufficient size to accommodate the signal services and those officers and clerks whose presence was indispensable at the fighting headquarters.

No untoward incident marred the work of preparation until the night of the 7th of August. Up to that time all had gone exceptionally smoothly, due largely to the fact that Sir John Monash in his final conference had announced that on no account would the decisions then arrived at be changed in any way. Thus every commander knew exactly where he stood, and the "order, counter-order, disorder" sequence that has marred so many military enterprises was happily eliminated. In the Division, General Hobbs's numerous conferences had been attended with equally happy results. Notwithstanding the multiplicity of interests to be considered, due to the great number and variety of arms that were co-operating, all the difficulties were surmounted. It meant much hard thinking and incessant supervision on the part of the Divisional Commander, but the influence of his keen brain and invigorating personality permeated everywhere and the most vital problems were discussed and decided without a trace of friction and, as it invariably turned out, with sound results. On a smaller scale, similar things were happening at the Headquarters of the three infantry brigades and of the 5th Divisional Artillery, and, on a still smaller scale, at the headquarters of all the subordinate units, and everywhere the same magnificent spirit of mutual assistance and goodwill was apparent. It should be mentioned also that the co-operation of the 2nd Australian Division in matters that mutually concerned both Divisions was invariably generous and helpful, and Col. Bruche afterwards paid a particularly warm tribute to the goodwill displayed by

Lieut.-Col. Durrant, the A.A. and Q.M.G. of the 2nd Australian Division.

But on the night of the 7th of August an event occurred which at the time had a most sinister significance and threatened at least a grave dislocation of the supply arrangements. Eighteen tanks, including the nine supply tanks of the 5th Australian Division, had been parked well forward in a pretty little orchard on the northern outskirts of Villers Bretonneux, an area within easy field-gun range of the enemy lines. A German shell of small calibre happened to strike one of these tanks and soon it was blazing furiously. The flames rapidly spread, and the great heat generated soon caused the trench mortar ammunition in the tanks to explode. The scene was striking and could not fail to attract the attention of the enemy. Flames were leaping high in the air, dense clouds of smoke were rolling across the hillside, and the deafening report of the exploding shells as tank after tank was blown up made concealment impossible and rendered vain all hope of confining the conflagration. The tank *personnel* present did what brave men may do to extricate their tanks, and Gunner J. T. Leydon and Bombardier W. L. Atkinson, both of the 113th Howitzer Battery, A.F.A., dashed into the fatal orchard, pulled the blazing camouflage off several of the tanks, and assisted in driving them out of the inferno which raged around. But all the others were irretrievably ruined, and with them most of the Division's supply tanks. It was an anxious moment for General Hobbs and his staff. Had the enemy learned of our plans of attack, or was it merely a chance shot? Even assuming the latter, would the enemy now divine what was afoot, and, even if he did not, how were the supplies of food and ammunition to be got forward during the battle? Col. Bruehe addressed himself to the last problem. Additional transport, including motor lorries, was got and also additional supplies. It meant much hurried work and threw considerable strain on the services involved. But it was done, and well done. Only three supply tanks were able to go forward in the battle, but the full establishment of stores went up as originally arranged and no one suffered any hardship. And the enemy, too, though a little mystified at the extraordinary commotion created by one small shell, attributed it to the explosion of an ammunition dump situated for some reason or other somewhat further forward than usual. So the critical moments ticked on towards Zero and all was well.

Zero hour was fixed for 4.20 a.m. on the 8th of August, and the attacking infantry of the 5th Division left its positions in the reserve system at about midnight for the march to the assembly line. The men had all been given a fine hot meal before they set out, and they were in the best of spirits. The night was dark, and there was a tendency towards fog. But the assembly line stretching just behind the front line was only two or three miles distant, and there was

ample time to get the assaulting battalions into position along it. This was quietly and comfortably accomplished by 3.30 a.m., and, so far, the enemy gave no indication that he suspected anything unusual. That he was vigilant, however, was demonstrated by the brief but severe shelling he administered in the direction of some tank *personnel* whose voices, as they guided their cumbersome pets into position, were unduly raised.

Precisely at 4.20 a.m. the barrage came down in a single magnificent crash and at once commenced to creep forward. The attacking battalions of the 2nd Australian Division sprang up and followed it. The details of their experiences will doubtless be related in another place; all that it is necessary to say here is that they did their work splendidly, and that at 8.20 a.m., when the 5th Division eventually moved through them, it left them very happily installed on their objective line and encumbered with rather more prisoners than they knew what to do with.

As the 5th Division was not to move through the 2nd Division on the green line till 8.20 a.m., it was not necessary for it to leave the assembly line for an hour after the other formation, and even then it would have a clear three hours to move over the two or three miles that lay between the assembly position and the green line. As the men waited for the word to move forward they speculated eagerly on the fortunes of the fight and wondered if all was going well. The darkness and a rapidly thickening fog made visual observation impossible. The artillery roar from behind was incessant and tremendous, but in front the sounds of battle grew steadily fainter and fainter. The enemy artillery reaction was scattered and ineffective, which meant that our Heavies had done their work well and truly. And even as the men waited impatiently for the order to advance enterprising Pioneers were pushing rapidly forward and clearing roads and paths through the debris of battle in front. By 5.20 a.m. the fog, aggravated by the smoke and dust of battle, had thickened so much that it was impossible to see more than half a dozen yards in any direction, and into this the long lines at last pressed forward. All officers were hard put to it to maintain direction, but compass bearings had been taken beforehand and these proved most helpful. Also, the right of the 15th Brigade was to rest for the whole of the advance on the Villers Bretonneux-Ham railway, an invaluable guide, while the Fouilloy-Warfusée road was an approximate line for the left flank of the 8th Brigade. Thus, despite fog and a ground littered with wire entanglements and truncated with trench systems, both direction and formation were preserved very well. Temporary dislocations, too, were occasioned by odd enemy snipers and machine-guns. It was inevitable that in the hurry and obscurity some of these would be passed over unnoticed by the 2nd Australian Division and odd parties of them sprang into untimely activity as the 5th Division waves approached

them. They were promptly dealt with and the advance continued without perceptible check. By half-past six the fog had thinned somewhat, and by the time the green line was reached but little readjustment of formation was necessary. This was quickly effected and at 8.20 a.m., with the good wishes of the 2nd Australian Division ringing in their ears, the attacking battalions passed over the green line on their eventful mission.


On the 4,000 yards of the 5th Divisional front the order from right to left of the attacking battalions ran 57th (Lieut.-Col. Denehy), 59th (Lieut.-Col. Scanlan), 31st (Lieut.-Col. Freeman), and 30th (Lieut.-Col. Street). The 60th Battalion (Major Kerr) and the 58th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Watson) were in support on the 15th Brigade front, while General Tivey detailed the 32nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Davies) to support his two attacking battalions and placed the 29th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. MacArthur) in close reserve. Both Brigades maintained approximately this disposition of their battalions throughout the first day of the battle.

The formations employed by the 8th and 15th Brigades had many features in common. It may assist the reader to visualise the operation if a diagrammatic reproduction of the 15th Brigade formation is included.

The country that lay before the attackers was gently undulating and pleasant enough to the eye. Though far from featureless, it presented no tactical characteristics of outstanding eminence. This, however, meant nothing, as the whole course of the war had demonstrated that the worst resistance is often encountered from positions skilfully concealed in ordinary ground, possessing no apparent tactical advantage except a field of fire. And all the men knew that at any moment an apparently innocent field might stand revealed as a stronghold made formidable by well-concealed machine-gun garrisons. On General Elliott's front the village of Bayonvillers was presumably a centre of enemy concentration, where, even if elaborate fortifications had not been prepared beforehand, stout machine gun opposition and even local counter-attacks might reasonably be expected. On General Tivey's front the advance was astride the main Villers Bretonneux-Vermand road, a fact which in itself rendered stiff resistance probable. There was also the deep and wooded gully known as the Morcourt Valley. This long depression, with its fairly precipitous sides, lay across the main road just west of the red line and was ideally situated for the concealment of troops and had other admirable defensive possibilities.

Preceded by its eighteen fighting tanks, the attacking line of the 5th Division pressed steadily on. The spirit of victory was in the air, and the men already felt that they were participating in a triumph. Machine gun opposition developed, as was only to be expected, in various places, but invariably a tank made straight for the spot and extinguished it. Brave German artillerymen often

served their field guns till the last moment, and continued to fire point blank at the advancing troops till long after all hope of escape had gone. The 57th Battalion suffered in this way from a 5.9 battery. A tank drove straight at it and actually got to within 40 yards before it was knocked out by a direct hit. But the battery



was captured and its crew made prisoners. A 77 mm. gun similarly obstructed the 59th Battalion and knocked out one of its Lewis gun teams. The brave German driver, seeing that it was then too late to save his gun, shot his horses and made good his escape. On the 31st Battalion front no fewer than five tanks were successively knocked out by a battery of field guns. But these, too, were quickly

captured. The magnificent gallantry of the tank crews appealed to-day, as always, to the Australian soldiers, and no other arm of the Service has gained quite the place in the affections of our men that the tank *personnel* enjoy. The 30th Battalion was checked for a time by *minenwerfer* firing down the main road—a novel application of trench weapons in open warfare. But this opposition was speedily brushed aside, and so the advance went on. There were scarcely perceptible local halts from time to time, but no general delay. The enemy opposition was paralysed and already beyond the possibility of a general reorganisation. It thus became individual, sporadic, and ineffectual. At half-past nine a great victory was clearly in sight.

By this time, too, the splendid work of the road-making troops had borne full fruit, and, as the attack progressed, the most wonderful panorama of open warfare that the world had yet seen was disclosed to the observers. Up the long main road from Warfusée Abancourt came a rapid stream of transport of all descriptions. Armoured cars racing after the infantry, cavalry streaming forward to play its part in the wonderful drama that was afoot, field guns galloping up, motor ambulances for casualties, motor lorries with supplies, and humbler transport with water, food, and engineering material—all pressed on and on, each with its appointed task and each straining every nerve to do it thoroughly and quickly. Tanks of all sizes and capacities were ploughing imperturbably along across country with the ludicrous look of anything big that is in a hurry. Overhead the sky was thick with the aeroplanes of two nations, and the droning of their engines and the frequent patter of their machine-guns made the air as troubled as the earth. Ahead were the wonderful fighting tanks that had borne the brunt of the advance so far, and, just behind them, the long indomitable lines of infantry. But they were no longer to have pride of place. Soon the armoured cars went dashing through them; soon the fan-spread cavalry was circling out in front, rounding up bewildered prisoners, turning the enemy disorder into chaos. There in all its terrible splendour was yet another altar of the far-flung temple of Mars and to-day Australia's greatest soldier was its High Priest. As the armies of Ludendorff reeled back mile after mile from this fatal blow Sir John Monash sat thoughtfully before his maps at Corps Headquarters and read the writing on the wall.

The immediate effect of the forward patrolling of the armoured cars and cavalry was to reduce still further the opposition to the infantry. On the 15th Brigade front the red line was reached before half-past ten. Bayonvillers had provided no serious obstacle, the front line troops skirting to north and south of it and leaving to the 58th Battalion the task of mopping it up. This was accomplished without difficulty and by 2 p.m. a forward Y.M.C.A. centre was established in the village! On the 8th Brigade front the Morcourt

Valley proved more difficult. It was stoutly defended by numerous machine guns which the armoured cars had been unable to deal with owing to the impossibility of their entering the rugged depression; so after enjoying some "good shooting" from the roadside they streaked on to other centres of resistance more appropriate for their employment. However, several tanks were brought up and with their assistance the 8th Brigade troops cleared the valley and captured from it some 200 prisoners. By this time, too, the advanced sections of the 13th and 14th A.F.A. Brigades under Lieuts. Jones and Punch respectively, had caught up to the infantry and were moving along in their immediate rear and finding good targets over open sights. These sections did admirable work. Lieut. Jones replaced his horse casualties by capturing stray cavalry horses and using them in his gun teams. The Morcourt Valley cleared, little additional opposition was experienced by the 8th Brigade, and before 10.30 a.m. it, too, was digging in on the red line. On the 5th Division front the line had been advanced over three miles in two hours. Everywhere casualties were extremely light and the men, though commencing to feel tired, were anxious to push yet further on.

It will be remembered that it was at this stage that the Mark V Star tanks were to pass through the infantry on the red line and proceed to the capture of the blue line. Until the attacking infantry could get up the blue line was to be held by the large detachments of Vickers and Lewis guns which were being brought forward in these tanks. Accordingly, for just a brief period, the leading infantry waves paused and tried to discover the Star tanks among the sea of miscellaneous transport which was surging across the plain a mile or two behind. But there was no sign of them. Not a Star tank was to be seen. On the fronts of both General Elliott and General Tivey the same situation arose, and it was dealt with in the same way. The Brigade and Battalion Commanders on the spot, realising that the enemy was still stunned from the shock of our blow, did not hesitate. The tanks were not there to take the exploitation objective, so the infantry must take it, and take it quickly, too, before any organised enemy resistance could be achieved. Accordingly, the word was passed to push on to the blue line at once, and shortly after 10.30 a.m. the advance recommenced. Meanwhile, the Star tanks were doing their utmost to get forward. But they were slower and more heavily laden than the fighting tanks, and the extraordinarily rapid advance of the infantry had left them far behind. The brave machine gunners with them chafed at the delay, and, fearing that they might be urgently required forward, they took guns and ammunition out of the tanks and, thus heavily weighted, pressed on on foot in order to fulfil their task. For once in a way, however, their presence was not essential to the infantry advance, which, still preceded by what was left of the original attacking tanks, forged steadily on.

The blue line of the operation was, on the 5th Divisional front, one of the reserve trench systems of the Amiens defences of 1915 and 1916. Although the works had long since collapsed and had become partly filled and covered under a rank growth of weeds, the chief trenches were still clearly defined, and the ground, of course, retained the tactical advantages which had led to its original selection as a defensive zone. From the red line the additional distance to the blue line on the 5th Divisional front averaged about three-quarters of a mile. It was greatest on the 15th Brigade front, where the village of Harbonnières lay between the two lines and threatened to prove a difficult obstacle. In any other circumstances it would have been. But the 8th of August was a day of exceptions, and Lieut.-Col. Scanlan's men were able to work round the place with swiftness and certainty. The 15th Machine Gun Company fought a duel with some enemy machine guns that were threatening trouble and killed their crews without themselves suffering a casualty. The infantry thereafter poured into the village and by 11 a.m. an Australian flag was waving proudly from the church spire. Meantime, along the railway, the 57th Battalion was progressing steadily and its casualties were being sent back to the dressing station in a huge German motor lorry which had been captured somewhere in the fight. By 11.30 a.m. all four battalions of the two attacking brigades had reached the blue line and consolidation of the area was soon in progress. The red line was wired before nightfall and strong posts were constructed. The quantity of material captured in the area was very great and engineering supplies were everywhere available for purposes of consolidation.

Over seven miles behind lay the front line of a few hours ago—the front line which in March and April the world had watched with bated breath as it bulged on and on towards Amiens. The earliest and deadliest of the three great enemy salients was now shaken to its foundations and already was threatening to crumble back in ruins on the line from which it had sprung. And over Villers Bretonneux, the storm centre of many tragic months, the hand of peace seemed already to have descended. White tents were shining in the sun where yesterday to have shown a head for a moment would have brought death. Eager railway trains were already panting down in Amiens waiting for the last little repair to the rails before they could come once more to Villers Bretonneux and thence puff on to Paris. And the repairs were soon completed and at D.H.Q. in the railway cutting a sentry was stationed with a bell which he rang loudly as the trains approached lest an unwary clerk or staff officer should lose his head by projecting it out inopportunistly from his dug-out office.

But the transition scene behind the line, striking as it was, compared not at all with the excitement and wonderful happenings occurring far beyond the advanced infantry on its final objective.

The reader will remember that the armoured cars and cavalry had passed through the infantry somewhere between the green and the red lines. The infantry had seen nothing of the cars since then, but it knew from the utter demoralisation of the enemy that they had done their work well. The cavalry was nearer at hand and frequently brought back to the infantry large batches of prisoners, for whom a receipt was given in due form. The cavalry, indeed, was doing astonishing work. For instance, a Capt. Mitchell captured a train near Framerville and made all its passengers prisoners. Capt. Mitchell's report unfortunately does not state what the passengers thought of this most irregular proceeding. Obviously another case of unpunctuality in the railway service. It was just near here that Lieut. G. Burrows, of the 14th Field Company, did some very fine work. On the same railway, some hundred of yards beyond our foremost line, stood a huge railway gun on a truck, of which the 31st Battalion had already taken possession. It had with it its engine and its ammunition tenders—indeed, the complete outfit—and Burrows thought it would be a fine thing to start up steam and bring the gun into our own lines. This with the help of two sappers of the 8th Field Company he did and perhaps some day the gun may be brought to Australia for all to see.

The cavalry worked in close liaison with the advanced infantry, and perhaps did their best work in rounding up large batches of fleeing Germans who otherwise would have escaped. The armoured cars went much further afield. Streaming up the main road past the Morcourt Valley, they had encountered all kinds of enemy transport, most of which failed to recognise them as British vehicles. Staff officers in cars, drivers of motor lorries carrying supplies, scores and scores of horse-drawn vehicles, were all shot down. The roads were soon blocked with dead animals and upturned vehicles, and the enemy transport was reduced to inextricable confusion. Branching off the main road as opportunity offered, the cars went to Proyart, Chuignolles, and other villages. They chased a lorry loaded with troops and killed nearly all of them. A car pulled up in front of an hotel where a number of German officers were seated at lunch. Firing through the window, it shot them down as they sat at table. Other officers and men were shot in their billets. For a distance of five miles beyond the furthest infantry outpost the whole German organisation was hopelessly confounded and the infantry on the blue line remained immune from counter-attack. Towards evening the armoured cars commenced to return homeward, and they found great difficulty in getting back over the roads which their own efforts had almost rendered impassable. Till nightfall they patrolled the roads immediately in front of the blue line. During the day they had fired 26,880 rounds of machine gun ammunition and suffered only eight casualties, four officers and four other ranks being wounded. Had that been the only occasion on which they were employed

throughout the war their magnificent services would have amply justified their existence.


Of the other arms employed on that wonderful day it is enough to say that each and every one of them did splendidly. Next to the dash and skill of the tanks, armoured cars, cavalry, and infantry, perhaps the early opening of the roads by the pioneers and engineers was the most important contribution to the great victory. The 8th and 14th Field Companies carried out admirably the engineering services of the two attacking brigades and, in addition to consolidation, did valuable work in road and railway reconnaissance. In this connection it may be mentioned that by 4 p.m. on the 8th of August the 8th Field Company alone had sent in accurate reports on over 19 miles of roads and railways in the newly-won ground.

It was obviously not the occasion for the successful employment of trench mortars on a grand scale. Nevertheless, the mobile sections of the L.T.M.B. did useful work against machine guns at several phases of the advance, and one of Capt. Wallis's Medium Trench Mortars was also got up in time to help a little. The work of the Field Artillery Brigades was excellent throughout, the support of their advanced sections in particular being highly valued by the infantry. The 114th (Howitzer) Battery had the misfortune to number amongst its casualties its commander, Major N. Dreyer, who was killed some little time before the attack opened. He was one of General Bessell-Browne's most valued battery commanders.

Considering the great extent of the advance, Major Stanley's signal communications stood their test admirably. On this occasion the telephone was by far the most useful form of communication, for the lines, in the absence of any heavy enemy artillery barrages, stood excellently. Indeed, they suffered more from the coming and going of our own tanks than from any enemy action. The contact aeroplanes, too, did fine work in communication. Other planes dropped boxes of S.A.A. near the forward troops, and though no urgent necessity arose for supplies of S.A.A. from heaven this celestial ammunition column demonstrated its practical utility.

The medical arrangements worked admirably throughout the day. The forward stretcher-bearers displayed great devotion in getting patients back to the horse ambulance and motor ambulance posts, and the "pooled" motor ambulances, both Ford and Sunbeam, under Capt. Fay (14th Field Ambulance) worked splendidly. By 7 p.m. a Walking Wounded Dressing Station was established at Warfusée Abancourt. A special team for blood-transfusion supplied by the 4th Australian Division was used successfully at the M.D.S. at St. Acheul. There was at no time any hitch in evacuations, and Col. Downey was naturally delighted with the fine work done by all medical *personnel*.

Towards evening on the 8th of August the 14th Brigade was distributed in depth over the area between the green and red lines



THE LARGE RAILWAY GUN CAPTURED BY 31ST BATTALION, 8TH AUGUST, 1918.

and formed a strong general reserve in case of enemy counter-attack. But the enemy had no thought of counter-attacking. He was much too disorganised for that, and appears to have spent the night in a great endeavour to hold us to our present line in the event of our trying a further advance on the morrow. The night therefore passed quietly as far as actual fighting was concerned, but both sides were busied with preparations for the next day's work. On the right of the 5th Division the splendid Canadian Corps, which had also gained its full objective for the day, was similarly occupied. On the 5th Division's left the 4th Australian Division was also on its final objective except on its left, where the line bent sharply back in the direction of Chipilly to connect with the III (British) Corps north of the Somme, where the advance of General Butler had not been so successful.

General Rawlinson decided to continue the advance on the 9th in the general direction of the Villers Bretonneux-Ham Railway. The greatest advance was required on the right of the new line where the Canadian Corps was fighting and the rôle of the Australian Corps was to advance in order to protect the left flank of the Canadians. The advance was arranged to commence at 11 a.m. and the 1st Australian Division, which had been in reserve on the preceding day, was instructed to pass through the 5th Division at that hour and to take up the forward movement in conjunction with the Canadians. Unfortunately, the 1st Australian Division was unable to get up in time and for a few hours the brunt of the work fell again on the 8th and 15th Brigades. General Elliott's instructions were that the 58th and 60th Battalions should pass through the 57th to the attack while General Tivey entrusted the advance on his front to the 29th and 31st Battalions. As the new objectives required a change in direction almost half-right the battalions of the 8th Brigade, instead of advancing on their original frontage, passed through the left half of the 15th Brigade front.

The enemy had got numerous machine guns into position overnight and as so many tanks had been knocked out on the previous day progress was very slow for a couple of hours. On the 15th Brigade front stout opposition was experienced north of the railway, but it was eventually cleared, thanks largely to the fine work of Capt. Loughnan, and 200 prisoners were taken from that vicinity. Between 1 and 2 p.m. the first objective line was reached on the 15th Brigade front and at 4 p.m. the troops of the 1st Australian Division passed through and took over the responsibility of the battle front. On the 8th Brigade sector strong opposition was also met with at first, but after persistent fighting the objective line was secured about 2 p.m. Just beyond it lay the village of Vauvillers, from which strong machine gun garrisons were already raking our new positions. Seeing that the situation would grow hourly more difficult to deal with, the commander on the spot,

Lieut. C. Davis (29th Battalion), determined to take the village at once with his A Company. Though this Company was already considerably reduced by casualties, Davis personally led a most gallant attack and captured and consolidated the village. One hundred and fifty prisoners were taken. What was left of Major Pape's 13th Tank Battalion co-operated magnificently in the fighting on the 8th Brigade front. During the afternoon the 1st Australian Division took over this part of the front also and by the evening of the 9th the infantry of the 5th Division was thus entirely relieved.

Thus concluded the share of the 5th Australian Division in what was incomparably the greatest battle that Australian troops had yet undertaken. The perfection of its conception was rivalled only by the perfection of its execution. Perhaps only one man in the world realised immediately the full significance of the operations of the 8th of August. On the Allied side everybody felt that the enemy had been given a tremendous blow. The far-sighted Monash saw further. Foch, perhaps, further still. But Ludendorff alone knew at once that the blow was mortal. "After the severe defeat of August 8th," he wrote, "I gave up the last vestige of hope." And again, "August 8th was the black day in the history of the German Army." Wonderful words from the man who, a few months before, himself had staged the greatest and most successful offensive of modern war! Wonderful words from the gifted leader of the hosts that had defied for four long years the united forces of civilisation! A wonderful tribute to the Australian soldier who had instigated the victory, and to the troops, Canadian, Australian, and British, that won it. Some writers of repute have stated that the Allied offensive opened on the 18th of July with the brilliant French success against the Champagne salient. It is not so. That splendid episode was essentially defensive in its characteristics. The defensive principle was engrafted upon it as unmistakably as it was, for instance, on the Australian recapture of Villers Bretonneux. It occurred at a moment during an enemy offensive when a menacing salient lay uniquely exposed to flank pressure. The flank pressure was applied as a matter of course and the menace was removed. Whereupon the local action terminated as did ours at Villers Bretonneux. But the 8th of August was the chosen date for an attack on positions long stabilised, and the sector of attack was deliberately selected for the facilities it offered for the continuance of aggressive operations and a triumphant termination of the war. It was thus essentially an offensive blow, the freeing of the Amiens-Paris railway being a secondary but important consideration. In a few thrilling hours it brought the war to within measurable distance of its termination. Let the 8th of August therefore be forever a day of rejoicing and *fêtes* and thanksgiving throughout all free lands, but especially in Australia. The Armistice was signed on the 11th of November,

1918, the Peace on the 29th of June, 1919, but both were won on the glorious 8th of August.

The casualties of the 5th Division in the battle were less than one-sixth of those sustained at Fromelles and about one-quarter of those incurred at Polygon Wood. The 15th Brigade had 59 other ranks killed and 18 officers and 341 other ranks wounded; the 8th Brigade lost five officers and 38 other ranks killed and 24 officers and 217 other ranks wounded. The Artillery suffered about 90 casualties, the machine gun battalion 22, the 14th Infantry Brigade 15, the Medical Services 11, the Engineers seven and the other units had smaller losses still. Of the five officers killed in the 8th Brigade four belonged to the 29th Battalion, the hard fighting round Vauvillers on the 9th taking a heavy toll of subordinate leaders. Among the wounded was General Elliott, but his injury, happily, was only slight. Lieut.-Col. MacArthur suffered more severely from a wound in the neck, but he too was able to return to his command soon afterwards. The total casualties for the Division were thus 870, of whom only 121 were killed. The enemy killed were very numerous. In addition, 47 officers and 1,663 other ranks were taken prisoners by the 5th Australian Division and an immense quantity of military stores was also captured. These included motor cars, motor lorries, transport vehicles of every description, vast engineering stores, bicycles, travelling cookers, etc. The capture of the 11·7-inch railway gun has already been mentioned. Fourteen other guns and howitzers of large calibre were also taken as well as 31 77-mm. guns, 17 minenwerfer, and 203 machine-guns. Never in the Division's history had such great results been achieved at such little cost.

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On its withdrawal from the line on the 9th of August, the infantry of the 5th Australian Division rested for some days in the vicinity of Villers Bretonneux, already a back area. In this position they were once again visited by his Majesty the King, whose anxious personal concern in the welfare of his Army was never more nobly displayed than in the disasters and triumphs of 1918. It is interesting to notice, too, that at the very same time the Kaiser was presiding over the First Imperial Council held in Berlin for the purpose of securing peace.

The operations on the battle front continued with general success for several days, though north of the Somme the progress for a time was not marked. In order to bring both banks of the river under the command of the Australian Corps, a Liaison Force under General E. A. Wisdom was formed on the 12th of August. This consisted of the 131st American Regiment, the 13th Australian Infantry Brigade the 58th (British) Divisional Artillery, and the necessary auxiliary troops. The 15th Field Company was the chief engineer unit with the force, and Major Greenway acted as C.R.E. The existence of the Liaison Force was not a long one, but it did excellent work,

especially at Etinhem Spur, in which the 15th Field Company participated.

On the 16th of August the 5th Division, including its Artillery, relieved in the line just south of the Somme the 17th (British) Division which had recently been allotted to Australian Corps from G.H.Q. Reserve. On the 17th D.H.Q. moved to a quarry about half-way between Corbie and the Bois de Vaire. The 14th and 15th Brigades on the right and left respectively took over the line, and at once commenced to advance it by infiltration methods, that is, dribbling it gradually forward here and there whenever opportunity offered and without any formal fighting. The men humorously called it "peaceful penetration." By these means the 15th Brigade got its line forward about 300 yards and the 14th Brigade also advanced in several places, capturing a few prisoners and machine guns. By the 18th further infiltration on this sector became impossible, and a set attack was necessary if the line was to be advanced further. The 1st Australian Division was ordered to carry out the operation, and it accordingly relieved the 5th Division on the night 21st/22nd August. On the morning of the 22nd, the 3rd Australian Division, now fighting north of the Somme, advanced the line there to the vicinity of Bray. The 1st Division attack took place on the morning of the 23rd of August in conjunction with an attack by the 32nd (British) Division, and, after a fine battle, the front south of the Somme was advanced to the approximate line of Herleville-Chuignes-Baraque. In this action the 5th Divisional Artillery ably co-operated, and a forward section under Lieut. C. B. Thorne was specially commended. On the same night, the 3rd Australian Division captured Bray and soon afterwards took Suzanne with little opposition. By the 26th of August the Australian Corps front lay in a general north and south direction astride the Somme from Suzanne inclusive to Foucacourt exclusive. The general progress of these operations, a knowledge of which is necessary to an understanding of the next phase of the 5th Division's work, may be traced on the map given.

Meantime, the Third and Fourth Armies were now attacking successfully in the vicinity of Bapaume, and, on the 26th of August, General Horne's First Army opened a successful battle in the vicinity of Arras. The German forces were everywhere retiring, and it was clear that they were endeavouring to extricate themselves from the ungainly Somme salient into which their famous March offensive had carried them. On the Australian Corps front the pressure was never relaxed and the 2nd and 5th Divisions were once more brought into the line on the 26th of August. The new Divisional front lay astride the Villers Bretonneux-Vermand road and it faced due east. The 8th Brigade took over the front and General Tivey was instructed to maintain a steady pressure on the withdrawing German forces. His Brigade Group, in effect, constituted a Divisional

Advanced Guard, much as General Elliott's had done east of Bapaume in March, 1917. The German rear guards were constituted chiefly of strong and mobile machine gun detachments.

At dawn on the 27th the advance commenced, the 32nd Battalion rushing a strong post north of Fouacourt and capturing or killing a number of the enemy. The village of Fouacourt offered a stout resistance, and fine work was done there by C and D Companies of the 30th Battalion, who carried it after a flank and frontal attack. Corporal Ford, when his company was held up by a machine gun, called out, "This is no good to me! I'll get that cow!" And he rushed forward alone against the gun. He killed the entire crew save one, whom he took prisoner and thus cleared the way to the village. It was a smart fight in which fine work was also done by Capt. Savage and Lieut. Wells. The 30th Battalion casualties were 13 killed and 66 wounded. By nightfall General Tivey's line lay approximately from the south of Fontaine les Cappy to Fouacourt inclusive, a marked advance on the positions of the preceding day.

On the 28th the opposition, though steady, was less resolute. The enemy machine gun rear guards disappeared on bicycles before the advance of our leading patrol. Fay and Estrée were captured before 1 p.m., and by 9 that night the Advanced Guard had taken Assevillers and the line lay north and south across the main road in the vicinity of Belloy en Santerre, an advance of about 5,000 yards for the day. D.H.Q. moved forward on the same day to La Flaque Dump, a position near the Villers Bretonneux-Vermand road a little north of Harbonnières. By the 29th of August, the 29th and 31st Battalion (Major Geddes) had relieved the 30th and 32nd in the vanguard of the advance. Belloy was captured at 5.25 a.m. Horgny, Barleux, and Villers Carbonnel fell in quick succession and by 7 a.m. both leading battalions had almost reached the Somme. Eterpigny, on the river bank, resisted our left battalion resolutely for a time, the enemy's object being to cover the retreat of his troops across the Somme. Nevertheless, our machine guns made good play on the crossings, where his losses were heavy. By nightfall our patrols had reached the river bank at all parts of the Divisional front. The 30th was devoted to a careful examination of the river with a view to finding out if a crossing in force was practicable, and several patrols did actually cross the river in daring reconnaissances. All the patrol reports indicated that the river itself was negotiable, but that the marshes, which extended to a width of some hundreds of yards, rendered a general crossing impracticable against strong opposition. The high ground east of the river was everywhere strongly held, the bridges were destroyed, and it appeared that the enemy had determined to make a desperate stand on what was in reality an ideal defensive line.

Thus concluded the fine advanced guard work of the 8th Brigade. An advance of about 14,000 yards had been accomplished in three

days and constant touch had been maintained with the enemy. The 5th Divisional Artillery, though not heavily engaged, had kept close touch with the infantry throughout and had from time to time rendered excellent help. Two officers and 86 other ranks had been captured in the various affrays and several guns and 20 machine-guns were also taken. Over 20 square miles of territory had been recovered and the enemy had been harried to such a degree that his reorganisation and his preparation of a new defensive line had been seriously impeded. The difficult problem of crossing the river had still to be solved and the story of its solution is left to the following chapter.

Before proceeding to a narrative of the operations undertaken to secure the river crossing, a few important changes in the staffs and higher commands will be noticed. Lieut.-Col. J. H. Peck's fine career of service as the Division's G.S.O. I. came to an end on the 28th of August. Overcome by the constant strain of major operations, he literally dropped in his tracks while still at duty and was evacuated to England suffering from a severe breakdown. He had displayed professional ability of a high order in all that he had undertaken with the Division and had carried his heavy responsibilities with conspicuous success. He was a fine, capable G.S.O. I., and all ranks of the Division were glad to hear some weeks later that he was gradually recovering his health and strength. During the month the command of the 56th Battalion had passed to Lieut.-Col. A. C. S. Holland, and Major Charlton of the 30th Battalion held temporary command of the 29th Battalion during the absence of Lieut.-Col. MacArthur. The total casualties for August were 78 officers and 1,433 other ranks. At the end of the month the strength of the Division was reduced to 862 officers and 15,708 other ranks. Heavy work yet remained to be done and there were, alas! not sufficient reinforcements in sight to raise anticipations that the Division would ever again attain its full fighting strength.

CHAPTER XV

(1st September—26th September, 1918.)

THE BATTLE OF PÉRONNE

Important contemporaneous events :—

Americans straightened St. Mihiel salient	..	September	12th.
Allied advances in Macedonia	15th.
Battle of Epehy	18th.
Allenby's great battle in Palestine opened	19th.
Bulgaria asked for armistice	25th.
British and Belgian Armies under King Albert advanced on a 23 mile front..	28th.

If the reader will turn once again to the map he will see that two defensive positions of outstanding excellence still intervened on this front between the retreating enemy armies and irretrievable disaster. The first was the great natural barrier of the Somme River and its marshy valley which threatened to hold our advance indefinitely in the area south of Péronne ; the second was our old acquaintance the Hindenburg Line, which, some 16 miles further east, interposed its formidable strength to any advance that might in the future be undertaken there. Although the Germans had even now lost the war they were not yet devoid of hope of securing such a peace as would maintain their international status almost unimpaired. If they were no longer fighting for victory absolute, there was still a chance that they might tide over affairs for a couple of months until another winter held up operations and, during the period of winter stagnation, they might then conclude a peace by negotiation on terms not utterly disastrous. To achieve this result, on the front with which we are concerned, it was necessary to hold our armies on the Somme line for several weeks, which time would be devoted to the further organisation of the somewhat obsolete Hindenburg defences. As soon as this was completed the Somme line could be once more abandoned as in March, 1917, and the Hindenburg positions could be taken up and held until winter descended once more upon the struggle. At German G.H.Q. the dejection consequent upon the 8th of August battle gradually became less acute,

and all energies were concentrated upon the new defensive plans. The forces under Marshal Foch, on the other hand, strove unceasingly to bring affairs to a head before the winter. "Attack" became Foch's watchword. "I order General Humbert to attack in his turn," he said to an interviewer. Humbert said, "No reserves." "No matter, get on with it! I tell Marshal Haig to attack too. He's short of men also. Attack all the same! There we are advancing everywhere—the whole line! *En avant!*" And so the infection passed to British G.H.Q. "Risks," said Haig, in a stirring order to his troops, "which it would have been criminal to incur a couple of months ago should now be incurred as a matter of duty." It was in this spirit that the Division entered on its last great operations in the war.

The 8th Brigade had hardly reached the Somme when instructions were received from Corps that Divisional sectors were to be readjusted. The 5th Australian Division was to side-slip north and take over the sector of the 2nd Australian Division, which in its turn was to sideslip north and occupy a sector north of the Somme. In accordance with this instruction, the 15th Brigade took over the new divisional sector along the river front immediately south and south-west of Péronne. This was effected on the night of the 30th of August, at which time the 32nd British Division was also relieving the 8th Brigade on the old Divisional front. On relief, the 8th Brigade passed into Divisional reserve near Barleux. The new Divisional front extended along the west bank of the Somme from a point opposite Farm Lamire to a point near Biaches.

It was the policy of the Australian Corps to force the Somme as speedily as possible, and the problem presented to the 5th Division was to secure a crossing on its Divisional front. To do this it was necessary to take the high ground east of the river a mile or two south of Péronne. This high ground dominated all possible crossings on the Divisional sector. The enterprising patrols of the 8th Brigade on the old front, and now of the 15th Brigade on the new, revealed clearly that this could not be done by a frontal attack across the wide belt of marsh and river in the Somme Valley. It therefore became necessary to devise other means.

The reader should note carefully that the Somme river in a wide, sweeping bend south-west of Péronne changes its direction, almost at right angles, from north to west. Thus while the front of the Division lay on the banks where the river flowed north, the Division's left flank also rested on the river where it flowed west. On the immediate north of the river, that is, on the Division's left flank, the advance eastwards had now been carried as far as the general line Cléry-sur-Somme and Halle, where the 2nd Australian Division had thus a footing on a narrow strip of land on the right bank of the river. Here it was faced by a formidable obstacle in the shape of Mt. St. Quentin. Mt. St. Quentin was really the western and

culminating point of a long ridge of sufficient height to command the whole of a low-lying ground between it and the town of Péronne. Péronne lies about a mile south of St. Quentin and on the right bank of the river where it makes its bend westwards. At 5 a.m. on the 31st of August the 2nd Australian Division and the 3rd Australian Division, which was operating still further north, attacked in an easterly direction and Mt. St. Quentin was reported captured. This reported capture, which appeared to open the way to Péronne, had an important bearing on the operations ordered for the succeeding day.

As it was impossible for the 5th Australian Division to carry out a frontal attack on the high ground across its river front, it was decided to turn the position from a flank, and the reported capture of Mt. St. Quentin appeared to offer a solution of the problem. At 9 p.m. on the 31st of August a conference was held at the headquarters of the 6th Australian Infantry Brigade near Herbecourt. This was attended by representatives of Australian Corps Headquarters, 2nd Australian Division, and 5th Australian Division. Major Wootten, G.S.O. II, represented the latter formation, and General Stewart and his Brigade Major, Major Legge, were also present from the 14th Brigade. After considerable discussion it was decided that the 2nd Australian Division would continue to attack eastwards and that the 14th Brigade would cross the Somme into the 2nd Division's area, attack east in the direction of Péronne, and thence south against the flank of the enemy positions in the high ground east of the Divisional frontage. This was to be the main tactical objective of the 14th Brigade operation, the capture of Péronne being merely an intermediate and incidental phase. Meanwhile, the 15th Brigade was to maintain steady pressure along the real front of the 5th Division, to co-operate as occasion might arise with the 14th Brigade attack further north, and to seize any opportunity that offered of crossing the river and securing a bridgehead on the eastern bank. While the capture of Péronne was, as already stated, merely incidental to the main purpose of the 5th Division's operations, the bitter struggles of the next few days in and around the town will be known forever in Australian history as the Battle of Péronne.

The whole attack was so hurriedly arranged that there was no time to make the elaborate preparations necessary for a creeping artillery barrage. A system of special bombardments of selected areas was substituted, and Zero hour was fixed for 6 a.m. on the morning of the 1st of September. It was about midnight when the conference dispersed, and General Stewart hastened back to his Headquarters, where his battalion commanders were awaiting his arrival. Only a few hours remained before Zero and there was a great deal to be done. The 14th Brigade, which, earlier in the day, had marched seven miles across country, was at this time assembled

east of Cléry-sur-Somme, having crossed the river at Buscourt. Orders had to be promulgated throughout the units, and the attacking battalions had to be moved over the couple of miles which lay between their present positions and their assembly positions east and south-east of Halle. Rarely during the war had a brigade been committed to a major offensive operation on such brief notice, and it speaks volumes for the excellence of the arrangements of General Stewart and his staff that everything was ready in time. Lest the reader may think that the whole operation was too hurried, he should bear in mind the policy of the Allied chiefs at this time. There can be no doubt that the offensive here could have been better staged after a postponement of twenty-four or forty-eight hours. The point was that the defensive would certainly have benefited to a much greater extent by any delay in our attack. It was of the highest importance that the pressure on the enemy, so admirably maintained since the 8th of August, should not be relaxed for a moment, and least of all at a position in his retreat which a few days' defensive organisation would render well-nigh impregnable.

General Stewart's dispositions for the attack were as follow: The 54th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Marshall), on the right, was to advance from the southern outskirts of Halle and clear the ground between Halle and Péronne. That accomplished, it was to storm the town itself and mop it up. On the left, the 53rd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Cheeseman) was to attack east from Florina Trench through Le Quinconce Wood and the cemetery north of Péronne, and thence, skirting the north of the town, was to establish itself on the line of Darmstadt trench, which ran north and south nearly a mile east of Péronne. Such an advance would effectively turn the right flank of the German position on the high ground east of the river. With this advance secured, the 56th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Holland), following as support to the 53rd, was to turn south and attack the high ground from the north. In this it was to be supported by the 55th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Woods) with special instructions to mop up Flamicourt, a little suburb south of Péronne, through which the railway passed and which was known to be very strongly held with machine guns.

The reader will have gained a fair idea of the battlefield from the preceding paragraphs, and from the map. Péronne itself had been a citadel almost from time immemorial, and its great tactical advantages have endowed it with a military history of great interest and importance. Girt with an impassable barrier of marsh and river on the south and west, it required only heavy battlements on the north and east to make it practically impregnable in mediæval warfare. These ramparts had been constructed, and, flanked by broad and deep ditches on the outside, they reared their massive walls to a height of 20 or 30 feet in solid masses of stone that only a protracted bombardment by the heaviest artillery could

have crumbled. These ramparts were now used for the protection of numerous machine gun garrisons which were almost entirely immune from any artillery bombardment. The height of the ramparts also gave the machine guns admirable command over the ground north and west of Péronne. The entire area north of the town was also dominated, not only by Mt. St. Quentin itself, but also by the long ridge which extended eastwards from it. Just north of the eastern extremity of the town lay the wood and village of St. Denis and a large brickworks. All of these were skilfully fortified, and constituted a formidable obstacle to any advance towards Darmstadt trench. To make the position north and west of the town even more secure, the Germans had constructed a triple row of strong and thick wire entanglements leading from the river northwards towards the western slopes of Mt. St. Quentin. Two chief exits from the town existed on the northern and western sides. Here the road passed through the ramparts and over the moat by means of a causeway. These causeways had been mined, and the openings through the ramparts were covered by machine guns especially disposed for that purpose. Altogether the position was one of the very strongest on the whole of the Western Front.

At about 4 a.m. on the morning of the 1st of September the 14th Brigade battalions moved from their bivouacs along the roads and old trench systems around Cléry. A bleak "Scotch mist" drifted slowly along the river valley, but later on the day became finer, though with occasional driving showers. Day broke as the 53rd Battalion neared its jumping-off line, Florina Trench, which had been reported clear of the enemy. Considerable "whiz bang" fire, which appeared to come from Mt. St. Quentin, fell around the troops, and a good deal of machine gun fire coming direct from in front warned the attackers that the enemy was in strength and on the alert. His vigilance had doubtless been aroused by the fact that the artillery bombardment on the front of the 2nd Division was timed to commence half an hour earlier than that provided for the 14th Brigade, but, even allowing for this, opposition at this early stage had not been expected, and it was already becoming evident that the area was less clear of the enemy than had been reported. The surprise was completed as the leading waves of the 53rd Battalion reached Florina Trench, part of which was actually found to be strongly held by the enemy. Without hesitation the advanced troops of C Company charged into the trench and thus, 15 minutes before Zero, became engaged in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle for the possession of the jumping-off line. It was a sharp fight in which quarter was neither asked nor given, and it terminated in the usual way. But the left flank of the 53rd Battalion was inevitably delayed, and it was twenty-five minutes past six before it could get going on the attack proper. Meanwhile, on the right, the position was far more favourable. A Company of the

53rd Battalion and the 54th Battalion, which in the low ground near the river was less exposed, after passing through a moderate artillery barrage, reached their jumping-off line without incident of note and commenced the attack to time.

No sooner had the leading waves of the 53rd Battalion shown themselves on the steadily rising ground east of Florina Trench than heavy machine gun fire from Mt. St. Quentin commenced to rake the whole area. This was supplemented by fire from Quinconce Wood, and from Anvil Wood on the west of it. Casualties at once commenced to mount rapidly, but, with the highest courage and steadiness, all ranks pressed on. At the first of the wire belts progress was checked for a little and the rate of casualties quickened. Major Murray, Lieut. Eastman, and Lieut. Toppler, and indeed all the officers present, displayed fine leadership, and the Lewis gunners of the Battalion, resting their guns along the top of the wire belts, sought to keep down the enemy fire while their comrades worked a way through the wire. It was accomplished quickly and the advance recommenced, but not before many casualties had been suffered. By this time all the officers of A Company were killed or wounded, and Capt. Smith, collecting A and B Companies under his command, pushed on and reached and cleared the wood. The attackers worked their way out through the east edge of the wood and found themselves in the cemetery. Here they were now utterly exposed, not only to the machine guns on Mt. St. Quentin, but also to a hail of machine gun fire from the ramparts of Péronne on their right and from the brickworks and St. Denis in front. Caught in this storm of converging fire, the 53rd Battalion was unable to make any further substantial headway. Numerous graves had been dug in the cemetery by the Germans for the reception of their dead, and into this welcome cover the men dropped. Others dug in, and by 7.15 a.m. the right half of the 53rd Battalion was fairly established in and around the cemetery. In this position they were joined a little later by the left companies, which, after their fight at Florina Trench, had made good progress. Elements of the 55th Battalion had joined in the 53rd attack on the delayed left half of it, and the remainder of the 55th Battalion was now disposed on the left rear of the 53rd, where it constituted a very necessary protection of the northern flank of the 14th Brigade attack. Leading detachments of the 56th Battalion had also become involved and had fought most gallantly side by side with the 53rd.

A private of the 55th Battalion had an amusing experience in this phase of the operations. He was carrying a smoke and incendiary bomb in his breeches pocket and it was hit by a bullet and ignited. Dense volumes of smoke at once burst out and his clothes commenced to burn in numerous places. He was forced to strip naked and go to the rear. Feeling rather cold, he dressed himself in the overcoat and helmet of a dead German and wandered back

towards the dressing-station to have his burns attended to. On the way he was met by an officer who mistook him for a German prisoner and addressed him as such. "Say, digger," retorted the man in an injured tone, "don't be too hard on a bloke."

By this time the artillery programme was a good deal in advance of the attacking infantry, and without close artillery support any further progress on the part of the 53rd Battalion was out of the question for the time being. The wonder was, not that the men were unable to progress further, but that they had got so far. With Mt. St. Quentin still in enemy hands, the ground gained had been won solely by the magnificent leadership of the subordinate officers and by the amazing gallantry of the men in the face of a position which was still absolutely impregnable according to all the standards of modern war. Few battalions in the British Army have in their records a more glorious episode than the 53rd Battalion advance of a mile over such obstacles and in face of such a fire as was encountered. A feature of its work was the capture of a 77 mm. gun by Corporal Weatherby and Ptes. Crank and Hopkins. They were not expert artillerymen, but the crest of Mt. St. Quentin was a good visible target, and they expended on it a considerable quantity of ammunition which was lying near the gun. But of the individual exploits in the 53rd Battalion on that memorable morning the work of Pte. W. M. Currey takes precedence. He, too, had encountered a 77 mm. gun which was being bravely served by its crew and was doing much execution in our ranks. Single-handed, he rushed forward through a deadly machine gun fire and killed the entire crew and captured the gun. Later on in the operations he crept out on to the flank of an enemy strong point containing a garrison of 30 men and directed upon it the fire of his Lewis gun. Having killed many of the garrison, Currey rushed in alone, killed four more men, wounded two, and took another prisoner. For these and other fine achievements he was awarded the V.C.

Meanwhile, events were progressing well with Lieut.-Col. Marshall's attack on Péronne itself. Despite a good deal of resistance, the 54th Battalion had progressed steadily to the outskirts of the town, the lower conformation of the ground affording it in the early stages of the attack more security from machine gun fire, which the 53rd Battalion had found so deadly. After hard fighting most of the enemy defenders were forced back into the town and shortly after the last party crossed the causeway it was blown up and, for a time, all attempts of the 54th to get forward were checked by machine-gun fire from positions near the ramparts and from the housetops. At this stage, and, indeed, throughout the entire operation, Cpl. A. C. Hall displayed distinguished courage and initiative. Alone he rushed a machine gun post that was holding up the advance, shooting four of the enemy gunners as he charged forward and capturing nine others and two machine guns. For this and similar

exploits, he was awarded the V.C. Not less magnificent was the work of Cpl. A. H. Buckley. He, too, single-handed, rushed an enemy strong point, killed four of its occupants and took 22 prisoners. A little later a machine gun position across one of the moats held up the advance of his company. A bridge led across the moat, and Buckley, though he knew the attempt was almost hopeless, dashed across the bridge towards the strong point and was killed. He, too, was awarded the V.C. These and other instances of dashing leadership eventually overcame all opposition outside the walls, and by 8.40 a.m. the Battalion, inspired by the personal direction of Lieut.-Col. Marshall, had gained a good grip on the western half of the town and the men were busy mopping up the extensive cellar defences, which in many places held out strongly. In this work, Capt. Downing rendered conspicuous service. Soon afterwards, the right of the 54th Battalion established touch with part of the 59th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Scanlan) near the river bend.

The generous spirit and ceaseless enterprise of General Elliott had not permitted him to remain inactive during all this heavy fighting. At 8 a.m. he was busily engaged in his habitual personal reconnaissance, and he actually crossed the Somme River and worked his way through the marshes in an endeavour to determine the precise nature of the enemy defences. He formed the opinion that large bodies of troops might be gradually dribbled across the river, and the 58th Battalion (Major H. Ferres) and the 59th Battalion were directed to try the crossing and to exploit any success that might be gained. Lieut. Pentreath, of the 59th Battalion, was the first to get a platoon over, and he found himself so near an enemy strong point that a German officer showed himself and invited the party to surrender. Pentreath, in reply, shot the fellow dead and made good his slender footing on the eastern bank of the river. Other platoons of both the 58th and 59th Battalions gradually worked their way across, and by 11.30 a.m. four companies were thus in position on the eastern bank. But they could get no further. Any attempt to move in the direction of the high ground or of Flamicourt was met with such a storm of fire that it had to be abandoned. As it was clear that no progress could be made here until the operations of the 14th Brigade developed further, most of the 15th Brigade men on the eastern bank of the river were withdrawn during the day, only a small party being left to guard the crossing in case it should be required again.

The front line of the 14th Brigade, despite its great exertions earlier in the day, made another unsuccessful attempt to advance at 1 p.m. At 1.30 p.m., however, the position on the left was relieved considerably by the capture by the 2nd Division of the summit of Mt. St. Quentin after a gallant attack by the 6th Brigade. At 3 p.m. a company of the 56th Battalion pushed up and connected the right of the 53rd Battalion with the left of the 54th in Péronne.

Throughout the day the work of Capt. G. H. Mann, of the 56th Battalion, had been of the highest order, and now again he rendered notable service, not only by his personal gallantry, but also by his skilful leadership. The position was so much easier in the latter part of the afternoon that yet another advance was attempted by the 14th Brigade at 5 p.m. This met with more success, and the line was advanced some hundreds of yards east of the cemetery with advanced elements still further out. The machine gun fire from the north-east ramparts of the town and from the vicinity of St. Denis was, however, still most deadly, and at 8.15 p.m. General Stewart ordered the advanced elements to be withdrawn so that a thorough artillery preparation of the entire area might be carried out as the necessary prelude to further infantry attacks. The withdrawal was effected accordingly, and a line just east of the cemetery was consolidated overnight. The 55th Battalion, meanwhile, had linked up to the 2nd Australian Division on its left, and the order of the battalions on the 5th Divisional front on the night of the 1st/2nd of September thus ran from north to south 55th, 53rd, 56th, 54th, 59th and 57th (Lieut.-Col. Denehy) and the approximate line was as shown on the map.

Though the great haste which had marked the preliminary arrangements for the battle had prevented the usual careful preparations on the part of the Divisional Staff, General Hobbs had followed with anxious concern the progress of the operations throughout the day, and as soon as it was seen that affairs were settling down for the night he summoned a conference of Brigade commanders and the C.R.A. to meet at 8th Brigade Headquarters at 9.30 p.m. The car sent for General Elliott unfortunately failed to locate him, and the General had to make his way as best he could over the wilderness of the old battlefield that lay between him and the rendezvous. It was a pitch dark night and General Elliott did not reach 8th Brigade Headquarters until 2.30 a.m. on the 2nd. By this time General Stewart had been forced to leave the conference in order to carry out the preparatory work for the operation decided upon, and thus the two Brigadiers most closely concerned were unable to confer personally on the work in hand. This was unfortunate, but, in the circumstances, it could not be helped. The chief result of the occurrence was the great haste with which both General Elliott and General Stewart had perforce to complete their arrangements for the battle on the 2nd, Zero hour for which was again fixed for 6 a.m.


The plan as finally decided on was to a great extent a continuation of that adopted for the first day's operation, with the substitution of fresher battalions in the attack and the direct assistance of the 14th Brigade by the 15th. The attack north of Péronne was to be continued on a frontage of about 600 yards. The 56th Battalion, plus two companies of the 55th, was to carry this out on a one com-

pany front, the jumping-off line being fixed on a general north and south direction slightly east of the cemetery.


The eastern objective was the ground in the vicinity of Darmstadt Trench and to the east of it. The 54th Battalion was to extend its hold on Péronne, the eastern half of which was still strongly held. The 59th and 60th Battalions, the 60th commanded by Major Kerr, were to follow behind the eastern attack of the 56th and 55th Battalions, and when the last-named units had attained their eastern objective were to face south and make for the high ground east of the river. The 58th Battalion was to assist the 54th Battalion in clearing Péronne, while the 57th Battalion on the true Divisional front west of the river was to maintain close watch on the situation and to cross the river and occupy the high ground if the opportunity arose. General Stewart, when he left the conference, understood that the whole of the 15th Brigade attack was to take place across the river front south of Péronne, and it was not until about two hours after zero that information of the precise nature of the 15th Brigade co-operation reached him.

The artillery co-operation was again to consist of a bombardment of special areas which in the previous day's fighting had been revealed as enemy strongholds. It should be stated here that both Lieut.-Cols. Caddy and Derham experienced great difficulty in the selection of suitable battery positions, and that the enforced haste of the operations imposed as much strain on the artillery staff as it did elsewhere.

The 56th Battalion suffered heavy casualties from an enemy bombardment just prior to Zero, and all the officers of three companies became casualties before the attack opened. A hurricane machine gun fire opened on the leading waves as the advance commenced. The enemy, protected by the ramparts on the north-east of Péronne, had easily withstood the artillery preparation, and the machine gun crews there were still intact. Round about St. Denis and the brickworks the machine gun detachments appeared to have been reinforced during the night, and the 56th Battalion casualties were heavy from the outset. Sgt. O'Connor now took command of the remnants of one company and by the most skilful and determined leadership progressed with it some 300 yards beyond the jumping-off line. Here he dug in with a company reduced in strength to 35 other ranks. The two companies of the 55th Battalion, by working round on the north side of the attack, managed to get further forward, reaching an embankment some little distance in front of the brickworks. At 7.45 a.m. parties of the 55th Battalion had stormed the brickworks and gained a temporary footing in St. Denis. Capt. Pinkstone and Lieut. Phillips did particularly fine work at this stage. O'Connor's dauntless party still held on in its dangerous position, while the 59th Battalion had moved forward on the right and linked up his line with that of the 54th in Péronne.



APPROXIMATE
AND 6TH



APPROXIMATE BOUNDARIES OF ADVANCE OF THE 5TH AUST DIV^N BETWEEN 17TH MARCH AND 6TH APRIL 1917. — — — — HINDENBURG LINE (APPROX) — — — —

THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE, MARCH AND APRIL, 1917.

Meanwhile, the 54th and 58th Battalions had done good work in the mopping up of Péronne. The machine gun garrisons there held on with their customary stubbornness and the fighting was bitter and bloody, but the fresher 58th Battalion especially was not to be denied, and, thanks largely to the dash of its men and the fine leadership of its officers, particularly Lieuts. Laing, Morrison, and Slaughter, the town was finally cleared. In this stage of the fight four officers and 100 other ranks were taken prisoners by the 58th Battalion and Major Ferres, though now wounded, continued to direct its operations with his customary courage and resource. Lieut. J. Adams, of the 54th Battalion, again displayed in this fighting the gallantry which had made him conspicuous on the previous day.

By this time the 55th and 56th Battalions were so reduced in strength that it was deemed advisable to use them as a single battalion. Lieut.-Col. Woods accordingly took charge, and for some hours the line remained stationary slightly west of the St. Denis-Mt. St. Quentin road. The 58th Battalion made slight additional progress during the afternoon and linked up with the 55th and 56th Battalions just north of the extreme eastern edge of Péronne. Despite this considerable outflanking of their positions, the enemy forces in Flamicourt and on the high ground south of it still held on with the greatest tenacity and the right flanks of the 58th and 54th Battalions therefore swung back sharply along the southern outskirts of the town and connected with the 57th Battalion on the river bank near the point marked Faubourg de Paris. During the afternoon the 59th and 60th Battalions tried to improve the position on the northern part of the attack front and suffered a heavy gas and shell bombardment in the attempt but they made no material progress. The 57th Battalion, too, twice attempted to cross the river and marshes a mile or two south of Péronne but both attempts were checked. In this, and, indeed, throughout all the operations of the 57th Battalion, Capt. Peacock displayed fine leadership. The line for the night of the 2nd/3rd of September remained as described.

It is impossible not to pay a tribute to the fine tenacity of the German machine gun garrisons which now for two days had held on so grimly in the face of our desperate assaults. One particular incident will serve to show the reader the quality of the fighting material here opposed to the Division. A German machine-gunner had his leg blown off by a shell. He rested the bleeding stump on part of the concrete defences of his position and kept on firing. Our men, as they rushed the spot, noticed his condition and, anxious to spare him, called on him to surrender. His only answer was a spirited attempt to bring his gun to bear on them and it was necessary to kill him. Such was the resolution of the defenders of the Péronne positions—and the resolution of the attackers was greater!

At 6 p.m. on the 2nd of September General Hobbs held another Conference, this time at 15th Brigade Headquarters. The heroic

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At 6 p.m. on the 2nd of September General Hobbs held another Conference, this time at 15th Brigade Headquarters. The heroic

efforts of the 14th Brigade during two days of fierce fighting made it imperative that it should be relieved at once, and the 15th Brigade was ordered to take over the entire front. The 8th Brigade was ordered to move up into support near Halle, while the 14th Brigade was returned to Divisional reserve. The relief was effected overnight. It was responsible for at least one incident of fine and generous comradeship. A 15th Brigade officer brought his men up to a sector of the front line to relieve the 14th Brigade garrison there. His practised eye saw at a glance the condition of things—the white, haggard men, tired almost beyond the limits of human endurance, many of them wounded, all suffering from the effects of gas, Lewis gunners too weak to move their guns, the officer in charge tottering from weakness and loss of blood, but affecting a hearty bearing lest the spirits of his men should suffer. The officers conversed for a moment or two. “Come on,” said Stewart’s man to Elliott’s, “I’ll show you right round the sector and give you a good ‘take-over.’” Now, a good “take-over” means anything up to two or three hours’ careful examination of the sector. It means scrambling in the dark over shell-holes and trenches and crawling out to the outposts. Numerous points, each of great local importance, have to be explained so that the incoming party may be thoroughly conversant with every detail of its position; and of all things the relieving troops most desire a “good take-over.” The 15th Brigade officer looked closely at his *confrère*. “You’ll do no such thing,” he said shortly, “I know the sector thoroughly and I accept full responsibility for its safety from this moment. I suggest that you get your men back immediately.” The 14th Brigade officer looked his gratitude. He got his men back immediately—but the Lewis guns had to be left behind.

The fighting on the 3rd of September was less intense than that of the two preceding days. Constant pressure was maintained along the entire front. Lieut. Marxen (57th Battalion) made good progress along the railway towards Flamicourt, but was killed when bravely leading the advance. The obstinate defence of Flamicourt continued. During the night of the 3rd/4th the 60th Battalion made a useful advance north of St. Denis. On the 4th of September the line remained generally as it had been and towards the evening the 30th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Street) relieved the 59th and 60th Battalions in the northern sector. The 32nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Davies) at the same time relieved troops of the 2nd Division on the left of the 30th Battalion. At midnight the 58th Battalion, pressing south in the direction of Flamicourt, found that the enemy opposition was weakening. Flamicourt and Darmstadt Trench were soon both captured and by early morning of the 5th the whole front was moving rapidly forward. The 58th Battalion, still attacking south, swept over the long-coveted high ground and reached Aulnies Wood by 9.30 a.m. The 32nd (British) Division had already crossed the

river at Eterpigny and the position there was safe. The 57th Battalion, now on the left of the 58th Battalion, had reached Doingt, and the 32nd Battalion was in Bussu. By evening of the 5th the line held by the 5th Division lay generally along the Bussu-Doingt-Le Mesnil road, and everywhere the enemy was retiring under cover of his rearguards.

The Battle of Péronne had been fought and won. In five days the Division had pierced what was perhaps the strongest natural defensive position on the front of the British Armies at that time, and which many good judges had estimated would hold out for several weeks. To the magnificent courage of the men—it should be remembered that three Victoria Crosses were won in about an hour by the 53rd and 54th Battalions on the morning of the 1st of September—and to the leadership of the subordinate commanders the honour of this soldiers' battle was chiefly due, and words cannot express what in particular is owing to the 14th Brigade for its heroic efforts on the first two days of the fight. The rôle of the 15th Brigade, though on the whole less arduous, was sustained with the same splendid heroism, and it and the 8th Brigade reaped on the 5th of September the reward of the efforts of the 14th Brigade on the 1st and 2nd. The total casualties in the Division were 73 officers and 1,251 other ranks, of which 43 officers and 797 other ranks were suffered by the 14th Brigade, and 23 officers and 262 other ranks by the 15th Brigade. The Machine Gun Battalion had 98 casualties, the Artillery 28, and the Engineers 26. Forty German officers and 800 other ranks were taken prisoner; the 14th Brigade captured five guns, 91 machine guns, and four minenwerfer, while the 15th Brigade took 18 machine guns and other material. But, worse even than his losses of men and material, the enemy had been deprived of one of his two best defensive positions. It was a hard blow, but the German General Staff was not yet utterly without hope. There still remained the Hindenburg line. Surely that would check us till the winter!

Once again the writer has ungratefully relegated to the end of the chapter mention of the work of the arms supporting the infantry. The nature of the artillery work has already been indicated. Considering that only a few hours' notice of the operations on the 1st and 2nd of September was possible, the special artillery shoots were admirably arranged and carried out. The gunners, too, had all the disadvantages of exposed battery positions and extremely rough country for the transport of guns and ammunition. Here, as always, the 5th D.A.C. (Major Thornithwaite) did sterling work, allowing no considerations of time, place, or circumstance to interfere with the regular supply of ammunition to the guns. The 5th Machine Gun Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Marsden) did excellent work, and its machine guns were used mainly in close support of the infantry instead of being arranged in barrage groups, as was done at Polygon Wood.

The companies for the most part worked with the brigades to which they originally belonged, but the 25th Machine Gun Company relieved the 15th Machine Gun Company on the night of the 31st of August. As the country was much too rough for the wheeled transport of guns and supplies, they had to be carried by the men, whose work was thus considerably increased. Mobile detachments for machine guns accompanied the infantry throughout the various assaults and their powerful fire effect was always of great assistance. The light and medium trench mortars also helped considerably at times, but weapons so specially designed for trench warfare had naturally fewer opportunities in fighting of the nature described.

With the engineers it was otherwise, and never, with the possible exception of the road-making period through the mud seas in March and April of 1917, had the engineers rendered such splendid service to the Division. The 8th Field Company (Major Farquhar) was, for the most part, in reserve, but the 14th Field Company (Major Coghlan) and the 15th Field Company (Major Greenway) were able to display to the full their great engineering resource. The 14th Field Company sent sapper sections with the attacking battalions, and these carried out the urgent forward work. The remainder of the Company was occupied in bridging, and, among its other works, it moved a floating timber bridge some hundreds of yards along the Somme and established it where it was required in the vicinity of Biaches. On the front of the 15th Brigade the 15th Field Company had even finer opportunities. A foot-bridge more than 300 yards in length was constructed right across the Somme marshes in the face of the enemy, and on the 1st of September a bridge for artillery was completed near the Faubourg de Paris. Two other good bridges were also built in close proximity to Péronne. Numerous demolition charges were removed, and all this work was carried out within a few hundred yards of strong enemy garrisons. It was a splendid performance on the part of the 15th Field Company. The pioneers were engaged throughout the operation on the repair of the forward roads. The wide extent of the operations again imposed considerable strain on the signal services, and Major Stanley's command was forced to employ all its signalling resources. The telephone, wireless, and visual sections all did good work, and the D.R.L.S. was again most effective. The medical services were greatly hampered in the work of evacuation by the bad and long roads over which the wounded had to be carried. The great advance of the last three weeks had carried all the services far beyond the areas of thorough organisation, and, despite the fine work of the thousands of men employed on communications, the forward roads and railways had not entirely kept pace with the advance of the fighting front. The bearer divisions of the 14th and 15th Field Ambulances had worked throughout the operations with their respective brigades and had displayed their customary devotion in

the care of the wounded. The 15th Field Ambulance staffed the A.D.S. near Herbecourt and the 8th Field Ambulance was in charge of the M.D.S. A Ford ambulance post near Cléry did good service in the early stages of the operation, but it soon became possible to move it forward to Halle, near which a bridge had been completed by the engineers. The use of this shortened the route of evacuations by nearly six miles. Supplies of food and ammunition to the fighting troops were admirably maintained throughout the operations, the vigilance of the "Q" Staff at D.H.Q. and of Staff Captains at Brigades meeting all difficulties with their usual unobtrusive efficiency. The work of the quartermasters of battalions was again most capable. The fine administration of the regular supplies was once again supplemented in the most welcome way by the efforts of the A.C.F. and the Y.M.C.A., whose resources always seemed to expand in proportion to the need of the front line men.

On the night 5th/6th September the 3rd Australian Division relieved the 5th Division on the front Bussu-Doingt and Le Mesnil and the latter formation side-slipped south to continue again the advance on its original line astride the Villers Bretonneux-Vermand road. General Hobbs placed General Tivey in command of the Divisional Advanced Guard, which comprised in addition to the four infantry battalions of the Brigade a squadron of the 13th A.L.H., two brigades of British Artillery, the 8th Field Company, the 8th Machine Gun Company, and the 8th L.T.M.B. The 8th Field Ambulance took over the medical services of the Advanced Guard. The new front extended approximately from Le Mesnil to Athies, and on the morning of the 6th the advance commenced with the 29th (Lieut.-Col. MacArthur) and 31st (Lieut.-Col. Freeman) Battalions in the vanguard. Steady progress was made for the next few days, the advance on the 7th of September being particularly marked. On this day General Tivey's men captured Hancourt, Vraignes, Berens, Flechin, and Pœuilly. On the 8th Soyecourt was captured, and the 8th Brigade was at the end of the long straight road that stretches 30 miles from Villers Bretonneux to Vermand. It was within 10 miles of St. Quentin and was closer still to the Hindenburg Line. On the 9th and 10th of September General Tivey's troops, exhausted by the long marches and constant vigils of open warfare but proud of their fine and swift advance, were relieved by the 4th Australian Division and passed back with the remainder of the 5th Division to a well-earned rest in the Le Mesnil and Barleux areas. D.H.Q. remained at Fontaine les Cappy. During its four days as Advanced Guard the 8th Brigade had carried the line forward a distance of eight or nine miles on a broad front and had displaced strong and skilful enemy rearguards at every stage of their progress. The 8th Field Company carried out the engineering duties of the advance and reconnoitred 79 miles of roads and tracks in the country covered.

The rest period was very badly required by all ranks of the Division. The war was rushing on apace to its climax, and everywhere the strain on the troops was intense. During the first days of the rest period the following message from the Divisional Commander to his war-worn troops was circulated throughout the Division. It will speak for itself :—

HEADQUARTERS,
5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,
8th September, 1918.

COMRADES OF THE 5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

I take the opportunity of the Division being relieved for a period of rest and training to most heartily congratulate all ranks on their splendid work and successes achieved since the 1st of February last, and especially since taking part in the operations commencing with the enemy attack on Villers Bretonneux on the 24th April last, when the magnificent stand by the 14th Brigade against the enemy's attacks and the night counter-attack by the 15th Brigade led to such splendid results, to the complete successes by the 8th and 15th Brigades at the battle of Villers Bretonneux on the 8th and 9th August, and ending with the brilliant advance to the Somme in the last days of August by the 8th Brigade and the capture of Péronne, where the 14th and 15th Brigades with the 5th Machine Gun Battalion have earned imperishable fame for their gallantry and valour.

In all this work the infantry have, at all times, been most perfectly and whole-heartedly supported by the Divisional Artillery, Engineers and Signal Service, while the Ambulances, Army Service Corps and Divisional units have never failed to respond most fully at all times, and especially in any emergency.

During this period the Division has captured 50 square miles of country, 1 town and 23 villages, 110 officers and 3,400 other ranks, 53 guns of all calibres (including one 11-inch gun on railway mounting complete), about 450 machine guns, and about 50 trench mortars. Immense quantities of enemy ammunition, engineer and other war-like stores, and even railway locomotives and trains have been captured, vast quantities of material have been salvaged, and even of greater importance, our sick casualties have been very moderate indeed—lowest as a rule among all the Australian Divisions.

This is a record we may well be proud of, and is the result of good discipline, perfect co-operation and co-ordination, and the spirit of self-sacrifice, devotion to duty, and determination to succeed at all costs which has permeated all ranks of the Division.

I know and fully appreciate the long period of almost unbroken front line service that the Division has gone through, the hardships, the often severe and bitter fighting by night and day, the long marches, digging and wiring, and the loss of dear and gallant friends and comrades.

But, Comrades, you have the intense satisfaction of knowing that you have done your duty, that your efforts have assisted in no small measure to break the Boche and turn defeat into victory, and that your splendid work, success achieved, and sacrifices made by our devoted and gallant comrades who have fallen during the last month—and especially during the last few days—means beyond doubt the appreciable shortening of the War and the saving of hundreds—probably thousands—of the lives of our fellow-countrymen in the days to come.

Your magnificent service has been fully recognised and deeply appreciated by the Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig; by the Army Commander, General Sir Henry Rawlinson; by the G.O.C.A.I.F., General Sir William Birdwood; by our Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Sir John Monash; by the noble French people we have so frequently been able to assist; and, I assure you, by myself; I am only sorry that I cannot do more to express my sense of gratitude for your loyal and gallant devotion to duty and the help all ranks have so ungrudgingly given me, than by mere words and inadequate expressions of thanks. I am confident that our people in Australia will be proud of their men in this Division and of their splendid record, and grateful for the great sacrifices so many of our gallant comrades have made in this great fight for freedom and humanity which we have every reason to hope is now approaching final and complete victory for our arms.

(Sgd.) J. TALBOT HOBBS, *Major-General.*
Commanding 5th Australian Division.

Early in the month of September Lieut.-Col. J. D. McColl had been appointed G.S.O. I of the Division in succession to Lieut.-Col. J. H. Peck. He had been a member of the A. and I. Staff of the permanent Australian Forces and had seen much service with the British Forces during the present war on the Salonica front. Lieut.-Col. McColl soon displayed the professional skill that could safely be expected from a man of his wide experience and natural ability, and no diminution of the high standard attained by Lieut.-Cols. Wagstaff and Peck in the G Branch of the Division resulted from his appointment. Some important changes in General Bessell-Browne's staff also occurred during September. Major H. H. Hulton's period of long and valuable service as Brigade Major came to its end and his departure was greatly regretted throughout the Division. He was succeeded by Capt. T. R. Mellor, an Australian officer of known worth and capacity. Capt. Morris, the popular Staff Captain of the Artillery, was succeeded by Lieut. E. H. Booth, whose work as Officer for Reconnaissance on the Artillery staff had been consistently good. Lieut. H. R. McLarty followed Lieut. Booth in the last-mentioned appointment.

The hearts of the "dinkum Anzacs" still with the Division were cheered about this time by the announcement that three months' leave in Australia was to be granted to those who had seen service on Gallipoli as original members of the 1st Australian Division. Nevertheless, many of them, although four years absent from their homes, were reluctant to leave the Division at a time when the war seemed nearing its conclusion. To those who did not wish to avail themselves of the opportunity of returning to Australia, an alternative of 90 days' leave in England or France was later offered. These leave concessions were most timely in that all ranks saw a genuine desire to recognise long service men, and the effect generally on the Division was a most happy one.

For between two and three weeks the Division remained in this area, and the troops were rested and refreshed by every possible means. The Division was now far below strength and the inevitable day had come when a reduction in the number of battalions per brigade was necessary. This had already been effected throughout the British Divisions, and it was necessary in the Australian forces in the interests of uniformity, efficiency, and expense. The 54th Battalion was the first ordered to be "withdrawn." The men were profoundly moved at the threatened loss of their identity. For three and a half years they had learnt the lessons of *esprit de corps*. The Battalion's reputation had been built upon their blood and sweat and sacrifices. It had given them food and clothes and comradeship; in strange foreign lands it had been their loved and honoured home. "Bush lawyers" among the men argued plausibly that the order to break up was illegal, and, assured by these counsellors that such a course was entirely honourable, the men determined on passive resistance. There were precedents for this course in other Australian formations. The officers knew nothing of this and the Battalion was formed up for its final parade. Lieut.-Col. Marshall addressed the men in suitable terms and gave the order to march off to their new units in the brigade. The officers and N.C.O.'s obeyed, but not a man moved. The parade was dismissed and the men returned to their camp in the best order. For the remainder of the rest period things remained in that state, the men training and conducting themselves in the most exemplary way, but steadily declining to be dispersed to other units. However sympathetic the authorities felt, the position was utterly impossible from a military point of view, but urgent operations prevented the matter from being brought to a head at once. In the 15th Brigade only the wonderful personal influence of General Elliott averted similar happenings. The men of the 60th Battalion, however, though equally reluctant to lose their unit identity, carried out their instructions and passed for the most part to the 59th Battalion. The prompt withdrawal of the 60th Battalion was a unique personal triumph for the Brigadier. For the time being no battalion

was ordered to be withdrawn from the 8th Brigade, as it was still fairly strong.

On the 18th of September an operation carried out by the Third and Fourth Armies brought the line through the outer defences of the Hindenburg Line and carried the front to within a few hundred yards of the Hindenburg Line proper. The 1st and 4th Australian Divisions, with which were associated the 5th Divisional Artillery, played a prominent part in this success. The 5th Machine Gun Battalion was also attached to the 4th Australian Division for the fight, and Lieut.-Col. Marsden, reconnoitring the forward areas on the day before the action, stumbled on an enemy outpost and was captured. He made a gallant attempt to escape that evening as he was being led to the rear. Knocking down by a punch from his fist one of his escort, he grappled courageously with the others. But the odds were against him and he was led away to captivity. His services to the 5th Australian Division had been of the highest order, whether as O.C. of the 8th Machine Gun Company, as Divisional Machine Gun Officer, or as C.O. of the 5th Machine Gun Battalion. Major Wright, his able second-in-command, led the Battalion for the next few weeks through the stirring events which are narrated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XVI

(27th September—October 8th, 1918.)

THE BATTLE OF THE HINDENBURG LINE

Important contemporaneous events :—

Second British Army and Belgian Army opened successful offensive on Ypres front	September 28th.
Damascus captured	October 1st.

THE battle of the 18th of September had cleaned up the last enemy defences west of the Hindenburg Line proper, and the contending armies were now faced with the final crisis of the war. If the enemy could maintain himself in his formidable positions for but a few weeks, winter would end all major operations for several months, and, in that space, the enemy expected that he could conclude a peace by negotiation. Although the terms he would have had to accept in such a case would have been deeply humiliating to Prussian pride, they would still have fallen far short of the degradation to which a complete military overthrow would subject him. And, most important of all, the legend of the invincibility of the German Armies, based though it was on a somewhat frail foundation, would have survived. The Hohenzollern might still have held sway in Germany; the clank of his sabre might still have echoed through the Council Hall of Nations, might still have terrorised as of yore the hearts of the weaker creatures in the political jungle of Europe. Let freedom for all time thank men like Clemenceau and Lloyd George, who, through the darkest days, had followed the gleam unwaveringly, and had found military leaders like Foch and Haig to inspire their armies and lead them to triumph absolute. Foch's clarion call of "Attack! Attack!" echoed and reechoed along the allied front, and everywhere heralded the way to freedom. It animated yet again the British brigades, now little more than gaunt skeletons of the proud formations that had fought so blithely years ago. It summoned to the assembly line thousands of men sick almost unto death, physically enervated, nervously bankrupt. Even in the 5th Australian Division men were breaking under the

strain; men who had been decorated and rdecorated for acts of the highest courage were now deserting it: if, that is, to creep away for a week and sleep in some dingy cellar and then to return to battalion headquarters and say, "I was knocked up. I have been away for a sleep and a rest. I'll take whatever punishment is coming to me. I'm all right for the line again now"—if that constitutes deserting. So it was on both sides of the front. So it must be before victory can be won. Foch and Haig and all commanders knew how it was with their infantry. But war is a cruel and terrible thing in which the greatest exertions must be demanded of men at the very moment when they would give heaven and earth for a little rest. But Foch still cried, "On!" And however the leaders' hearts ached for their men, it must still be, "Advance! Attack!" And no account could be taken of tottering limbs and failing nerves if work was to be done. And now, when the deep zone of the Hindenburg Defences implacably barred all further progress, now, most of all, was resolute attack required. It was to be the final effort. The call came to the 5th Division on the 27th of September, almost exactly eight months after its last real rest, and on that day it stoically packed up once more and moved eastwards the ten or twelve miles that lay between it and the Hervilly area. D.H.Q. opened at the tattered village of Hervilly on the 27th of September, but it was not until the day of the attack that the infantry went into the line.

The sector of the Hindenburg defences which the Division was to attack lay a few miles east of Hervilly and about 20 miles south-east of the Bullecourt sector, where the 58th and 54th Battalions had achieved distinction in the spring of 1917. The front in which the Division was now concerned was about 4,000 yards in length and the village of Bellicourt, just behind the Hindenburg Line, stood near its centre. Although in the details of its construction the Hindenburg Line was here substantially the same as in the Bullecourt Sector, the whole terrain was so different that the tactical problems it presented were vastly different. In front and to the south of Bellicourt (map p. 365) the line lay along a deep valley in the bed of which lay the St. Quentin Canal. The position was so so low that, from the point of view of command and observation, it was not at all favourable to the enemy, being readily overlooked by the higher ground on the western slope of the valley which was now in our possession. This, however, was counterbalanced by the fact that the enemy held the high eastern slopes of the valley, overlooking not only the Hindenburg Line itself but also our positions on the opposite slope. North of Bellicourt, that is, on the left half of the new Divisional front, the ground rose rapidly—so much so, indeed, that the canal could not be carried over it. This high ground was, in fact, part of the watershed that divides the rivers which flow west into the English Channel from those that flow north

into the North Sea. The great Napoleon had recognised the commercial benefits which would spring from connecting the two sets of rivers, and had constructed about the year 1810 a huge underground tunnel by means of which the St. Quentin Canal connected with the northern waters. It was thenceforth possible for a barge to leave, say, Paris on the Seine and convey merchandise to Ypres or Bruges or Brussels. The St. Quentin Canal dived underground a little south of Bellicourt and emerged again near Le Catelet at a point about three miles north of Bellicourt. A high mound, generally called the tunnel embankment, ran along the surface of the ground and marked its subterranean course. Through this, air-shafts had been dug at regular and frequent intervals to provide ventilation for the bargemen a couple of hundred feet below. The whole tunnel was lit by electricity and was known to be mined.

The canal and tunnel had considerably influenced the course of the Hindenburg Line. South of Bellicourt the enemy had naturally availed himself of the protection afforded against attacking infantry by the wide belt of water in the canal. To that end he had constructed the Hindenburg Line just east of the canal bed, and, lest the water should be drained off by the destruction of the canal banks at any place, he had built across it concrete walls at regular intervals. These converted the canal into a long series of dams, only one of which would be drained by the destruction of the canal bank at any one spot. Four hundred yards south of Bellicourt the canal disappeared into the bowels of the earth and its value as a superficial obstacle was gone. The Hindenburg Line proper thence swung westwards, partly to include the village of Bellicourt, and partly also to contain all the exits to the tunnel. This was important, because the tunnel was largely used for the accommodation of troops. Numerous barges lay grounded in the now shallow and stagnant waters inside it, and, with their cooking and sleeping facilities, they were an invaluable accession to the enemy's forward accommodation in the area. No matter how the conflict might roar overhead, many thousands of men could, if required, find safe and comfortable accommodation in the tunnel below, and could be brought up through one or other of the exits to reinforce the front line as occasion demanded. Hence, for the 1,500 yards of the Division's attack sector north of Bellicourt, the main defences of the Hindenburg Line lay about 500 yards west of the long high mound that marked the course of the canal underground. Unlike the sector south of Bellicourt, this part of the Hindenburg trench was on high ground, with good command over the adjacent sectors. In the sector with which the Division was now concerned it was speedily recognised that the mopping-up of the tunnel, the deep dug-outs, and the cellars of Bellicourt would be a tedious and difficult task, and one that was absolutely essential to the success of the contemplated operations.

Three wide gullies led down the slope of the western side of the valley west and south-west of Bellicourt. These were, from north to south, Buckshot Ravine, Quarry Ravine, and Bruyère Ravine. Of these the most important was Buckshot Ravine, which led straight down to Bellicourt and contained the Templeux-Bellicourt road, the chief approach to Bellicourt from the west. From this brief description of it, it will be seen that the 5th Divisional sector contained defensive elements of unique and formidable character.

These, however, were only the first of a series of organised defensive zones. The Hindenburg Line proper, the canal and the tunnel, were all within a few hundred yards of what was to be the assembly line for the attack, and it could confidently be expected that they would be overwhelmed in the first rush. Greater difficulties lay in the ascent of the eastern face of the wide valley. This attained its maximum height at an average distance of three-quarters of a mile east of the canal and tunnel. On the southern edge of the sector boundary this ridge was crowned by the village of Nauroy, and it ran thence, in general direction a little west of north, to the village of Le Catelet about three miles distant. Along this ridge—it was called Railway Ridge in its northern reaches—the enemy had constructed a strong subsidiary defence line known as the Le Catelet-Nauroy system. From its height it readily commanded all the ground between itself and the Hindenburg Line proper, and any attack debouching from the Hindenburg Line would find itself forced to cross a wide area commanded by the Nauroy-Le Catelet system. The Nauroy-Le Catelet line was not carried south of Nauroy, and there was thus a narrow strip of land on the extreme right of the sector where an attack would not be directly influenced by that line. At an average distance of about two miles east of the Nauroy-Le Catelet line ran a third system of heavily-wired trench defences called, in that sector, the Beaurevoir line. The area between these two lines was strongly fortified by strong points, mutually supporting, and distributed in depth. Farms, factories, and cottages had been cleverly organised to this end. Two villages, Estrées and Joncourt, were included in the area last mentioned. South-east of Nauroy were two other villages, Etricourt and Magny-la-Fosse, both of which were eventually associated with the operations of the 5th Australian Division. All these villages were provided with wire and trench defences.

The area has thus been described at some length because in no engagement of the 5th Division, with the possible exception of the Battle of Péronne, has the configuration of the country had so marked an effect upon the operations. The II American Corps was affiliated with the Australian Corps for the attack, and it was arranged that two American Divisions, the 27th and the 30th, would advance behind a creeping barrage and take the first objective or "green line." This included the capture of the Hindenburg Line proper,

and of the Nauroy-Le Catelet system, a total advance of about 4,000 yards. The second stage of the advance, that is, to the "red line," included the capture of the Beaufort Line and of the villages Estrées, Joncourt, Beaufort and Wancourt, and the establishment of the Corps line in a general north and south direction east of the two last-named villages. This stage involved an advance of about 5,000 yards without the support of the creeping barrage and with all the complications of open warfare, which only well-trained and thoroughly seasoned soldiers could be expected to undertake. It was to be carried out by the 5th and 3rd Australian Divisions which were to leap-frog through the 30th and 27th American Divisions respectively on the "green line." The 30th American and 5th Australian Divisions were allotted the right or southern half of the Corps front, and it is that sector which has been described in the preceding paragraphs. The 46th and 32nd (British) Divisions were to attack on the sector immediately to the right. Zero hour for the whole operation was fixed for 5.50 a.m. on the 29th of September. The 5th Australian Division was not to pass the assembly line before 9 a.m. or the "green line" before 11 a.m.


General Hobbs's preparations for the operation were of the thorough character which marked all his military administration. The very limited success achieved by the 30th American Division radically altered the whole of the 5th Division action, and the Divisional plans were necessarily so substantially modified that the actual doings of the various units bore little resemblance to the rôles originally outlined for them. For this reason, the battle plans are not here set out in detail. It will be sufficient to say that a three days' artillery preparation by a great number of field and heavy artillery brigades was arranged by Corps in order to flatten the wire obstacles that might otherwise hold up the American divisions in their assault on the Hindenburg Line proper. A strong creeping barrage was to lead the Americans to the "green line," after which the 5th Divisional Artillery (General Bessell-Browne) and six other field artillery brigades would go forward to support the 5th Australian Division's attack. A hundred and eighty tanks were to operate on the Corps front. An Armoured Car Battalion was to go through the infantry when the roads permitted. The 13th A.L.H. Regiment, the 5th Cavalry Brigade, and the 3rd Squadron A.F.C. were also employed on the Corps front, and General Hobbs and Lieut.-Col. McColl worked out in detail the employment of each as far as it concerned the operations of the Division.

The three field companies of engineers were to be employed with their affiliated brigades; the 5th Pioneer Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Carter) was placed under C.E. Corps and was allotted the work of completing the forward roads in order to permit of the early passage of the armoured cars and cavalry. All the roads leading to the jumping-off line of the 30th American Division were carefully allotted

to the various units in order that no congestion of traffic might mar the important work of assembly. The bearer divisions of the 8th, 14th, and 15th Field Ambulances were to operate under their affiliated brigades. Lieut.-Col. Thompson (14th Field Ambulance) took charge of the forward evacuations. The 8th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Clayton) was at the M.D.S. and Gas Centre at Templeux. The 15th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Col. Walsh) was at No. 1 Corps Relay Post near Tincourt; the C.C.S. was at Tincourt. Medical transport of the 5th Australian Division was again pooled under the command of Capt. F. W. Fay (14th Field Artillery).

Col. Bruche's "Q" arrangements provided for the usual issue of additional battle supplies. Lieut. Deshon was placed in charge of the Divisional arrangements for water supply. The S.A.A. and grenade supplies were under the capable control of Capt. W. Keen, the Divisional Bombing Officer, and of Lieut. W. Dunlop, who, in his long association with the S.A.A. Section of the D.A.C., had rendered notable service to the Division. The Traffic Control Posts in the Divisional sector were doubled, an American and an Australian being maintained on each. An advanced D.A.D.O.S. Dépôt was established for the prompt supply of ordnance stores damaged in battle. Railhead was at Tincourt and the Divisional Train (Lieut.-Col. Francis) brought the supplies up to Brigade Refilling Points. Col. Bruche also supervised the marking of roads, the supply of tents, trench shelters, pack saddlery, wire cutters, pea soup and solidified alcohol, as well as the issue of extra water-bottles and rations. The reader, who by now should be fairly familiar with the great work of preparation for a major operation, will understand that in this, the Division's last battle, it was, if anything rather more complicated than in any previous engagement. But once again the co-operation of the infantry and artillery brigade staffs, and of the staffs of the smaller units, overcame all difficulties and, as Zero hour approached, there was no reason to anticipate that the operation would not be as successful as that of the 8th of August. On the day before the battle, news was received of the successful opening of a British and Belgian offensive north of Ypres and the tide of victory seemed flowing at the flood. The weather was fine and the omens everywhere favourable. Our men had already co-operated at times with American troops attached to our units and had formed the highest opinions of their dash and courage. Had the operations now to be described demanded nothing except dash and courage there is no doubt that the American Divisions would have earned in them quite as many laurels as the Australians.

The attack on the right of the Divisional front was to be carried out by the 8th Brigade Group, supported by the 13th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Caddy), the 25th Machine Gun Company, a company of the 8th Tank Battalion, and two troops of the 13th A.L.H. On the left sector the 15th Brigade (General Elliott) consisting now of



THE PERONNE OPERATIONS, 1st TO 5th SEPTEMBER, 1918.

only three infantry battalions and supported by the 14th A.F.A. Brigade (Lieut.-Col. Derham) the 15th Machine Gun Company, a company of tanks, and a composite troop of the 13th A.L.H. was entrusted with the attack. The 14th Brigade Group (General Stewart), supported by the 6th (Army) A.F.A. Brigade, the 14th Machine Gun Company and a company of tanks, was held as Divisional Reserve. Half the 8th Machine Gun Company operated under this brigade while the other half was attached to the 8th Brigade.

The three brigade groups had been bivouacked on the night before the attack in areas along the several roads by which the troops were to march to the assembly line. A thick autumnal fog hung over the whole battlefield on the morning of the 29th and this was intensified by the smoke used by the artillery and aeroplanes. We will trace separately the events of the 29th of September on the 8th and 15th Brigade sectors, commencing with the former.

The 8th Brigade attacked on a two battalion front, the 32nd Battalion (Major Wark) on the right, and the 29th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. MacArthur) on the left. The 31st Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Freeman) was on the right flank and the 30th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Street) was in brigade reserve. The heavy fog already alluded to caused a good deal of embarrassment as the battalions left their bivouacs near Hesbecourt at 7 a.m. and headed for the assembly line. This was duly crossed at 9 a.m. and so far all seemed well. The battalions then moved steadily on towards Bellicourt in artillery formation, intending to deploy into their respective attack sectors as they approached the "green line," which was still over a mile away. They reached Bellicourt shortly after 10 a.m. and here gained a very decided impression that all had not gone well with the American attack. Heavy machine gun fire was encountered from the direction of Nauroy, which was one of the villages within the American objective and, even around Bellicourt itself, it was obvious that many enemy posts had not been mopped up. Such of these as opposed the advance of the 8th Brigade were promptly dealt with and the march continued towards Nauroy. Already it was clear that the Americans in the area were somewhat disorganised and, from the amount of machine gun fire which was met with from the direction of Nauroy, the officers felt reasonably certain that no organised American line lay before them. The 32nd Battalion attached to itself about 200 Americans who had come to a standstill near Bellicourt and found them most willing to help in any way possible. In this way the 8th Brigade continued its steady progress up the ridge, the 32nd Battalion now bearing away to the right with a view to passing through, and to the south of, Nauroy in accordance with its instructions, while the 29th kept more to the north and headed for the southern extremity of the Le Catelet-Nauroy line.

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The supporting tanks of the 8th Brigade had made good progress to this point, but the fog was now clearing up and a tank fort west of Nauroy came into action with deadly effect. Its position was beautifully chosen on the rising ground, and an observation post there, connected by telephone with some field guns, machine guns, and minenwerfer lower down the slope, directed heavy fire on each tank as it came into view. With the magnificent courage that the tank *personnel* invariably displayed they pushed on. At one place on the 29th Battalion front three were knocked out in quick succession. An infantry officer hurried down as the next tank commenced to show itself. He stopped it, told the officer it was certain death to come forward, and exhorted him to remain below the slope until the tank fort had been dealt with by other means. "I must go on, if I think there's a chance," answered the tank officer, "and, you know, there *is* a chance." He climbed in and the tank advanced another thirty yards. Then a flash and a roar as a shell hit it squarely. It ignited the petrol and the horrified infantry saw the tank burst into flames. A door opened unsteadily and the officer, wounded, blinded, and blazing from head to foot fell out on to the ground. "Shoot me, please," he pleaded. Somebody shot him.

The companies of the 29th Battalion continued to press forward against steady opposition. Surprised as they were to find the opposition so strong in front, they were still more surprised to find a steadily increasing enfilade fire assailing them from the left and left rear, where the 15th Brigade was supposed to be operating. By noon this enfilade fire had reached such proportions as to make any further advance impracticable even if it were tactically desirable. The 29th Battalion had now reached and occupied the southern end of the Le Catelet-Nauroy trench. Heavy machine gun fire from Cabaret Wood Farm kept pouring in on the companies, and there were obviously no organised American troops on the Green Line in front of them. In these circumstances a halt was called and the line, still several hundred yards behind the American objective, rested in that position for several hours.

Meanwhile, the 32nd Battalion on the right was experiencing wonderful success. General Tivey had felt grave doubts that the British troops on his right would succeed in the difficult task of crossing the canal, and had specially detailed the 31st Battalion and half a machine gun company as a right flank guard. Happily, General Tivey's doubts on this score were groundless. The attack of the 32nd and 46th (British) Divisions was proceeding admirably and the 32nd Battalion, free for a time from flank complications, pushed on at a rapid rate. Its D Company swept through the southern outskirts of Nauroy at 11.15 a.m., mopped them up, and sent back 50 prisoners. Lieuts. Crain and Lucas did particularly good work about this time, using a captured German gun with considerable

effect. Fifty Americans were found in the vicinity of Nauroy, but no other American troops were seen by the 32nd Battalion in this part of the field. The clearing of Nauroy was completed a little later by detachments of the 30th Battalion which were most gallantly led by Lieut. J. C. Yeomans. Mounted on top of a tank, he ascertained the dispositions of the enemy forces in the village. He then returned to his company, collected a small patrol, and went again to Nauroy, which he soon cleaned up. Lieut. Forbes, of the same battalion, also did fine work in the vicinity of Nauroy.

Swinging south and south-east from Nauroy, the 32nd Battalion now crossed into what was to have been the exploitation area of the 30th American Division. It made rapid progress and mopped up the village of Etricourt and the northern part of Magny-la-Fosse, near which connection was established with the British troops on the right. The amazing gallantry and leadership of Major Wark were now working wonders with the battalion and making its onset utterly irresistible. Almost alone, he stormed a battery of field guns, and captured them, and, again and again, with small parties he cleaned up strong enemy machine gun posts in the most daring way. With him at their head the troops simply could not be stopped, and throughout the afternoon they pushed on and on, and one patrol actually went right through Joncourt and temporarily established a line on the eastern edge of that village. At this point the 32nd Battalion was nearly three miles ahead of the general line then reached by the remainder of the Division. But Major Wark realised that his left flank was dangerously exposed, and when it became clear that the remainder of the Divisional line was, definitely held up in the vicinity of Nauroy and still further west, he withdrew his line about 2,000 yards and established it a little east of Etricourt. A heavy counter-attack originating from Mill Ridge was repulsed by the 32nd Battalion at 5.30 p.m. Even now there was a big gap between the 29th Battalion right and the 32nd Battalion left, and this was filled by the 31st Battalion, which thus became the left, instead of the right, flank guard of the 32nd. The 31st Battalion had become involved in the fighting in various ways prior to this and Lieut. Avery had done conspicuously good service with his Lewis gun team.

During the afternoon the 29th Battalion had made a further attack and had reached the "green line" north-east of Nauroy. As its position here was considerably more exposed to the enfilade fire from the left, the 29th line was withdrawn again to the Le Catelet-Nauroy trench until the situation on the left should ease. At 8 p.m. General Tivey ordered consolidation of his brigade front on the general lines indicated above. This was carried out under cover of darkness, and for the night of the 29th/30th of September the 8th Brigade line lay from north of Nauroy to east of Etricourt in a general direction facing a little north of east. It had been an

extraordinarily uneven day's fighting. Splendid progress had been made on the right and comparatively little on the left, and this latter result was due rather to flank than to frontal opposition. From all of which it may be inferred that the 15th Brigade was in serious trouble on the left, and we will now turn to that part of the battle front and see what had happened.

The 57th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Denehy) and the 59th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Scanlan) attacked on the right and left respectively of the 15th Brigade front. The 58th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Watson) was brigade reserve. Each battalion was accompanied by four tanks and each was further supported by an advanced section of the 14th A.F.A. Brigade, and by a half section of the 13th A.L.H. Regiment. Like the 8th Brigade battalions, they were considerably hampered by the heavy fog, and the 59th Battalion was considerably astonished in its progress to the assembly line to find itself under steady machine gun fire. This caused numerous casualties. It came partly from posts in front which had not been cleared up by the Americans and partly from the left flank, where, on the 3rd Australian Divisional front, the situation appeared to be even worse. However, the American liaison officers with the 15th Brigade reported that their attack was progressing well and the battalions, though they were commencing to doubt it, pressed steadily on and continued to suffer severely. Lieut.-Col. Scanlan in a forward reconnaissance nearly lost his life from machine gun fire. He became entangled in some barbed wire only thirty yards in front of an enemy machine gun post and only escaped with his life by the greatest of good luck. By 11 a.m. the 57th Battalion had crossed the Hindenburg Line and had reached the superficial embankment which marked the line of the underground tunnel north of Bellicourt. Lieut.-Col. Denehy's men had found a box of a hundred cigars somewhere en route and a smoke barrage of unusual fragrance enveloped the companies for a little time. On its arrival at the tunnel embankment the 57th Battalion found that it was quite out of touch with the 59th Battalion. That unit, indeed, had gone too far to the left, partly as a result of fog troubles, and partly because it was attracted in that direction by the greater opposition on its left flank. It had had a stiff fight all the way from the assembly line and had found it necessary to detail a company as a left flank guard. When it finally reached the Hindenburg Line it was some hundreds of yards to the left of its appointed position. In these circumstances, the 58th Battalion was moved up between the 57th and the 59th, and it shortly afterwards established touch with the 57th on the tunnel embankment, and with the 59th back in the Hindenburg Line. The 58th Battalion, like the 57th and the 59th, had already suffered a good deal, and both now and later on in the day Lieut. N. Dagleish, when his company commander and all the other company officers were casualties, directed the company with equal skill and gallantry.

The fog was now commencing to lift and the tanks of the 15th Brigade were suffering heavily from enemy artillery. Strong machine gun fire from the front and left constantly swept the area and, for the time being, all progress on the brigade front was definitely held up. In the Hindenburg Line the 59th Battalion was also hard beset, persistent enemy attempts to bomb along the trench from the north being constantly made and as constantly checked by our heavy counter bombing. In these circumstances the 15th Brigade battalions could only consolidate their line as it existed, and the enfilade and reverse fire from the north and north-west caused them constant trouble. About this time the bearers of the 15th Field Ambulance, operating under Major Craig and Capt. Le Soeuf, in searching for a suitable medical post in rear of the 57th Battalion, mopped up an enemy party of two officers and 40 other ranks.

Until 3 p.m. the battalions of the 15th Brigade remained in this position. By that time a series of forward reconnaissances had cleared up the situation in front. A few scattered bodies of Americans without definite positions or definite plans were found and these were collected and attached temporarily to our battalions. Arrangements were made with the 14th A.F.A. Brigade for a creeping barrage at 3 p.m. to lead the attack on to the Nauroy-Le Catelet line. The artillery barrage of a single brigade, though good in the circumstances, could not in the nature of things be heavy enough to smother entirely the enemy machine gun fire, and the 57th and 58th Battalions lost heavily as they advanced. The enemy artillery, too, was quick to get on to the tanks, and nine of these were knocked out in the first fifteen minutes of the action. Nevertheless, the 57th Battalion, thanks mainly to the protection of its right flank, got a definite footing in the Nauroy-Le Catelet trench, while a small party of the 58th Battalion, by gallant fighting, also penetrated it, but at a point further north. The exposed left of the 58th attack could not reach the Nauroy-Le Catelet line, the heavy enfilade fire from the North definitely checking it. A defensive flank was formed here and the line bent back sharply and junctioned with a company of the 44th Battalion of the 3rd Australian Division, which in turn connected with the right of the 59th Battalion. It was arranged that the 59th Battalion should extend to the right and take over the short sector of the line held by the company of the 44th Battalion. Meantime, the 57th Battalion had connected with the left of the 29th Battalion in the Nauroy-Le Catelet line, but the stretch of this trench between the 57th left and the 58th party that had reached the line was still occupied by the enemy. Accordingly, bomb blocks were constructed and lively bomb fighting continued around them during the afternoon and evening.

Thus ended one of the most extraordinary day's fighting in the history of the Division. The right battalion, the 32nd, after with-

drawing a considerable distance, had reached a point about 5,000 yards beyond the assembly line of the American attack, while the left battalion, the 59th, at its extreme left had barely crossed the same line. And, of the two battalions, it is probable that the 59th had suffered the more heavily. Such is the fortune of war! Between them, from right to left lay the 31st, 29th, 57th, and 58th Battalions, and, as already noted, parts of the 30th Battalion had been involved around Nauroy. During the day, the 14th Brigade had moved steadily forward from the vicinity of Hervilly, and was now disposed with its foremost battalions along Sentinel Ridge, west of Bellicourt. In these positions, therefore, the Division remained during the night 29th/30th of September, its front line forming roughly the diagonal of a rectangle almost from the "green line" objective on the right, back to the start line on the left. Tactically, the position was, in the circumstances, quite sound. This was due as much to the restraint of Brigade and Divisional commanders as to the excellent leadership of the commanding officers of battalions. More than once throughout the fighting of the 29th the conditions had pointed to the possibility of a grave disaster. Not only had disaster been averted, but very material advantages had been gained and kept in circumstances where only blank tragedy could have resulted from less skilful leadership. Except for the slight advance on the left of the 59th Battalion, the line on the front of the 3rd Australian Division had remained practically stationary throughout the day. There the 27th American Division had been much less successful than the 30th American Division, which, on the front of the 5th Australian Division, had at least progressed a mile along more than half its front of attack. Doubtless, it would have done better still had the 27th Division been more successful on its left. However, the 30th American Division undoubtedly made a material contribution to the final success of the operations, and if that success was less than had been anticipated, the inexperience of the American troops and the great natural difficulties of the position must be given due consideration.

The most marked feature of the American inexperience was their neglect to mop up positions which they had crossed superficially. At the moment of the American assault it is probable that quite two-thirds of the enemy strength was concentrated underground. In the absence of, or non-compliance with, mopping up orders, these Germans simply came out and shot the foremost troops from behind, while, unhindered by the barrage which had now crept far beyond them, they opposed machine gun fire to the Australian troops who were coming up across the open to take their part in the fight. On several occasions, too, large batches of German prisoners being sent back under small escorts by the foremost American troops, were liberated by the Germans who had not been mopped up. These simply shot down the escorts, and the prisoners, thus

liberated, immediately reinforced their comrades in the rear positions which were thus considerably strengthened by these unexpected reinforcements. All these complications greatly increased the work of the 5th Australian Division when its attack was launched, and among the earliest sufferers in that formation was the 5th Pioneer Battalion.

In accordance with their orders, and thinking doubtless that the attack would be more or less a repetition of the 8th of August operation, the pioneers had pushed forward on their road-making mission immediately after the American attack. Excellent progress was made with the work and the Battalion was almost into Bellicourt when it commenced to suffer heavily from enemy rifle and machine gun fire. All four companies soon found themselves engaged in hot fighting with strong enemy parties which had not been mopped up by the Americans. Amazed but not daunted by this, the pioneers threw away their shovels and set lustily to work with rifle and bayonet—an employment not less congenial, and equally well understood. A defensive flank was formed north of the village and altogether six officers and 154 other ranks were captured by the pioneers in these lively mopping up operations. Major McClean conducted this work with credit and success. As may be expected, the pioneers suffered considerable losses, seven officers and 57 other ranks becoming casualties, but the work accomplished in practically clearing Bellicourt of enemy garrisons was of great value to the operations as a whole, and much facilitated that of the other troops. The 5th Pioneer Battalion, having completed its original task, was withdrawn on the same evening and Lieut.-Col. Carter and his very capable adjutant, Capt. Helsham, must have felt amply recompensed for all the pains they had taken to maintain the Battalion as an efficient fighting unit, even though its work was usually road and trench construction.

Towards evening on the 29th a sensational report reached D.H.Q. that a German boiling down factory for getting fat from human bodies had been discovered in the canal tunnel. The report was not credited at D.H.Q. and later investigations proved it utterly groundless. Just above the tunnel entrance and about ten feet inside the outer earth the Germans had constructed a large chamber for cooking purposes. It was reached by a stairway from the eastern bank of the canal. A stage of stout planking boards provided the floor, and several large coppers stood upon it, in which the food was cooked. Bombardments of the tunnel entrances had formed part of our artillery preparation and apparently delayed action fuses had been used. One lovely shot had hit the southern face of the ground immediately above the tunnel and had penetrated through the eight or ten feet of earth before exploding. It thus burst exactly in the kitchen and, apparently, precisely at the hour when the Germans were crowding in to draw their rations. The

slaughter must have been very terrible. Many fragments of human bodies were blown into the coppers while other bodies fell through the holes made in the floor on to the barge about 20 feet below in the canal. The human remains in the coppers naturally gave rise to a recurrence of rumours of a German "corpse factory" on the Western Front. The whole scene was unspeakably gruesome.

At 11 p.m. on the 29th General Hobbs held a conference at D.H.Q. to determine the course of the operations on the following day. It was arranged that the left flank of the 5th Division was to advance in a northerly direction in conjunction with an attack of the 3rd Australian Division, the object of the operation being to clear the 3rd Divisional area and to relieve the pressure on the 5th Division's left flank. The objective of the 5th Division attack was Railway Ridge, the high ground south of Le Catelet along which the Nauroy-Le Catelet line was constructed. The 53rd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Cheeseman) supported by the 55th Battalion (Major Stutchbury) was to attack north on a front of about a thousand yards, stretching from the tunnel embankment at a point about half a mile north of Bellicourt to the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line in front of Cabaret Wood Farm. The 15th Brigade was to co-operate by taking over a large part of the area after the 14th Brigade attack had passed it. Two field artillery brigades were to provide the barrage for the 14th Brigade attack, and special attention was to be paid to mopping up and to picketing the numerous tunnel entrances. The total advance set out was about 2,500 yards, the northern half of which was in the area of the 3rd Australian Division. Zero was to be at 6 a.m. It was late when the conference dispersed and General Stewart for the second time thus found himself entrusted with a major operation and with only a few hours to make the necessary preparation.

A good deal of rain fell throughout the night, and before morning most of the men were wet through. The 53rd Battalion was a few minutes late at the start line and it immediately came under heavy machine gun fire, which our artillery barrage was not strong enough to smother entirely. The machine gun fire was particularly intense from Cabaret Wood Farm to the right of the attack, from the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line, and from the tunnel entrances along the embankment. Despite this, the attack made steady, if slow progress, overcoming strong resistance at almost every step of the advance. Several enemy field guns were kept in action until the last possible moment and were captured after a hard fight. The enemy's resistance was everywhere most stubborn, and before our advance had gone 500 yards several counter-attacks had been repelled. But the 53rd Battalion and an advanced company of the 55th Battalion fought with equal obstinacy and with greater skill. A few yards only could be gained here and there and at odd times, but for four hours the attackers worked gradually forward, by which

time an advance of about half a mile was accomplished. By 1 p.m. this advance had been nearly doubled and the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line had been completely cleared in the 5th Division's sector and our penetration had gained a few hundred yards into the sector of the 3rd Australian Division. On the left of the attack frontage our troops were now meeting with obstinate resistance, and heavy counter-attacks were originating from the Hindenburg Line proper which was still held in great strength in the southern part of the 3rd Divisional area. At 3 p.m. another heavy counter-attack surged down the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line and drove back our men about 200 yards and took a prisoner. An immediate counter-charge by the 53rd Battalion completely restored the ground and recovered the man who had been captured. Over 200 dead Germans in the area testified to the stubbornness of the fighting and to Australian superiority in hand-to-hand combats. At 4.30 p.m. enemy massings, this time between the Hindenburg and Le Catelet-Nauroy Lines, were observed. Our artillery was promptly turned on to the spot and smashed the concentration.

Among all the deeds of distinguished valour that characterised the deadly grapplings of that afternoon of the 30th of September none was more distinguished than that of Pte. John Ryan (55th Battalion), who led a dashing and apparently hopeless bombing attack along one of the numerous trenches of the area. Inspiring with his own courage the small party which he led, he fought and exterminated enemy forces several times as numerous, and when he at last fell wounded on the tunnel embankment, he had completely restored a situation of grave local danger. For this he was awarded the V.C. It should be noted that, throughout the heavy fighting of the 30th, a party of about 60 all ranks from the 119th American Regiment rendered the 14th Brigade invaluable assistance in the carriage of forward supplies. This team of men worked with unremitting courage and success.

Although the brunt of the second day's fighting had fallen upon the 14th Brigade, General Elliott and General Tivey had been by no means idle. The 58th Battalion had swung forward behind the 14th Brigade attack and, after the 53rd Battalion had cleared a considerable part of the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line, the 58th Battalion occupied it and inflicted very heavy casualties on enemy troops withdrawing from the vicinity. The 57th Battalion, too, had effectually cleared out the troublesome enemy pocket that had existed since the preceding day in the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line between it and the 58th Battalion right. The 57th Battalion had also made an attempt to clear the formidable Cabaret Wood Farm, but this was frustrated by the strong machine gun defences of the place. Throughout its work on the 30th of September the 57th Battalion found the co-operation of the 53rd Battery A.F.A. (Major H. L. Hely) most helpful.

The 8th Brigade had been busy throughout the day with local

adjustments of the line, but at 4 p.m. the 29th Battalion in conjunction with the 57th Battalion made an attempt to take the Lamp Signalling Station north-east of Nauroy. The position was on high ground and was very ably defended. Neither of the two battalions succeeded in the attempt which, nevertheless, was of great value in showing the precise line of opposition of the enemy. The night thus closed in with the line in the centre of the Divisional sector substantially as it had been throughout the previous night, but material improvements had been made on both the right and left flanks. On the latter, the 14th Brigade had now a firm footing on an important part of Railway Ridge, while the 32nd Battalion, in conjunction with the 32nd (British) Division on its right, had also considerably extended its gains without much effort. Belliecourt, Nauroy, and indeed the whole area had suffered from heavy enemy shelling all day, and casualties from this cause were numerous.

Taken all together, the operations of the 30th of September, though they resulted in no striking gains of ground, had cleared up many disquieting local conditions and, what was more important, had accurately defined both our own line and the enemy line of resistance. It was now possible to do what had been utterly impossible at the end of the first day's fighting, namely, to arrange a "set piece" attack, that is, a heavy bombardment of enemy positions and a creeping barrage behind which the Divisional front could be carried forward with reasonable protection for the infantry. With the contending forces so intermingled, the contending lines so overlapping, and the probability of isolated advanced parties of Americans holding out somewhere "in the blue," as they had been on the morning of the 30th, a searching artillery preparation was out of the question. But the fighting of the 30th had again restored the conditions necessary for a "set piece" attack, and at a conference held at 8th Brigade Headquarters on the night of the 30th the Divisional Commander decided to carry out such an attack on the following day.

In order to regulate the attack on the morning of the 1st of October the brigade sectors were readjusted overnight, the 14th Brigade, less two battalions, taking over about a thousand yards of the right front of the 15th Brigade. The attack on the 1st of October was thus carried out by the 8th Brigade on the right, the 14th in the centre, and the 15th on the left. General Hobbs decided on a moderate advance only but with ample scope for exploitation later if the circumstances were favourable. The 8th Brigade was instructed to take the Sugar Factory east of Nauroy, and to establish a footing on Mill Ridge; the 14th Brigade was to take the Lamp Signalling Station and the high ground around it which had caused so much trouble on the preceding day; the 15th Brigade was to capture the obstinate Cabaret Wood Farm position. With those essential points in our possession and the ridge eminences everywhere secured,

General Hobbs felt confident that material exploitation advances would be possible. The necessary artillery arrangements were completed overnight and the infantry assemblies were effected to time on all brigade fronts.

Zero hour was at 6 a.m. and our barrage was fine. Everywhere along the front the troops pushed forward to the attack through just such a mist as they had of late so often experienced. On the 8th Brigade front the 32nd and 31st Battalions were both on their objective before 7 a.m. On the 14th Brigade front, where the 56th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Holland) on the right and the 54th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Marshall) on the left, carried out the attack, similar success was achieved. Working well under the barrage these battalions reached their objectives at 7.15 a.m. and immediately consolidated. On the 15th Brigade front the 59th, 57th, and 58th Battalions attacked from right to left in that order. By 7.30 a.m. all objectives were taken and the troops were busily seeking opportunities for exploitation. Thus, in little over an hour on the 1st of October positions that had been almost impregnable on the preceding day succumbed with little difficulty to other methods of attack and fell like ripe plums into our hands.

Each brigade now busied itself with exploitation of its success. Immediate results were secured by the 8th Brigade. By 9 a.m. its patrols were, for the second time, through Joncourt, and the line was established east of that town and just in front of the Beaufort Line. Touch was maintained with the 32nd Division on the right and with the 14th Brigade on the left at a point just east of Estrees. This village had been cleared before 8 a.m. by the 56th Battalion, assisted by one company of the 54th Battalion, and prisoners and field guns were captured there. For a time, our troops in Estrees felt themselves too far advanced and withdrew west of the village but the place was soon afterwards reoccupied and held. Connection with the 15th Brigade was established north of Estrees. During these operations patrols of the 53rd Battalion, with which the 55th Battalion was temporarily amalgamated, had been active on the extreme left of the Division's sector and had ascertained that the enemy in the 3rd Divisional sector had retired to new positions south of Le Catelet. 53rd Battalion patrols immediately made good the ground vacated and linked up the left of the 15th Brigade with the right of the 3rd Division. Shortly before three in the afternoon the 54th Battalion moved north and relieved part of the 15th Brigade where it connected with the 53rd Battalion. Capt. S. A. Benson did very good work during the operations of the 54th Battalion, but the Quartermaster of that unit, Capt. Hunt, was killed in the brave performance of his duty.

It will have been gathered from the narrative of the exploitations of the 14th Brigade that the 15th Brigade had also been successful in its subsequent operations. Its early exploitation in the vicinity

of Estrees, Mint Copse, and Folemprise Farm had been considerably hampered by enemy artillery which had a clear view of the parties as they descended the eastern slope of the crest of the ridge. Prompt counter-battery work from our own artillery soon relieved this pressure, and by noon the general line of Estrees, Folemprise Farm, and Rudder Copse was secured, while the 53rd Battalion patrols, as already stated, were pushing along Railway Ridge on the left. By dusk the 15th Brigade line was further advanced to the Estrees-Grandcourt road, which line was eventually handed over to the relieving troops. During the afternoon it became known that the relief of the 5th Australian Division was to commence almost immediately.

After its three days' hard fighting the Division was utterly worn out, and on the night of the 1st/2nd October the 5th Brigade of the 2nd Australian Division relieved the 8th and 15th Brigades in the line, as well as the 56th Battalion. These formations on withdrawal passed into support and reserve in and around the Le Catelet-Nauroy Line and the Hindenburg Line. The 5th Divisional front was now reduced to a sector of about 3,000 yards, lying approximately between Mint Copse and a point about 3,000 yards north of Bellicourt. This the 14th Brigade was still holding, connecting with the 5th Australian Infantry Brigade on its right and the 3rd Australian Division on its left. The 54th Battalion held the right half of the brigade frontage and the 53rd Battalion, with which the 55th was still amalgamated, held the left half. At 9.30 a.m. on the 2nd, a unit of the 50th (British) Division took over the left half of the brigade frontage and the 54th Battalion, still in the line, passed for the night of 2nd/3rd October to the command of the 2nd Australian Division. It was relieved on the 3rd and rejoined its own brigade at an early hour on that date. On the same day the whole of the infantry of the 5th Australian Division was moved back to a reserve position near Hervilly.

Troops more fatigued had rarely been seen and yet, by sheer determination, they overcame the weakness of the body and marched back in excellent order to their new positions. But their strained, pallid faces revealed what they had passed through, and numerous transport units along the roads respectfully and in silence pulled their vehicles to one side that the war-worn men might not have an extra step to march. It was the mute and eloquent testimony of brave men to heroes. And as they trudged back homewards a wonderful conviction came mysteriously into their hearts and minds and greatly assuaged their suffering. It was borne upon them that they were marching out of the line for the last time. They told their officers of it—and the officers smiled, sympathetically but without belief. But the conviction was too strong. It had come to stay. The men cherished it and no jests or friendly banter from the officers could dispel it. And so the matter rested for a time, while every resource of the Division was strained to its uttermost that the men

might be made comfortable and happy until they were again called out to fight.

But the subtle psychologic promptings of thousands of men were truer than the military knowledge of even the best-informed officers. Great as had been the allied successes, the German border was yet over a hundred miles away, and no one could foresee that all fighting would be concluded five weeks later. So this was, indeed, the infantry's last tour in the line and, in all its wonderful record, the 5th Australian Division had never accomplished finer things than it did in its last great battle in the toils of the Hindenburg Line. And how worn and weakened were the brigades that by sublime courage and skilful leadership had won their way through almost to the last strand of wire and the last yard of trench that stood between the enemy and ruin! On the morning of the 29th of September the trench strength of the 8th Brigade was 1,926 all ranks; of the 15th Brigade, 1,584 all ranks; of the 14th Brigade, 1,131 all ranks. Thus, none of the brigades was of a complete two-battalion strength, while the 14th Brigade was of little more than one! Such were the formations that bore the brunt of the last great victory of the 5th Australian Division.

Of the arms other than the infantry it would be hard to speak too appreciatively. The advanced sections of the Divisional Artillery that had gone forward with the infantry battalions did most gallant and most useful work, and it was one of Lieut.-Col. Caddy's sections that eventually silenced the anti-tank guns in the tank fort near Nauroy. Lieuts. Creed and Sinclair accomplished fine work with these sections, while Lieut. Gibson helped the infantry very much as F.O.O. on the 30th of September. The nature of the enemy shelling to which the 5th Divisional Artillery was subjected on the 29th of September may be gauged from the fact that the 13th A.F.A. Brigade had over 50 horses killed and wounded in the space of two hours. Lieut.-Col. Derham's advanced sections with the battalion of the 15th Brigade suffered severe losses, the section supplied by the 55th Battery losing specially heavily in Bellicourt. Owing to the slight advance on the left, the advanced sections here had not the same opportunities as those experienced on the right. They returned to their batteries on the 29th. Both the 13th and 14th A.F.A. Brigades contributed to the creeping barrage for the 14th Brigade attack on the 30th. This barrage lasted 123 minutes. The creeping barrage on the 1st of October was very fine and each artillery brigade again sent forward advanced sections which were of considerable assistance to the infantry in the work of exploitation. Advanced sections of the Divisional Trench Mortar Brigade (Capt. Wallis) were useful at Cabaret Wood Farm. The 5th D.A.C. (Major Thornthwaite) was again unremitting in its work of ammunition supply. An idea of the work involved in the transport of artillery ammunition will be gained from the fact that the 5th Divisional Artillery fired almost

20,000 shells in the three days' fighting. Like all other artillery units, the D.A.C. experienced much enemy shelling in its movements over the exposed western slopes of the valley. Altogether, the Divisional Artillery in its last battle with the 5th Division fully maintained the great reputation that it had established under General Bessell-Browne as a very gallant and very expert artillery formation.

The engineer companies affiliated with their respective brigades carried out promptly all the engineering work that was necessary throughout the operations. Although they had not the scope that was found in the Péronne battle, the sappers were indefatigable in their work on road and dug-out reconnaissance, in the search for booby traps and land mines, in the discovery and maintenance of wells, and, in one case, of bridge construction over the canal. The splendid work of the 5th Pioneer Battalion has already been alluded to. The Signal Services were again most satisfactory, the fine work of the forward telephones rendering the use of pigeons and visual signalling scarcely necessary. Wireless and Popham Panels, however, proved very helpful. The work of Lieuts. T. Collier and B. Mudford of the signal section with the 8th Brigade received particularly warm commendation. The linesmen kept the lines in a state of good repair, despite all the enemy shelling and, in places where lines could not be maintained, the gallant runners of the infantry were always ready to carry messages. The despatch riders of the Signal Company rendered their usual excellent service.

Despite the modifications in medical dispositions caused by the upsetting of the American attack on the first day, the medical evacuations were always prompt and satisfactory. The M.D.S. was working well at Templeux on the afternoon of the 29th, but the A.D.S. was not taken forward until the 1st of October, when it was established about a mile south of Bellicourt on the eastern bank of the canal. Machine gun wounds were the most frequent, a fact which was borne out by the great number of machine guns captured in the fighting. The bearers of all three field ambulances were again splendid, and no concentration of enemy shelling ever deterred them from their perilous carrying of stretcher cases along the forward tracks. Ford cars were invaluable. Once again Col. Downey had every reason to feel proud of the work of the medical services.

The Machine Gun Battalion, distributed in companies as already stated, at all times gave splendid assistance to the infantry. This was especially the case in the many places where artillery assistance could not be asked for. Machine gun ammunition was supplied throughout the operations by a daring use of pack horses. The infantry of all brigades most cordially acknowledged the work of machine gun companies, without which the successes gained might never have been won and could scarcely have been held. The light trench mortar batteries of the three infantry brigades, though they

had fewer opportunities for employment, were always on hand and always ready to help whenever opportunities arose.

All the administrative arrangements of Col. Bruche once again worked admirably. The Divisional Staff was still without a D.A.Q.M.G., but Staff Captains of brigades like Capt. H. W. Cuming, Capt. A. H. L. Godfrey, and Capt. C. Lay, and Capt. Booth of the artillery, were in themselves almost a guarantee of successful supply administration. Of their work on the "Q" side one can only say that it was worthy to rank with the performances of their respective Brigade Majors on the "G" side. These were Capt. Wisdom, Major Legge, Capt. Gollan, and Major Mellor. It is indeed a magnificent testimony to the work of the Divisional Staff, and of all the Brigade Staffs, to record that in the entire succession of great major operations from the 8th of August to the present time the staff work of all formations was well-nigh flawless.

The total casualties of the Division in the operations described in this chapter were 14 officers and 205 other ranks killed, 62 officers and 1,219 other ranks wounded, and 26 other ranks missing. That is, a total of 1,526 all told. Of these the 15th Brigade suffered 516, the 8th Brigade 455, and the 14th Brigade 302. A regrettable feature of the list of officers killed was the inclusion in it of several names of officers whose connection with the Division had dated from its earliest formation. These men had done magnificent service with the formation throughout its various campaigns, and it was particularly sad that their lives were lost in its last fight. The officers alluded to include Capts. S. W. Neale, L. L. Hornby, and C. H. Roberts, all of the 59th Battalion, and Capt. Johnson, of the 53rd Battalion. They were all sterling men, whose services to their respective units were invaluable.

The losses of the 5th Pioneer Battalion were 80, of the Machine Gun Battalion 67, of the 5th Divisional Artillery 56, of the 5th Divisional Engineers 18, of the 5th Divisional Signal Company nine. The losses in other units of the Division amounted to 23 all told. Almost 1,000 prisoners were captured and 37 guns, 11 minenwerfer, 6 anti-tank rifles, and 250 machine guns, as well as many military stores, were also taken. It was, all through, a great and hard-fought battle in which the superiority of the infantry officers in leading, and of the men in fighting, and of the combined work of the other arms, over the respective organisations of the enemy was most marked. All the resources of artillery support had been lavished on the 30th American Division for the opening of the assault, and a creeping barrage of great strength and decision had been placed at its disposal to pave the way to success. The 30th American Division did not utterly fail, but it certainly did not succeed. What success it won was very partial and, to the troops who were to pass through, most embarrassing. The 5th Australian Division took up the tattered threads of the battle where they had been dropped, and by infinite

pains wove them into the fabric of victory. Although, when it was withdrawn from the line, it had not actually attained the final objective line originally allotted, it was very near to it, while the work it did in the Divisional area on its left more than compensated for the slight shortcoming in frontal penetration. Not only the capture of prisoners and material, but a comparison of the casualties sustained and inflicted, and the average penetration of about 5,000 yards through the very midst of the Hindenburg zone, all showed an overwhelming victory for the operations of the 5th Australian Division. The acknowledgments of General Monash and of General Rawlinson to the 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions in their uphill and stubborn fight were promptly forthcoming and are appended.

From General Monash :—

“ Please convey to all Commanders, Staffs, and troops of 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions my sincere appreciation of and thanks for their fine work of the past three days. Confronted at the outset of the operations with the critical situation of great difficulty and hampered by inability to make full use of our Artillery resources these Divisions succeeded in completely overwhelming a stubborn defence in the most strongly fortified sector of the Western Front. This was due to the determination and resource of the leaders and the grit, endurance, and fighting spirit of the troops. Nothing more praiseworthy has been done by Australian troops in this war.”

From General Rawlinson :—

“ The task carried out by the 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions, including the main Hindenburg system in the neighbourhood of Bony, has greatly assisted the operation, and I wish to thank both these gallant Divisions for their endurance and tenacity in carrying out a most difficult and intricate operation.”


As the whole Australian Corps was withdrawn early in October, and never again was called upon to fight, General Rawlinson's appreciation of its efforts during the last six months of the war may appropriately be inserted here. It is a remarkable tribute to Australian prowess on the field of battle.

FOURTH ARMY No. G.S. 2/23.

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,

Since the Australian Corps joined the Fourth Army on the 8th April, 1918, they have passed through a period of hard and uniformly successful fighting of which all ranks have every right to feel proud.

Now that it has been possible to give the Australian Corps a well-earned period of rest I wish to express to them my gratitude for all that they have done. I have watched with the greatest interest and admiration the various stages through which they have passed from



SCALE

THE DIVISION'S SECOND SOMME CAMPAIGN

The shaded areas are approximately those captured by the 5th Australian Division.

- (A) Taken by 15th Bde., 24th, 25th, 26th April.
 (B) Taken by 15th Bde., 4th July.
 (C) Taken by 8th and 14th Bdes., 29th July.

- (D) Taken by 8th and 15th Bdes., 8th August.
 (E) Taken by 8th Bde. as Adv. Gd., 2nd August.
 (F) Taken by 14th, 15th and 8th Bdes., 1st/5th Sept.

- (G) Taken by 8th Bde. as Adv. Gd., 6th/9th Sept.
 (H) Taken by 8th, 14th and 15th Bdes., 20th Sept., 2nd Oct.

the hard times of Flers and Pozières to their culminating victories at Mont St. Quentin and the great Hindenburg System at Bony, Bellicourt Tunnel and Montbrehain.

During the summer of 1918 the safety of Amiens has been principally due to their determination, tenacity and valour.

The story of what they have accomplished as a fighting Army Corps, of the diligence, gallantry and skill which they have exhibited, and of the scientific methods which they have so thoroughly learned and so successfully applied, has gained for all Australians a place of honour amongst nations and amongst English-speaking nations in particular.

It has been my privilege to lead the Australian Corps in the Fourth Army during the decisive battles since August 8th which bid fair to bring the war to a successful conclusion at no distant date.

No one realises more than I do the very prominent part that they have played, for I have watched from day to day every detail of their fighting, and learned to value beyond measure the prowess and determination of all ranks.

In once more congratulating the Corps on a series of successes unsurpassed in this great war I feel that no mere words of mine can adequately express the renown that they have won for themselves and the position they have established for the Australian nation not only in France but throughout the world.

I wish every officer, N.C.O. and man all possible good fortune in the future and a speedy and safe return to their beloved Australia.

(Sd.) H. RAWLINSON, *General.*
Commanding Fourth Army.

H.Q., FOURTH ARMY.
14th October, 1918.

The Division remained only a few days longer in the Hervilly area. For over eight months it had been constantly either in the line or in close reserve to it, and the urgent need for a complete rest was now obvious to the Army Command. Utterly drained of its strength, and with the infantry brigades thousands of men below establishment, the Division was indeed a shadow of its former self. But its courage was undiminished, its *moral* high, its discipline and tone excellent. Officers and men required only the long overdue rest in a quiet area to refit them again for battle, and all were delighted when move orders were circulated and the Division, less its artillery, prepared for its departure. Its original destination was the Huppy area, but it was changed while the Division was *en route* to the Oisemont area. The change of destination, at a time when units could not be reached by telephone or telegraph, made the move most complicated. Nevertheless, it was completed admirably, and all ranks were soon comfortably housed and happily recuperating in

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It has been my privilege to lead the Australian Corps in the Fourth Army during the decisive battles since August 8th which bid fair to bring the war to a successful conclusion at no distant date.

No one realises more than I do the very prominent part that they have played, for I have watched from day to day every detail of their fighting, and learned to value beyond measure the prowess and determination of all ranks.

In once more congratulating the Corps on a series of successes unsurpassed in this great war I feel that no mere words of mine can adequately express the renown that they have won for themselves and the position they have established for the Australian nation not only in France but throughout the world.

I wish every officer, N.C.O. and man all possible good fortune in the future and a speedy and safe return to their beloved Australia.

(Sd.) H. RAWLINSON, *General.*
Commanding Fourth Army.

H.Q., FOURTH ARMY.
14th October, 1918.

The Division remained only a few days longer in the Hervilly area. For over eight months it had been constantly either in the line or in close reserve to it, and the urgent need for a complete rest was now obvious to the Army Command. Utterly drained of its strength, and with the infantry brigades thousands of men below establishment, the Division was indeed a shadow of its former self. But its courage was undiminished, its *moral* high, its discipline and tone excellent. Officers and men required only the long overdue rest in a quiet area to refit them again for battle, and all were delighted when move orders were circulated and the Division, less its artillery, prepared for its departure. Its original destination was the Huppy area, but it was changed while the Division was *en route* to the Oisemont area. The change of destination, at a time when units could not be reached by telephone or telegraph, made the move most complicated. Nevertheless, it was completed admirably, and all ranks were soon comfortably housed and happily recuperating in

quiet and picturesque surroundings. Oisemont is a small village some ten miles south of Abbeville and about 70 miles due west of Herville. D.H.Q. opened at Oisemont on the 8th of October. The infantry brigades and other units were distributed in neighbouring villages.

The Divisional Artillery was kept in the line till the 24th of October. During these three weeks it co-operated in two attacks of the 27th and 30th American Divisions, and all Australians were pleased to hear that these brave divisions had met with better success in their later operations. Again in the Selle River operations the 5th Divisional Artillery supported an attack of the IX Corps, and both the American and English troops acknowledged in the warmest terms their appreciation of its assistance. Capt. Wallis's trench mortars were particularly helpful in these operations, and Major C. A. Kelly's battery, the 54th, did excellent work. Later on in the month, Lieut.-Col. Derham's Brigade maintained on one occasion a creeping barrage for 7½ hours, advancing as it fired and suffering from constant machine gun fire. General Bessell-Browne's formation was withdrawn finally about the end of October and staged back to the Camon area near Amiens for its rest.

With the move of the Division to Oisemont the transition period between war and peace was entered. Narration of the Division's activities there, and subsequently, is accordingly left to the final chapter of this book.

PART VI.

PEACE

CHAPTER XVII

(8th October, 1918—28th June, 1919)

THE CURTAIN FALLS

Important contemporaneous events :—

Germans defeated in battle of Selle River	October 17th.
Armistice concluded with Turkey	,, 30th.
Austrians ceased hostilities	November 3rd.
German fleet mutinied	,, 3rd.
German request for armistice granted	,, 11th.
Abdication of the Emperor of Austria	,, 14th.
Allied Armies of Occupation moving to the Rhine	,, 17th.
German fleet surrendered	,, 21st.
British House of Commons dissolved	,, 25th.
Signed Abdication of the German Emperor ..	,, 28th.
British General Election and triumph of Mr. Lloyd George's Liberal and Unionist Coalition ..	December 14th.
Mr. Hughes formed new Cabinet in Australia ..	January, 1919
German fleet scuttled at Scapa Flow	June 21st.
Peace signed at Versailles	,, 28th.

FROM the security of its quiet home in the Oisemont area the 5th Australian Division watched the last convulsive struggles of the war. The knock-out blows of the 8th of August and of the storming of the Hindenburg Line left the enemy without possible hope of recovery, and an unconditional surrender was inevitable. It was only a question of time, but wide divergences of opinion existed regarding the enemy's power of prolonging his resistance. In the southern part of the British battle front the First, Third, and Fourth British Armies sustained incessantly the magnificent offensive blows which had never relaxed since the 8th of August. In the north the Second British Army and the Belgian Army had taken up the running and were advancing rapidly. And between these two striking forces General Birdwood's Fifth Army was advancing almost unmolested over a wide area of enemy withdrawals. On the French front our Allies and the growing American forces were forging steadily ahead. Under such pressure, and in view of its rapidly deteriorating *moral*, the German Army was clearly beyond all hope of recovery.

On one or two occasions in its greater operations the 5th Australian

Division had felt disappointment in the co-operation of British formations fighting on its flank. However justifiable that feeling was, all ranks of the 5th Australian Division now recognised with unstinted admiration the magnificent tenacity and fighting powers of the British. In the closing stages of the war Australians saw the British Armies of their history books and youthful dreams, the British Armies that they had wished to know, obdurate, indomitable, victorious. Despite the strain of four years of war, despite the losses and sufferings entailed by the fierce enemy offensives of 1918, the British forces rose to their highest pinnacle of endurance, determination, and efficiency in the last three months of the war. And all Australians who understood the conditions of that trying, vital period gladly and cordially acknowledge the prowess of the British Divisions with which they had the honour of being associated. From the 18th of July (the date of the successful French attack on the Champagne salient) to 11th November the total Allied captures on the Western Front were as follow :—

British Armies	188,700
French Armies	139,000
American Armies	43,300
Belgian Armies	14,500

It was, in the circumstances, a tremendously fine performance on the part of the British Armies, which undoubtedly did more to administer the knock-out blow than the forces of any other nation.

These figures should also be a very fine corrective to the deplorable boastfulness of a small but noisy and wordy element in Australian circles. They show that, of the total 385,000 prisoners captured by the Allies in this period, the average Australian Division took about one per cent. ! As a matter of fact this is a very fine result and is well above the average percentage of captures of the allied divisions, and there is always the reflection that the importance of battles cannot always be gauged by the numbers of prisoners captured. Nevertheless, it serves to show after all how very small was the Australian Army in comparison with the great masses of troops engaged. Great as is, and must be, the pride of all true Australians in the achievements of their Army, those who make arrogant and absurd claims about its performances, especially in the presence of strangers, only cover themselves with ridicule and their friends with confusion. A false species of *esprit de corps*, too, that is felt by some soldiers, is tainted by a universal contempt for, and disparagement of, the abilities of all the other units in the same Army. This is a great pity. If, therefore, in this narrative any assertions appear which show the Australian contribution, or the Division's contribution, in a distorted perspective, the historian will have failed lamentably in his duty as a recorder of the simple truth, and no one will regret it more sincerely or more profoundly than he.

As the month of October drew to a close the excitement of the French civilians in the Divisional rest area knew no bounds. Each day's *communiqué* brought with it news of fresh triumphs that seemed to the long-suffering civilians too good to be true. The drain on the British Divisions was naturally very great, and the 5th Australian Division was astonished to learn that it was now numerically one of the strongest divisions in the British Army. In these circumstances all officers commenced to foresee the possibility of an early return to the line, but the men's conviction that they were finished with the line for ever was unshaken. The 30th of October saw the capitulation of Turkey. Austria ceased hostilities on the 3rd of November. But Germany, though she had made shifty proposals for an armistice, still continued to haggle about terms and the pressure on her was never relaxed. On the 9th of November the 5th Pioneer Battalion was ordered to move to the line, and on the 10th the 5th Divisional Artillery also got orders to go forward. But at 11 a.m. on the 11th of November the Armistice came into effect and hostilities everywhere ceased. War, with its train of hate and bloodshed, of heroism and unselfishness, left the world. Peace took its place; cowards resumed, unabashed, their stand beside brave men, and everywhere the god of Self was propitiated by sacrifices more numerous than those demanded by the god of War. The last shot was fired over the grave of so much that was noble and inspiring that idealists have no choice but to mourn the death of War almost as deeply as they rejoiced at the birth of Peace.

In order that the reader may see the Division's Order of Battle as it existed practically at the conclusion of hostilities a copy is inserted here.

ORDER OF BATTLE—FIFTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Commander—Major-General Sir J. TALBOT HOBBS, K.C.B., V.D.

A.D.C.—Capt. W. L. HAMILTON, A.A.S.C.

A.D.C.—Lieut. TEMPERLY, 32nd Battalion.

G.S.O. I.	Lieut.-Col. J. T. McColl, M.C., 40th Battalion.
G.S.O. II.	Major A. N. Forbes, M.C., 1st Divisional Artillery.
G.S.O. III.	Capt. L. G. Merkel, A.E.
A.A. and Q.M.G.	Col. J. H. Bruche, C.M.G., General List.
D.A.A.G.	Lieut.-Col. E. M. Ralph, D.S.O., General List.
D.A.Q.M.G.	Capt. H. Cuming, M.C., 31st Battalion.
Div. I.O.	Lieut. J. E. Murray, 55th Battalion.
C.R.A.	Brig.-Gen. A. J. Bessell-Browne, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.E.	Lieut.-Col. L. R. S. Mather, D.S.O., A.E.
A.D.M.S.	Col. M. H. Downey, D.S.O., A.A.M.C.
D.A.D.M.S.	Major C. K. Parkinson, A.A.M.C.
D.A.D.V.S.	Lieut.-Col. M. Henry, D.S.O., A.A.V.C.
D.A.D.O.S.	Lieut. M. C. Welch, A.A.O.C.
D.A.P.M.	Capt. B. H. Cooper, A.P.C.

INFANTRY BRIGADES.

8TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brig.-Gen.—E. Tivey, C.B., D.S.O., V.D.

Brigade-Major—Capt. F. A. Wisdom, 30th Battalion.

Staff Captain—Capt. R. H. Robinson, 32nd Battalion.

30th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. F. Street.

31st Battalion, Lieut.-Col. MacArthur, D.S.O.

32nd Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Davies, D.S.O.

8th L.T.M.B., Capt. W. H. Hind.

14TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brig.-Gen.—J. C. Stewart, D.S.O.

Brigade-Major—Major R. G. Legge, D.S.O., M.C., 59th Battalion.

Staff Captain—Capt. A. H. L. Godfrey, M.C., 58th Battalion.

53rd Battalion, Lieut.-Col. W. J. R. Cheeseman, M.C.

55th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. A. G. S. Holland.

56th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. N. Marshall, D.S.O., M.C.

14th L.T.M.B., Capt. A. H. Brock.

15TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brig.-Gen.—H. E. Elliott, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M.

Brigade-Major—Capt. H. R. Gollan, M.C., 56th Battalion.

Staff Captain—Capt. C. Lay, 59th Battalion.

57th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Denehy, D.S.O.

58th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. C. V. Watson.

59th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. J. J. Scanlan, D.S.O.

15th L.T.M.B., Capt. H. S. McColl.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY

Brigade-Major—Major J. R. Mellor, A.F.A.

Staff Captain—Capt. W. H. Booth, M.C., A.F.A.

Reconnaissance Officer—2nd Lieut. H. R. McLarty, M.M., A.F.A.

13TH F.A. BRIGADE

Lieut.-Col. H. O. Caddy, D.S.O.

49th Battery, Major V. H. Gatliff, D.S.O.

50th Battery, Major H. Retchford.

51st Battery, Major E. G. Lister.

113rd Battery, Major A. R. Leschen.

14TH F.A. BRIGADE

Lieut.-Col. F. P. Derham, D.S.O.

53rd Battery, Major H. L. Hely.

54th Battery, Major C. A. Kelly.

55th Battery, Major R. S. Coates.

114th Battery, Major B. M. Morris.

Div. T.M. Officer—Lieut. H. J. Filshie, M.C.

9th M.T.M.B.—Capt. A. G. Macallister, M.C., D.C.M.

10th M.T.M.B.—Lieut. N. Scott.

Divisional Engineers.

- 8th Field Company, A.E., Major W. G. Farquhar, D.S.O.
 14th Field Company, A.E., Major J. Coghlan, M.C.
 15th Field Company, A.E., Major H. Greenway, D.S.O.
 5th Aust. Div. Signal Company, Major R. A. Stanley, D.S.O.

5TH PIONEER BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. H. G. Carter, D.S.O.

DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN

Major R. Thornthwaite, M.C.

5TH MACHINE GUN BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. C. C. Mason, D.S.O.

- 8th Machine Gun Company, Capt. A. R. Flack, M.C.
 14th Machine Gun Company, Capt. C. H. Holmes, M.C.
 15th Machine Gun Company, Capt. G. F. Fitzgerald.
 25th Machine Gun Company, Capt. H. A. Barker, D.C.M.

Divisional Train

Lieut.-Col. F. H. Francis, D.S.O.
 S.S.O.—Major C. Robinson.

- 10th Company, A.A.S.C. (H.Q. Coy.), Major J. A. Brazenor, D.S.O.
 18th Company, A.A.S.C., Capt. H. M. Laity.
 28th Company, A.A.S.C., Capt. C. B. Grieve, M.C.
 29th Company, A.A.S.C., Capt. C. W. E. Hawker.

Medical Units.

- 8th Field Ambulance, Lieut.-Col. A. R. Clayton, D.S.O.
 14th Field Ambulance, Lieut.-Col. C. W. Thompson, M.C.
 15th Field Ambulance, Lieut.-Col. R. W. W. Walsh, D.S.O.

5TH MOBILE VETERINARY SECTION

Capt. P. L. Edward.

5TH DIVISIONAL SALVAGE COMPANY

Capt. C. E. Viner.

- Divisional Gas Officer—Lieut. E. A. Hepburn, 31st Battalion.
 Divisional Musketry Officer—Capt. A. D. Ellis, M.C., 32nd Battalion.
 Divisional Courts-Martial Officer—Lieut. W. S. Houghton, 32nd Battalion.

31st October, 1918.

The news of the Armistice was received with singular quietness in the Division. Most of the men were so convinced of an early termination of hostilities that they accepted the news without surprise and without boisterous demonstrations of satisfaction. Others thought it was only another of the long series of "Furphies," with which the tedium of their military life had been so pleasantly beguiled. The civilians were more demonstrative. The beloved tricolor fluttered proudly from even the humblest cottage, and, at

least in one village, wood and poultry claims against the soldiers were stated to have been suspended for the day. Nevertheless, it was hard to believe that the war was really over and it took many weeks to grow quite accustomed to the feeling. Thoughts, lately focussed on the hostilities, now persistently flew homewards to Australia, and eager speculation was rife regarding the time and manner of the home-coming. Until lately it had been a luxury for the men of the combatant services to imagine that they might ever get home at all! And even now no one was blind to the fact that an armistice did not necessarily mean a peace, though a single glance at the crushing terms accepted by the Germans disposed at once of the thought that serious resistance would ever again be developed. The abdication of the Kaiser and the Emperor of Austria brought a thrill of delight to everybody; the atmosphere of Europe was less oppressive now that the dynasties of the Romanoffs, the Hohenzollerns, and the Hapsburgs—an ill-omened trinity—had fallen into dust.

And on the ebb tide of war the sands of the 5th Australian Division, too, were running swiftly out to sea, to the sea of Eternity where the memory of its deeds will live in honour for all time, and their echoes

“ Roll from soul to soul
And grow for ever and for ever.”

Widespread and abundant as are the blessings of peace, it is impossible to contemplate without emotion the gradual passing away of the proud and splendid Division, which, since its birth on the deserts of Egypt, had lived in bonds of goodwill and mutual helpfulness, which had borne itself in ever-growing fame throughout the most terrible of wars, and which had been consecrated by sublime sacrifices, and by a profuse outpouring of its richest blood. We pray that Australia may never see her divisions in the field again; but when she does let her revere them as instruments of immortal splendour, of nobility unspeakable. It is difficult to speak in measured terms of the dissolution of such a creation.

Let us therefore sketch the lines but lightly, and carry the reader quickly back with us to the land we love.

The Division remained in the Oisement area until the 28th of November. The most important event of that period was the withdrawal of the 29th and 54th Battalions, which was completed before the end of October. The *personnel* of both battalions was absorbed in other units of their respective brigades. The men displayed a certain amount of passive resistance, but it was not unduly prolonged and was characterised by no semblance of disorder. On the 28th of November the Division set out by train on what was originally intended to be a preliminary stage in the “march to the Rhine.” Its first halt was in the Favril area, where D.H.Q. opened on the same day. Favril is about 25 miles east of the Bellicourt

area, where the Division had had its last fight. It is near Le Cateau and Landrecies, towns famous in the fighting of 1914.

Just before the Division left Oisement it became known that General Hobbs had been promoted to the command of the Australian Corps. The urgent problem of the demobilisation and repatriation of the Australian Army had called General Monash to England and General Hobbs received the Corps command. Enough has been said of General Hobbs, both as a man and as a soldier, to afford the reader an idea of the unique position he occupied in the esteem and affection of the entire Division. It can be said without possibility of contradiction that the luckiest day in the history of the Division was the day that brought General Hobbs to it as its commander. His long *régime* during the most exacting phases of the war had been characterised by perfect justice, by immaculate personal and official integrity, and by complete harmony throughout the formation. His military knowledge and character had been equal to all the heavy demands made upon them, and it is doubtful if a single officer, N.C.O., or man in the many thousands he commanded ever cherished any feeling for him save that of the highest regard. And that is a rare circumstance even with the most successful commanders.

Command of the Division passed to General Tivey, the senior Brigade Commander. It was the well-merited recognition of long, capable, and conscientious service. His unobtrusive manner, his unceasing regard for the happiness and welfare of his men, his personal courage and steadiness in operations, had all contributed greatly to the successes of his brigade, and it was generally recognised that the administration of the Division would be secure in his hands throughout the tedious transition period. General Tivey was succeeded in command of the 8th Brigade by General Davies, late Commanding Officer of the 32nd Battalion. General Davies, in addition to being senior battalion commander of the 8th Brigade, had been long acknowledged as one of the "crack" commanding officers of the Division, and his promotion was popular and well merited.

Other changes had come, or were rapidly coming, over the Divisional Staff. To some extent the centre of gravity had shifted to England, where Sir John Monash was now forming a strong staff of officers to deal with the colossal problems of demobilisation and repatriation. It was inevitable that Col. Bruche's staff ability would find wider scope here than in the gradually narrowing limitations of a division undergoing demobilisation, and he left for England early in January, 1919. It would be difficult to overestimate the value of his services, and of their influence on the Division as a whole. His administrative and supply arrangements had invariably been models of their kind; no detail was too minute for his personal attention, no problem too complex for his broad and profound vision. Every one of his subordinates throughout the supply ser-

vices of the Division was attached to him by the memory of help, sympathy, and encouragement freely and fully given. His mantle as A.A. and Q.M.G. fell on the shoulders of Lieut.-Col. Ralph. He had long been Col. Bruche's valued assistant. He was thoroughly competent in every branch of the work and his invigorating, helpful manner, and his unlimited capacity for hard work made him a staff officer of exceptional ability. Lieut.-Col. Ralph's position as D.A.A.G. was filled by the appointment of Lieut.-Col. Hurst. The long-existing vacancy of D.A.Q.M.G. had been filled early in October by the appointment of Capt. H. W. Cuming. For years he had been a tower of strength on the staff of the 8th Brigade, and he was admirably qualified to fill the important post to which he was promoted. Another change in the Staff of the Division had been caused by the serious illness of Major E. Langley, the A.P.M.—now called D.A.P.M.—since its formation. He was evacuated towards the close of the Division's fighting period. He had served well and faithfully and the news of his gradual recovery was pleasing to his many friends. His stalwart assistant, Lieut. Freer, returned to Australia on leave in October. Major Langley was succeeded as D.A.P.M. by Capt. Cooper, who did good service during the few months his health permitted him to remain with the Division.

In the "G" Branch of the Divisional Staff Major Wootten had left early in October to fill an important appointment at G.H.Q. He had done good work with the Division and, like his *confrère*, Major Legge, at 14th Brigade H.Q., had set a standard of professional ability that future Duntroon graduates will find it very difficult to attain. Major Wootten's successor was Major Forbes, another Duntroon man of fine military capacity. It should also be noted that during the latter-day phases of the Division's service in the field, the General Staff work at D.H.Q. was benefited by the capable and conscientious work of the brothers, Major John and Capt. James Chapman, also Duntroon graduates. In due course, Lieut.-Col. McColl, G.S.O. I, was nominated for a course of training at the War Office in London and Lieut.-Col. Milligan succeeded him as G.S.O. I and ably carried out the training and educational administration of the last months of the Division's existence. In the hands of Lieut.-Cols. McColl and Milligan the high traditions established by Lieut.-Cols. Wagstaff and Peck were maintained to the end. A pathetic incident of the closing days of the Divisional Staff was the suicide by shooting of Lieut.-Col. Mather, the Division's C.R.E. This occurred at Solré-le-Château on the 23rd January, 1919. He had rendered good services to the formation.

It is not proposed to mention in detail the numerous other changes that occurred in the staffs and senior appointments throughout the Division in its post-armistice days. This appears ungrateful in one sense, because much hard and responsible work was still necessary. The war was virtually over and the great natural restraint and

discipline it imposed were withdrawn at once. This was felt in all armies. A long, and necessarily tedious, wait for repatriation was inevitable in the case of overseas forces, and it speaks volumes for the administrative tact of General Tivey and of all the officers of the Division that no unpleasant instances, and no suggestion of disorder, arose anywhere to tarnish the fair fame of the formation. In the difficult *post bellum* phases the same high sense of discipline, the same chivalrous regard for the property and persons of the French or Belgian inhabitants, characterised the Division that it had maintained everywhere throughout the war, and great praise is due to all ranks for their self-control and patience.

The claims made against the Division by civilians for damage to their property are always an interesting sidelight on the discipline of the troops. Records furnished by Lieut. Lee, the Divisional Claims Officer during the last year of the Division's existence, reveal a very fine standard of conduct in relation to civilians and their property. For instance, only £160 were claimed for the six months ending the 30th of September. Lieut. Lee rendered exceptionally good service to the Division, and to the civilians, in his prompt, just, and sympathetic handling of these claims, a work for which he was by temperament and training uniquely well qualified.

The idea of marching to the Rhine was wisely not persevered with in the case of the Australian Corps. On the 19th of December the 5th Division moved to the Solré-le-Château area, where it was very near the Belgian border, and about the 12th of March it moved to the Walcourt area, where it was now entirely clear of French soil. During all this time the process of demobilisation had been proceeding rapidly and a slight sketch of the method followed will be of interest.

The whole thing depended on ships. Sir John Monash's London H.Q. ascertained exactly what shipping space would be available for a given period and notified the divisions in France when their quotas should be dispatched. Each quota consisted of 1,000 all ranks, and the divisions supplied quotas in rotation, commencing with the 1st Australian Division. In selecting the *personnel* for each quota the divisional authorities had to be careful that the units of the division were reduced in strength proportionately to their establishments and that officers and N.C.O.'s were distributed proportionately between the quota and the units remaining. Subject to these conditions the *personnel* for each quota was selected on the basis of length of service. On arrival in England the quotas went to Depôt Camps, where all ranks were given pre-embarkation leave. About a fortnight before a ship was due to sail all ranks allotted to her assembled at the Embarkation Camp for the preparation of boat rolls, the organisation of the ship's company, and the final adjustment of financial and medical matters.

The departure of the first large quotas from the Division gave rise to many touching scenes, in which poignant joy was strangely

mingled with poignant grief. The delight of the departing men at the prospect of soon returning home was tempered by loving thoughts of the brave companions who had come to France with them and would never return. The units also invariably farewelled the parting quotas, and all the men knew that many long and loving comradeships were being broken. The French civilians, too, found that the mutual good feeling between themselves and the Australians had ripened insensibly into sincere attachments and they assembled in force to watch the quotas march out of the village for the last time. There were many tear-dimmed eyes on those occasions.

But perhaps the most touching scene of all occurred at the departure of the first large quota from the 15th Brigade. In no formation in the Army was the *esprit de corps* more intense, and the departing men realised with something of a shock that their loved Brigade was already on the threshold of dissolution. Their thoughts flew to their Brigadier and they instantly asked their officers for a voluntary parade and a last march past as a token of this regard for him. The officers gladly acquiesced and General Elliott stood stiffly at the salute as, with colours flying and bands playing, his entire Brigade marched past him for the last time. It is doubtful if any other commander in the field was honoured with such a unique and voluntary testimony; it is certain that none deserved it better. He had the heart of a lion, and it glowed with fine, generous impulses. He was a big, brave man, and in honouring him the men unconsciously honoured themselves.

The reader will readily see that this gradual dispersion by quotas could not be long continued before the units in the Division were left at a very low strength. When this became the case two or more units would be amalgamated under one set of officers. In this way, for instance, on the 8th of March the 30th and 32nd Battalions amalgamated while the 31st Battalion and the 8th L.T.M.B. did likewise. A similar procedure was observed in the 14th and 15th Brigades. All three Divisional Engineer Companies amalgamated on the 9th of March. The four batteries of the 13th A.F.A. Brigade united in pairs with the four batteries of the 14th A.F.A. Brigade. This system was continued throughout all the units of the Division. In due course further amalgamations became necessary. What was left of the 8th and 15th Infantry Brigades amalgamated under General Davies, 15th Brigade H.Q. ceasing to function on the 26th of March. Divisional Artillery H.Q. ceased to function on the 24th of March and the remnants of the two artillery brigades, the T.M. Brigade and the D.A.C., were formed into a single artillery unit under Lieut.-Col. Caddy. The three field ambulances were also eventually reduced to a single unit.

With all the divisions of the Corps similarly contracted it was no longer necessary to continue with five Divisional Staffs. Further, amalgamations were promptly carried out, and the 2nd Australian

Divisional units joined the 5th Australian Divisional units and constituted a single group, known as "B" Divisional Group, under the command of General Tivey. This took place on the 29th of March, by which time it was obvious to everyone that the demobilisation and repatriation organisation in England was exceeding even the most sanguine expectations. On the same day "B" Divisional Group concentrated in the vicinity of Marcinelle and around Charleroi, where amalgamations still continued. The 1st and 4th Australian Divisions had amalgamated as "A" Divisional Group some time before. This group was now reduced to the dimensions of a single Brigade Group, and, after the 19th of April, the H.Q. dissolved and the units were administered direct from Corps H.Q. On the 26th of April what had been Brigade H.Q. of the 14th Brigade, and of the amalgamated 8th/15th Brigade, ceased to function, and on the 27th of April Australian Corps H.Q. itself ceased to be, and command of all Australian troops in the area was assumed by General Tivey, G.O.C. "B" Divisional Group. On the next day General Tivey handed over to General Martin and the famous "G" and "A.Q." branches of which we have talked so much closed for the first and last time since they had opened at Tel-el-Kebir, early in 1916. Thus the diminished form of 5th Australian Divisional H.Q. slipped swiftly and silently from the realm of things present to the realm of things gone for ever.


So far we have said nothing of the demobilisation of the animals, of the vehicles, of the guns and mortars, of all the accessories which are necessary to a division in the field. Many of the animals were sold to the French and Belgian inhabitants, who had long since been robbed of their horses and were ready purchasers. The soldiers were sorry to part with their dumb friends whom they often kissed affectionately before handing over. The bargain was not invariably a happy one for the purchaser. "I buy ze mule," said one farmer in asking for an exchange of the animal; "I buy ze mule. I pay for ze mule. He have kicked my wife. He have pursued my cow. I place him in ze voiture—ze voiture is finish! He have eaten my chemise and all the serviettes of my house. He have entered my kitchen and try to climb ze stairs. Take him, Monsieur! for the love of the bon Dieu! and give me a mule more docile." Of course, the animal was always exchanged.

Other horses and mules were sent to the Base for return to England. The guns, vehicles, bicycles, pack saddlery, ambulance cars, etc. were returned in due course to an overworked D.A.D.O.S. and thence sent back to the Base. Over 150 trucks were required.

Mention of the demobilisation of the Division's animals makes this an appropriate place for the insertion of an interesting chart (page 400) compiled and contributed by Lieut.-Col. Henry, the Division's D.A.D.V.S. Lieut.-Col. Henry's interest in his work had never flagged, and one result of his constant training was the greatly

improved horsemastership attained by the Division. The chart shows graphically the fluctuations in animal evacuations from the formation of the Division until December, 1918. It is an interesting sidelight on the periods of greatest strain and hardship experienced by the Division.

Of the employment of the men during the post-Armistice period little need be said. Their day was divided up into military and



GRAPH SHOWING EVACUATION, ETC., OF HORSES & MULES, 5TH AUST. DIV.

Evacuated—Upper line.
Died—Lower line.

recreational training, and in educational activities, designed to prepare them for their re-entry into civil life. A Divisional Education Officer—Capt. E. W. Fricker, 14th Field Ambulance—was appointed, and under his guidance the Educational Classes grew rapidly and were greatly appreciated by the men. The list of subjects in which instruction was given was extremely wide and ranged over such diverse studies as Shorthand, Carpentry, French, Wool-classing, Mathematics, and Motor Engineering, in addition to

all the subjects of an ordinary primary school education. Tours to Brussels, Waterloo, etc., were an appreciated activity of the historical education of the men. The Education Classes did not close till the 26th of April.

A strong Sports-Staff, for long headed by Major J. J. Murray (53rd Battalion), was also created in the Division, to conduct the recreational training which did so much to occupy the minds of the men and to keep their bodies fit. Scores of contests were held in various sports, inter-unit, inter-brigade, and inter-divisional, and, as may be imagined, the Division fully maintained its athletic reputation in these contests. An international flavour was imparted to the sporting programme by the presence in Solré-le-Château of the 6th Battalion Chasseurs Alpines of the 66th French Division. The French soldiers engaged in rifle shooting and M. G. competitions with units of the 15th Brigade, and were handsomely beaten on both occasions. The contests were characterised by the utmost cordiality and good fellowship.

The opportunities placed at the disposal of the Australian soldier for effecting the transition between military and civil life were greatly increased by the splendid organisation created by the Demobilisation and Repatriation Staff in London. As many hundreds of the 5th Division benefited by this, it is right that some mention be made of it here. Sir John Monash created a Non-Military Employment Branch of his staff which arranged with numerous business and manufacturing firms, universities and technical schools, agricultural and engineering industries, to receive Australian soldiers for a course of training for the several months that must elapse before repatriation. The response was most generous, and the men on their part were equally anxious to avail themselves of the opportunity of linking up again with their old professional, industrial, or commercial pursuits. Applications for non-military employment poured in from all quarters, and Australian soldiers were soon dispersed over the length and breadth of Great Britain and were rapidly fitting themselves again for their niches in civil life. These were brought appreciably nearer by the conclusion of Peace with Germany on the 28th of June, 1919.

This narrative has now come to its end. The men of the Division were already scattered far and wide; many had reached Australia, many were *en route*, many were engaged on non-military employment awaiting their turn for repatriation; others still were retained on military duty on the staffs of the organisations which were superintending the return of the troops. But the Division as a formation had ceased to exist and the purpose of this story is now fulfilled.

We are much too near the events of the war to be able to see them in a true perspective. As the years pass away the various aspects of the Division's life and work will doubtless present them-

selves in truer proportions than they do at present. Just now positive deductions would be premature, and, in any case, they are not the province of this page. But if the survivors of the Division do not attempt to learn some of the obvious lessons of the war and hand them on to posterity, they will be ignoring, with an ingratitude almost criminal, the sacrifices of the Division's Glorious Dead.

The Division's Glorious Dead! Swift Avengers of the weak and innocent! Champions of Freedom! Victors over tyranny and armed savagery! Of all those things of which the 5th Australian Division is proud, it is proudest of its Dead. Them it most reveres. The memory of them it cherishes above all things. May all Australian hearts be softened by their love, animated by their courage, ennobled and uplifted by their example until the end of time!

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

VICTORIA CROSSES

1876 Corporal BUCKLEY, Alexander Henry, 54th Battalion A.I.F. (killed in action),

For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Péronne during the operations on 1st/2nd September, 1918. After passing the first objective his half Company and part of the Company on the flank were held up by an enemy machine gun nest. With one man he rushed the post, shooting 4 of the occupants and taking 22 prisoners. Later, on reaching a moat, another machine gun nest commanded the only available foot bridge. Whilst this was being engaged from the flank, this N.C.O. endeavoured to cross the bridge and rush the post, but was killed in the attempt.

Throughout the advance he had displayed great initiative, resource and courage, being a great inspiration to his men. In order to avert casualties amongst his comrades and to permit of their advance he voluntarily essayed a task which practically meant certain death. He set a fine example of self-sacrificing devotion to duty and bravery.

3774 Private BUDGEN, Patrick, 31st Infantry Battalion A.I.F. (killed in action).

At Polygon Wood on 26th/28th September, 1917, Private Budgen displayed conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. On two occasions the advance was temporarily held up by strongly defended "Pill Boxes." This man in the face of devastating fire from machine guns gallantly led small parties to attack these strong points, and successfully silencing the machine guns with bombs, captured the garrison at the point of the bayonet. On another occasion, when a corporal who had become detached from his Company, had been captured and was being taken to the rear by three Germans, Private Budgen single-handed rushed to his rescue, shot one German and bayoneted the remaining two, thus releasing the corporal. On five occasions he rescued wounded men under intense shell and machine gun fire, showing an utter contempt and disregard for danger.

Always foremost in volunteering for any dangerous mission, it was during the execution of one of these missions that he was killed.

1584A Private CURREY, William Matthew, 53rd Battalion A.I.F.

During the attack on Péronne on the morning of 1st September, 1918, Private Currey displayed most conspicuous gallantry and daring. During the early stage of the advance the Battalion was suffering heavy casualties from a 77 mm. field gun that was firing over sights at a very close range. Private Currey, without hesitation, rushed forward and, despite a withering machine gun fire that was directed on him from either flank, succeeded in capturing the gun single-handed after killing the entire crew. Later, when continuing the advance, an enemy "Strong Point" containing 30 men and two machine guns was noticed which was holding up the advance of the left flank. Private Currey crept around the flank and engaged the post with a Lewis gun, causing many casualties. Finally he rushed the post single-handed, killing four, wounding two, and taking one prisoner, the survivors running away. It was entirely owing to his gallant conduct that the situation was relieved, and the advance enabled to continue.

After the final stage of the attack, it was imperative that one of the Companies that had become isolated should be withdrawn. This man at once volunteered to carry the message, although the ground to be crossed was very heavily shelled and continuously swept by machine-gun fire. He crossed the shell and bullet swept area three times in the effort to locate the Company, and on one occasion his box respirator was shot through by machine gun bullets, and he was gassed. Nevertheless he remained on duty and, after finding the isolated Company, delivered the message, and returned with very valuable information from the Company Commander. Owing to the gas poisoning from which he was suffering, Currey had shortly afterwards to be evacuated. Throughout the operations his striking example of coolness, determination and utter disregard of danger had a most inspiring effect on his comrades, and his gallant work contributed largely to our success.

2631 Corporal HALL, Arthur Charles, 54th Battalion A.I.F.

For most conspicuous gallantry, brilliant leadership and devotion to duty during the operations at Péronne on 1st and 2nd September, 1918.

A machine gun post in the enemy front line was holding up the advance; alone this N.C.O. rushed

the position, shot four of the occupants as he advanced, and captured nine others and two machine guns. Then, crossing the objective with a small party, he reconnoitred the approaches to the town covering the infiltration of the remainder of the Company. During the mopping up he continuously—in advance of the main party—located enemy posts of resistance and then personally led parties to the assault. In this way he captured many small parties of prisoners and machine guns. On the morning of 2nd September, during a heavy barrage on the newly-consolidated position, a man of his platoon was severely wounded. Seeing that only immediate medical attention could save him, Corporal Hall volunteered and carried the man out of the barrage, handed him to a stretcher-bearer, and immediately returned to his post. This Company was heavily engaged throughout the day, only one officer remaining unwounded. The energy and personal courage of this N.C.O. undoubtedly contributed largely to the success of the operations. Throughout the operations he showed utter disregard for danger, and under trying conditions behaved in a most gallant and skilful manner. His daring coolness and self-sacrificing devotion to duty compelled the admiration and confidence of all associated with him.

Lieutenant MOON, Rupert Vance, 58th Infantry Battalion A.I.F.

On the morning of 12th May, 1917, in portion of the Hindenburg Line east of Bullecourt, Lieut. Moon displayed most conspicuous bravery in an attack on a German strong point. His own immediate objective was a position in advance of the enemy trench. His orders were, having captured this, to move on to the trench itself, co-operate in the general attack in progress there, and in a further assault on another strong point immediately in rear. The full story is told by two eye-witnesses whose evidence is attached. Lieut. Moon was hit in the face when advancing to his first objective, which, after a sharp bomb fight, he captured. Leading his men, he engaged in the attack on the trench which the enemy held in force. Here he received another wound in the shoulder which spun him round and dazed him for a while. His men wavered and hesitated, but Lieut. Moon again rushed forward, calling to his men, "Come on, you'll not see me left, boys." His men rushed after him, and the enemy broke and retired to the strong point in rear of the trench. Behind there was a sunken road where the enemy had a large dug-out from which parties had continually been emerging to reinforce the defenders. Lieut. Moon's party, now much diminished, fought on in the general attack, which was so strongly pressed that the enemy to the number of 184 surrendered. Lieut. Moon had by this time received another wound in the foot.

He busied himself with the consolidation of the captured position and went down into the sunken road, where he received a bullet through the face, fracturing his jaw. Only then would he consent to retire from the fight. His bravery was magnificent, and was largely instrumental in winning a fight against superior numbers, safeguarding the flank of the attack on Bullecourt and gaining 184 prisoners and four machine guns.

1717 Private RYAN, John, 55th Battalion A.I.F.

For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, and for saving a very dangerous situation under particularly gallant circumstances during an attack against the Hindenburg defences on 30th September, 1918. In the initial assault on the enemy's positions this soldier went forward with great dash and determination, and was one of the first men of his Company to reach the trench which was their objective. Seeing him rush in with his bayonet with such exceptional skill and daring, his comrades were inspired and followed his example. Although the enemy shell and machine gun fire were extremely heavy, the enemy trench garrison was soon overcome. In the assault the attacking troops were weakened by casualties, and, as they were too few to cover the whole front of attack, a considerable gap was left between Private Ryan's battalion's left and the unit on the flank. The enemy counter-attacked soon after the objective was reached, and a few succeeded in infiltrating through the gap and taking up a position of cover in rear of our men, where they commenced bombing operations. The section of trench occupied by Private Ryan and his comrades was now under fire from front and rear, and for a time it seemed that the enemy was certain to force his way through. The situation was critical and necessitated prompt action by someone in authority. Private Ryan found that there were no officers or N.C.O.'s near, they had become casualties in the assault. Appreciating the situation at once, he organised the few men nearest him, and led them out to attack the enemy with bomb and bayonet. Some of his party fell victims to the enemy's bombs, and he finally dashed into the enemy position of cover with only three men. The enemy were three times their number, but by skilful bayonet work they succeeded in killing the first three Germans on the enemy's flank. Moving along the embankment, Private Ryan alone rushed the remainder of the enemy with bombs. It was while thus engaged he fell wounded, but his dashing bombing assault drove the enemy clear of our positions. Those who were not killed or wounded by his bombs fell victims to our Lewis gunners as they retired across "No Man's Land."

A particularly dangerous situation had been saved by this gallant soldier, whose display of determined bravery and initiative was witnessed by the men of the two attacking battalions, who, inspired and urged by it, fought skilfully and bravely for two days.

Major WARK, Blair Anderson, D.S.O., 32nd Battalion A.I.F.

During the period 29th September/1st October, 1918, in the operations against the Hindenburg Line at Bellcourt, and the advance through Nauroy, Etricourt, Magny La Fosse and Joncourt, Major Wark, in command of the 32nd Battalion, displayed most conspicuous gallantry and set a fine example of personal bravery, energy, coolness and control under extremely difficult conditions.

On 29th September, under heavy artillery and machine gun fire at very close range from all sides, and in a dense fog, Major Wark, finding that the situation was critical, moved quickly forward alone and obtained sufficient information regarding the situation in front to be able to lead his command forward. At this time American troops were at a standstill and utterly disorganised, and Major Wark quickly organised more than 200 of them and attached them to his leading companies and pressed forward. By his prompt action in the early stages of the battle he narrowly averted what would have resulted in great confusion on the part of the attack-troops. Still moving fearlessly at the head of

his leading companies, and at most times far out in advance attended only by a runner, he cheered his men on and they swept through the Hindenburg defences towards Nauroy.

Pushing quickly through Nauroy and mopping up the southern portion of the village, the process yielding fifty prisoners, the battalion swung towards Etricourt. Still leading his assaulting companies he observed a battery of 77 mm. guns firing point blank into his rear companies and causing heavy casualties. Calling a few of his men to him he rushed the battery, capturing the four guns and ten of the crew; the remainder of the crew fled or were killed. Moving rapidly forward with only two N.C.O.'s he surprised and captured fifty Germans near Magny La Fosse. Quickly seizing this opportunity he pushed one company forward through the village and made good the position. Having captured his objectives for the day and personally reconnoitring to see that his flanks were safe he found his command in a very difficult and dangerous position, his left flank being exposed to the extent of 3,000 yards on account of the 31st Battalion not being able to advance. He, after a strenuous day's fighting, set about the selection and reorganisation of a new position, and effected a junction with British troops on the right and 31st Battalion on the left and made his line secure.

At 6 a.m. on 30th September he again led his command forward to allow of the troops on the right being able to advance. The men were tired and had suffered heavily, but he personally led them, and his presence amongst them inspired them to further efforts. On 1st October, 1918, his battalion was ordered to advance at very short notice. He gave his orders for the attack and personally led his troops forward.

A nest of machine guns was encountered, causing heavy casualties to his men. Without hesitation, and regardless of personal risk, he dashed forward practically into the muzzles of the guns and under an exceptionally heavy fire and silenced them, killing or capturing the entire crews. Joncourt and Mill Ridge were then quickly captured and his line consolidated. His men were practically exhausted after the three days' heavy fighting, but he moved amongst them: from post to post, across country swept by heavy and continuous shell and machine gun fire at point blank range, urged them on, and the line was made secure.

Throughout he displayed the greatest courage, and devotion to duty, coupled with great tact and skill, and his work, together with the reports based on his own personal observations, which he forwarded, was invaluable to the Brigade.

It is beyond doubt that the success achieved by the Brigade during the heavy fighting on 29th and 30th September and 1st October was due to this officer's gallantry, determination, skill and great courage.

APPENDIX II

OTHER HONOURS AND AWARDS

(i) The honours shown are only those awarded for services with the 5th Australian Division.

(ii) As a general rule the ranks and units are shown as at the date of the last honour awarded.

(iii) Bars to decorations are indicated by asterisks.

(iv) Foreign decorations are indicated by (F.).

(v) The honours gained by the several machine gun companies are here grouped under the heading 5th Machine Gun Battalion.

DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Hobbs, Lt.-Gen. Sir J. J. Talbot, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. (F.) (F.).	Mather, Lt.-Col. L. F. S., D.S.O. McColl, Lt.-Col. J. T., O.B.E. (F.).	Varwell, Maj. R., M.C. Goodland, Capt. K. A., M.C.
Bruche, Col. J. H., C.B., C.M.G.	Peck, Lt.-Col. J. H., C.M.G.	Hamilton, Capt. W. L., O.B.E.
Hearne, Col. W. W., D.S.O. (F.).	Wagstaff, Lt.-Col. C. M., Brevet Rank.	Merkel, Capt. L. G., M.C.
Carey, Lt.-Col. A. B., D.S.O.	King, Maj. D. M., D.S.O.	Smith, Capt. G. D., M.C.
Downey, Lt.-Col. M. H., D.S.O.	Langley, Maj. E. J. E. (F.).	Hobbs, Lieut. J. M., M.C.
Henry, Lt.-Col. M., D.S.O.	McGregor, Maj. R. S., D.S.O.	McKay, Lieut. E. J. (F.).
Hurst, Lt.-Col. J. H. (F.).		

Other Ranks

Brownhill, S.Q.M.S. W. R., M.S.M.	Lyons, S.Q.M.S. G. T., M.S.M.	Solley, T.W.O.I. E. E., M.S.M.
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DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Bessell - Browne, T/Brig.-Gen. A. J., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (F.).	Booth, Lieut. E. H., M.C.	Ellis, Lieut. A. B., M.C.
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13TH A.F.A. BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Caddy, Lt.-Col. H. O., C.M.G., D.S.O. (F.).	Vowles, Capt. E. L., M.C. (F.). Jones, Lieut. K. J., M.C.*	Kingsbury, Lieut. E. L., M.C.* Miller, Lieut. S. H., M.C. (F.).
Chase, Capt. C. M. C., M.C.		

Other Ranks

Austin, Pte. R., M.M.	Gillhooley, Gnr. B. B., M.M.	Jeffrey, Sgt. W. O., M.M.
Bray, B.S.M. F. 1., M.S.M.	Grogan, Sgt. A. T., M.S.M.	Redford, Gnr. E. W. (F.).
Disher, Cpl. S. H., M.S.M.	Holmes, Cpl. N. A., D.C.M.	Thomas, W.O.I. H. E., M.S.M.
Fleming, Sgt. W., M.M.*	Jamieson, Sgt. G. S., M.M.	

49TH BATTERY A.F.A.

Officers

Gatliff, Maj. V. H., D.S.O.
McHenry, Lieut. R. W., M.C.

Osmond, Lieut. W. F., M.C.

Sinclair, Lieut. W., M.C.*, M.M.

Other Ranks

Allen, Gnr. T., M.M.
Back, Cpl. W., M.M.
Broderick, Gnr. M. W. B., M.M.
Butler, Gnr. R., M.M.
Cannan, Sgt. W. S., D.C.M.
Connolly, Dvr. G. A., M.M.
Crozier, Gnr. A. A., M.M.

Fernandez, Dvr. J., M.M.
Gorry, Sgt. G. D., M.M.
James, Gnr. A. J., M.M.
Jaylor, Sgt. H. S., M.M. (F.).
Johnson, Gnr. M. L., M.M.
Lawler, T/Bmdr. J., M.M.

Lee, Bmdr. J. (F.).
Ley, Gnr. A., M.M.
Martin, Sgt. H. H., M.M.
Stephens, Sgt. H. P., M.M.
Warman, Dvr. B. T., M.M.
Wilson, Gnr. G. W., M.M.

50TH BATTERY A.F.A.

Officers

Bennett, Lieut. R. A., M.C.
Clark, Lieut. M. C., M.C.

Marsh, Lieut. H. W., M.C.

McMullen, Lieut. W. J., M.C.

Other Ranks

Allan, Bmdr. G. S., M.M.
Bowen, W.O.II. A. T., D.C.M.
(F.).
Mowat, Dvr. W. A., M.M.
Murphy, Sgt. A. J., M.M.

Roberts, Gnr. T. H., M.M.*
Smith, Fitter A., M.M.
Southam, Gnr. A., M.M.
Stewart, Sgt. G., D.C.M.

Summers, Gnr. J., M.M.
Walton, Dvr. E. R., M.M.
White, Sgt. E. L., M.M.
Willis, Gnr. W. L., M.M.

51ST BATTERY A.F.A.

Officers

Lister, Maj. E. J., D.S.O.

Other Ranks

Allen, B.S.M. W. E. (F.).
Campbell, Gnr. C., M.M.
De-Chaneet, Sgt. V., M.M.
Dimmack, Gnr. B. F., M.M.
Fotheringham, Dvr. A. H., M.M.
Furniss, Sgt. W., D.C.M.

Hasey, Cpl. A. S. P., D.C.M.
Jeffrey, Sgt. W. O., M.M.
Lindsay, Gnr. A., M.M.
McRae, Sgt. W. J., M.M.
Moore, Gnr. J., M.M.

Moore, Sgt. A., M.M. (F.).
Munro, Gnr. H., M.M.
Pottage, Sgt. P. M., M.M.* (F.).
Reimer, Gnr. H. G., M.M.
Sims, Gnr. H. T., M.M.

113TH BATTERY A.F.A.

Officers

Carrigan, Lieut. A. H., M.C.
Gregory, Lieut. W. E. C., M.C.

Mahon, Lieut. A. H., M.C.

Smith, Lieut. J. T. V., M.C.

Other Ranks

Anderson, Gnr. C. E., D.C.M.
Atkinson, Gnr. W. L., M.M.
Cooke, Gnr. A. S., M.M.
Cottrell, B.S.M. C. D., M.M.,
M.S.M.
Davison, Sgt. D., M.M.
Fairweather, Sgt. J. T., M.M.
Haddock, Bmdr. R. C., M.M.
Herring, Gnr. E., M.M.

Jones, Sgt. A., M.M.*
King, Gnr. E., M.M.
Leyden, Gnr. J. J., M.M.
McLatchie, Dvr. S., M.M.
Minchin, Gnr. C. R., M.M.
Mosely, A/Cpl. A. G., M.M.
Molan, Dvr. T. A. R., M.M.
O'Donnell, Q.M.S. M. J., M.S.M.
Ramsden, Bmdr. N. W. H.,
D.C.M., M.M.

Smith, Gnr. W. L., M.M.
Stewart, Cpl. J. D., M.M.
Sutherland, Sgt. W. D., M.M.*
(F.).
Suthern, Dvr. H., M.M.
Suthern, Gnr. F. H., M.M.
Veale, Gnr. C. R. J., M.M.
Williams, Gnr. D. G., M.M.

14TH BRIGADE A.F.A. HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Derham, Lt.-Col. F. P., D.S.O.
(F.).

Phillips, Lt.-Col. O. F., D.S.O.
McCormack, Maj. P. J., D.S.O.

Morris, Maj. B. M., D.S.O.
Aldenton, Lieut. S. W., M.C.

Other Ranks

Brough, Gnr. D. G., D.C.M.
Catling, Dvr. N., M.M.
Conradi, W.O.I. F. M., M.S.M.

Eade, Cpl. W., D.C.M.
Fleming, B.S.M. W., M.M.B.

Lousada, Cpl. E. St. L., D.C.M.*
M.S.M.
West, Gnr. R. McD., M.M.

APPENDIX II

53RD BATTERY A.F.A.

Officers

Beavis, Maj. L. E., D.S.O.

Borwick, Lieut. H. B., M.C.

Punch, Lieut. J. J. R., M.C.

Other Ranks

Andrews, Gnr. G. W., M.M.
 Black, Dvr. W. C., M.M.
 Crouch, Cpl. T., M.M.*
 Edwards, Bmdr. A. L., M.M.
 Ennis, Dvr. S., M.M.*
 Hart, Cpl. H. E., M.M.
 Hearnshaw, Sgt. E., M.M.

Hunter, Gnr. R. I., M.M.
 Hyman, Dvr. J., M.S.M.
 Kiel, Gnr. F. E., M.M.
 Mankey, Dvr. A., M.M.
 McQuade, Gnr. B., M.M.
 Murphy, Gnr. T., M.M.

Page, Sgt. W. M., M.M.
 Shardlow, Dvr. F. P., M.M.
 Sharpe, Gnr. E. K., M.M.
 Smith, Gnr. G. F., M.M.
 Tocknell, Gnr. E. A. F., M.M.
 Waugh, Gnr. A., M.M.

54TH BATTERY A.F.A.

Other Ranks

Burris, Sgt. W., M.M., M.S.M.
 Daniels, B.S.M. C. E., M.S.M.

Douglas, Dvr. H. A., M.M.

King, Bmdr. T. T., M.M.

55TH BATTERY A.F.A.

Officers

Thorne, Capt. C. B., M.C.

Other Ranks

Douglas, Gnr. H. R., M.M.
 Graham, Sgt. P. J., D.C.M.
 Kydd, Sgt. A. J. (F.).

Marshall, Gnr. H., M.M.
 Richie, T/Bmdr. F. H., M.M.

Talbot, Gnr. W. H., M.M.
 Vernon, Dvr. J., M.S.M.

114TH BATTERY A.F.A.

Officers

Dreyer, Maj. N. L., D.S.O.
 Gwynne, Lieut. E. W., M.C.

Jones, Lieut. H., M.C.

McLeod, Lieut. R., M.C.

Other Ranks

Atkins, Gnr. E., M.M. (F.).
 Crossland, Sgt. H., M.M.
 Cullen, Sgt. J., M.M.
 Eade, Bmdr. W., M.M.
 Gore, Cpl. W. E., M.S.M.
 Hazelwood, Gnr. J. P., M.M.*

Hodgens, Cpl. W., M.M.
 Kerr, Sgt. J., M.M.
 King, Bmdr. T. T., M.M.
 Markley, Gnr. H. A., M.M.
 McLean, Gnr. T., D.C.M.*
 McNamara, Dvr. C. R., M.M.

McPherson, Bmdr. B., M.M.
 Oliver, Dvr. R., M.S.M. (F.).
 Patch, Sgt. F. E., M.M.
 Stewart, Gnr. V. E., M.M.
 White, Gnr. C. K. B., M.M.

25TH BRIGADE A.F.A.

Officers

Cox-Taylor, Lt.-Col., D.S.O.

Other Ranks

Chippendale, Bmdr. S. P., D.C.M.

Robbins, Gnr. G. S., M.M.

DIVISIONAL TRENCH MORTAR BRIGADE

Officers

Walls, Capt. W. D., M.C.*, M.M.

Filshie, Lieut. H. J., M.C.

Macallister, Lieut. A. G., M.C.,
D.C.M.*Other Ranks*

Allan, Gnr. W. F. A., M.M.
 Allen, Gnr. L., M.M.
 Arnold, Sgt. C. F., M.M.
 Berwick, Gnr. T. S., M.M.
 Butters, Sgt. A., M.S.M.
 Cockett, Sgt. T., D.C.M., M.M.
 Courtney, Bmdr. A., M.M.
 Dixon, Gnr. C. C., M.M.
 Dixon, Gnr. R. (F.)
 Eagleton, Gnr. C. H., M.M.
 Edwards, Cpl. T. J., M.M.

Eneberg, Bmdr. B. W. H., M.M.
 English, Bmdr. J., M.M.
 Freemantle, Cpl. W. F., M.M.
 Gardner, Gnr. J., M.M.
 Hale, Sgt. F. H., M.M.
 Hare, Bmdr. G. S., M.M.
 Hart, Gnr. M., M.M.
 Lorensinl, Sgt. W. R., D.C.M.
 Marshall, B.S.M. F. S., D.C.M.,
M.M.

Maumill, Cpl. L. J., M.M.
 Morris, Gnr. A. E., M.M.*
 Parsons, Cpl. F., M.M.
 Still, Gnr. W., M.M.
 Street, Cpl. R. E., M.M.
 Vaughan, Cpl. T. H., M.M.
 Wallace, Gnr. J. D., M.M.
 Wiber, Cpl. E. H., D.C.M.
 Wiles, Cpl. A. S., M.M.
 Wyndham, Gnr. T., M.M.

DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN

Officers

Thornthwaite, Lt.-Col. F., D.S.O. M.C. (F.).	Goldsmith, Capt. H., M.C. Dunlop, Lieut. E., M.C.	Trenerry, Lieut. W. L., M.C.
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Other Ranks

Anderson, R.S.M. J. F., M.S.M.	Hanscombe, Dvr. H. A., M.M.	Pollock, Dvr. D. H., M.M.
Bowen, Dvr. T. E. F., M.M.	Hope, T/Bmdr. D., M.M.	Scott, A/Sgt. H., M.S.M.
Bruce, Dvr. R. R., M.M.	Jackson, Cpl. B. W., M.M.	Stallord, Sgt. R. V., M.M.
Eustis, B.S.M., G. H., M.S.M.	Knox, Sgt. W. J., M.S.M.	Williams, Dvr. A. E., M.M.
Evans, Cpl. W. G., M.M.	McCormack, Cpl. A. J., M.M.	Witham, Dvr. J. A., M.M.
Fox, Dvr. J. J., M.M.	McGahan, Bmdr. A. J., M.M.	Wyett, Dvr. S. F., M.M.
Goyen, B.S.M., H. K., M.S.M.	McKnight, A/Bmdr., H. J., M.M.	Young, T/B.S.M. J. V. (F.).
Green, B.S.M. F. T., M.M.	Miller, Gnr. W. D., M.M.	

8TH BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Tivey, T/Maj.-Gen. E., C.B., C.M.G.	Casey, Maj. R. G., D.S.O.	Cumling, T/Maj. H. W., M.C.*
Dentry, S/Sgt. C. C., M.S.M.		Mason, Sgt. J. E., M.S.M.

29TH BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

McArthur, Lt.-Col. J., D.S.O.*	Thompson, Capt. W. H., M.C.	Lambden, Lieut. W. J., M.C.
Purser, Lt.-Col. M., D.S.O.	Bolitho, Lieut. L., M.C.	Patterson, Lieut. S. L., M.C.
Davies, Capt. C. E., D.S.O., M.C.	Braden, Lieut. W., M.C.	Thomas, Lieut. E., M.C.
Coldwell-Smith, Capt. F. L., M.C.	Downes, Lieut. R. F. A., M.C.	Taylor, Lieut. T. H., M.C.
Derham, Capt. C. A. M., M.C.	Farmer, Lieut. A. C., M.C.	Whitelaw, Lieut. F. F., M.C.
Ellis, Capt. A. D., M.C.	Friday, Lieut. A., M.C.	Cornish, Lieut. R., D.C.M.
Read, Capt. C. H., M.C.	Harrison, Lieut. H. A., M.C.	Birdsey, Lieut. O. R., M.M.
Robertson, Capt. A. M., M.C.	Harper, Lieut. G., M.C.	Klug, Lieut. L. C., M.M.
	Lacey, Lieut. C. L., M.C.	

Other Ranks

Adamson, Pte. J. R., M.M.	Hall, Pte. P. E., M.M.	Polkinghorne, Cpl. S., M.M.
Ashton, Pte. W. G., M.M.	Hannaford, Pte. G. B., M.M.	Powell, S/Sgt. T. C. H., M.S.M.
Bagley, Cpl. C. L., M.M.	Hayward, L.-Cpl. J. R. C., D.C.M.	Price, L.-Cpl. L., M.M.
Barnes, L.-Cpl. A. E., M.M.	Higgin, Pte. D., M.M.	Primmer, Cpl. I., M.M.
Bartlett, Pte. H. S., M.M.	Hollins, L.-Cpl. S. G. (F.).	Pullybank, L.-Cpl. W. C., M.M.
Baulch, Pte. E. E., D.C.M.	Humphreys, Pte. J. W., M.M.	Rankin, Cpl. F. T., M.M.*
Beavis, L.-Cpl. R. C., M.M.	Hutcheson, Pte. S. McD., M.M.	Rawlings, Pte. W. R., M.M.
Blake, Pte. A. E., M.M.	Hyatt, L.-Cpl. C. E., D.C.M.	Reed, Pte. H., M.M.
Bloxon, Sgt. W. F. J., M.M.	James, Q.M.S. W. E., M.S.M.	Reedy, Sgt. J. J., M.M.
Bolger, Pte. P., D.C.M.	Jasper, Pte. F., M.S.M.	Roberts, L.-Cpl. G. T., M.M.
Broom, L.-Cpl. A., M.M.	Johnson, Pte. G. T., M.M.	Robinson, Cpl. C. C., M.M.
Buckland, L.-Cpl. F. J., M.M.	Jones, Pte. W. T., M.M.	Robinson, Cpl. W. B., M.M.
Bye, Pte. A. J., M.M.	Juliff, Sgt. E. P., M.M.	Rodger, Pte. J. W., M.M.
Bye, Pte. A. P., M.M.	Keir, Pte. R. H., M.M. (F.).	Ross, C.S.M. J. C., D.C.M.
Catton, Pte. J., M.M.	Kimberley, Cpl. G. T., M.M.	Scotthern, Pte. B., M.M.
Cavanagh, Cpl. A. W., D.C.M.	King, Pte. G. L., M.M.	Simmons, Pte. E., M.M.
Charles, Sgt. R. E., M.S.M.	Lawry, L.-Cpl. H. W. H., M.M.*	Sinclair, Sgt. W. L., D.C.M.
Clucas, Sgt. H. C., D.C.M., M.M.	Logan, Pte. J. C., M.M.	Staples, Pte. (F.).
Collett, Cpl. C. J., M.M.	Longthorp, Sgt. R. S., M.M.	Steele, Pte. W. J., M.M.
Collins, Cpl. B. A., D.C.M.	Love, Cpl. J. J., M.M.	Stevenson, Pte. E., M.M.
Cook, Sgt. A. W., M.M.	Low, Pte. W., M.M.	Sturges, Pte. S. G., M.M.
Corr, L.-Cpl. W. J. A., M.M.	MacDonald, Pte. A. P., M.M.	Sturtevant, Pte. J. R., M.M.
Coverdale, Pte. J. A. V., M.M.	MacDonald, Pte. J. B., M.M.	Swadfield, Sgt. J. B., M.M.
Crawford, Pte. D., M.M.	MacLean, Pte. J. G., M.M.	Thompson, Pte. W. T., M.M.
Deeker, Pte. M. P., M.M.	McConnell, Sgt. J., D.C.M., M.M.	Tippet, Pte. E. J., M.M.
Dodd, L.-Cpl. J. T., M.M.	McCowan, Cpl. J. (F.).	Tucker, Pte. C. H., M.M.
Douglas, Sgt. G., M.M.	McFerran, Q.M.S. H., M.M.	Walley, Sgt. W. J., M.M.
Emmerson, L.-Cpl. A. E., M.M.	McKenzie, Sgt. H. W., D.C.M., M.M.	Warlands, Pte. W. E. L. J., M.M.
Farrar, Pte. L., M.M.		Watson, Cpl. C. G., D.C.M.
Featherston, Pte. S. E., M.M.	Nesbitt, Pte. J. J., M.M.	Whitehead, Pte. F., M.M.
Feehan, Pte. P. T., M.M.	Oakman, Pte. F. H. (F.).	Williams, Pte. D., M.M.
Fitts, L.-Cpl. F. E. T., M.M.	Oliver, Sgt. D. P., D.C.M., M.M.*	Williams, Pte. G., M.M.
Fox, Pte. R. F., M.M.	Olsen, Pte. O., M.M.	Williams, Pte. V. J., M.M.
Giles, Pte. G. A., M.M.	Parker, Cpl. J., M.M.	Williamson, Pte. T. J., M.M.
Glew, Pte. H., M.M.	Pekin, Sgt. T. H., M.M.	Wilson, Pte. P. C., M.M.
Graham, Cpl. P. J., M.M.	Peters, Cpl. C. T., M.M.	Winfield, Cpl. P., M.M.
Gralton, Pte. H. E., M.M.	Pitt, Sgt. M. A., D.C.M., M.M.	Woonsnam, Sgt. F. W., M.M.

30TH BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Clarke, Lt.-Col. J. W., D.S.O.
 Street, Lt.-Col. F., D.S.O.
 Cheeseman, Lt.-Col. W. J. A.,
 M.C. (F.).
 Beardsmore, Maj. R. H., D.S.O.
 Chapman, Maj. J. A., D.S.O.
 Adams, Capt. E., M.C.
 Allen, Capt. R. A., M.C.
 Chapman, Capt. J. A., O.B.E.

Chalmers, Capt. D., M.C.
 Charlton, Capt. P., M.C.
 Hind, Capt. W. H., M.C.
 Macfarlane, Capt. E. A. C., M.C.
 Savage, Capt. C. D., M.C.
 White, Capt. A. C., M.C.
 Wisdom, Capt. F. A., D.S.O., M.C.
 Yeomans, Lieut. J. C., D.S.O.
 Biddle, Lieut. W. W., M.C.

Bragg, Lieut. B. A., M.C.
 Butler, Lieut. S. C., M.C.
 Doust, Lieut. H., M.C.
 Flynn, Lieut. J. J. W., M.C.
 Fullarton, Lieut. J. G., M.C.
 Hanlon, Lieut. W. T., M.C.
 Rush, Lieut. B. D., M.C.
 Wells, Lieut. H. J., M.C.
 McKinnon, Lieut. E. G., M.S.M.

Other Ranks

Abbott, Sgt. W. C., M.M.
 Alcorn, Cpl. A. E. (F.).
 Amps, Sgt. E. C. E., D.C.M.
 Ashenden, L.-Cpl. P., M.M.
 Baker, L.-Cpl. E. H., M.M.
 Baker, Pte. E. L., M.M.
 Barrett, Pte. W., D.C.M.
 Bond, C.Q.M.S. J. H., M.S.M.
 Bredhauer, Pte. G., M.M.
 Burns, Sgt. A. D., M.M.
 Burns, Pte. G. W., M.M.
 Butterworth, Sgt. F. A., M.M.
 Case, Sgt. R. A., M.M.
 Casey, L.-Sgt. J. J., M.M.*
 Chapman, L.-Cpl. H. D., M.M.
 Collins, Pte. W. E., M.M.
 Costin, Pte. A. E., M.M.
 Cowan, T/C.S.M. G., D.C.M.
 Davies, Sgt. B. O., D.C.M.
 Davies, Pte. D. H., M.M.
 Davis, Pte. C. F., M.M.
 Dixon, Pte. L., M.M.
 Dowd, L.-Sgt. W. A., D.C.M.
 Dunn, Pte. E., M.M.
 Eccles, L.-Sgt. T., D.C.M., M.M.
 Estell, Sgt. R. J., M.M.
 Faulks, L.-Cpl. A. G., M.M.
 Forbes, Cpl. A. E., M.M.
 Ford, Pte. F. W., M.M.
 Ford, Cpl. J. C., D.C.M.
 Garaty, Dvr. N. (F.).
 Gilchrist, Pte. R., M.M.
 Gillingham, Pte. G., M.M.
 Glover, Pte. G., M.M.

Gordon, Pte. A., M.M.
 Gott, Pte. G., M.M.
 Grant, L.-Cpl. P. F., M.M.
 Grogan, Pte. T. C., M.M.
 Hartley, Pte. R., M.M.
 Hezzelwood, Pte. F. M., M.M.
 Hogg, Sgt. J. A., M.M.
 Hough, Pte. J., M.M.
 Hunter, Pte. L. G., D.C.M.
 Huxley, Pte. W. H., M.M.
 Jones, Pte. J., M.M.
 Joyce, Pte. H. H., M.M.
 Knight, Pte. A. E., M.M.
 Lahiff, L.-Cpl. H., M.M.
 Laing, T/Cpl. J. W., M.M.
 Lancaster, L.-Cpl. V. L., D.C.M.
 Lister, Pte. E. H., M.M.
 Massey, Sgt. T. M., M.M.
 Mather, Pte. R., M.M.
 Mathews, Sgt. E. H., D.C.M.
 May, Pte. A., M.M.
 McClosky, Sgt. E. H., D.C.M.
 McDermott, Pte. W., M.M.
 McGillcuddy, Sgt. F., M.M.
 McGowan, C.S.M. J. B., D.C.M.
 McMahon, Pte. J., M.M.
 Milgate, Pte. P., M.M.
 Moore, Sgt. L. H., M.M.
 Morgan, Pte. J. G., M.M.
 Motby, Pte. P. H., M.M.
 Munday, Cpl. W. F., M.M.
 Murdoch, Sgt. S. R., D.C.M.
 Nankivell, Pte. P. J., M.M.
 Nicolle, Pte. A. (F.).

North, L.-Cpl. F., M.M.
 Parkes, Pte. W. A., M.M.
 Pearce, Pte. R. J., M.M.
 Pickering, T/Cpl. F. H., M.M.
 Pittaway, Pte. G. W., M.M.
 Player, Pte. W., M.M.
 Potter, Pte. C. W., M.M.
 Powe, Pte. B., M.M.
 Proud, Pte. H., M.M.
 Rankin, Pte. D. P., M.M.
 Raynor, Pte. L. J., M.M.
 Sander, L.-Cpl. J., M.M.
 Sayers, Pte. B. G., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. C. S., M.M.
 Smith, Sgt. D., M.M.
 Smith, Sgt. G. W., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. R., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. W. J., M.M.
 Staples, L.-Cpl. H. E. G., M.M.
 Thomas, L.-Cpl. R. J., M.M.
 Thurlay, Cpl. A. E., M.M.
 Tripp, Cpl. W., M.M.
 Walker, Pte. A. C., M.M.
 Ward, Pte. W. A., D.C.M.
 Watts, Cpl. W. W., M.M.
 Welley, L.-Cpl. G. E., M.M.*
 Wellings, Sgt. L. C., M.S.M.
 White, Pte. J., M.S.M.
 Whyatt, Pte. A., M.M.*
 Williamson, Pte. H. E., M.M.
 Wood, Pte. J., D.C.M.
 Woodbine, L.-Sgt. D., M.M.
 Young, Pte. H., M.M.

31ST BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Toll, Lt.-Col. F. W., D.S.O.*
 McLennan, Capt. H. E., M.C.
 Trounson, Capt. L. J., M.C.
 Wilson, Capt. G. H., M.C.
 Drayton, Capt. F. (F.).
 Sparkes, Hon. Capt and Q.M.
 P. G. (E.).

Avery, Lieut. J. K., M.C.
 Blomfield, Lieut. C. J., M.C.
 Hall, Lieut. A. H., M.C.
 Hill, Lieut. A. H., M.C.*
 Morpeth, Lieut. W. K., M.C.*
 Hynes, Lieut. A. E., M.C.
 Jennings, Lieut. G. W., M.C.

Larnach, Lieut. L. N., M.C.
 Nelson, Lieut. J. M., M.C.
 Skinner, Lieut. H. D., M.C.
 Smith, Lieut. F. R., M.C.
 Still, Lieut. G. A., M.C.
 Thompson, Lieut. R., M.C.
 Towns, Lieut. S., M.C.

Other Ranks

Adams, C.S.M. A. E., D.C.M.
 Allen, Pte. D., M.M.
 Andrews, Pte. G. J. L. M., M.M.
 Ashmore, Cpl. L. W., D.C.M.
 Ayre, Pte. A. H., M.M.**
 Baker, Pte. T. C., M.M.*
 Bennett, Pte. T., M.M.
 Branchflower, Pte. A. H., M.M.
 Bubbles, Pte. T., M.M.
 Burrell, Pte. R., M.M.
 Carew, Cpl. R. J., D.C.M.
 Chapman, L.-Cpl. F. A., M.M.*
 Collins, T/Cpl. H. A., M.M.,
 M.S.M.
 Coyne, Sgt. D. E., A.M.

Davies, Pte. T. S., M.M.*
 Davis, Pte. D. B., M.M.
 Devonshire, Pte. J., M.M.
 Dingwall, Pte. H. A. S., M.M.*
 Drinkwater, Cpl. B., M.M.
 Edeson, T/Cpl. W., M.M.
 Egenton, Sgt. M. W., M.S.M.
 Evans, Pte. H. de L., M.M.
 Fitzpatrick, Pte. J. L., M.M.
 Foley, L.-Cpl. J. F., M.M.
 Fordyce, Pte. G. L., M.M.
 Foster, Sgt. E. P., D.C.M.
 Francey, Pte. H. T., M.M.
 Gartner, Pte. W. J., M.M.
 Gibb, Pte. J., M.M.

Gill, Cpl. M. J., M.M.
 Gordon, Pte. A., M.M.
 Gothard, Pte. E. J., D.C.M.
 Grantham, Sgt. R. E., M.M.
 Greber, Pte. E. G., M.M.
 Halse, Sgt. A. T., M.M.
 Harvey, Pte. W. J., M.M.
 Hickson, Pte. A. E., M.M.
 Hullah, Pte. J., M.M.
 Kent, L.-Cpl. E. R., M.M.
 King, Pte. W. E. (F.).
 Kirby, Sgt. C., M.M.
 Klumpp, Pte. F. M., D.C.M.
 Kuhlmann, Pte. C., M.M.
 Laurie, Pte. D. C., M.M.

Other Ranks—cont.

Law, Sgt. F., D.C.M.
 Law, Pte. V. E., M.M.
 Lilley, Pte. A. P., D.C.M.
 Mackie, Pte. P. K., M.M.
 Maher, Sgt. D. K., M.S.M.
 Main, Pte. A. H., M.M.
 McDougall, Sgt. N. A., M.M.
 McGann, Pte. J. A., M.M.
 McGhie, L.-Sgt. W. R., M.M.
 McLean, C.S.M. W., D.C.M.
 Mitchell, Pte. H. G., M.M.
 Morgan, Pte. G., M.M.
 Nickols, Pte. S. A., M.M.
 Norman, Sgt. W. H., M.M.
 O'Connor, L.-Cpl. D., M.M.

O'Neill, Pte. H. A. A., M.M.
 Parton, L.-Cpl. J., M.M.
 Patterson, Pte. E. M., M.M.*
 Pontee, Pte. F., M.M.
 Prince, Pte. T., M.M.
 Ramsay, Sgt. R. G., M.S.M.
 Reddan, L.-Cpl. J. C., M.M.
 Renouf, Pte. K., M.M.
 Rippon, Sgt. I. G., M.M.
 Roberts, Pte. D. E. (F.).
 Rodgie, Sgt. S. D., M.M.
 Rollis, L.-Cpl. A. W., M.M.
 Rueben, Cpl. D. M., M.M.
 Russell, Pte. R. G. (F.).
 Sawrey, Pte. P. M., M.M.

Scott, Pte. W. J., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. H. W., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. J., M.M.*
 Smith, Sgt. S., D.C.M.
 Stewart, C.S.M. K. G., M.C., M.M.
 Sykes, L.-Cpl. E. A., M.M.*
 Taylor, Pte. R. E., M.M.
 Thompson, Pte. A., M.M.
 Undery, Pte. C., M.M.
 Warne, Pte. R., M.M.
 Whittaker, Pte. N. J., M.M.
 Willey, Sgt. F. J., M.M.
 Wilson, Pte. H. G., M.M.
 Wilson, Pte. W. O., (F.) D.C.M.
 Woodcroft, Pte. G. H., M.M.

32ND BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Davies, Lt.-Col. C. S., D.S.O. (F.).
 Wark, Maj. B. A., V.C., D.S.O.
 Hunn, Maj. S. A., M.C.
 Allen, Capt. J. H., M.C.*
 Hardy, Lieut. F., M.C.*
 Campbell, Capt. A., M.C.
 Geddes, Capt. R. A., M.C.
 Krinks, Capt. F. L., M.C.
 Rogers, Capt. A. T., M.C.

White, Capt. A. R., M.C.
 Bull, Lieut. P. A., M.C.
 Crain, Lieut. H. T., M.C.
 Francis, Lieut. A. R., M.C.
 Lucas, Lieut. P. F., M.C.
 Maddern, Lieut. J. S., M.C.
 Mills, Lieut. S. E. G., M.C.
 Neild, Lieut. H. K., M.C.
 Opie, Lieut. A. M., M.C.

Pratt, Lieut. J. H., M.C.
 Slade, Lieut. C. S., M.C.
 Smith, Lieut. H. B., M.C.
 Taylor, Lieut. C. M., M.C.
 Taylor, Lieut. W. H., M.C.
 Trimmer, Lieut. D., M.C.
 Walker, Lieut. H., M.C.
 Ward, Lieut. W. A., M.C.

Other Ranks

Adams, Pte. E. A., M.M.
 Addison, Sgt. W. S., M.M.*
 Adams, Pte. G., M.M.
 Andrews, Cpl. W. C., M.S.M.
 Arnold, L.-Cpl. W. E., M.M.
 Atkinson, Pte. C., M.M.
 Bell, Pte. A. J. (F.).
 Bemold, Pte. C. A., D.C.M.
 Berry, Sgt. H. L. J. (F.).
 Bolto, Sgt. R. L. C., M.M.
 Boylan, Dvr. A., D.C.M.
 Bradshaw, L.-Sgt. F. G., M.M.
 Brimage, Sgt. H., M.M.
 Brock, Pte. A. E., M.M.
 Browne, Pte. H. F., M.M.*
 Burdett, Pte. H. W. E., M.M.
 Burns, T/Cpl. S. R., M.M.
 Burns, Pte. G. S., M.M.
 Burt, Pte. W. S., M.M.
 Campbell, Pte. J. W., M.M.
 Clark, L.-Cpl. H. E. G., M.M.
 Conlan, Pte. P. J., M.M.
 Cross, Cpl. C. C., D.C.M.
 Crackel, Pte. H., M.M.
 Critchley, Pte. P. G., M.M.
 Curchenven, Cpl. C., M.M.
 Densley, Sgt. A. L., M.M.
 Dickson, L.-Cpl. J., M.M.
 Downing, Pte. W. P., M.M.
 Eakins, L.-Cpl. G. C., M.M.
 Eldridge, Pte. E. A., M.M.
 Fitzgerald, Pte. M. J., D.C.M.

Furze, C.S.M. H. W., D.C.M.
 Fowler, Cpl. W. R., M.M.
 Giles, Sgt. F. T., M.M.
 Gordon, Sgt. H. McK., D.C.M.
 Gourley, Pte. J., M.M.
 Greenshields, Pte. G. W., M.M.
 Gully, Sgt. G. B., D.C.M.
 Hall, L.-Cpl. G. R. H., M.M.
 Hanrahan, Pte. M., M.M.
 Hendrick, Sgt. T. J., M.M.
 Heuzenroeder, T/Cpl. M. W., M.M.

Hogg, Cpl. E., M.M.
 Hyde, Pte. D., M.M.
 Jaeger, Pte. A. E., D.C.M.
 Jarvis, Sgt. L. G., D.C.M.
 Johnson, Pte. C. H., M.M.
 Jones, Pte. W. V., M.M.
 Kell, Pte. A. D., D.C.M.
 Kelly, Sgt. L. S., M.S.M.
 Ledgerd, Pte. J. E., M.S.M.
 Lloyd, Pte. C. G. L., M.M.
 Lodge, R.Q.M.S. E. G., M.S.M.
 Lugg, Pte. J., M.M.
 Lund, L.-Cpl. J., M.M.
 Lundberg, Pte. M. O. W., M.M.
 Macfarlane, Pte. H. T., M.M.
 Massey, C.Q.M.S. C. O. R., M.M.
 McCarthy, Cpl. B. S., M.S.M.
 McGovern, Sgt. T. J., M.M.
 McMillan, L.-Cpl. W. J., M.M.

McNamara, Pte. R., M.M.
 Nottle, Sgt. A. C., D.C.M.
 Palmer, Cpl. W. T., M.M.
 Parker, Cpl. C. P. (F.).
 Parker-Laycock, Sgt. J., M.S.M.
 Quinn, Cpl. T. J., M.M.
 Reid, Pte. J., M.M.
 Richards, Pte. H. G., M.M.
 Ritter, Sgt. R. H., M.S.M.
 Robertson, T/Sgt. D. K., M.M.*
 Ross, Pte. M. R., M.M.
 Savage, Sgt. L. J., D.C.M.
 Scanlon, Sgt. J. P., M.M.
 Schenaher, Pte. H. A., M.M.
 Shepherd, Pte. T., M.M.
 Shiels, Pte. W., M.M.
 Shilcock, Cpl. P. G., D.C.M.
 Sinclair, Sgt. W. L., M.M.
 Smith, Sgt. S. A. J., M.M.*
 Standley, Pte. H. J., M.M.
 Storr, Pte. P. S., M.M.
 Swan, Pte. T., M.M.
 Taylor, Sgt. H., M.M.
 Thorson, L.-Cpl. N. A., M.M.
 Thorson, Sgt. C. W., M.M.
 Tillett, Cpl. W., M.M.
 Turner, Pte. G. A., M.M.
 Wade, L.-Cpl. W. J., M.M.
 Webster, L.-Cpl. J. K., M.M.
 Wheaton, L.-Sgt. F. A., D.C.M.
 Wylie, L.-Cpl. W. B., M.M.

8TH L.T.M.B.

Officers

Goff, Capt. G., M.C.
 Hind, Capt. W. H., M.C.

Mulvey, Capt. R. D., M.C.

Thorsen, Lieut. C. R., M.M.

Other Ranks

Daymond, Pte. W. H. (F.).
 Deard, Pte. S. H., M.M.
 Doyle, Pte. T., M.M.
 Feeley, Cpl. E. F., M.M.

Kelly, Pte. R. J., M.M.
 Rueben, Sgt. D. M., D.C.M., M.M.

Sharlaud, L.-Cpl. W. S. C., M.M.
 Stanford, Sgt. M. H., M.M.
 Warland, Sgt. W. E. L. J., M.M.*

14TH BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Hobkirk, T/Brig.-Gen. C. J., C.M.G.	Dickinson, Maj. G. F., D.S.O. (F.)	Wisdom, Capt. F. A., D.S.O., M.C.
Stewart, T/Brig.-Gen. J. C., C.M.G., D.S.O.		

53RD BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Cheeseman, Lt.-Col. W. J. R., D.S.O., M.C. (F.)	Pearson, Hon. Capt. and Q.M. C. C., M.C.	Jackson, Lieut. A. E., M.C.
Cronshaw, Lt.-Col. D. M., D.S.O.	Bevan, Lieut. W. V., M.C.	Lang, Lieut. J. F., M.C.
Murray, Maj. J. T., D.S.O., M.C.	Clift, Lieut. F., M.C.	Lovett, Lieut. N. B., M.C.* (F.)
Roberts, T/Maj. P. T., D.S.O. (F.)	Cooper, Lieut. A. W., M.C.	Ridley, Lieut. J. G., M.C.
Evers, Capt. S. W., M.C.	Dexter, Lieut. J., M.C.	Stinson, Lieut. J., M.C.
Johnson, Capt. C. A., M.C.	Elliott, Lieut. A. L., M.C.	Toffer, Lieut. L. J., M.C.
Lindsay, Capt. W. F., M.C.	Francis, Lieut. T., M.C.	Waite, Lieut. W., M.C.* (F.)
Smith, Capt. W. E., M.C.* (F.)	Geldard, Lieut. H. S., M.C.	Wensor, Lieut. G. P., M.C.
Thompson, Capt. N. D., M.C.	Hill, Lieut. R. V., D.S.O.	Wilson, Lieut. W. G., M.C.
		Woolrych, Lieut. A. C., M.C.
		Young, Lieut. A. G., M.C.

Other Ranks

Adams, Sgt. C. H., M.M.	Grocott, Pte. F. T., D.C.M.	Ralph, L.-Sgt. P. E., M.M.
Alexander, Sig. J. A., M.M.	Haines, Cpl. J. W., M.M.	Ramsden, Sig. J., M.M.
Allison, Sgt. A. M., D.C.M.	Harrop, L.-Cpl. J. H., M.M.	Rayner, Cpl. C. R., M.M.
Anderson, T/Cpl. E., M.M.	Heath, Pte. G., M.M.	Reid, Pte. W. S., M.M.
Angus, Pte. C., M.M.	Higgs, Pte. I. P., M.M.	Rodwell, Pte. R., M.S.M.
Baker, Cpl. R. J., M.M.	Hobson, Pte. W., D.C.M.	Rosewell, W.O. I. R.S.M. T. H., M.S.M.
Barkell, Sgt. V. J., D.C.M.	Hockley, Pte. H., M.M.	Rowley, Pte. J. B., M.M.
Barnidge, L.-Cpl. C. H., M.M.	Hopkins, Pte. A. J., M.M.	Saunders, Sgt. F., D.C.M.
Barron, Pte. E., M.M.	Hubbert, Cpl. H., D.C.M.	Say, Cpl. W., M.M.
Bartley, Pte. P. F., M.M.	Jackson, Cpl. R. A., M.M.	Scullen, L.-Cpl. E. A., M.M.
Battese, L.-Cpl. C. H., M.M.	Keith, Sgt. C. J., M.M.	Scully, Sgt. V. J., M.M.
Black, Pte. J. D., M.M.	Kenny, Sgt. W. J., D.C.M., M.M.	Small, Pte. E. C. B., D.C.M.
Black, Dvr. W. C., M.M.	Kinross, Sgt. K. (F.)	Smith, L.-Cpl. A. E. L., M.M.
Blackham, Sig. A. G., M.M.	Lancaster, Dvr. A. M., M.M.	Smith, Sgt. C., D.C.M.
Boserio, L.-Cpl. W. C., M.M.	Langlois, Pte. T. A., M.M.	Smith, Pte. E. J., M.M.
Bridge, Pte. R., M.M.	Lavery, Pte. W., M.M.	Smith, T/Sgt. F. O. C., M.M.
Bromwich, Pte. W., M.M.	Lee, W.O. II L., D.C.M.	Smith, Dvr. L. G., M.M.
Brown, L.-Cpl. W. C., M.M.	Lette, Pte. B. I., M.M.	Smith, L.-Cpl. O. W., D.C.M.
Burns, T/C.S.M. C. R., D.C.M.	Lineham, Sgt. C. C., M.M.	Smith, Sgt. W. H., M.M.
Callaghan, Sgt. R. L., D.C.M.	Lorking, Sgt. C. H., D.C.M.	Sorton, Pte. F., M.M.
Cameron, Pte. R. C., D.C.M.	Lyons, Cpl. R. A., M.M.	Spratt, Pte. A. J., M.M. (F.)
Carey, Pte. E. A., M.M.	Madden, C.Q.M.S. D., D.C.M.	Stewart, Cpl. J. McD., M.M.
Clarke, Pte. G. F., M.M.	Maisey, Pte. R. T., M.M.	Sullivan, Sig. J. S., M.M.*
Cooling, Sgt. S. P., M.M.	Marsh, Pte. C. S., M.M.	Taylor, T/Cpl. C., M.M.
Crank, Pte. R., D.C.M.	McArdle, L.-Cpl. R. F., M.M.	Tuite, Pte. T., M.M.
Croft, Pte. P. L., D.C.M.	McCallum, L.-Cpl. A., M.M.	Turner, L.-Cpl. A. J., M.M.
Croker, Sgt. J. E. B., M.M.	McLaughlin, Sgt. H. G., D.C.M.	Twyford, Cpl. H. A., M.M.
Cullen, Pte. T. S., D.C.M.	McNamara, Dvr. C. R., M.M.	Walker, Sig. E. P., M.M.
Cullingford, Sgt. F. C., D.C.M.	Miller, L.-Cpl. T., M.M.	Warboys, Pte. F., M.S.M.
Devery, Pte. G. H., M.M.	Mitchell, L.-Cpl. A. E., M.M.	Ward, Sig. J., M.M.
Foster, Sgt. R. T. R., D.C.M.	Munro, Sgt. S., D.C.M.	Watson, C.Q.M.S. A. V. (F.)
Fox, Cpl. J. J., M.M.	Myers, Sgt. F. R., D.C.M.	Weatherby, L.-Cpl. C. J., D.C.M.
Gallagher, R.Q.M.S. H. H., M.S.M.	Newland, Pte. A. G., D.C.M., M.M.	Webb, L.-Cpl. A. G., M.M.
Gibbs, Cpl. O. R., M.M.	Payne, Pte. A. C., M.M.	Wilkinson, Sgt. A., M.M.
Gilmore, Pte. H. J., D.C.M.	Phillips, L.-Cpl. J. E., M.M.	Willard, L.-Cpl. H. E., M.M.*
Gledhill, T/Cpl. H. R., M.M.	Phipps, L.-Cpl. A. G., M.M.	Wilson, Pte. W. S., M.M.
Goggin, L.-Cpl. P., M.M.	Quattrill, Sgt. R., M.M.	Wood, T/C.S.M. J., D.C.M.
Greenhalgh, Pte. W., M.M.	Quintal, L.-Cpl. B. G., D.C.M.	Younie, L.-Cpl. G. E., M.M.

54TH BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Marshall, Lt.-Col. N., D.S.O.** M.C.	Morris, Capt. A. G., M.C.*	Harris, Lieut. W. D., M.C.
Leckey, Maj. C. S., D.S.O.	Young, Capt. H. H., M.C.	Harvey, Lieut. C. W., M.C.
Downing, Capt. R. G., M.C.*	Adams, Lieut. J., M.C.*	Judd, Lieut. E., M.C.
Healy, Capt. R. S., M.B.E.	Bates, Lieut. A. G., M.C., D.C.M.	McArthur, Lieut. D. A., M.C.
Mitchell, Capt. J. A. S., M.C.	Gunter, Lieut. A. C., M.C.	Morley, Lieut. F., M.C.

Other Ranks

Anderson, L.-Cpl. L. A., M.M.
 Black, Cpl. J., M.M.
 Brett, Pte. G. H., M.M.
 Browne, Cpl. R., M.M.
 Buckley, Pte. J., M.M.
 Burslem, L.-Cpl. C. G., M.M.
 Carter-Ihnen, Pte. L. P., M.M.
 Chapman, Sgt. J. J., M.M.
 Collier, L.-Cpl. G., M.M.
 Cookson, Sgt. J., D.C.M., M.M.
 Cornish, Pte. W. B., M.M.
 Cowcher, Pte. W. H., M.M.
 Cull, L.-Cpl. J. E., D.C.M., M.M.
 De-Bell, Cpl. C. A. J., D.C.M.,
 M.M.
 Deviland, Pte. L. S., M.M.
 Fullarton, Sgt. J. McB., M.M.
 Gatling, Dvr. N., M.M.
 Goldspink, Pte. C., M.M.
 Grant, Pte. R. E., M.M.
 Hall, Pte. P. E., M.M.
 Hardy, R., M.M.
 Hawke, Cpl. C. R., M.M.
 Hillery, Sgt. O. F., M.M.

Hunt, Cpl. E. W., M.S.M.
 Hutchison, Sgt. J. A., M.M.
 Hyde, Sgt. P., M.M.
 Johnson, Sgt. E. R. J., M.M.
 Jones, C.S.M. F. S., D.C.M.
 Kelly, Sgt. H. E., M.S.M.
 Ketchen, Cpl. W. C., M.M.
 King, Sgt. H. C., D.C.M.
 King, Pte. P. J., M.M.
 Leach, Sgt. J. H., D.C.M.
 Ledwidge, Pte. F. C., M.M.
 Little, Sgt. E. R., D.C.M.
 McCabe, Pte. J., D.C.M.
 McCarthy, Pte. W. H., M.M.
 McLean, Sgt. J. A., D.C.M.
 McRobie, W.O.I. R.S.M. J. S.,
 D.C.M.
 Mealy, Cpl. P., M.M.
 Melrose, Pte. J., M.M.
 O'Connor, Pte. E. (F.).
 O'Neill, Cpl. R. A., P.D.C.M.
 Partridge, Pte. W., M.M.
 Place, Pte. R. J., M.M.

Pollock, Cpl. J. H., M.M.
 Pratt, Pte. A. E., M.M.
 Pratt, Sgt. G. W., M.M.*
 Puckeridge, Pte. J., M.M.
 Redding, Sgt. B. G., D.C.M.
 Richards, Sgt. A. T., M.M.
 Richards, Pte. R. G., M.M.
 Russell, Pte. W. J., M.M.
 Ryan, Pte. P. M., M.M.
 Scobie, Pte. R. S., D.C.M.
 Shaw, Pte. B., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. S., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. S., M.M.
 Stringer, Sgt. F. T., D.C.M. (F.).
 Sumers, L.-Cpl. J., M.S.M.
 Taylor, Sgt. R. N., M.S.M.
 Tuckerman, L.-Cpl. R., M.M.
 Walsh, Pte. G., M.M.
 Wark, Sgt. K. N., D.C.M.
 Whalley, Cpl. C., M.M.
 Wheen, Pte. A. W., M.M.**
 White, Pte. J., M.M.

55TH BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

McConaghy, Lt.-Col. D. McF.,
 D.S.O.
 Woods, Lt.-Col. P. W.,
 D.S.O.* M.C.*
 Stutchbury, Maj. E. W., M.C.*
 Cotterill, Capt. P. J., M.C.
 Giblet, Capt. W. N., M.C.*
 Goldrick, Capt. R. A., M.C.
 Pinkstone, Capt. S. A., M.C.
 Wyllye, Capt. K. R., M.C.

Gow, Hon. Capt. and Q.M. C. B.,
 M.C.
 Armstrong, Lieut. F. E., M.C.
 Chadwick, Lieut. L., M.C., M.M.
 Chapman, Lieut. P. W., M.C.
 Clark, Lieut. W. F., M.C.
 Colless, Lieut. S., M.C., D.C.M.
 Denoon, Lieut. W., M.C.
 Donaldson, Lieut. G. S., M.C.
 Duprez, Lieut. A. A., M.C.

Ellsmore, Lieut. R., M.C.
 Hourn, Lieut. M. S., M.C.
 Miller, Lieut. H., M.C.
 Morgan, Lieut. W. B. S., M.C.
 Morris, Lieut. R. S., M.C.
 Murray, Lieut. J. E., M.B.E.
 Neville, Lieut. D. T. W., M.C.,
 D.C.M.
 Slater, Lieut. H. E., D.S.O. (F.).

Other Ranks

Anson, C.S.M. H., D.C.M.
 Arnet, Pte. C. V., M.M.
 Auckland, L.-Cpl. A., M.M.
 Biden, Sgt. E. R., M.M.
 Bishop, Pte. W. H., M.M.
 Bourke, Sgt. E. A., D.C.M.
 Buckridge, Pte. J. W., M.M.
 Buckley, Pte. J. J., M.M.
 Cadd, Pte. A. E., M.M.
 Campbell, L.-Cpl. G. McI., M.M.
 Cant, Pte. M. H. C., M.M.
 Chadwick, Pte. L., M.M.
 Christie, Pte. W. N., M.M.
 Clark, Sgt. K. A., D.C.M.
 Collens, R.Q.M.S. A. G., M.S.M.
 Corey, Cpl. E. A., M.M.**
 Curran, Pte. L. W., M.M.
 Dawe, C.S.M. E. R., M.M.
 Dobson, Pte. W., M.M.
 Dowling, Pte. R. G., D.C.M.
 Dunne, W.O.I. R.S.M. J. H.,
 D.C.M.
 Farrell, Pte. C. M., M.M.
 Foret, Pte. T. A., M.M.
 Freebody, Pte. L. E., M.M.
 Freeman, Pte. F. J. T., M.M.
 Gillett, Pte. A. J., M.M.
 Graham, Sgt. P. J., D.C.M. (F.).
 Groutsch, Pte. F. J., M.M.
 Hall, Pte. L. J., M.M.
 Hannah, Pte. J. L., D.C.M.

Hardy, L.-Cpl. A., M.M.
 Higgs, Pte. I. P., M.M.
 Hitchener, L.-Cpl. W. A., M.M.
 Hoeking, Sgt. P. A., D.C.M.
 Hodges, Cpl. H., M.M.
 Howell, L.-Cpl. F. W., M.M.
 Jackson, Pte. L. A., M.M.
 Jacobs, Pte. A. S., M.M.
 James, Pte. T., M.M.
 Jenkins, Sgt. W. H., M.S.M.
 Kearns, Sgt. A. A., D.C.M.
 Kelly, L.-Cpl. P., M.M.
 Kerin, Pte. M., M.M.
 Klein, Pte. H. C., M.M.
 Kydd, Sgt. A. C., M.M.
 Lemon, Pte. H. M., M.M.
 Lewis, Pte. A., M.M.
 Longstaff, Pte. W., M.M.
 Marshall, Sgt. B., M.M. (F.).
 Marshall, Pte. J. P., D.C.M.,
 M.M.
 Matthews, Sgt. R., D.C.M.
 McAllister, Pte. F. W., M.M.
 McCabe, Pte. C., M.M.
 McClusky, Pte. P., M.M.
 McDonald, Pte. W., M.M.
 McInnes, Pte. J. A., M.M.
 McKay, T/Sgt. A. L. G., D.C.M.
 McKenzie, Sgt. F. B., D.C.M.
 McMahon, Pte. S. L., M.M.
 McNeish, Pte. H. W., M.M.

McPhee, Pte. J. A., D.C.M.
 Monck, Pte. P. E., M.S.M.
 Mortlock, Sgt. H., D.C.M.
 Muir, Pte. W., M.M.
 Murray, Pte. S. C., M.M.
 Nicholls, Pte. W. G., M.M.
 Nield, L.-Cpl. E., M.M.
 O'Dea, Sgt. D. J., M.M.
 Olive, Pte. A., M.M.
 Penny, Cpl. A. G., D.C.M.
 Perkins, Pte. J. A., M.M.
 Peters, Sgt. G. L. A., D.C.M.,
 M.M.
 Petts, Sgt. W., M.S.M.
 Pringle, Cpl. J. L., M.M.
 Rossborough, Pte. A., M.M.
 Ryall, Sgt. W. P., M.M.
 Schwind, Pte. B., M.M.
 Sharpe, Pte. T. J., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. A. G., M.M.
 Stewart, Cpl. R. E., D.C.M., M.M.
 Street, Pte. E. H., M.M.
 Thompson, Pte. A. R. D., M.M.
 Turner, L.-Cpl. A. H., M.M.
 West, Pte. F., M.M.
 Winter, Cpl. A. T., D.C.M.
 Wolridge, L.-Cpl. C. E. R., M.M.
 Wood, Cpl. L. C., M.M.
 Woodhart, Cpl. E., M.M.
 Woods, Pte. E. G., M.M.
 Yelds, Pte. S. D., M.M.

56TH BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Holland, Lt.-Col. A. C. S., (F.).
 Scott, Lt.-Col. A. H., D.S.O.
 Cameron, Maj. H. G. L., D.S.O.,
 M.C.
 Roberts, Maj. H. A., (F.).
 Dalketh, Capt. E. L., M.C.
 Mann, Capt. G. H., M.C.
 Plomley, Capt. N. R., M.C.

Sheen, Capt. W. R., M.C.
 Smythe, Capt. V. E., M.C.*
 Browne, Lieut. H. J., (F.).
 Bull, Lieut. J., M.C.
 Cosgrove, Lieut. L., M.C.
 Cottin, Lieut. A. S., M.C.
 Grace, Lieut. T. P., M.B.E.
 Hicks, Lieut. A. W., M.C.

Mehan, Lieut. D. A., M.C.
 Penneteather, Lieut. H. F., M.C.
 Pitt, Lieut. W. McL., M.C.
 Poore, Lieut. R. J., M.C.
 Scott, Lieut. L., M.C.
 Watt, Lieut. J. C., M.C., D.C.M.
 Williamson, Lieut. G. A., M.C.

Other Ranks

Askew, L.-Cpl. C. S., D.C.M.
 Bayne, Pte. T., D.C.M.
 Beasy, Pte. F. W., M.M.
 Blackmore, L.-Cpl. C. H., D.C.M.
 Bloomfield, L.-Cpl. H. L., (F.).
 Bolin, Cpl. L. M., M.M.
 Brain, T/Sgt. N. W., M.M.
 Brown, Cpl. A. E., M.M.
 Burridge, Cpl. F. C., M.M.
 Byrne, Sgt. J., M.S.M.
 Cammell, Sgt. J. D., M.M.
 Clayton, Pte. P. E., M.M.
 Clune, Pte. A. H., M.M.
 Colburn, Pte. F., M.M.
 Cook, Pte. C. S., M.M.
 Court, Sgt. C., M.M.
 Craig, Sgt. J., M.S.M.
 Davidson, Pte. G., M.M.
 Dawes, Sgt. E., M.M.
 Eagle, Sgt. H. B., M.S.M.
 Ferguson, Sgt. J. T., M.M.
 Fletcher, C.Q.M.S. J. K., M.S.M.
 Foster, Sgt. R., D.C.M.
 Fuller, Sgt. C. E., M.M.
 Gordon, Sgt. T. F., M.M.
 Grimston, C.S.M. R. J., D.C.M.

Hawkless, L.-Cpl. E., M.S.M.
 Hellam, Pte. S., M.M.
 Hillier, L.-Cpl. R. J., D.C.M., (F.).
 Howitt, Pte. A., M.M.
 Hughes, Sgt. G., D.C.M.
 Hurley, Sgt. W. H., D.C.M.
 Innes, T/Cpl. J., M.M.
 Johnson, L.-Cpl. B. M., D.C.M.
 Jolley, Pte. B., M.M.
 Kear, Pte. E. J., (F.).
 Kite, Pte. W., D.C.M., M.M.
 Laird, L.-Cpl. C. S., M.M.
 Lappan, Pte. J. E. R., M.M.
 Lewis, Pte. J., M.M.
 Luke, Sgt. B. E., M.M.
 Macarthy, Pte. J. M., M.M.
 Marshman, Cpl. E. A. C., M.M.
 McCallum, Pte. K., M.M.
 McCarthy, Pte. J. M., M.M.
 McCrory, Pte. C. B., D.C.M.
 McInroy, C.Q.M.S. C. B., M.S.M.
 McNaughton, Pte. H., M.M.
 Melrose, Pte. C., M.M.
 Monkhouse, L.-Cpl. C. E., M.M.
 Mostyn, L.-Cpl. A. J., M.M.
 Nancarrow, Sgt. W. E., (F.).

O'Connor, Sgt. A. L., D.C.M., (F.).
 Oldham, L.-Sgt. W. H., D.C.M.
 Penfold, Pte. E., M.M.
 Phillips, Cpl. M., D.C.M.
 Pound, Pte. W. J., M.M.
 Poundsberry, Pte. C. L., M.M.
 Powell, L.-Cpl. J. H., M.M.
 Ranken, Sgt. G. W., D.C.M.
 Richards, Sgt. H. A., M.M.
 Robertson, Pte. J., M.M.
 Rowley, Pte. T. C., D.C.M., (F.).
 Rush, Cpl. D. W. A., M.S.M.
 Scanlon, Pte. D. J., M.M.
 Seale, Cpl. E., D.C.M.
 Sharman, Pte. A. J., M.M.
 Sharpe, Cpl. N. E., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. R. C., M.M.
 Speed, Pte. G., M.M.
 Stewart, C.S.M. R., D.C.M., M.M.
 Tidswell, Pte. P., M.M.
 Verney, Pte. R., D.C.M.
 Wilson, Pte. C. P., M.M.
 Woodbury, Pte. H., M.M.
 Wood, L.-Cpl. D. J., M.M.
 Young, Pte. R. P. R., M.M.

14TH L.T.M.B.

Officers

McNab, Capt. D. A., M.C.

Other Ranks

Ambler, Cpl. H., M.M.
 Bush, Pte. R. H., M.M.
 Christie, Pte. J. A., D.C.M., M.M.
 Fletcher, Sgt. N. J., M.S.M.

McLeau, Sgt. A. T., D.C.M.
 Meyers, Pte. H., M.M.
 Ostler, Pte. E. W. L., M.M.

Reidy, Cpl. W. F., M.M.
 Rose, Cpl. E., (F.).
 Young, Cpl. G., M.M.

15TH BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Elliott, Brig.-Gen. H. E., C.B.,
 C.M.G., D.S.O., (F.). (F.).
 Legge, Maj. R. G., D.S.O., M.C.

Wieck, Maj. G. P. C., D.S.O.
 Gollan, Capt. H. R., D.S.O., M.C.

Lay, Capt. C. W., M.C.
 Street, Capt. G. A., M.C.

Other Ranks

Cairns, Sgt. C. H., M.S.M.

Marr, Cpl. J., M.S.M.

57TH BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Denehy, Lt.-Col. C. A., D.S.O.*,
 (F.).
 Taylor, Hon. Major and Q.M.
 C. B., M.C.
 Elliott, Capt. L. W., D.S.O.
 Laing, Capt. J. B., M.C.
 Peacock, Capt. B., M.C.

Trainor, Capt. W. P., (F.).
 Dautreband, Lieut. R., M.C.*
 Edgar, Lieut. W. E. J., M.C.
 Falconer, Lieut. J. A., M.C.
 Forrest, Lieut. C. G., M.C.
 Knuckey, Lieut. W. J., M.C.
 Mackle, Lieut. J. M., M.C.

McWhannell, Lieut. F. B., M.C.
 Meara, Lieut. W. J., M.C.
 Money, Lieut. W. A., M.C., M.M.
 Muter, Lieut. R., M.C.
 Noad, Lieut. C. S. A., M.C.
 Salmon, Lieut. R. A., M.C.

Other Ranks

Arland, Sgt. J. E., M.M.
 Atkins, L.-Cpl. S., M.M.
 Austin, Pte. H., M.M.
 Banfield, Cpl. G. W., D.C.M.
 Baskiville, Sgt. W. H., M.M.
 Benolt, Pte. T., D.C.M.
 Birthisel, Sgt. J. R., D.C.M.,
 M.M.
 Cowley, Pte. F., M.M.
 Cullan, Pte. L. P., M.M.
 Curtis, Pte. W. G., M.M.
 Dench, Pte. W. A., M.M.
 Diaper, Pte. W. W., M.M.
 Dorrington, Pte. C. C., M.M.
 Dow, Sgt. W., M.M.
 Drysdale, Sgt. R. H., D.C.M.
 Duke, Pte. J., M.M.
 Fisher, R.Q.M.S. E., M.S.M.
 Fleming, Sgt. J. H., D.C.M., M.M.
 Flynn, Cpl. J. P., M.M.
 French, Sgt. L. E., M.M.
 Frew, Cpl. B., M.M.
 Gallagher, Pte. A. A., M.M.
 Gamble, Pte. R., M.M.
 Giles, Pte. A. T., M.M.*
 Guilmartin, L.-Cpl. T. G. C., M.M.
 Harvey, Pte. M. J., M.M.
 Hawker, Pte. A., M.M.

Heitmann, Pte. F. E., M.M.
 Hocking, Pte. R. J., M.M.
 Hopping, L.-Cpl. C. H., M.M.
 Hughes, C.Q.M.S. F. V., M.S.M.
 Kemp, Pte. A., M.M.
 Kennedy, Pte. C., (F.).
 Kilgour, Cpl. W., D.C.M.
 Lewis, Dvr. R. W., M.M.
 Liddcutt, Sgt. H. G., M.M.
 Lott, Pte. J. C., M.M.
 Macfarlane, L.-Cpl. H. T., M.M.
 Maddams, L.-Cpl. T., M.M.
 Malone, Sgt. P. B., D.C.M.
 Marr, Cpl. J., M.S.M.
 McConnell, Cpl. E., M.M.
 McDonald, Pte. A., (F.).
 McDonough, C.Q.M.S. S., M.S.M.
 Money, Sgt. W. A., M.M.
 Monk, Pte. L., M.M.
 Murphy, Pte. M., M.M.
 Muston, Pte. W., M.S.M.
 Nickelson, Cpl. R. J., M.M.
 Norrington, Pte. A. S., M.M.
 Patten, Pte. W., M.M.
 Pitcher, Sgt. E. G., M.M.
 Quirk, Pte. W. J., M.M.
 Reed, Pte. P. G., D.C.M.

Ross, Sgt. A. G., D.C.M.
 Ryan, Pte. J. L., M.M.
 Saunders, Cpl. S., M.M.
 Schmah, Cpl. C., M.M.
 Schultz, Cpl. W., M.M.
 Shearer, Sgt. R. J. L., D.C.M.
 Shepherd, Pte. R., M.M.
 Shuttleworth, Pte. H., M.M.
 Steer, Cpl. J., M.M.
 Strahan, Sgt. A., D.C.M.
 Street, Pte. H. H. S., M.M.
 Sundstrum, Pte. G., M.M.
 Thorburn, C.S.M. J. M., D.C.M.
 Tognolini, Pte. J., M.M.
 Vernon, Cpl. J., M.M.
 Wake, Pte. J. E., M.M.
 Walker, Sgt. L. S., D.C.M.
 Wallis, L.-Sgt. A., M.S.M.
 Warland, Pte. A. R., M.M.
 Waterman, L.-Cpl. W. H., M.M.
 Waycott, Pte. G. P., M.M.
 Webb, Cpl. J. M., M.M.
 Williams, Pte. W. J., M.M.
 Willoughby, Sgt. R. T. M.S.M.
 Wilson, Pte. R. A., M.M.
 Wolstenholme, Pte. R., M.M.
 Wray, L.-Cpl. H. McD., M.M.

58TH BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Watson, Lt.-Col. C. V., D.S.O.*
 Ferres, Maj. H. D. G., D.S.O.,
 M.C.*
 Freeman, Maj. N. M., D.S.O.
 Dawson, Capt. F. C., D.S.O.,
 M.C.
 Fairfax, Capt. T. A., M.C.
 Forsyth, Capt. R. B., M.C.
 Loughnan, Capt. J., M.C.

Scurry, Capt. W. C., M.C.
 Anderson, Lt. B., M.C.
 Boyd, Lt. H. J., M.C.
 Cronin, Lt. A., D.C.M.
 Dalgleish, Lt. N., D.S.O.
 Davies, Lt. J. E., M.C.
 Deane, Lt. C. A., M.C.
 Godfrey, Lt. A. H. L., M.C.
 Green, Lt. J. H., M.M.

Hooper, Lt. R., M.C.
 Keating, Lt. J. E., M.C.
 Laing, Lt. G., M.C.
 O'Malley, Lt. E. A., M.C.
 Shiels, Lt. W. E., M.C.
 Slaughter, Lt. J. A., M.C.*
 Trevan, Lt. G. H., M.C. (F.).
 Willis, Lt. H. D., M.C.

Other Ranks

Anderson, L.-Cpl. C. R., M.M.
 Baker, L.-Cpl. S., M.M.
 Barrett, Pte. R. M., M.M.
 Barter, Sgt. G. H., M.M.
 Bath, L.-Cpl. L. A., D.C.M.
 Baum, Pte. O., M.M.
 Bennett, C.Q.M.S. T. J., M.S.M.
 Boadle, Sgt. A., M.M.
 Bockmaster, Sgt. K., D.C.M.
 Boxer, L.-Cpl. W. H., D.C.M.,
 M.M.*
 Brandenburg, L.-Cpl. H. P., M.M.
 Brown, Pte. A. C., M.M.
 Carter, Pte. E. P., M.M.*
 Cathie, Sgt. G. A., M.M.
 Cato, Cpl. L. F., M.M.
 Charlton, Cpl. J. J., M.M.
 Cleary, L.-Cpl. F. H. P., M.M.
 Colclough, Sgt. J. J. G., D.C.M.,
 (F.).
 Collett, Sgt. S., D.C.M.*
 Cook, Pte. L. A., M.M.
 Cox, Pte. W. F., M.M.
 Danaher, Sgt. M. T., M.M.
 Daniel, Cpl. E. J., M.M.
 Davies, Pte. H. W., M.M.
 Dawes, Sgt. E., M.M.
 Deed, L.-Cpl. J., M.M.
 De-Forest, Pte. W. E., M.M.
 Dickinson, R.Q.M.S. W. T.,
 M.S.M.
 Diversi, Pte. J. L., M.M.
 Dove, Pte. J. (F.).
 Duffy, Pte. P. A., D.C.M.

Dunn, Pte. A. J., D.C.M.
 Eales, L.-Cpl. P. W., M.M.*
 Free, Sgt. C. E., D.C.M.
 Freeman, Pte. A. B., M.M.
 Gibson, Pte. J., M.M.
 Grasby, Pte. G. W., M.M.
 Gunn, Pte. C. J., M.M.
 Hayes, Cpl. W. H., M.M.
 Howley, Pte. J. J., M.M.
 Jaggs, Pte. A. W. C., M.M.
 Jones, Pte. A. G., M.M.
 Jones, Pte. D. S., M.M.
 Jones, Pte. W., M.M.
 Kerr, Sgt. W. J., M.M.
 Lang, Sgt. D. G., M.S.M.
 Lee, Pte. A. J. E., M.M.
 Maroney, Pte. T. J., D.C.M.
 Martin, Pte. J. C., M.M.
 Mason, Pte. F. C., M.M.
 Mason, Pte. W. F., M.M.
 Mathieson, Pte. C. B., M.M.
 McDonnell, Pte. W. E., M.M.
 McGregor, Cpl. J., M.M.
 McKenzie, Sgt. W. A., D.C.M.
 McLeod, Pte. T. G., M.M.*
 Meadows, Pte. W., M.M.
 Milburn, Pte. A. N., M.M.
 Missen, L.-Sgt. A. J., M.S.M.
 Moon, L.-Sgt. C. D., M.M.
 Moss, Sgt. H. C., M.M.
 Mowat, T/Sgt. G. W., M.M.
 Newlands, Sgt. F. A. G., M.M.
 Ogilvie, Cpl. L. T. S., M.M.
 Partridge, Sgt. F. L., D.C.M.

Penny, Pte. E. C., D.C.M.
 Perkins, L.-Cpl. C. E., M.M.
 Pickford, L.-Cpl. H., D.C.M.
 Pledge, Cpl. H. S., M.M.
 Potter, L.-Cpl. W. G., M.M.
 Price, C.Q.M.S. H. G., M.S.M.
 Reid, Pte. E., M.M.
 Robertson, Pte. F., M.M.
 Roth, Pte. N. H., M.M.
 Rutter, Pte. R., M.M.
 Sayers, Cpl. D. A., D.C.M. M.M.
 Shone, Pte. E. M., M.M.
 Smee, Pte. A., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. G. F. (F.).
 Smith, L.-Cpl. V. F., M.M.*
 Stein, Pte. W. D., M.M.
 Stephenson, Cpl. R. G., D.C.M.
 Stevens, Sgt. J. A., M.S.M.
 Stokes, Pte. J., M.M.
 Stubbs, R.S.M. H. C., M.C.
 Thorne, Pte. A. J., M.M.
 Townsend, Cpl. E. L., M.M.
 Treloar, Pte. S., M.M.*
 Tulloch, L.-Cpl. A. E., M.M.
 Walker, C.Q.M.S. H. D., M.S.M.
 Webster, Pte. H., M.M.
 Weisheit, Sgt. F. P., D.C.M.
 Whiting, L.-Cpl. F., M.M.
 Williams, Pte. E., M.M.
 Williamson, Sgt. T., M.M.
 Wilson, Cpl. J. A., M.M.* (F.).
 Wright, Cpl. J. (F.).

59TH BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Mason, Lt.-Col. C. C., D.S.O.
Scanlon, Lt.-Col. J. J., D.S.O.*
Hewitt, Capt. P. R., M.C.
Lay, Capt. C. W., M.C.
McDonald, Capt. K. G., M.C.
Neale, Capt. S. W., M.C.
Smith, Capt. G. S., M.C.
Young, Capt. E. McL., M.C.

May, Hon. Capt. and Q.M. O. M.,
M.C.
Beck, Lt. A. J., M.C.
Binder, Lt. H. A. L., M.C.
Bursery, Lt. T. F. McL., M.C.
Callander, Lt. R., M.M.
Chambers, Lt. H. W., M.M.
Christian, Lt. J. C., M.C.
Diamond, Lt. S., D.C.M.

Gibbs, Lt. R. H. M., M.C.
McIver, Lt. W. F. (F.).
Pentreath, Lt. G. L., M.C.
Pinkerton, Lt. A. J., M.C.
Stevenson, Lt. W. F., M.C.
Telfer, Lt. G. S., M.C.
Toohey, Lt. D. G., M.C.
Wadeson, Lt. J. H., M.C.

Other Ranks

Barclay, L.-Cpl. N., D.C.M.
Bartholomew, Pte. W. G., M.M.
Brockfield, Pte. M. V., D.C.M.
Buckley, Pte. R. G., M.M.
Cameron, Pte. J. A., M.M.
Carter, Pte. R. A. E., M.M.
Chenery, Sgt. A. G., D.C.M.
Clarke, L.-Cpl. L. N., M.M.*
Clausen, Sgt. F. E., M.M.
Crozier, L.-Cpl. W. S., M.M.
Delaney, Pte. W. J., M.M.
Dengate, L.-Cpl. A. A., M.S.M.
Doody, Pte. L., D.C.M.
Dumont, Pte. S. L., M.M.
Duncan, Sgt. H., D.C.M.
Dunston, Pte. S. W., M.M.*
Every, L.-Cpl. G., M.M.
Facey, Sgt. S. G., D.C.M. (F.).
Fox, Cpl. T. W., M.M.
Gasperino, L.-Cpl. H., M.M.
Gibson, L.-Cpl. E. B., D.C.M.
Gordon, T/W.O. I, H. B. M.,
M.S.M.
Grigg, L.-Cpl. E. A., M.M.
Harrington C.S.M., R., D.C.M.
Hawkins, Pte. E. V., M.M.

Honey, Pte. A., M.M.
Horsey, Pte. G., M.M.
Ibbotson, Cpl. A., M.M.
Johnson, L.-Cpl. G. L., M.M.
King, Pte. H., M.M.
Leach, L.-Cpl. P. E., M.M.
Little, S.-Sgt. P. L., D.C.M., M.M.
Maginn, Pte. E., M.M.
Martin, Pte. E., M.M.
McArthur, Pte. A. G., M.M.
McCash, C.S.M. J. McD., D.C.M.*
McClintock, L.-Cpl. S., M.M.*
McMartin, Pte. E. V., M.M.
McPhee, Pte. A. J., M.M.
McRae, Pte. E. W., M.M.
Mitchell, Pte. G., D.C.M.
Morgan, L.-Cpl. C. W., M.M.
Morris, Pte. W. J., M.M.
Morrison, Pte. F. H., M.M.
Moss, Pte. J., M.M.
Munn, Sgt. T. G. D. (F.).
Niquet, Cpl. J. A., M.M.
Oates, R.Q.M.S. T. A., M.S.M.
O'Donnell, Pte. E. C., M.M.
O'Sullivan, Pte. J. J. J., M.M.
Palmer, Sgt. C. H., M.M.

Parr, Sgt. A. J., D.C.M.
Pendergast, Sgt. G. L., D.C.M.
Phillips, S.-Sgt. H. J. C., M.S.M.
Powell, Pte. L. J., M.M.
Rand, Pte. J. G. W., M.M.
Renrew, Pte. A., M.M.
Richardson, C.S.M. E. A., D.C.M.
Rowe, Cpl. J. R., M.M.
Ryan, Pte. W. F., D.C.M.
Salvado, Pte. J., M.M.
Schuldt, L.-Cpl. H., M.M.
Serle, Sgt. W. H., M.M.
Sexton, Pte. P., M.M. (F.).
Simmonds, Pte. J. K., M.M.
Smith, Sig. W. A., M.S.M.
Stewart, L.-Cpl. A., M.M.
Sundstrum, Pte. G., M.M.
Towers, Pte. W. J., M.M.
Traill, Pte. R. G., M.M.
Turnley, C.Q.M.S. A. P., M.S.M.
Walkem, Cpl. G. L., M.M.
Wildmau, Sgt. V. G., M.S.M.
(F.).
Williams, L.-Sgt. G. F., M.M.
Williams, C.S.M. R., M.M.

60TH BATTALION A.I.F.

Officers

Layh, Lt.-Col. H. T. C., C.M.G.,
D.S.O.*
Marshall, Lt.-Col. N., D.S.O.**,
M.C.
Cahill, Capt. M., M.C.
Nichol, Capt. S. J., M.C.

Allandyce, Lt. G. A., (F.).
Calder, Lt. R. A., D.C.M.
Kerr, Lt. T., M.C.
Knight, Lt. M. D., M.C.
Leggatt, Lt. W. W., M.C.
Moore, Lt. J. C., M.C.**, M.M.

Parker, Lt. A. T., M.C.
Plzzey, Lt. C. E., M.C.
Richards, Lt. H. N., D.C.M.
Sterling, Lt. J. H., M.C.
Stillman, Lt. L. R., M.C.
Wrigley, Lt. H., M.C.

Other Ranks

Acton, Sgt. W. E., D.C.M.
Armstrong, Sgt. G. F., M.M.*
Armstrong, Pte. W., M.M.
Atkin, Sgt. J., M.M.
Beavon, Cpl. W., M.S.M.
Beilby, Sgt. H., M.M.
Bryant, C.Q.M.S. J., M.M.
Bugg, L.-Cpl. J. A., M.M.
Bugs, Pte. L. W., M.M.
Burt, Pte. A. R., M.M.
Cameron, Pte. W. F., M.M.
Chambers, Pte. W. G., M.M.
Clark, L.-Cpl. L. N., M.M.
Cockerell, Cpl. J. H., D.C.M.
Cole, Sgt. F., M.M.
Cranford, Cpl. W. H., M.M.
Dunn, Pte. A. J., M.M.
Flavelle, Cpl. A., D.C.M.
Fowler, Pte. G. H., M.M.
Fraser, Cpl. A. L., M.M.
Gates, Sgt. W. H., D.C.M.

Graham, C.Q.M.S. H., M.M.
Gray, Pte. W. J., M.M.
Griuter, L.-Cpl. C. V. J., M.M.
Gruener, Dvr. H. J. F., M.M.
Hand, Sgt. H. J., M.M.
Harrison, Pte. J. (F.).
Harrison, Sgt. S. J., M.M.
Hibbert, Pte. C. C., M.M.
Hornig, Sgt. J. G., M.M.
Hornsey, Sgt. S. B., M.M.
Johnson, Sgt. C., D.C.M.
Jones, L.-Cpl. G. P., M.M.
Jones, Cpl. W. M., M.M.
Kirfield, Sgt. J. W., M.S.M.
Killy, Cpl. W. (F.).
Lane, Pte. A. J. (F.).
Lawler, L.-Cpl. E. J. A., M.M.
Lawler, Sgt. L. J., M.M.*
Lee-kin, Cpl. G. V., M.M.
Lemlin, L.-Cpl. A., M.M.
Livio, Pte. W. H., M.M.

Lloyd, Pte. A. C., M.M.
Lowrie, Sgt. W. J., M.M.
Marshall, Sgt. R. W., M.M.
McCallum, Pte. E. A., M.M.
McClintock, L.-Cpl. S., M.M.
McDonald, Pte. D. H., M.M.
Metcalfe, W.O. I, R.S.M. J., D.C.M.
Moles, Pte. A., M.M.
Morris, Pte. C. H., M.M.
Mudford, Sgt. M. E., M.M.
Murtagh, Cpl. J., M.M.
Pepper, Pte. C. F., M.M.
Porter, Pte. F. O., D.C.M.
Pouler, Pte. R. E., M.M. (F.).
Rasmussen, L.-Cpl. O., M.M.
Robertson, Sgt. W. H. G., M.M.
Rolfe, L.-Cpl. A. B. A., M.M.
Ryall, Sgt. L. H., M.M.
Whinfield, Pte. D. H., M.M.
Varley, R.Q.M.S. A. A., M.S.M.

15TH L.T.M.B.

Officers

Freeman, Capt. W. E., M.C.

Gamble, Capt. W. M., M.C.

Scurry, Capt. W. C., M.C.

*Other Ranks*Chalker, Pte. L. O., M.M.
Harris, L.-Cpl. A., M.M.*
Hesser, L.-Cpl. W., M.M.Loughlin, Sgt. J. E., M.M.
McBride, Pte. A. G., M.M.
Olsen, Cpl. W. H., M.M.Ready, Cpl. T. A., M.S.M.
Wright, Pte. J., M.M.

5TH MACHINE GUN BATTALION

*Officers*Marsden, Lt.-Col. T. R., D.S.O.
Bridgeford, Capt. W., M.C.
Fitzgerald, Capt. G. F., M.C.
Holmes, Capt. C. H., M.C.
Muirson, Capt. K. B., M.C.*Basedow, Lt. F. M., M.C.
Flack, Lt. A. K., M.C.
Gritten, Lt. S. W., M.C.
Hackworthy, Lt. H. G., M.C.
Hanna, Lt. H. G., M.C.Macdermid, Lt. W. D., M.C.
Stanford, Lt. M. H., M.C.
Trevan, Lt. H., M.C. (F.).
Tufnell, Lt. G., M.C.
Watson, Lt. L. E., M.C.*Other Ranks*Allsopp, T/Cpl. W. L., M.M.
Ashton, Cpl. E. (F.).
Atkinson, Sgt. W., D.C.M.
Bellett, Pte. C. F., M.M.
Brown, Sgt. A. T., D.C.M.
Brown, Pte. R. B., M.M.
Bryant, Sgt. L., M.M.
Eull, S.-Sgt. H. J., M.S.M.
Calloway, Pte. W., M.S.M.
Carr, Pte. A. E., M.M.
Cheyne, Cpl. R. G., M.M.
Denton, Pte. A. J. G., M.M.
Dobinson, Pte. J. H. (F.).
Donnelly, Pte. J. (F.).
Drewitt, L.-Cpl. E., M.M.
Durkin, Pte. P. F. (F.).
Evans, T/Cpl. S. A., M.M.
Evans, T/Sgt. W. G., M.M.
Forbes, Cpl. R. L., M.M.
Forwood, Pte. J. E. D., M.M.
Freeman, Pte. A. P., M.M.
Freeman, Dvr. H., M.M.
Godgawd, Dvr. C., M.M.
Hammett, Dvr. E., M.M.
Harbord, Cpl. L., M.M.
Harrop, Cpl. J. G., M.M.
Henderson, Sgt. J., M.M.*Hill, Sgt. G. A. (F.).
Holgate, Pte. H. S., M.M.
Hurl, Cpl. G., M.M.
Jacobson, L.-Sgt. J. A. C., M.M.
Johnson, Cpl. J. B. D. (F.).
Kelly, Sgt. J. E., M.M.
Kirwan, Sgt. H., M.M.
Lewing, C.S.M. N. T., M.S.M.
Limbert, Cpl. E. E., M.M.
Lindenburg, Pte. A. L., M.M.
Lovell, Cpl. J. L., M.M.
Lowman, Pte. J. A., M.M.
Mackinlay, L.-Cpl. D. J., M.M.
Maloney, L.-Cpl. B. F., M.M.
Martin, Pte. H., M.M.
McKilloch, Cpl. R. A., M.M.
McKenney, T/Cpl. H. M., M.M.
McKeown, W.O. II. C.S.M. T.,
D.C.M.Newton, L.-Cpl. H. E., D.C.M.
O'Brien, Pte. L., M.M.
Phillips, Sgt. J. G., M.S.M.
Pinder, Cpl. E. W., D.C.M.
Player, Pte. C. H., M.M.
Reid, Sgt. H. C., M.M.
Reid, Cpl. M., M.M.
Russell, Sgt. R., D.C.M.
Ryan, Pte. A. E., M.M.
Sloan, Pte. G. S., M.M.
Smith, Pte. T., M.M.
Staggs, T/Cpl. H. T., D.C.M.
Sterling, Cpl. H. J., M.M.
Stewart, Sgt. A. J., M.M.
Stooke, Cpl. W., M.M.
Thompson, Pte. N. E., M.M.
Turner, Pte. W., M.M.
Walker, C.Q.M.S. F., D.C.M.
Webb, Sgt. R., D.C.M.
Webb, Sgt. S. F., M.S.M.
White, Pte. D., D.C.M.
Whitmore, Cpl. L. T., D.C.M.
Williams, A/Cpl. A. J. (F.).
Williamson, Pte. J. T., M.M.
Wilson, Sgt. J. W., D.C.M.
Young, Cpl. M. M., M.M.

5TH PIONEER BATTALION

*Officers*Carter, Lt.-Col. H. G., D.S.O.
Dwyer, Maj. A. J., M.C.
McCleean, Maj. F. S., D.S.O.*
Scott, Maj. E. I. C., D.S.O.
Helsham, Capt. C. H., O.B.E.
Jackson, Capt. L. T. C., M.C.Vidal, Capt. E. S. W. S., M.C.
Wilkinson, Capt. W. T., M.C.
Buchan, Lt. W., M.C.
Cunninghame, Lt. W. A. F., M.C.
Duke, Lt. C. R., M.C.England, Lt. J., M.C.
Hill, Lt. S. A., M.C.
McGowan, Lt. R. J., M.C.
Stevenson, Lt. T. D., M.C.
Whitfield, Lt. N. H., M.C.*Other Ranks*Bailey, Sgt. F. J., M.M.
Banning, Sgt. W., M.M.
Beale, L.-Sgt. W. F. (F.).
Bertie, Pte. J., M.M.
Bragg, Sgt. G., M.M.
Bulmer, Pte. C. W., M.M.
Busteed, Sgt. R. L., D.C.M.
Casey, Sgt. J. F., M.M.
Cawston, T/Cpl. M. W., M.M.
Charlton, T/Cpl. T., M.M.
Condon, Pte. W., M.M.
Cooney, T/Cpl. J. T., M.M.
Corlett, L.-Cpl. V. H., M.M.
Dall, Cpl. R., M.M.
Dillon, L.-Cpl. A. E., M.S.M.
Douglas, T/Cpl. L. O., M.M.
Eggington, L.-Cpl. S., M.M.
Gaylor, C.S.M. H., D.C.M.Gibson, Sgt. F. N. (F.).
Gidlow, Sgt. W., D.C.M.
Golding, Pte. A., M.M.
Golding, Pte. A., M.S.M.
Gray, Cpl. A. B., M.S.M.
Grix, Pte. H. A., M.M.
Jackson, Sgt. W., M.M.
Jurd, C.S.M. F. G., D.C.M.,
M.M. (F.).
Kenning, Pte. A., M.M.
Lambert, Pte. B. L., M.M.
Landaman, L.-Cpl. A. E., M.M.
Lukins, Cpl. C. (F.).
Massey, L.-Cpl. H. J., D.C.M.
McLeod, Cpl. J. A., M.M.
McNamee, Pte. H. J., M.M.
Mills, Sgt. J. E., M.S.M.
Morris, Sgt. T. G., D.C.M.Nelson, Sgt. H. (F.).
Northey, Pte. H., M.M.
O'Brien, Pte. J. T., M.M.
Pratt, L.-Cpl. J., M.M.
Purtill, Pte. W. M.*
Raven, L.-Sgt. W. G. (F.).
Ross, Sgt. J., M.M.
Stuart, Pte. J. J., M.M.
Taylor, Sgt. G., D.C.M.
Telford, L.-Cpl. G. S., M.M.
Thompson, Pte. M. C., M.M.
Trevaskis, Sgt. F. T., D.C.M.
Vickers, Cpl. F. W., M.M.
Webster, Pte. G., M.M.
Wheeler, Pte. A. V., M.M.
Wilson, Pte. T., M.S.M.
Woodward, Sgt. W. H. (F.).
Wright, Pte. L., M.M.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS

Officers

Bachtold, Maj. H., D.S.O., M.C.
 Farquhar, Maj. W. G., D.S.O.
 (F.).
 Goghlan, Maj. J., M.C.
 Greenway, Maj. H., D.S.O. (F.).
 Sturdee, Maj. V. A. H., D.S.O.
 Caddy, Capt. J. P., M.C.
 Evans, Capt. S. E., M.C.
 Jessop, Capt. A. J., M.B.E.

Bullen, Lt. G. L., M.C.
 Burrows, Lt. G., M.C.*
 Crampton, Lt. A. J., M.C.
 Dunn, Lt. A., M.C.
 Ewart, Lt. A. T., M.C., M.M.
 Fay, Lt. H. W., M.C.*
 Gibb, Lt. W., M.C.*, M.M.
 Gilbert, Lt. W. C., M.C.
 Holmes, Lt. R. A., M.C., M.M.

Isaacs, Lt. R. M., M.C.
 Litter, Lt. A. B., M.C.
 Midelton, Lt. T. B., M.C.
 Morrison, Lt. G. B., M.C., M.M.
 Nangle, Lt. N. J., M.C.
 Noedle, Lt. L., M.C.
 Oliver, Lt. C. K., M.C.*
 Prltchard, Lt. G., M.C.
 Turner, Lt. G. H., M.C.

Other Ranks

Banks, Sgt. E. C. (F.).
 Barnes, C.S.M. F. S., M.S.M.
 Baxter, C.O.M.S. J. P., M.S.M.
 Bignell, Cpl. J. M. (F.).
 Blows, Spr. W., M.M.
 Bodycoat, L.-Cpl. W., M.M.
 Bowman, L.-Cpl. A. M., M.M.
 Brooks, Sgt. A., D.C.M.
 Bryant, Spr. H. J., M.M.
 Cheatman, 2/Cpl. C., M.M.
 Chisholm, L.-Cpl. G. S., M.M.
 Clayburt, Spr. F. A., M.M.
 Coulson, Spr. C. F. (F.).
 Critchley, Spr. W. H., M.M.
 Cronin, Spr. A., D.C.M.
 Duncanson, T/Sgt. J., M.S.M.
 Forbes, Spr. G. K., M.M.
 Griggs, Sgt. P. T., M.M., (F.).
 Harper, L.-Cpl. J. T., D.C.M.*
 Harrison, 2/Cpl. W. J., D.C.M.
 Howlett, Sgt. S., M.M.

Huddy, 2/Cpl. R., D.C.M.
 Ives, Sgt. W. F., M.M.
 Jackson, Sgt. R., M.M.
 Jones, Dvr. G. H., M.M.
 Keck, Cpl. C., M.M.*
 Kennaugh, Sgt. W. H., M.M.
 Lawson, L.-Cpl. R. W., M.M.
 Lennox, Sgt. J., M.M.
 Lewis, C.S.M. H. S., M.S.M.
 Masters, 2/Cpl. H. S., M.M.
 Matthews, 2/Cpl. H. C., M.M.
 McDonald, Spr. G. L. V., M.M.
 McDonald, 2/Cpl. W. A., M.M.
 McGiven, 2/Cpl. J., M.M.
 Miller, Sgt. B. R., D.C.M.
 Moore, Cpl. J. H., D.C.M.
 Morrison, Sgt. A. D., M.M.
 Murphy, Sgt. A. J., D.C.M.
 Murphy, Sgt. E., M.M.*
 Nankivell, Sgt. A. H., M.M.
 Neasbey, 2/Cpl. H. E. G., M.M.

Nicholls, L.-Cpl. E. V., M.M.
 Noone, Spr. J. M., M.M.
 Palmer, Spr. J. H., M.M.
 Perini, L.-Cpl. F. (F.).
 Pottenger, Cpl. R. H., M.M.
 Radford, Spr. L. H., M.M.
 Reid, L.-Cpl. R. J., M.M.
 Ring, Dvr. H. C., M.M.
 Robertson, Cpl. W. E., M.M.
 Scott, Spr. C. J., M.M.
 Strahan, Cpl. L. J., M.M.
 Thomson, Cpl. A. R., M.M.
 Urquhart, L.-Cpl. F., M.M.
 Walsh, Cpl. J. T., M.M.
 Walsh, Sgt. L. J. F. (F.).
 Watkins, 2/Cpl. W. J. (F.).
 Wilson, Spr. A. G., M.M.
 Wilson, Sgt. G. C., D.C.M.
 Wilson, Spr. R. S., M.M.*
 Wooley, Spr. A. C. N., M.M.
 Wright, Spr. C. H., M.M.

DIVISIONAL SIGNAL COMPANY

Officers

Stanley, Maj. R. A., D.S.O.
 Bath, Capt. C. H., O.B.E.
 Kelynack, Capt. C. J., M.C.
 Butler, Lt. S. L., M.C.

Collier, Lt. T. R., M.C.*
 Dixon, Lt. G. N., M.C.
 Haining, Lt. G. S., M.M.
 Leggatt, Lt. W. W., M.C.

Schroder, Lt. H. D., M.C.**
 Sweetman, Lt. A. J., M.C.
 Young, Lt. G. W., M.C.

Other Ranks

Allen, Cpl. C. H., M.S.M.
 Atkin, Sgt. S. H., M.S.M.
 Batchelor, Sgt. C. A., D.C.M.
 Bradwell, Spr. E. V., M.M.
 Brown, Cpl. A. V., M.M.
 Bruce, Pte. D. D., M.M.
 Burley, Spr. T. J. E., M.M.*
 Burrows, L.-Cpl. J. R. J., M.M.
 Byrnes, Spr. E. R., M.M.
 Canning, Spr. S. W., M.M.
 Carroll, Spr. H., M.M.
 Cate, Pte. A. L., M.M.
 Clark, Sgt. J. H., M.M.
 Clarke, 2/Cpl. J., M.M.
 Dadswell, Spr. G. M., M.M.
 Daws, Pte. J. F., M.M.
 Dingwall, Spr. G. M., M.M.
 Duncan, Spr. W. G., M.M.
 Ellis, Cpl. L., M.M.
 Farrer, F.-Sgt. R. J., M.S.M.
 Fisher, W.O. II. C.S.M. G. F.,
 M.S.M.
 Fysh, Sgt. E. W., M.S.M.

Gill, Cpl. E. H. G., M.M.
 Green, L.-Cpl. A. W., M.M.
 Harrison, Sgt. J. F., M.M.
 Henry, Sgt. T. D., M.M.*
 Holden, L.-Cpl. G. R., M.S.M.
 Horner, Sgt. L. C., M.S.M.
 Jarvis, Sgt. E. R., M.M.**
 Johnston, Sgt. J. G., M.S.M.
 Kimball, Spr. C. R., M.M.
 Kirk, Spr. C. S., M.M.
 Lickiss, Spr. J. G., M.M.
 Low, Spr. J. R., M.M.
 Mathison, L.-Cpl. A. J., M.M.
 McBain, Spr. J. S., M.M.
 McInerney, Spr. P., M.M.
 McKay, Dvr. D. C. N., M.M.
 Moore, Sgt. J., M.M.
 Morris, Spr. W. H., M.M.
 Mounsey, 2/Cpl. J. L., D.C.M.
 Mudford, Sgt. B. E., M.M.
 Neville, Spr. G. S., M.M.
 Nickolls, Spr. R. E., D.C.M.
 O'Connell, Spr. J. P., M.M.

Pace, Spr. S. Y., M.M.
 Parnell, Spr. K., M.M.
 Paterson, T/Cpl. A. (F.).
 Pender, L.-Cpl. H. L., M.M.
 Pennicuk, Spr. J. D., M.M.
 Pitchford, Cpl. T. R. (F.).
 Porter, Spr. R., M.M.
 Power, Cpl. R. L., M.S.M.
 Raymo, Spr. C. J. V., M.M.
 Rennie, Sgt. A. N., M.M.
 Sempie, Spr. J., M.M.
 Sheppard, Sgt. A. E., M.M.
 Sloan, L.-Cpl. H. E., M.M.**
 Suckling, C.O.M.S. T. N., M.S.M.
 Thomson, Spr. J. C., M.M.
 Watson, Cpl. J. M., M.M.
 Weir, Pte. A. A., M.M.*
 Wells, Spr. C. J. S., M.M.
 Welsh, Pte. W. G., D.C.M.
 West, Spr. R. Mc. D., M.M.
 Williams, Cpl. G. W., M.M.
 Wilson, Spr. J. D., M.M.

DIVISIONAL TRAIN

Officers

Brazenor, Maj. J. A., D.S.O.
 Robinson, Maj. C. W., O.B.E.
 Curtis, Capt. A., M.C.

Grieve, Capt. C. B., M.C.
 Laity, Capt. H. M., M.C.
 Webster, Capt. R. J., M.C.

Chamberlain, Lt. H. P., M.C.
 Marriott, Lt. R. W., M.C.

Other Ranks

Beach, Cpl. N. E., M.M.
 Bellingham, Sgt. C. W., M.S.M.
 Best, Sgt. R. W., M.M.
 Birch, Cpl. A. R., M.M.
 Briggs, Dvr. C. J. W., M.M.
 Campbell, Dvr. A. H., M.M.
 Clark, C.S.M. J. E., M.S.M.
 Cook, Dvr. H. P., M.S.M.
 Cunnene, Cpl. T. A., M.M.
 Dick, Dvr. H., M.M.

Ellis, Dvr. G. W., M.M.
 Harrison, Sgt. W. R. W., M.M.
 Higgs, S.-Sgt. A. J. Mc. G.,
 D.C.M.
 Holgate, A/Sgt. L., M.S.M.
 Jones, S.-Sgt. J., M.M.
 Lackie, Dvr. H., M.M.
 Ludbrook, L.-Cpl. J. G., M.M.
 McPhee, T/Cpl. R. M., M.M.
 Newman, Dvr. R. G., M.M.

O'Neill, W.O. I. E. J., D.C.M.
 Roberts, T/Cpl. J. E., M.M.
 Sedgely, Cpl. W. H., M.M.
 Shepherdson, S.-Sgt. E. F.,
 M.S.M.
 Spittle, Dvr. S. G., M.M.
 Steansen, Dvr. C. M., M.M.
 Stubbs, C.Q.M.S. C. T., M.S.M.
 Thompson, Dvr. R., M.M.
 Triplett, Cpl. F. A., M.S.M.

A.A.M.C.

Officers

Fry, Lt.-Col. H. K., D.S.O.
 Hardy, Lt.-Col. C. H. W., D.S.O.
 Stewart, Lt.-Col. J. M. Y., D.S.O.
 Tebbutt, Lt.-Col. A. H., D.S.O.
 Thompson, Lt.-Col. C. W., D.S.O.
 Walsh, Lt.-Col. R. W. W., D.S.O.
 Bond, Maj. L. W., D.S.O.
 Clayton, Maj. A. R., D.S.O.
 Craig, Maj. R. E., D.S.O.
 Guest, Maj. J. V. H. (F.).
 Maplestone, Maj. F. A., D.S.O.
 McIntosh, Maj. C. S. L., D.S.O.
 Sawers, Maj. C. S., D.S.O.

Beard, Capt. J. R., M.C.
 Cosgrove, Capt. L., M.C.
 Dolg, Capt. K. McK., M.C.
 Elliott, Capt. G. S. E., M.C.
 Fay, Capt. F. W., M.C.*
 Grieve, Capt. K. H., M.C.
 Jagger, Capt. T. R., M.C.
 James, Capt. F. H., M.C.
 Jose, Capt. Y. B., M.C.
 Leedman, Capt. C. H., M.C.*
 Mackay, Capt. M. J., M.C.
 Manksley, Capt. H. F., M.C.
 McGlashan, Capt. J. E., M.C.

Metcalf, Capt. J. B., M.C.
 Minty, Capt. C. C., M.C.
 Parkinson, Capt. C. K., M.C.
 Raitton, Capt. S. A., M.C.
 Rayson, Capt. H., M.C.
 Robinson, Capt. C. E., M.C.
 Smith, Capt. W. L., M.C.
 Voss, Capt. P. E., M.C.
 Wheeler, Hon. Capt. Q.M. R. P.,
 M.C.
 Woods, Capt. E. W. B., M.C.
 Woodward, Capt. E. A., M.C.
 Wylie, Capt. H. A., M.C.

Other Ranks

Ackworth, Pte. W. C., M.M.
 Adams, Pte. A. C., M.M.
 Anderson, Pte. J., M.M.*
 Armstrong, L.-Cpl. H. (F.).
 Arnot, Pte. I. W., M.M.
 Atherton, Pte. L., M.M.
 Barton, L.-Cpl. F. G., M.M.
 Benham, L.-Cpl. W., M.M.
 Berry, Pte. H. V., M.M.
 Binger, Sgt. B. J., M.M.
 Black, W.O. I. G. D., M.S.M.
 Blinman, L.-Cpl. J. C., M.M.
 Boots, Pte. R., M.M.
 Bowden, Pte. H., M.M.*
 Brandon, Pte. E. C., M.M.
 Brealey, Pte. C. L. (F.).
 Buchanan, T/Sgt. J. R., M.M.
 Bull, L.-Cpl. F. J., M.M.
 Burgess, Sgt. N. C. D., M.M. (F.).
 Calf, Pte. E. E., M.M.*
 Colley-Priest, Pte. L. W., M.M.
 Collier, Pte. K. E., M.M.
 Collins, Pte. N. J., M.M.
 Coots, Pte. J. W., M.M.
 Corr, Pte. W. J. A., M.M.
 Cosier, Cpl. H. E., M.M.
 Cropley, Sgt. O. A., D.C.M.
 Davis, Pte. A. F., M.M.
 Davis, Cpl. A. H., M.S.M.
 Eggington, Sgt. W. H., M.M. (F.).
 English, Pte. R. W., M.M.
 Felton, Pte. R. C., M.M.*
 Fleischman, L.-Cpl. H. A., M.M.
 Flynn, Pte. S. J., M.M.
 Francis, Pte. J. W., D.C.M.
 Gissing, S.-Sgt. H. E., M.S.M.
 Goodhall, W.O. I. J. T., M.S.M.
 Goyder, Pte. C. W., M.M.
 Goyder, Pte. M. S., M.M.
 Hall, L.-Cpl. O. R., M.M.
 Halliday, Pte. D. N., M.M.
 Hanby, Pte. H. F., M.M.
 Haterley, Pte. A. A., M.S.M.

Hayson, Pte. A., M.M.
 Higgins, Pte. F. W., M.M.
 Hill, L.-Cpl. G. H., M.M.
 Hill, Pte. W. H., M.M.
 Hippersley, Pte. W. A., M.M.
 Hopkins, Pte. E. S., M.M.
 Hough, Pte. A., M.M.
 Howard, Pte. B. W., M.M.
 Howard, Pte. T. W., M.M.*
 Hunt, L.-Cpl. A. J., M.M.
 Jackson, Pte. R. N., M.M.
 Jacobs, Pte. A. N., M.M.
 James, L.-Cpl. W. J. S., M.M.
 Jones, Sgt. M. O., M.M.
 Keeves, S.-Q.M.S. F. W., M.S.M.
 Kennedy, S.-Sgt. R. L., M.S.M.
 King, Pte. H. H., M.M.
 Kingston, L.-Cpl. W. R., D.C.M.
 Kitson, W.O. I. E., M.S.M.
 Laidlaw, L.-Cpl. R. G. G., M.M.
 Lawler, L.-Cpl. V., M.M.
 Leigh, Cpl. G. C., M.M.
 Lemon, Pte. A. F., M.M.
 Loveday, Pte. R. C., M.M.
 Lucas, L.-Cpl. G. R. E., M.M.
 Marlow, L.-Cpl. M., M.M.*
 Marrott, Sgt. R. D., M.M.
 Mars, Sgt. E. S., M.M.
 Marshall, C.S.M. J., M.S.M.
 Matheson, Sgt. A. H., M.M.
 May, Pte. W. E. (F.).
 McCallum, L.-Cpl. W., M.M.
 McFadden, Sgt. T., M.M.
 McGoldrick, Pte. A. R., M.M.
 McLean, L.-Cpl. T., M.M.
 Miller, Pte. W. A., M.M.
 Miller, Pte. W. S., M.M.
 Monro, Dvr. R. G., M.M.
 Moore, L.-Cpl. A. J., M.M.
 Moore, L.-Cpl. D. G., M.M.
 Morcombe, Pte. R. H., M.M.
 Moran, L.-Cpl. H. H., M.M.
 Morley, Pte. E., M.M.

Morris, Pte. P. B., M.M.
 Murphy, L.-Cpl. J. F., D.C.M.
 Murray, S.-Sgt. H. R., M.S.M.
 Nichol, Pte. W. G., M.M.
 Nix, Cpl. A. L., M.M.
 Page, L.-Cpl. H., M.M.
 Parker, Pte. A. J. C., M.M.
 Paternoster, Pte. T., M.M.
 Power, L.-Cpl. J. A., M.M.
 Pownall, L.-Cpl. A. R., M.M.*
 Quirk, Pte. R., M.M.
 Ramsden, Pte. H., M.M.
 Rees, Pte. J. S., M.M.
 Reid, L.-Sgt. J. W., M.M.
 Ridgway, Pte. J. W., M.M.
 Riley, Pte. J. G. B., M.M.
 Roberts, Sgt. R., M.M.
 Rose, Pte. A. E., M.M.
 Ross, L.-Cpl. T., M.M.
 Shean, Pte. H. H., M.M.
 Shearer, Pte. T. R. E., M.M.
 Silk, Cpl. C. A., M.M.
 Sims, L.-Cpl. O. L., M.M.*
 Skiller, Pte. F. C., M.M.
 Slingo, Pte. H., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. E. R., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. T. W., M.M.
 Smith, Pte. W. S., M.M.
 St. Clair, Pte. S. A. (F.).
 Sturrock, Pte. J. McL., M.M.
 Swadling, L.-Cpl. W. L., M.M.*
 Treseder, Pte. H. A., M.M.
 Trousdale, L.-Cpl. L. S., M.M.
 Waksely, L.-Cpl. D., M.M.
 Walker, Pte. B. G., M.S.M.
 Wall, Pte. A. A., M.M.
 Walton, Pte. V. D., M.M.
 Watts, Pte. E. R., M.M.
 White, L.-Cpl. H. G., M.M.
 White, L.-Cpl. J. G., M.M.
 Wilson, Pte. J. W., M.M.
 Wright, Pte. S. H., M.M.
 Wroth, Pte. E. J. S., M.M.

A.A.V.C.

Other Ranks

Brand, Sgt. S. R., M.S.M.

Pentland, Sgt. W. C., M.S.M.

APPENDIX II

A.A.O.C.

Other Ranks

Flett, S.-Sgt. F., M.S.M.

Pearson, Dvr. H. J., M.M.

Pollock, Dvr. D. H., M.M.

A.A.P.C.

Other Ranks

Hogan, W.O. I. R. J., M.S.M.

White, C.S.M. P. J., M.S.M.

A.P.C.

*Other Ranks*Bird, Sgt. L. E., M.M.
Cowan, Tpr. W. G., M.M.Gleeson, Cpl. J., M.M.
Horston, Cpl. L. A., M.M.Marcus, L.-Cpl. W. T. G., M.M.
Robertson, Tpr. D., M.M.

CHAPLAINS' DEPARTMENT

Bergin, Rev. M. H., M.C.
Gilbert, Rev. P. J., M.C.

Kennedy, Rev. J. J., D.S.O.

Ward, Rev. F. G., M.C.

APPENDIX III

MENTIONS IN DESPATCHES

- N.B.**— (i) The number of times mentioned is shown in brackets after each name.
 (ii) Only the Mentions gained for service with 5th Australian Division are recorded.
 (iii) The units and ranks of officers and men mentioned in despatches are shown as at the date of the last mention awarded.

5TH DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Hobbs, Lt.-Gen. Sir J. J. Talbot (6) McCay, Maj.-Gen. the Hon. J. W. (1)	Bruche, Col. J. H. (5) McColl, Lt.-Col. J. T. (1) Peck, Lt.-Col. J. H. (3) Ralph, Lt.-Col. E. M. (3)	Wagstaff, Lt.-Col. C. M. (1) Hamilton, Capt. W. L. (1) Hunn, Capt. S. A. (2) Goodland, Lt. K. A. (2)
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Other Ranks

Brownhill, S.-Q.M.S. W. R. (1)	Davies, A./Q.M.S. C. H. L. (1)	Lyons, A./W.O. I. G. T. (1)
Cairns, W.O. I. J. J. (1)		

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Bessell-Browne, T/Brig.-Gen. A. J. (6) Hely, Maj. H. L. (1)	Newmarch, Maj. J. H. (1) Phillips, Maj. O. F. (3) Archibald, Capt. H. B. (1)	Wallace, Capt. W. G. (1) Booth, Lt. E. H. (1)
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Other Ranks

Bray, Gnr. F. J. (1)

13TH BRIGADE A.F.A.

Officers

Caddy, Lt.-Col. H. O. (4) Gatliff, Maj. V. H. (1) Lister, Maj. E. G. (1)	Mellor, T/Maj. T. R. (2) Andrew, Capt. A. J. Fullerton (1)	Vowles, Capt. E. L. (1) Miller, Lt. G. H. (1)
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Other Ranks

Allen, B.S.M. W. E. (1) Balcke, Gnr. C. E. (1) Balhorn, Gnr. V. (1) Brown, Sgt. P. E. (1) Evatt, Bmdr. H. L. (1)	Gaskell, Dvr. A. (1) Gipps, Bmdr. H. B. (1) Haugley, Gnr. L. J. (1) Kelly, Gnr. E. M. (1) Kilsby, Bmdr. G. T. (1)	Nell, Dvr. C. (1) Nicol, Bmdr. G. T. (1) Spode, Bmdr. G. (1) Warrad, Sgt. F. W. (1)
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APPENDIX III

14TH BRIGADE A.F.A.

Officers

Derham, Lt.-Col. E. P. (4)
 Beavis, Maj. L. F. (1)
 Crespin, Maj. G. T. (1)
 Dreyer, Maj. N. L. (2)

McCormack, Maj. P. T. (1)
 Morris, T/Maj. B. M. (3)
 Retchford, Maj. H. (1)
 Nicholson, Capt. N. A. (1)

Robinson, Capt. C. F. (1)
 Pascoe-Webb, Lt. I. F. (1)
 Willan, Lt. G. P. (1)

Other Ranks

Bell, T/Cpl. G. H. (1)
 Corbert, Sgt. R. J. (1)
 Hodgens, Cpl. W. (1)

Hodgson, Gnr. C. R. (1)
 Marshall, Sgt. R. R. (1)
 McCaffery, Sgt. W. E. (1)

McIlwralght, Sgt. L. A. (1)
 Moore, A/Bmdr. J. (1)
 Oliver, F.-Sgt. L. (1)

25TH BRIGADE A.F.A.

Officers

Cox-Taylor, Lt.-Col. H. J. (1)

DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN

Officers

Thornthwalte, Lt.-Col. F. (3)

Other Ranks

Hopkins, Gnr. A. M. (1)

Northcott, Cpl. H. J. (1)

Robinson, Bmdr. A. J. (1)

DIVISIONAL TRENCH MORTAR BRIGADE

Officers

Wallis, Capt. W. D. (1)

Other Ranks

Brown, Bmdr. W. P. (1)
 Cappell, Gnr. A. H. (1)

Goodacre, Cpl. E. C. G. (1)

Wood, Cpl. V. (1)

8TH INFANTRY BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Tivey, Maj.-Gen. E. (6)
 Casey, Maj. R. G. (2)

Cumling, Maj. H. W. (1)

Wisdom, Maj. F. A. (1)

29TH BATTALION

Officers

McArthur, Lt.-Col. J. (3)
 Purser, Lt.-Col. M. (3)
 Davies, Capt. C. E. (1)
 Ellis, Capt. A. D. (1)

Weaver, Hon. Capt. and Q.M.
 E. S. (1)
 Chapman, Lt. H. P. T. (1)

Gullett, Lt. S. W. (1)
 Patterson, Lt. S. L. (1)
 Swinburne, Lt. H. L. (1)

Other Ranks

Dowell, Sgt. E. R. (1)
 Fitts, Pte. F. E. T. (1)
 Fricke, Sgt. R. E. (1)

Hollins, L.-Cpl. S. G. (1)
 Keir, Pte. R. H. (1)

Powell, A/S.-Sgt. T. H. C. (1)
 Thackeray, Cpl. L. C. (1)

30TH BATTALION

Officers

Clark, Lt.-Col. J. M. (2)
 Street, Lt.-Col. F. (1)
 Beardsmore, Maj. R. H. (1)
 Charlton, Maj. P. (1)

Chapman, Capt. J. A. (2)
 Savage, Capt. C. D. (1)
 Zander, T/Capt. W. H. (2)
 Grimwade, Lt. H. S. (1)

Hogan, Lt. T. S. C. (1)
 Lees, Lt. J. S. (1)
 Wedd, Lt. H. W. (1)
 Yeomans, Lt. J. C. (1)

Other Ranks

Arkell, Pte. M. K. D. (1)
 Cox, Sgt. H. H. (1)
 Crux, Pte. H. G. (1)
 Eccleston, T/Cpl. J. G. (1)

McDuff, Sgt. J. (1)
 Murdock, Sgt. S. R. (1)
 Nicholson, T/Cpl. H. L. (1)
 Smith, Pte. H. F. (1)

Sneesby, R. Q.M.S. E. G. (1)
 Tripp, L.-Cpl. L. (1)
 Walker, C. Q.M.S. E. F. (1)
 White, Pte. J. (1)

31ST BATTALION

Officers

Toll, Lt.-Col. F. W. (2)	Sparkes, Hon. Capt. and Q.M. P. G. (1)	Hepburn, Lt. E. A. (1)
Eckersley, Maj. P. A. M. (1)		Knowles, Lt. E. C. (1)
Drayton, Capt. F. (2)	Collier, Lt. T. R. (1)	McKay, Lt. E. J. (1)
Morrisset, Capt. V. L. (1)	Denning, Lt. M. E. (1)	Newall, Lt. H. R. (1)

Other Ranks

Barrett, Cpl. F. G. (1)	Lamborn, Pte. A. R. (1)	McLucas, T/C.S.M. W. G. (1)
Gothard, Sgt. E. J. (1)	Ludwig, Cpl. W. T. (1)	Wiley, Pte. F. T. (1)

32ND BATTALION

Officers

Campbell, Capt. A. (1)	Viner, Capt. C. E. (1)	Prockter, Lt. C. L. (1)
Robinson, Capt. R. H. (1)	Wark, Capt. B. A. (1)	Temperley, Lt. N. (1)
Taplin, Capt. C. Q. (3)	Inglas, Lt. W. (1)	

Other Ranks

Dodd, Pte. F. S. (1)	Longstaff, L.-Cpl. W. L. (1)	O'Malley, Pte. F. S. (1)
Giles, Cpl. F. J. (1)	Lynch, Pte. W. L. (1)	Stewart, Sgt. A. (1)
Green, Pte. M. L. (1)	Mason, Pte. S. J. (1)	Williams, Pte. G. (1)
Layton, L.-Cpl. J. D. (1)		

8TH LIGHT TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY

Officers

Mulvey, Lt. R. D. (1)

Other Ranks

Last, L.-Sgt. C. H. (1) McFadyen, Pte. (1)

14TH INFANTRY BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Hobkirk, Brig.-Gen. C. J. (2)	Stewart, Brig.-Gen. J. C. (3)	Legge, Maj. R. G. (2)
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53RD BATTALION

Officers

Cheeseman, Lt.-Col. W. J. R. (3)	Barkell, Lt. V. J. (1)	Hill, Lt. R. V. (1)
Murray, Maj. J. J. (2)	Cooper, Lt. A. E. (1)	Jennings, Lt. W. C. (1)
Roberts, Maj. P. T. (2)	Davis, Lt. C. E. (1)	

Other Ranks

Anderson, L.-Cpl. A. P. (1)	Chapman, A/Sgt. T. L. (1)	Quinn, Sgt. C. G. (1)
Angus, L.-Cpl. C. (1)	Jones, Cpl. F. J. (1)	Smith, L.-Cpl. W. H. (1)
Campbell, C.Q.M.S. S. D. (1)	O'Modei, Sgt. C. A. (1)	Winterbottom, L.-Cpl. J. (1)

54TH BATTALION

Officers

Cass, Lt.-Col. W. E. H. (1)	Lecky, Maj. C. S. (1)	Young, Capt. H. H. (1)
Marshall, Lt.-Col. N. (3)	Hansen, Capt. J. (1)	Adams, Lt. J. (1)
Mitchell, Lt.-Col. J. A. S. (1)	Lowe, Capt. M. J. (1)	Wark, Lt. K. N. (1)

Other Ranks

King, Sgt. H. C. (1) Reynolds, Pte. A. A. (1)

55TH BATTALION

Officers

McConaghy, Lt.-Col. D. McF. (2)	Gow, Hon. Capt. and Q.M. C. B. (1)	Peake, Lt. R. A. B. (2)
Woods, Lt.-Col. P. H. (3)		Slater, Lt. H. E. (1)
Cowley, Maj. R. O. (1)	Panton, Lt. A. W. (1)	Wilson, Lt. N. L. (1)
Pinkstone, Capt. S. A. (1)		

APPENDIX III

Other Ranks

Bennett, Dvr. A. M. (1)
 Bourke, Sgt. E. A. (1)
 Dickman, Pte. J. (1)
 Granger, Pte. H. S. (1)

Hollis, Pte. R. E. (1)
 Jenkins, Sgt. W. H. (1)
 McColl, Pte. J. (1)

Neville, Sgt. D. T. W. (1)
 O'Sullivan, C.Q.M.S. V. D. (1)
 Saxby, Pte. C. (1)

56TH BATTALION

Officers

Scott, Lt.-Col. A. H. (3)
 Cameron, T/Lt.-Col. H. G. L. (1)
 Benson, Capt. S. A. (1)
 Fanning, Capt. F. (1)

Gollan, Capt. H. R. (1)
 Lucas, Capt. C. R. (1)
 Mann, Capt. G. H. (1)
 Courtney, Lt. R. G. (1)

Grimsley, Lt. A. H. (1)
 McDonald, Lt. M. (1)
 Pennefather, Lt. H. F. (1)

Other Ranks

Bock, Sgt. C. E. (1)
 Collins, R.Q.M.S. E. J. (1)
 Cossedge, Pte. W. H. (1)
 Dawes, Sgt. R. R. (1)

Evans, Sgt. G. W. (1)
 Fishenden, Pte. W. T. (1)
 Hallman, Sgt. V. L. (1)
 O'Brien, Sgt. J. P. (1)

O'Sullivan, Cpl. D. J. (1)
 Richardson, Cpl. N. R. (1)
 Robinson, Sgt. C. E. (1)

14TH LIGHT TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY

Officers

Brock, Capt. K. H. (2)

Other Ranks

Cochrane, Sgt. J. M. (1)
 Ellsmore, Sgt. R. (1)

Fletcher, Sgt. N. J. (1)

Loy, Pte. P (1)

15TH INFANTRY BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Elliott, Brig.-Gen. H. E. (6)

Other Ranks

Bragg, A/Cpl. B. W. P. (1)

57TH BATTALION

Officers

Denehy, Lt.-Col. C. A. (1)
 Aitchison, Maj. R. McL. C. (1)
 Dickinson, Capt. H. S. (1)

Elliott, Capt. L. W. (1)
 Keys, Capt. A. E. (1)
 McDonald, Capt. W. H. L. (1)

Corney, Lt. E. (1)
 Doutrebrand, Lt. R. (1)
 Schroder, Lt. J. D. (1)

Other Ranks

Allen, Pte. F. J. (1)
 Davis, Sgt. C. W. (1)
 Fraser, Sgt. S. (1)

Harris, Sgt. A. G. (1)
 Marshall, Sgt. W. (1)
 McDonald, Pte. A. (1)

Robertson, Pte. J. (1)
 Sutcliffe, Pte. E. S. (1)

58TH BATTALION

Officers

Denehy, Lt.-Col. C. A. (3)
 Ferres, Lt.-Col. H. D. G. (2)
 Watson, Lt.-Col. C. V. (2)
 Freeman, Maj. H. G. (1)
 Dawson, Capt. F. C. (1)
 Anderson, Lt. B. (1)

Best, Lt. A. F. (2)
 Dalgleish, Lt. N. (1)
 Davis, Lt. L. F. (1)
 Eggington, Lt. W. G. O. (1)
 Forsyth, Lt. R. B. (1)

McWhannell, Lt. F. B. (2)
 Morrison, Lt. W. (1)
 Shiels, Lt. W. E. (1)
 Thompson, Lt. I. G. (1)
 Wilson, Lt. H. W. (1)

Other Ranks

Beggs, Pte. P. (1)
 Brown, Cpl. W. J. (1)
 Cunningham, C.S.M. A. L. (1)
 Jones, Pte. A. G. (1)

Jones, Pte. D. S. (1)
 Mulholland, L.-Cpl. J. T. (1)
 Newton, Pte. E. I. (1)
 North, Pte. H. H. (1)

Roberts, Cpl. A. G. (1)
 Saunders, Pte. H. (1)
 Westrup, Sgt. J. J. (1)

59TH BATTALION

Officers

Layh, Lt.-Col. H. T. C. (3)	Muirson, Capt. K. B. (1)	Keating, Lt. J. E. (1)
Mason, Lt.-Col. C. C. (1)	Pinkerton, Capt. A. J. (1)	McIver, Lt. W. F. (1)
Scanlon, Lt.-Col. J. J. (3)	May, Hon. Capt. and Q.M. W. (1)	Toohey, Lt. D. G. (1)
McDonald, Maj. S. R. (1)	Blandford, Lt. C. A. W. (1)	Wadeson, Lt. J. H. (1)
Keen, Capt. W. (1)	Haddow, Lt. J. D. (1)	

Other Ranks

Chamberlain, C.Q.M.S. F. (1)	Harrington, Pte. F. (1)	South, Cpl. F. (1)
Cummings, L.-Cpl. D. (1)	Lowry, Pte. E. N. (1)	Spalding, Pte. J. C. (1)
Hannigan, Cpl. J. J. (1)	Palmer, Cpl. G. I. (1)	Stowell, Pte. H. A. (1)

60TH BATTALION

Officers

Cameron, Maj. H. G. L. (1)	Davis, Lt. W. (1)	Simpson, Lt. J. L. (1)
McRae, Maj. G. G. (1)	Gannon, Lt. W. R. (1)	Steel, Lt. J. H. (1)
Cahill, Lt. M. (1)	Howells, Lt. L. J. (1)	Stillman, Lt. L. R. (1)

Other Ranks

Boyd, L.-Cpl. J. (1)	Grinter, Pte. V. J. (1)	McHush, L.-Cpl. B. (1)
Browning, L.-Cpl. H. E. (1)	Hassett, Cpl. M. J. (1)	Smith, Cpl. E. W. (1)
Cameron, Pte. C. N. (1)	Hulbert, L.-Cpl. G. H. (1)	Spivey, Pte. P. W. (1)
Ellington, Pte. A. (1)		

15TH LIGHT TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY

Other Ranks

Gilmore, Cpl. W. S. (1)

5TH MACHINE GUN BATTALION

Officers

Marsden, Lt.-Col. T. R. (5)	Fitzgerald, Capt. G. F. (1)	Harbord, Lt. L. (1)
Wright, Maj. A. H. (1)	Eldridge, Lt. L. G. (1)	Ing, Lt. G. L. (1)
Berry, Capt. S. S. (1)	Hanson, Lt. H. L. (1)	Leslie, Lt. A. N. C. G. (1)

Other Ranks

Bailey, Sgt. P. S. (1)	Gibb, C.S.M. J. (1)	Morgan, Pte. W. A. G. P. (1)
Benson, Sgt. H. (1)	Hill, Sgt. G. A. (1)	Muir, L.-Cpl. I. M. (1)
Butler, Sgt. G. (1)	Howard, Sgt. A. E. (1)	Parke, T./R.Q.M.S. G. (1)
Crowley, Pte. J. (1)	Hudson, Pte. E. C. (1)	Stagg, Sgt. H. T. (1)
Eley, Sgt. W. (1)	Jensen, Pte. N. A. (1)	Vincent, Pte. K. J. (1)
Garner, Cpl. E. A. (1)	McAviney, Pte. C. R. (1)	

5TH PIONEER BATTALION

Officers

Carter, Lt.-Col. H. G. (3)	Helsham, Capt. C. H. (3)	Duke, Lt. C. R. (1)
McClellan, Maj. F. S. (1)	Kerr, Capt. J. R. (1)	Vidal, Lt. E. S. W. S. (1)
Scott, Maj. E. I. C. (2)	Pattinson, Capt. T. J. (1)	Whitfield, Lt. H. H. (1)
Dwyer, T/Maj. A. J. (1)	Campbell, Lt. W. (1)	

Other Ranks

Andrews, A/Sgt. H. W. (1)	Dodson, A/Cpl. W. (1)	Marshall, Sgt. W. (1)
Brown, Sgt. H. S. (1)	Fincher, C.S.M. J. F. (2)	Sharpe, R.S.M. E. W. (1)
Cawston, Pte. M. W. (1)	Kerin, Pte. P. J. (1)	Stewart, Pte. F. (1)
Chinnock, Sgt. W. J. (1)	Maitland, Pte. R. (1)	Trigger, Pte. G. T. (1)
Dennis, L.-Sgt. W. F. (1)		

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS

Officers

Mather, Lt.-Col. L. F. S. (3)
 Sturdee, Lt.-Col. V. A. H. (2)
 Bachtold, Maj. H. (2)
 Carr, Maj. A. R. (1)
 Coghlan, Maj. J. (1)
 Farquhar, Maj. W. G. (2)

Greenway, Maj. H. (3)
 Reid, Maj. R. S. (1)
 Greenlees, Capt. A. McP. (2)
 Bell, Lt. J. W. (1)
 Doblo, Lt. F. (1)

Ewart, Lt. A. T. (1)
 Fry, Lt. H. W. (1)
 Malloy, Lt. V. L. (1)
 Merkel, Lt. L. G. (1)
 Nangle, Lt. N. J. (1)

Other Ranks

Allen, Cpl. W. J. (1)
 Atkinson, L.-Cpl. S. (1)
 Brown, Dvr. L. W. (1)
 Greshner, Spr. B. (1)
 Harris, T/Sgt. C. E. (1)
 Heggie, Sgt. J. P. (1)

Hughes, Sgt. H. (1)
 Jacobs, Dvr. J. P. (1)
 Mayes, T/Cpl. W. H. (1)
 Murray, Sgt. E. (1)
 Nicol, Cpl. T. B. (1)
 Page, Sgt. R. W. (1)

Page, Spr. R. A. (1)
 Satterthwaite, Dvr. W. (1)
 Uren, Sgt. G. A. (1)
 Willats, Spr. W. G. (1)
 Wyman, Spr. H. N. C. (1)

DIVISIONAL SIGNAL COMPANY

Officers

Hamilton, Maj. R. G. (1)
 Stanley, Maj. R. A. (2)
 Bath, Capt. C. H. (1)

Forrest, Lt. W. (1)
 Metcher, Lt. O. F. (1)
 Mudford, Lt. B. E. (1)

Pearson, Lt. C. W. K. (1)
 Sjoberg, Lt. E. C. F. (1)

Other Ranks

Butler, T/C.Q.M.S. L. (1)
 Grigg, Sgt. W. A. (1)
 Holden, 2/Cpl. F. J. (1)

Holdsworth, Cpl. H. (1)
 Makeham, Sgt. A. F. (1)
 Millar, Sgt. R. T. (1)

Moore, Cpl. J. (1)
 Williamson, Cpl. J. (1)

AUSTRALIAN ARMY MEDICAL CORPS

Officers

Downey, Col. M. H. (3)
 Shepherd, T/Col. A. E. (1)
 Hearne, Lt.-Col. W. W. (3)
 Stewart, Lt.-Col. J. M. Y. (1)
 Thompson, Lt.-Col. C. W. (1)
 Clayton, Maj. A. R. (1)

Craig, Maj. R. E. (1)
 Maplestone, Maj. P. A. (1)
 Norris, Maj. J. D. (1)
 Sawers, Maj. W. C. (1)
 Catford, Capt. H. R. (1)

Fay, Capt. F. W. (1)
 Howard, Capt. A. J. De S. (2)
 Jose, Capt. I. B. (1)
 O'Shea, Capt. P. J. F. (1)
 Railton, Capt. S. A. (1)

Other Ranks

Aspinall, Sgt. B. C. (1)
 Campbell, Sgt. H. (1)
 Cupit, Pte. E. A. (1)
 Fry, C.Q.M.S. D. L. (1)
 Harvey, Sgt. G. K. (1)
 Hile, S.-Sgt. W. J. R. B. (1)

Hutton, L.-Cpl. S. (1)
 Johnson, Sgt. S. (1)
 Macintosh, Pte. K. D. (1)
 Marshall, Sgt. J. (1)
 McFadden, L.-Cpl. T. J. (1)
 Musman, Pte. E. G. (1)

Rose, Pte. A. E. (1)
 Shepherd, Sgt. C. V. (1)
 Townsend, Pte. V. L. (1)
 Watkinson, Sgt. T. (1)
 Whiting, Sgt. G. R. (1)
 Woodbine, Pte. D. (1)

DIVISIONAL SANITARY SECTION

Other Ranks

Lay, L.-Cpl. R. T. (1)

Southwell, L.-Cpl. R. (1)

AUSTRALIAN ARMY VETERINARY CORPS

Officers

Henry, Lt.-Col. M. (3)

Other Ranks

Drummond, Sgt. J. J. (1)

Holt, Pte. F. G. (1)

5TH DIVISIONAL TRAIN

Officers

Francis, Lt.-Col. F. H. (3)
 Brazenor, Maj. J. A. (1)

Robinson, Maj. C. W. (2)
 Hamilton, Capt. W. L. (2)

Rudrum, Capt. A. C. (1)
 Marriot, Lt. R. W. (1)

Other Ranks

Blyton, Cpl. A. H. (1)	Lee, Cpl. R. (1)	Vickery, Sgt. R. W. (1)
Bryant, L.-Cpl. J. A. (1)	Lowell, Sgt. R. L. (1)	Warren, W.O.I. M. C. (1)
Davies, Dvr. (A/Q.M.S.) C. H. L. (1)	Manley, T/S.-Sgt. C. G. (1)	Waters, C.S.M. H. A. (1)
Evans, Sgt. S. A. R. (1)	McDonald, W.O.I. R. B. (1)	Watson, Cpl. G. (1)
Herman, Sgt. F. G. (1)	McLennan, T/Cpl. S. L. (1)	Wills, L.-Cpl. K. S. (1)
	Triplett, Pte. F. A. (1)	

AUSTRALIAN ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS

Officers

Rodd, Capt. J. M. (2)	Welch, Lt. M. C. (1)
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AUSTRALIAN ARMY PAY CORPS

Officers

Lawless, Lt. J. G. (2)

Other Ranks

Grigg, Sgt. L. D. (1)

AUSTRALIAN PROVOST CORPS

Officers

Lansley, Maj. E. J. F. (2)

DIVISIONAL TRAFFIC CONTROL DETACHMENT

Other Ranks

Kingston, L.-Cpl. J. E. (1)	Manville, T. J. (1)
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CHAPLAIN'S DEPARTMENT

Eva, Rev. A. F. (1)	Kennedy, Rev. J. J. (1)	Ward, Rev. F. G. (1)
Harewood, Mr. E. J. (1)		

APPENDIX IV

DEATHS

(i) The names of all officers and men who lost their lives from any cause whatsoever whilst on service overseas are included in this list.

(ii) The deaths of machine gun personnel are shown under the heading of the several machine gun companies.

DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Officers

Hearne, Col. W. W., D.S.O.

Other Ranks

Robinson, Pte. W. J.

13TH BRIGADE A.F.A.

Officers

Brunton, Capt. W.
Gatliff, Capt. F. E.
Knox, Capt. W. J.
Bennett, Lt. R. A.

Carrigan, Lt. A. H.
Matthews, Lt. W. F.
McMullen, Lt. W. J.
Pascoe-Webb, Lt. I. F.

Roebuck, Lt. J. N.
Spence, Lt. F. S.
Wiltshire, Lt. S. H. O.

49TH BATTERY

Other Ranks

Ashton, Gnr. P.
Brook, Gnr. W.
Byrne, Gnr. G. W.
Carleton, Gnr. A. H.
Carter, Gnr. F. E.
Cox, Gnr. M. J. E.
Ebsworth, Gnr. L.
Finch, Sgt. R.
Gribble, Gnr. E. J.
Jebb, Sgt. W. J.
Lingenburg, Sgt. H. G.

Mackley, Sgt. W. G.
Morse, Gnr. J. W.
Myres, Gnr. D.
Nelson, Gnr. C. J.
Newnham, Gnr. F. J.
Nilsen, Gnr. J. H.
Paget, Gnr. P. G.
Pateman, Bmdr. C.
Rhodes, Dvr. G. H. Y.
Richardson, Cpl. F. W. L.

Ricketts, Gnr. H. S.
Righter, Dvr. W. E.
Roker, Cpl. A. J.
Rowles, T/Cpl. E.
Spurr, Gnr. T. A.
Vine, Gnr. W. A.
Wakelling, Gnr. S. L.
Williams, Dvr. T. E.
Wilson, Gnr. C. A.
Young, Gnr. A. A.

50TH BATTERY

Other Ranks

Blissell, T/Sgt. J. C.
Brock, Gnr. G. L.
Browning, Gnr. W. H.
Bruce, Gnr. H. A.
Bye, Gnr. B. D. L.
Campbell, Gnr. L. G.
Cashin, Gnr. R. H.
Crossby, Sgt. D. W.
Duggan, Dvr. P. J.
Evans, Gnr. W. J.
Feltham, Bmdr. L. E. S.
Gillham, Dvr. R. C.
Gilhooly, Gnr. B. B.
Graves, Gnr. G. A.

Gregson, Gnr. N.
Griffiths, Dvr. D. E.
Hall, Gnr. R.
Harcus, Gnr. J. N.
Hartwell, Gnr. B. N.
Hawke, Gnr. A. W.
Hills, Gnr. H.
Holton, Gnr. J. M.
Marshall, Gnr. L. L.
McFarlane, T/Cpl. C. C.
Mitchell, Gnr. W. J.
Orr, Gnr. J.
Ramsey, Gnr. C. F.
Read, Gnr. J.

Rees, Bmdr. V. R.
Roberts, Gnr. T. H.
Robinson, Gnr. J.
Rogers, Gnr. R.
Ross, Gnr. J. E.
Shaw, Gnr. T. C.
Scott, Cpl. J. P.
Symon, Gnr. J. R.
Tasker, Gnr. W. G.
Taylor, Gnr. H.
Webb, Gnr. H. W.
Wylie, Gnr. W. C.
Zilmau, Gnr. F. M.

51ST BATTERY

Other Ranks

Aldred, Gnr. J.
 Anderson, Gnr. D.
 Barnes, Gnr. G. J. E.
 Boden, Gnr. F. C.
 Burling, Gnr. A.
 Byrne, Gnr. P. J.
 Caupbell, Gnr. C.
 Carr, Gnr. C. G.
 Chesterman, Gnr. G. S.
 Collings, Gnr. C. A.
 De Mamiel, Dvr. T. G.
 Edwards, Cpl. R.
 Everitt, Gnr. J. S.
 Furniss, Sgt. W.
 Green, Gnr. B. E.
 Hawkes, Gnr. D.
 Hilder, Gnr. W. D.

Humphries, Gnr. W. J. H.
 Jeffrey, Sgt. W. O.
 Jensen, Dvr. F. C. J.
 Johnston, Gnr. A. J.
 Kelly, Gnr. W.
 Kissell, Gnr. J.
 Lavers, Gnr. W. V.
 Le Brock, Gnr. D. T.
 Longwill, Gnr. W. M.
 Lyons, Gnr. R. L.
 McDonald, Gnr. J. J.
 McGrath, Gnr. R.
 McKnight, Gnr. R.
 Morris, B.S.M. W. A.
 Murrin, Gnr. W. J.
 O'Connell, Gnr. J.
 Oermann, Gnr. R.

Pearce, Gnr. N. P.
 Peverell, Gnr. E. C.
 Riddle, Gnr. J. T.
 Scammell, Gnr. L. C.
 Slade, Gnr. F. W.
 Smith, Gnr. R.
 Smith, Gnr. E. R.
 Solomon, Gnr. S. J.
 Stevens, Gnr. G. E.
 Thwaites, Gnr. A.
 Turner, Gnr. E. A.
 Walch, Gnr. G.
 Wheeler, Gnr. W. H.
 Wood, Gnr. L. W.
 Wyndham, Bmdr. C.
 York, Gnr. F. J.

113TH HOWITZER BATTERY

Other Ranks

Adams, Gnr. J. D.
 Anderson, Gnr. H. A.
 Baxter, Gnr. E. A.
 Beilby, Gnr. R. E.
 Bissell, Gnr. C. J.
 Bourne, Sgt. A. E.
 Burnell, Dvr. J.
 Burnett, Gnr. G. W.
 Culley, Gnr. F. D.
 Dignam, Gnr. P.
 Edgington, Gnr. G. O.

Gillen, Gnr. T. J.
 Gurr, Gnr. H.
 Hannaker, Gnr. R. E.
 Harkins, Dvr. J. M.
 Ireland, Gnr. D. M.
 Kimmance, Dvr. F. V.
 King, Gnr. E.
 Macpherson, Gnr. L. J. R.
 Mahoney, W.O. II. B.
 Main, Bmdr. T.
 Marshall, Shoosmith H. W.

Murphy, Cpl. W.
 Percy, Gnr. A. E.
 Ralston, Gnr. G. W.
 Ransden, Gnr. W. H.
 Rusten, Gnr. J. W.
 Smith, Gnr. A. V. T. C.
 Smith, Bmdr. L. S.
 Stewart, Gnr. D. L.
 Walker, Gnr. E. W.
 Williams, Gnr. A.

14TH BRIGADE A.F.A.

Officers

Steele, Capt. O. L. J.
 Barron, Lt. J.
 Blashki, Lt. R. H.

Browne, Lt. C. G.
 Gammon, Lt. R. T.
 Hopper, Lt. J. S.

McConville, Lt. V. H.
 Rowe, Lt. F. G.
 Skinner, Lt. P. S. A.

53RD BATTERY

Other Ranks

Austin, Gnr. C. A.
 Blake, Gnr. E. T.
 Bottom, T/Cpl. J. C.
 Brockwell, Bmdr. C. T.
 Burgess, Gnr. E.
 Burgess, Gnr. J. C.
 Burnside, Bmdr. R. D.
 Caporn, Gnr. W. E.
 Carrall, Dvr. A. L.
 Clay, Sgt. H. R.
 Curtain, Cpl. C. J.
 Davison, Gnr. A. R.

Eden-Little, Dvr. H.
 Edwards, Cpl. A. L.
 Goodwin, Sgt. R. B.
 Harrington, Gnr. T. E.
 Harvey, Ftr. H.
 Heffernan, Dvr. T. G.
 Hickey, Dvr. M. J.
 Hicks, Gnr. R. E.
 Jackson, S.-Sgt. W. H.
 Kingsbury, Dvr. J. B.
 Kirkbride, Gnr. S. H.
 Livingston, Cpl. W. J.

McCann, Gnr. C. A.
 Moy, Gnr. F. M.
 Prime, Dvr. P. H.
 Pryor, Gnr. W. A. E.
 Reynolds, Gnr. J. H.
 Reynolds, Gnr. W. G.
 Smith, Gnr. G.
 Symons, Dvr. J. M.
 Todhunter, Gnr. R. S.
 Weeks, Gnr. B.
 Willis, Gnr. J. F.

54TH BATTERY

Other Ranks

Bushby, Gnr. J.
 Carberry, Gnr. J.
 Cleland, Gnr. A. V.
 Clerke, Gnr. R. R.
 Crowe, Gnr. P. A.
 Gilles, Gnr. W. J.
 Gorrick, Gnr. J.
 Gray, Gnr. E. K.
 Hackett, Gnr. W.
 Hall, Gnr. T. D.
 Hethorn, Gnr. W. H.
 Hyde, Sgt. T.
 James, Gnr. R. R.
 Jones, Cpl. G.

Klar, Cpl. A.
 Kortman, Gnr. E. H.
 Lakin, Gnr. R. W.
 Lloyd, Gnr. T.
 Lloyd, Gnr. W. H.
 Marsh, Gnr. G. H.
 Martin, Gnr. R. L.
 McCarron, Gnr. C. T.
 Macully, Gnr. A. A.
 McDonald, Gnr. N. F.
 McGrath, Gnr. J. C.
 McLarnon, Gnr. M. H.
 McLeish, Gnr. A. B.
 Meurant, Gnr. W.

Mills, Dvr. J. A.
 Milner, Sgt. W. H.
 Minceal, Gnr. W.
 Moore, Gnr. G. F.
 O'Donnell, Gnr. W.
 Paterson, Gnr. E. A.
 Smith, Gnr. C.
 Smith, Gnr. E. M.
 Stewart, Dvr. H. J.
 Stewart, Gnr. R. M.
 Tantau, Gnr. J. V.
 Watkins, Gnr. L. A.
 Windlow, Gnr. R. B.

APPENDIX IV

55TH BATTERY

Other Ranks

Ashley, Gnr. C. T.
 Coggan, Gnr. G.
 Cotter, Gnr. E. O. O.
 Craigen, Gnr. C. H.
 Crouch, Gnr. N. R.
 Davies, Sgt. J. N.
 Dolan, Gnr. J. J. B.
 Dunner, Sgt. G. O.
 Eason, Dvr. J. A.
 Gadd, Gnr. R. L.
 Glennie, Gnr. C. O. S.

Greevy, Gnr. T. F.
 Hamilton, Gnr. G. S.
 Herbert, Gnr. W. R.
 Hodge, Gnr. B.
 Hope, Gnr. J. S.
 King, Bmdr. T. T.
 Kirby, Cadet E. S.
 Kerr, Gnr. E. J.
 McMahon, Gnr. T. J.
 Nevin, Gnr. W.
 Oulton, Gnr. H.

Parasiers, Gnr. R. V.
 Parker, Gnr. F. W.
 Pearce, Dvr. R. A.
 Fynegar, Gnr. E. S.
 Ritchie, Bmdr. F. H.
 Rowley, Sgt. R. C.
 Shaw, Gnr. H. H.
 Stephens, Ftr/Sgt. I.
 Turner, Gnr. L.
 Verinder, Gnr. G. F.

114TH BATTERY

Other Ranks

Angus, Gnr. L. S.
 Barnes, Dvr. H. A.
 Baxter, Dvr. J. P.
 Bellamy, Gnr. E. A.
 Cary, Gnr. R.
 Clemens, Gnr. P.
 Conrick, Gnr. F.
 Dickson (formerly Anderson)
 Gnr. J. D. B.
 Gray, Gnr. J. R.
 Hastings, Gnr. S. M.
 Hunter, Gnr. M.
 Kedge, Gnr. C. A.
 Kelly, Gnr. J. P.
 King, Gnr. C. S.

Lacaster, T/Cpl. B.
 Lancaster, Cpl. E. E.
 Leatherby, Cpl. T. D.
 Lousada, Cpl. C. St. L.
 Markley, Gnr. H. A.
 McCabe, Gnr. W. N.
 McKendry, Gnr. V.
 Mortimer, Gnr. L. H.
 Mulligan, Gnr. A.
 Nicholson, Gnr. A. M.
 Nicol, Sgt. L. D.
 Oldini, Cpl. J. E.
 Patch, Sgt. F. E.
 Paterson, Gnr. H.
 Pope, Shoe Smith Cpl. A. H.

Scaddan, Gnr. V. A.
 Seidel, Gnr. E. F.
 Shephard, Gnr. A. C.
 Spriggs, Gnr. E. W.
 Stainer, Gnr. G. R. F.
 Stalt, Gnr. C. F.
 Stocks, Gnr. E.
 Taylor, Gnr. H. L.
 Thompson, Bmdr. R. E.
 Valentine, Gnr. D. H.
 Walton, Cpl. W. D.
 Warner, Sgt. J. W.
 Watney, Gnr. L.
 Wilson, Gnr. R.
 Wind, Sgt. O.

25TH BRIGADE A.F.A.

Other Ranks

Dunning, Gnr. C. H.
 Gillam, Gnr. K. C.

Hardy, Gnr. I. St. C. E.
 Rawson, Dvr. E. A.

Webb, Gnr. F. J.

DIVISIONAL TRENCH MORTAR BRIGADE

Officers

Peskett, Lt. L.

Other Ranks

Allen, Cpl. W. F. A.
 Anderson, L.-Cpl. N. W. L.
 Appleby, Pte. F. G.
 Arnold, Sgt. C. F.
 Ayre, Pte. J.
 Bailey, Gnr. W.
 Baker, Gnr. S. R.
 Belcher, Gnr. C.
 Biggen, T/Cpl. E. H.
 Bol, L.-Cpl. J.
 Brown, Gnr. F. H.
 Bryant, Pte. R. C.
 Butler, Gnr. S. W.
 Buzolich, Sgt. H.
 Cameron, Pte. J.
 Cherry, Gnr. H.
 Chibnall, Cpl. W. H.
 Clarke, Gnr. H. H.
 Collins, Pte. D. B.
 Copeland, Gnr. A.
 Cran, T/Cpl. T. M.
 Cupit, Pte. H.
 Dix, Bmdr. M.
 Dottie, Pte. A.
 Doyle, Gnr. T.
 Fairhall, Pte. J. II.
 Forrest, Gnr. W. T.
 Forsyth, Sgt. W.
 French, Bmdr. A.
 Gardner, Gnr. J.

Garlick, Pte. W.
 Geraty, Cpl. P. W.
 Gesser, Pte. P.
 Glasson, Pte. C. A.
 Graham, Gnr. D.
 Graham, Gnr. W.
 Harder, Pte. W. J. C.
 Hennessy, Pte. T. J.
 Howell, Pte. E. J.
 Kent, Pte. W.
 King, Gnr. E.
 Krug, Pte. C. G.
 Lane, Cpl. G.
 Linane, Cpl. P.
 Lorensini, Sgt. W. R.
 Manby, Bmdr. L.
 Martin, Gnr. E.
 Maude, Cpl. P.
 McCare, Gnr. R.
 McKinney, Pte. G. W.
 Mitchell, Gnr. W.
 Mildren, L.-Cpl. A. A.
 Mortimer, Bmdr. H.
 Morris, Gnr. G.
 Moyes, Cpl. W.
 Muir, Pte. A. R.
 Murphy, Pte. P.
 Newlove, Pte. H.
 Northey, Pte. S. H.
 Opie, Gnr. J. L.

Paton, Cpl. J. W.
 Penney, Pte. W. F.
 Power, Gnr. S. R.
 Ramsay, Pte. R.
 Ragless, Gnr. C. W.
 Reid, Pte. J.
 Rennie, Pte. N. C.
 Ritchie, Pte. J.
 Roberts, Pte. J. J.
 Robinson, Bmdr. R.
 Ross, Pte. E.
 Shear, Gnr. H.
 Seath, Pte. J. A.
 Smith, Cpl. A. P.
 Smith, Gnr. H.
 Smith, Pte. W.
 Spencer, Gnr. E.
 Tapping, Gnr.
 Turner, Pte. L.
 Ward, Gnr. H. W.
 Wallace, Bmdr. J.
 Ward, Gnr. W.
 Warren, Gnr. F.
 Webster, Pte. A.
 Williams, Pte. G. W.
 Wilson, Gnr. L.
 Wipidham, Gnr. C.
 Wits, Bmdr. R.
 Woodford, Pte. E. L.
 Young, Pte. E. J.

DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN

Other Ranks

Anderson, Dvr. J.
 Andrews, Saddlr. J. E.
 Askew, Dvr. E.
 Atkinson, Dvr. R. L. L.
 Bond, Pte. R. H.
 Boyd, Bmdr. T. M.
 Britton, Pte. J.
 Browney, Dvr. W.
 Chave, Dvr. E. G.
 Cunliffe, Cpl. Dvr. F. H.
 Dyson, Sgt. F. W. H.
 Fordyce, Gnr. G. D.

Fox, Gnr. S. E.
 Griffin, Dvr. J. T.
 Hanrahan, Dvr. D. A.
 Harrell, Dvr. J. A.
 Harris, Gnr. C. M.
 Henry, Dvr. E. C.
 Holton, Gnr. J.
 Horton, Dvr. F. C.
 Johnson, Dvr. F. K.
 Lacey, Dvr. M.
 Leach, Gnr. H. W.
 Lynam, Dvr. M. J.

Manfield, Cpl. G. S.
 Nobbs, Dvr. A. J.
 Pery, Dvr. C. M.
 Phillips, Dvr. R. I.
 Poke, Dvr. F. T.
 Ramsay, Gnr. J. E.
 Scott, Gnr. A. W.
 Sullivan, Gnr. S.
 Tipping, Gnr. W.
 Trueman, Pte. T. G.
 Tregonning, Dvr. W. C. D.
 West, Dvr. P. L.

29TH BATTALION

Officers

Booth, Capt. E. R.
 Houlihan, Capt. J. V.
 Johnson, Capt. N. L.
 Mortimer, Capt. K. M.
 Robertson, Capt. A. M.
 Sheridan, Capt. T. F.
 Braden, Lt. W.

Coleman, Lt. S. W.
 Cornish, Lt. R.
 D'Alton, Lt. W. D.
 Dundas, Lt. F. C.
 Fowler, Lt. P. L.
 Grant, Lt. A. M.
 Hogg, Lt. W. T.

Jackson, Lt. N. L.
 Rankin, Lt. W. E. D.
 Swinburne, Lt. H. L.
 Whitelaw, Lt. F. F.
 Wood, Lt. H. V.
 Klug, 2/Lt. L. C.
 Stirling, 2/Lt. F. M.

Other Ranks

Adams, Pte. W.
 Addems, Pte. W. G.
 Ailes, Pte. J.
 Aldrick, Pte. J. T.
 Alexander, Pte. A.
 Allison, Sgt. J. C.
 Anderson, Pte. A. S.
 Anderson, Pte. M.
 Archibald, T/Sgt. E.
 Arlow, Pte. J. L. C.
 Artso, Pte. E. H.
 Ashley, Pte. S. A.
 Atkinson, Pte. E. A.
 Athern, Pte. J. S.
 Bailey, Pte. W. C.
 Baldwin, Cpl. A. V.
 Balfour, Sgt. A.
 Ballinger, Pte. E.
 Bamford, Pte. A. G.
 Barling, Pte. H. S.
 Barnett, Pte. G. R.
 Barrett, Pte. E. F. J.
 Barlow, Pte. H.
 Barton, Cpl. R.
 Batey, Pte. R. V.
 Bath, Pte. J.
 Bayden, Pte. F. P. L.
 Beaton, Pte. J.
 Beauford, Pte.
 Bell, Pte. H.
 Bell, Pte. J.
 Belleville, Pte. J. P.
 Binger, Pte. A. O.
 Binnock, Pte. J. W.
 Birrell, T/Sgt. J. H.
 Blain, Pte. R.
 Blake, Pte. C. W. G.
 Blake, Pte. T. J.
 Blight, Pte. G. S. H.
 Body, Pte. W. G.
 Bonnicks, Pte. J. W.
 Bowen, Pte. P.
 Bower, Pte. W. J.
 Box, Pte. F. C.
 Boyden, Pte. F. T. L.
 Bradshaw, Pte. A.
 Bray, Pte. G. D.
 Brequet, Pte. J.
 Briggs, Pte. H.

Brittain, Pte. W.
 Brodie, Pte. T.
 Bromley, Sgt. R. R.
 Bromsley, L.-Sgt. R. P.
 Brown, Pte. C. R.
 Brown, Pte. J.
 Brownbill, Pte. L. W.
 Brumm, Pte. N. L.
 Bull, L.-Cpl. R. W.
 Burton, Pte. H. E.
 Butterworth, Pte. J.
 Buyant, Pte. A. W.
 Byrne, Pte. S.
 Calverley, Pte. R. E. J.
 Campbell, Sgt. S. G. M.
 Cariss, T/Sgt. C. R.
 Carlin, Pte. T.
 Carlson, Pte. F.
 Carlson, Pte. J.
 Carnall, Pte. W. N.
 Carter, Sgt. E. C.
 Carter, Pte. E. J.
 Cavanagh, Pte. J.
 Chapman, Sgt. L. B.
 Cheshire, L.-Cpl. A. E.
 Cicalese, Pte. J. V.
 Clark, Pte. E. A.
 Clark, Pte. H. G.
 Clarke, Pte. A.
 Cole, Pte. R. M.
 Coleman, Sgt. W.
 Collier, Pte. A. St. J.
 Collins, Cpl. B. A.
 Collins, Pte. E. H.
 Colliver, Pte. A.
 Conisbee, Pte. A. R.
 Connop, Pte. J. E.
 Comb, Pte. J. T.
 Connolly, Pte. M.
 Conquest, L.-Cpl. A. H.
 Cooper, Pte. G.
 Corry, Pte. F. H.
 Cory, Pte. J.
 Coward, Cpl. J. C.
 Cozens, Pte. J. A.
 Crowl, Pte. T. C.
 Crush, L.-Sgt. G.
 Culliver, Pte. E. E.
 Cunningham, Pte. J. E.

Curtiss, Sgt. C. R.
 Davies, Pte. H. J.
 Davies, L.-Cpl. J. S.
 Davies, Pte. S. W.
 Deans, Pte. A. B.
 De Little, Pte. J. C.
 Devlin, Pte. B.
 Dinan, Pte. C. J.
 Dixon, Pte. H. S.
 Dixon, Sgt. H. T. W.
 Dodds, L.-Cpl. J. T.
 Donegan, Pte. H.
 Donnan, Pte. J.
 Donnie, Sgt. J. C. C.
 Doran, Pte. M. J.
 Drowitt, Pte. R. C.
 Drislane, Pte. N. L.
 Droop, Pte. C. E.
 Duncan, Pte. H. V.
 Dyas, Pte. E. H.
 Edwards, Pte. H. C.
 Edwards, Pte. J. B.
 Elder, Cpl. E. W.
 Ellis, Pte. W. A.
 Ennis, L.-Cpl. J. L.
 Everett Norton, Pte. L.
 Facer, Pte. F. W.
 Farlow, Pte. S.
 Farrell, Pte. W. E.
 Fasan, Pte. J.
 Faulks, Pte. T.
 Ferguson, Pte. F. J. K.
 Fish, Pte. W. A.
 Fisher, T/Cpl. F. B.
 Fitzgerald, Pte. W. B.
 Fleming, Sgt. R. V.
 Fleming, Pte. W. C.
 Fletcher, Pte. P.
 Forbitt, Pte. F. A.
 Ford, L.-Cpl. J. H.
 Foster, Pte. H. J.
 Fox, Pte. W. W.
 Francis, Pte. T. W.
 Fuller, Pte. A. M.
 Garlick, Pte. W. A. G.
 Gibbens, Pte. T. A.
 Gill, Pte. R.
 Gillies, Pte. T.
 Gillin, Pte. J. L.

Other Ranks—cont.

Gilmour, Pte. S. E.
 Gleeson, Pte. T. J.
 Goggin, Pte. M. L.
 Golding, Pte. C. C. E.
 Gooday, Pte. S.
 Gooding, Pte. W. T.
 Gordon, Pte. J.
 Gordon, Pte. T. W.
 Gorman, L.-Cpl. C. B.
 Gowty, Pte. G. H.
 Goy, Pte. H.
 Grady, Pte. W. P.
 Graham, Pte. R. B.
 Grant, Pte. D.
 Gray, Pte. G. R.
 Gray, Sgt. H. W.
 Green, Pte. J. T.
 Green, Pte. W. F.
 Griffin, Pte. T. E. C.
 Grinnam, Pte. O. O.
 Gronheit, Pte. W. J.
 Guest, Pte. E.
 Gunn, Cpl. D. J.
 Hagan, Pte. A. M.
 Hall, Sgt. T. M.
 Hall, Pte. W. P.
 Hammond, Pte. J.
 Hancy, Pte. G. T.
 Hancy, Pte. S. T.
 Harbridge, Pte. W. W.
 Harding, Pte. H. T.
 Harding, Pte. W. O.
 Harland, Sgt. O.
 Harris, Pte. F.
 Hartley, Pte. J. N.
 Harvey, Pte. W.
 Haslam, Pte. H. J.
 Hayes, Pte. C.
 Hayes, Pte. L. A.
 Heal, Pte. C. F.
 Heard, Sgt. H. H.
 Hendrickson, Pte. J.
 Herd, Pte. D. H.
 Heywood, Pte. W. J.
 Hickey, Pte. M.
 Higgins, Pte. J. J.
 Hill, Pte. A.
 Hill, Pte. C. G.
 Hill, Pte. E. L.
 Hillam, Pte. H.
 Hipper, Cpl. J. D.
 Hodgetts, Pte. H. J.
 Hogan, Pte. R. F.
 Holgate, Pte. H. S.
 Holmes, Pte. A. E.
 Holmes, Pte. A. L.
 Hood, Pte. E. D.
 Hudson, Pte. E.
 Hyden, Pte. F.
 Irvine, Pte. F. J.
 Jackson, Cpl. T. R.
 Jenkins, Pte. H. T.
 Jennings, Pte. W. J.
 Johnson, Pte. A. J.
 Johnson, Pte. W. F. M.
 Jones, Pte. E.
 Jones, Pte. J. B.
 Jones, Pte. J. J.
 Jones, Pte. N. P.
 Jones, Pte. O. L. T.
 Jose, Pte. G.
 Kave, Pte. A. J.
 Kay, Pte. T. L.
 Kennedy, Pte. L. F.
 Kenny, Pte. M.
 Kimberley, Cpl. G. J. C.
 King, Pte. E. J.
 King, Pte. W. J. C.
 Kirwln, Pte. J.
 Knell, Pte. V. E.
 Knox, Pte. C. W.
 Lacey, Pte. H.
 Ladlow, Pte. W.
 Lambert Ellison, Pte.
 Lennon, Pte. J. A.
 Lennox, Pte. H. M.
 Lett, Pte. J. Mc.
 Lewis, Pte. E. W.
 Lewis, Pte. H.
 Liddell, Pte. S. J.
 Liddle, Pte. J.
 Lilley, Pte. W. J.
 Lingham, C.S.M. A. R.
 Livingstone, Cpl. F. D.
 Lothouse, L.-Cpl. J.
 Loggin, Pte. L. H.
 Lomasney, Pte. R. P. J.
 Love, Sgt. A.
 Lund, Pte. H.
 Luscombe, Pte. R.
 Lynch, Pte. J. E.
 McAlpine, Pte. J. W.
 McCarthy, Pte. J. F.
 McCellar, Pte. W. C. G.
 McClintock, Pte. J.
 McCready, Pte. D. W. M.
 McDonald, Pte. H.
 McDowell, Pte. W. R.
 McGannon, Pte. T. J.
 McIntyre, Cpl. R.
 McKean, Pte. J. M.
 McKean, Pte. W. J.
 McKinney, Pte. W. T.
 McLaren, L.-Cpl. A. H.
 McLaren, Pte. G. R.
 McMahon, Pte. M. J.
 McNaughton, Pte. P.
 McPherson, Pte. C. H.
 McVicars, Pte. J.
 Mack, Cpl. F. J.
 Maddalford, Pte. R. J.
 Maggs, Pte. A.
 Mann, L.-Cpl. J. N.
 Martin, Sgt. F. D.
 Martin, Pte. F. J.
 Martin, Pte. J. J. W.
 Martin, Pte. R. H.
 Marshall, Pte. G.
 Matthews, Cpl. M.
 Mayes, Pte. C.
 Membey, Pte. W. J.
 Merton, Pte. S. R.
 Menteboon, Pte. P.
 Miewand, Pte. E. E.
 Mills, Pte. H. G.
 Mitchell, Pte. J.
 Mitchell, Pte. R. G.
 Mitchell, Pte. W. H.
 Molen, Pte. J. W.
 Monkovitch, Pte. L.
 Moon, Pte. L. M.
 Moore, Pte. J. H.
 Moorfoot, Pte. P. E.
 Morieson, Pte. I. F.
 Morison, Pte. L.
 Morrish, Pte. L.
 Morrison, Pte. E. C.
 Morshead, Sgt. E. D.
 Muldoon, Pte. F. J.
 Moss, Pte. S. I.
 Napper, Pte. A.
 Narbinge, Pte. W. W.
 Neilson, Pte. C. O.
 Nelson, Pte. R. J.
 Nelson, Pte. W.
 Nichoff, Pte. T. C.
 Nicol, Pte. C. E.
 Nicolson, Pte. J. A.
 Nixon, Pte. S. L.
 Noakes, Pte. N.
 Nolan, Pte. J.
 Norton, Pte. E. L.
 O'Brien, Pte. E. E.
 O'Brien, Sgt. W. P./
 O'Donnell, Pte. S. R.
 O'Donnell, Pte. T.
 O'Donnell, Pte. W.
 Olley, Pte. S. A.
 Olive, Pte. C. A.
 Oliver, Pte. E. R.
 Olson, L.-Sgt. C.
 Olsen, Pte. O. L.
 O'Neill, Pte. F. J.
 Orgill, Sgt. E. A.
 Ormsby, Pte. P. M.
 Osborne, Pte. F.
 O'Shea, L.-Cpl. P. F.
 Outer, Pte. G. T.
 Palmer, Pte. A. S.
 Palmer, Pte. P. H.
 Parker, Pte. L.
 Parkin, Pte. F. J.
 Parry, Pte. F.
 Patterson, Pte. F. G.
 Patterson, Pte. L. N.
 Patterson, Sgt. R. G. E.
 Peers, Cpl. H. A.
 Pekin, Pte. W.
 Pellow, Cpl. G. J.
 Penny, Pte. E. M.
 Pike, Pte. C. H.
 Pilling, Pte. E.
 Pinne, Pte. N. E.
 Plunkett, Pte. P. T.
 Pollard, Pte. A.
 Pollard, Pte. H. G.
 Powell, Pte.
 Proctor, Pte. R. A.
 Rankin, Pte. W. J.
 Rawlings, Pte. W. R.
 Regelson, Cpl. G.
 Reid, Pte. J. A.
 Reid, Pte. W. F.
 Renwood, Pte. J. J.
 Ricardo, Pte. R. R.
 Richards, Pte. G.
 Rideout, Pte. L. C. S.
 Ridgeway, Pte. A. H.
 Riley, Pte. H.
 Roberts, Pte. C. W.
 Robertson, Pte. A. J.
 Robertson, Pte. D. C. L.
 Robertson, Pte. W. V.
 Rock, Pte. G. O.
 Rodwell, Pte. R. J. J.
 Ross, Pte. D. J.
 Ross, Cpl. J. H.
 Ross, Pte. J. W.
 Ross, Pte. R. W.
 Rosser, Pte. H. L.
 Rossie, Pte. E. W. S.
 Rowe, Sgt. P. E.
 Russell, Pte. L. J.
 Russell, L.-Sgt. W.
 Ryan, Pte. L. J.
 Sadler, Pte. E. J.
 Saunders, Pte. C. F.
 Seawell, Pte.
 Sceney, Pte. C. C.
 Schultze, Pte. E. A.
 Scoberg, L.-Cpl. J. T.
 Scott, Pte. R. J.
 Scrim-Geour, Pte. T.
 Seymour, Pte. F. C.
 Shaw, Pte. S.
 Shelly, Pte. P.
 Shimlick, Pte. W.
 Short, Pte. H.
 Sibley, Pte. R. I.
 Silver, Pte. C.

Other Ranks—cont.

Simpson, Pte. C. J.
Sims, Pte. W. G.
Single, Pte. W.
Skehan, Pte. H. T.
Smith, Pte. E. M.
Smith, Pte. F. P.
Smith, Pte. G. T.
Smith, Pte. H. R.
Smith, Pte. N. V.
Smith, Cpl. P. K.
Smith, Pte. W.
Speers, Pte. J. P.
Spooner, Cpl. G. W.
Stanford, Pte. A. S.
Stanley, Pte. G. S.
Stanton, Pte. F.
Starling, Pte. W. D.
Stephenson, Pte. T.
Stevenson, Pte. W. T.
Stewart, Sgt. H. A.
Stone, Pte. P. V.
Stopher, Pte. A. H.
Strachan, Pte. R. R.
Styles, Pte. H. A. E.
Swanson, Pte. A. E.
Swanton, Pte. H. J.
Tattersson, Pte. J. L.
Taylor, Pte. J. M.
Thomson, Pte. A.
Thomas, Pte. H. E.

Tebble, Pte. J. F.
Toner, Pte. J. C.
Torbiitt, Pte. F. D.
Tormey, Pte. M.
Travers, Pte. F. J. J.
Treble, Pte. G.
Tregoning, Pte. H. T.
Trigg, Sgt. J.
Trigg, Sgt. R. J.
Trinder, Pte. W.
Tuck, Cpl. A. G.
Tucker, Pte. G.
Tunbridge, Sgt. L.
Turner, Pte. M. T.
Tuttle, Pte. M. J.
Tyrrell, Pte. R. H.
Urwin, Pte. T. H.
Urquhart, T/Sgt. R. A.
Valb, Pte. R. C.
Vance, Pte. S. W. J.
Vick, Sgt. A. J.
Viek, Pte. W. G.
Walker, Pte. E. F.
Walsh, Sgt. J. A.
Ward, Pte. J. R.
Warnock, Pte. C.
Waterhouse, Pte. B. S.
Waters, Pte. E.
Waycott, Pte. R. V.
Webber, Pte. H. P.

Webster, Pte. L. E.
Weir, Pte. A. J.
Welshe, Pte. J. J.
Westbridge, Pte. W. P.
Westaway, Cpl. L. W.
Westmoreland, Pte. H. J.
Whelan, Pte. F. R.
Wilding, Pte. L.
Wilkin, Pte. E. F.
Wilkin, Pte. P. C.
Wilkinson, Pte. A. E.
Williams, Pte. C. E.
Williams, Pte. J. S.
Williams, Pte. T. E.
Williamson, Pte. A.
Wills, Pte. G. C.
Wills, Pte. R. J.
Wilson, Pte. J. H.
Woodcock, Pte. R. S.
Woods, Pte. C.
Woods, Pte. W. P.
Woodyard, C.S.M. A. G.
Worley, Pte. W. W.
Wotton, Pte. C. C.
Wright, Pte. C. J. T.
Wright, Pte. P. R. H.
Wyatt, Pte. W. T.
Young, Pte. H. E.
Young, Pte. W. B.
Younger, Pte. C. H.

30TH BATTALION

Officers

Wells, Maj. J. C.
Adams, Capt. E.
Hext, Capt. A. P.
Roberts, Capt. L. E. W.
Stephens, Capt. H. E.
Browne, Lt. D. L.

Davies, Lt. B. O.
Doust, Lt. H.
Fisk, Lt. S. H.
Gaskell, Lt. R.
Haig, Lt. G.
Lees, Lt. J. S.

Mitchell, Lt. A.
Murdoch, Lt. S. R.
Farker, Lt. J.
Richardson, Lt. E. H.
Rush, Lt. B. D.
Smithers, Lt. K.

Other Ranks

Abbott, Pte. E. W.
Adams, Pte. J.
Albertson, Pte. G. W. P.
Alexander, Pte. R. G.
Allsopp, Pte. T.
Anderson, Pte. P.
Arnell, Sgt. M. K. D.
Arkill, Pte. E. C.
Arnott, Pte. C. H.
Atkins, Pte. C. A.
Aubrey, Pte. A. A.
Auld, Pte. H. W. J.
Aulton, Pte. H.
Austin, Pte. E. G.
Bailey, Cpl. V. R.
Baker, Pte. C. E.
Baker, Pte. G.
Ball, Cpl. R. J. T.
Balsdon, Pte. J.
Balsdon, Pte. R. H.
Barnes, Pte. L. E.
Barrett, L.-Cpl. H. R.
Barry, Pte. M.
Benfield, Pte. V. L.
Bennett, Pte. W. A.
Benson, Pte. G. V.
Bewley, Pte. S. G. B.
Bickerton, C.S.M. L. B.
Bishop, Pte. J. E.
Blackman, Pte. N. B.
Blackwood, Pte. J.
Bolton, Pte. P.
Boorer, Pte. J. B.
Bourke, Pte. E. A.
Bourke, Pte. H. J.

Bourne, Pte. A. M.
Bourne, Pte. O. A.
Boyc, Pte. J. A.
Boys, Pte. W. T.
Bradshaw, Pte. R. M.
Brennan, Pte. W.
Bridgemoent, Pte. E. S.
Brien, Pte. H.
Briscoe, Pte. L. L.
Brooks, Pte. F. E.
Browne, Pte. G. T.
Browne, T/Cpl. O. D.
Brudelin, Pte. L. B.
Bryden, Pte. J. A. McG.
Buck, Pte. N.
Buis, Pte. W. M.
Bunting, Pte. C. R.
Burgess, Pte. C.
Burgess, Cpl. C. B.
Burke, Pte. W.
Burns, Pte. A. J.
Burns, Pte. W.
Butcher, Pte. A. E.
Butler, Pte. A. J.
Butler, Pte. G. A.
Burtsworth, Sgt. J. E.
Callaghan, Pte. J. P.
Callan, Pte. W. H.
Cameron, Pte. W. J.
Camps, Pte. A.
Carr, Pte. K. J.
Carratt, Pte. W.
Caswell, Pte. D.
Cather, Pte. A. E.
Chapman, Pte. J. W.

Church, Pte. C. C.
Churchill, L.-Cpl. W. E.
Clayton, Dvr. C. K.
Coady, Pte. E.
Coggan, Pte. G. G.
Collier, Pte. F.
Connors, Pte. W. J.
Cook, Pte. W. H.
Cooper, Pte. C. W.
Cooper, Pte. E.
Cooper, C.S.M. R. H.
Cooper, Pte. S. J.
Cooper, T/Cpl. W. H.
Cork, Pte. H. H.
Cormick, Pte. J.
Cornford, Pte. H. G.
Costello, Pte. J. L.
Cotterill, Pte. A. S.
Coutie, Pte. H.
Cowie, Pte. A. J.
Cox, Sgt. H. H.
Cozens, Pte. F. J.
Cracknell, Pte. D.
Cracknell, L.-Sgt. R. B. W.
Craih, Pte. H.
Croft, Pte. G.
Croker, Pte. H.
Curnow, Pte. T.
Curran (formerly Sherry), Sgt. F. J.
Dalton, Pte. C. B.
Dalton, Pte. W. H.
Davey, Pte.
Davies, Pte. T. H.
Davies, Pte. H.

Other Ranks—cont.

- Day, Pte. L. W.
 Deane, Pte. A. J.
 Dickson, Pte. J. D.
 Dobbie, Pte. J.
 Douglas, Pte. H. W. J.
 Dowling, Pte. S. J.
 Doyle, Pte. J. T.
 Drake, Sgt. V. H.
 Dryburgh, Pte. L.
 Dufferin, Pte. P. F.
 Duncan, Pte. R. G.
 Dunn, Pte. J. J.
 Dunn, Pte. T. P.
 Dunstan, Pte. T.
 Dykea, Pte. C.
 Earle-Yates, Pte. E. W.
 Easlea, Pte. R.
 Easton, Pte. T.
 Eccleston, Sgt. J. G.
 Edmunds, Pte. C. C.
 Edwards, Pte. J.
 Elms, Sgt. W. H.
 Ely, Pte. E. J.
 Eyles, Pte. H. J.
 Farmer, Cpl. A. G.
 Fawcett, L.-Cpl. C.
 Fenwick, Pte. H. G.
 Ferris, Pte. T. J.
 Fiddling, Pte. C.
 Flanagan, Pte. W.
 Foley, Pte. J. F.
 Ford, Pte. A. W. J. J.
 Fordham, Pte. L. O.
 Forester, Pte. P.
 Foster, Pte. A. P.
 Fowle, Pte. A. J.
 Fox, Pte. W.
 French, Pte. R. N.
 French, Pte. T. R.
 Funnell, T/Cpl. A.
 Gardner, Pte. H.
 Gark, Pte. A. B.
 Garland, Sgt. C. S.
 Gelling, Pte. P.
 Germon, Pte. G. T.
 Gillies, L.-Cpl. J. J.
 Gladstones, L.-Cpl. G.
 Glenn, L.-Cpl. F. J.
 Goodhead, Pte. T.
 Gowing, Pte. B. G.
 Graham, Pte. W.
 Graham, Pte. W. J.
 Grant, Pte. F. T.
 Grey, Pte. R. H.
 Gribble, Pte. C. J.
 Gulson, Sgt. N. N.
 Gunn, Pte. H. W.
 Haddrell, Pte. F. G.
 Haines, Pte. E. J.
 Hammence, Pte. E. G.
 Hanley, Pte. A.
 Hare, Pte. J.
 Harper, Pte. E. G.
 Hart, Pte. J.
 Hawcroft, Pte. C. H.
 Hawksford, Pte. T. H.
 Hayman, Pte. W. F.
 Hedges, Pte. L. J.
 Henderson, Pte. T. W.
 Hepple, Pte. M.
 Herman, Pte. M. P.
 Herps, Pte. R. H.
 Heycox, Pte. E. G.
 Hicks, L.-Cpl. H.
 Higgins, Pte. W. B.
 Hill, Pte. A. J.
 Hill, Pte. T.
 Hlndes, Pte. G.
 Holder, Pte. P. J.
 Holt, Pte. B. P.
 Housdon, Pte. D. J.
 Howard, L.-Cpl. A. E.
 Hulls, Pte. H. W.
 Hunter, Pte. R.
 Huntriss, Pte. A. H.
 Hutton, Cpl. D. M.
 Hyde, Pte. J. A. J.
 Inglis, Pte. W.
 Jackson, Pte. F. H.
 Jackson, Pte. J. W.
 Jones, Pte. E.
 Jones, Pte. E. J.
 James, Pte. A. M.
 Jones, Pte. H.
 Jones, Pte. J.
 Jones, Pte. J. A. V.
 Justice, Pte. A.
 Kean, Pte. W. F.
 Keeling, Pte. T. E.
 Keen, Pte. R. H.
 Kelly, Pte. J. R.
 Kendall, Pte. L. S.
 King, Pte. C. D.
 King, Pte. D.
 King, Sgt. E.
 King, Pte. E.
 Knight, Pte. L. S.
 Knight, Pte. W.
 Laing, Pte. D.
 Laity, Pte. E. R.
 Lamb, Pte. A.
 Lancaster, Pte. V. L.
 Lane, Pte. P. R.
 Lansdowne, Pte. L. R.
 Laurie, Pte. A. D. G.
 Layton, Pte. D. W.
 Leahy, Pte. R. J.
 Leask, L.-Cpl. E. G.
 Lee, Pte. E. V.
 Lees, Pte. T. J.
 Lewis, Pte. W.
 Lewitz, Pte. R. J.
 Lindsay, Pte. J. D. Mc.
 Lloyd, Pte. L. C.
 Lotthamer, Pte. H. W.
 Low, Cpl. A. A.
 Lowbridge, Pte. G.
 Love, Pte. G.
 Love, Pte. W.
 Lucre, Pte. G. H.
 Lyle, Pte. F. A.
 McBride, Pte. H.
 McCullough, Pte. H. G.
 McDonald, Pte. J. T.
 McGivern, Pte. J. B.
 McGowan, C.S.M. J. B.
 McGregor, Pte. T.
 McKenzie, Cpl. N.
 McKillip, Pte. D. J. D.
 McLennan, Pte. D.
 McLeod, Pte. A.
 McMahan, Pte. J. E.
 McNamara, Pte. J.
 McRoberts, Pte. W. L.
 McVeity, Pte. W.
 McWatt, Pte. J.
 Magner, Cpl. N.
 Malcon, Pte. E. S.
 Mann, Pte. G. S.
 Marriott, Pte. T. C.
 Marsh, Pte. E. W.
 Marshall, Pte. W. G.
 Martin, Pte. R. C.
 Martin, Pte. R. L.
 Matthews, Pte. A. F.
 Maxwell, Pte. A. R.
 May, Pte. A.
 Maynard, Pte. S.
 Meadowcroft, Pte. F.
 Meaker, Pte. E. E.
 Medhurst, Pte. W. E.
 Menzies, Q.M.S. E. S.
 Miller, Pte. J.
 Mills, Pte. R.
 Moody (formerly Minter), Pte. F. G.
 Moate, Pte. G. W.
 Monro, Pte. W. F.
 Moore, Pte. W.
 Moses, Pte. R. L.
 Morrison, Cpl. T. J.
 Morris, Pte. F. F.
 Morris, Pte. G. L.
 Munro, Pte. N. E. S.
 Murphy, Pte. J. J. F.
 Murray, Pte. A. G.
 Murray, Pte. C. W.
 Murray, Pte. R. G.
 Nelson, Pte. H. O.
 Newson, Pte. J. F.
 Nichols, Pte. F. J.
 Noonan, Pte. J. W.
 Olsen, Pte. H.
 Osmond, Pte. R.
 Owen, Pte. W. W. S.
 Packman, Pte. S. J.
 Page, Pte. C. R.
 Paine, Pte. A. R.
 Palfreyman (formerly Colmore), Pte. G. F.
 Pall, Pte. F. W.
 Parker, Pte. A. E.
 Parker, Pte. W. P.
 Parkinson, Pte. J.
 Passmore, Pte. H.
 Payne, Pte. E. L.
 Pearce, Pte. A. B.
 Pearce, Cpl. H. J.
 Pearce, Pte. H. J.
 Peberdy, Pte. F. T. S.
 Peck, Pte. R. P.
 Pedersen, Pte. C.
 Perkins, Pte. J. A. T.
 Perks, Pte. J.
 Phillips, Pte. A. F.
 Porter, Pte. L.
 Powell, Pte. W. T.
 Powis, L.-Cpl. C. E.
 Pratt, Cpl. C. H. H.
 Price, Cpl. D. J.
 Price, Pte. W.
 Price, Pte. W. G.
 Pritchard, Pte. H. E.
 Pritchard, Pte. L. G.
 Provan, T/Cpl. L.
 Pye, Pte. A.
 Rankin, Pte. D. P.
 Rawcliff, Pte. A.
 Rawnsley, Pte. A. A.
 Read, Pte. M. R.
 Reeves, Pte. J.
 Rich, Pte. D. C.
 Ring, Pte. J. A.
 Rixon, Pte. T. S.
 Roams, Pte. J.
 Robbins, Pte. G.
 Robinson, Pte. C. R.
 Robinson, Pte. H. F.
 Robinson, Pte. H. J.
 Robson, Pte. C. E.
 Rose, Pte. J. E.
 Ross, Pte. F.
 Ross, Pte. W. P.
 Rowley, Pte. H. L.
 Rowley-Collier, Pte. F.
 Ryan, Pte. D. B.
 Ryan, Pte. P. E.
 Ryan, Pte. W. S.
 Sales, Pte. W. H.
 Sanderson, Pte. B.

Other Ranks—cont.

Sandham, Pte. P.
 Sandry, Pte. F. J.
 Saunders, Pte. J. P.
 Savage, Pte. M. J.
 Savell, Pte. E. J.
 Schmitzer, C.S.M. T. J.
 Scott, Pte. W. F.
 Scragg, Pte. A. G.
 Seader, Pte. J. S.
 Severs, Pte. C. B.
 Sharp, Pte. C.
 Sheehan, Pte. J.
 Shone, Pte. E.
 Sinclair, Pte. J. T.
 Sloan, Pte. E. T.
 Smith, Pte. A. J. (3255).
 Smith, Pte. A. J. (3386).
 Smith, Pte. C. H.
 Smith, Pte. D. J.
 Smith, Pte. G. C.
 Smith, Pte. H. L.
 Smith, Pte. J. D.
 Smith, Pte. J. J.
 Smith, Pte. W.
 Smith, Pte. W. J.
 Sparkes, Pte. J. E.
 Speed, Pte. H.
 Speedie, Pte. T. A.
 Spence, Pte. M.
 Springett, Pte. G.
 Staines, Pte. W.
 Stanborough, Pte. E. A. L.
 Stanley, Pte. G. S.

Steele, Pte. A. H.
 Stephens, Pte. L. A.
 Stevenson, Pte. T.
 Stuart, Pte. R. H.
 Tarrant, Pte. J.
 Tasker, Pte.
 Taylor, L.-Cpl. E. V.
 Taylor, Pte. R. M.
 Teakel, Pte. C.
 Thaxter, Pte. A.
 Thelning, Pte. W. P. P.
 Thesinger, Pte. N. L.
 Thomas, Pte. W. F.
 Thompson, Pte. A. J.
 Thomson, Cpl. A.
 Tlckner, Pte. F.
 Tisbury, Pte. C. F.
 Tisdell, L.-Cpl. L. S.
 Treleaven, Pte. L. T.
 Tucker, Pte. C. W.
 Turner, Pte. J.
 Vale, Cpl. T. G.
 Vincent, Pte. L. S.
 Wall, Pte. J. D.
 Wakeling, Pte. H.
 Warby, Pte. H. A.
 Ward, Pte. C.
 Ward, Pte. P. M.
 Warrington, Pte. J. D.
 Watkins, Pte. J. H.
 Watson, Cpl. J. H.
 Watson, Pte. R. E.
 Watterson, Sgt. R.

Watts, L.-Cpl. A. G.
 Watts, Pte. B.
 Watts, Sgt. H. G.
 Watts, Pte. T.
 Watts, Pte. W. L.
 Webb, Sgt. A.
 Webb, Pte. W. H.
 Webster, Pte. A. H.
 Welling, Pte. C. F.
 Weston, Pte. T.
 White, Pte. R.
 Whitton, Pte. J. D. G.
 Williams, Pte. A. E.
 Williams, Pte. J. J.
 Willis, Sgt. E. E.
 Wilson, Pte. G. W.
 Wilson, Pte. J.
 Windred, Pte. A. G.
 Wishart, Pte. J. H.
 Wood, Pte. A.
 Woods, Pte. C. A.
 Woolbridge, Cpl. H. V.
 Woolley, Pte. S. C.
 Woolsey, Pte. F. A.
 Woolston, Pte. W. J.
 Worboys, Sgt. A. L.
 Wright, Pte. H.
 Wymark, L.-Cpl. R. D.
 Wynn, Pte. J. C.
 Yardy, Pte. R. A.
 Yeates, Pte. N. K. H.
 Yeo, Pte. C.
 Yeomans, Pte. R. T.

31ST BATTALION

Officers

Clements, Maj. C. E.
 Hibbs, Capt. R. K.
 Robertson, Capt. G. C.
 Blackley, Lt. T. A.
 Brodie, Lt. J. G.
 Buchanan, Lt. L.
 Chute, Lt. C. H.
 Coutts, Lt. C. C.
 Cox, Lt. H.

Danaher, Lt. J.
 Elton, Lt. H. (formerly Skelton, G.)
 Gair, Lt. I. N.
 Gamble, Lt. J. S.
 Larnach, Lt. L. N.
 Nancarrow, Lt. R. C.
 Ranson, Lt. J. R.

Rose, Lt. E. C.
 Spreadborough, Lt. E. W.
 Synnott, Lt. B. P.
 Corcoran, 2/Lt. G. F.
 Hudson, 2/Lt. A.
 Rule, 2/Lt. J. L.
 Springfield, 2/Lt. E.
 Wilthew, 2/Lt. H. W.

Other Ranks

Alsthorpe, Pte. J. H.
 Aitkin, Pte. C. R.
 Alder, Pte. R.
 Aley, Pte. F. R.
 Alsbury, Pte. T. W.
 Anderson, Pte. A. C.
 Anderson, Pte. L. W.
 Anderson, Pte. F.
 Anderson, Pte. R.
 Andrew, Pte. J. A.
 Anthony, Pte. L.
 Arnold, Pte. W. J.
 Arthur, Pte. W.
 Athol (formerly Percival), Pte. P. T. H.
 Atkinson, Pte. J. B.
 Bannister (formerly Muire), Pte. J. W.
 Baker, Pte. W. H.
 Bailey, Pte. W.
 Bain, Pte. W. E.
 Bainbridge, Pte. R. B.
 Barnett, Pte. H. E.
 Barnett, Pte. T.
 Barnes, Pte. E. J.
 Barry, Pte. W.
 Bartley, Pte. W. G.
 Bayley, Pte. W. J.
 Baynes, Pte. F. L.

Baxter, Pte. T.
 Beard, Pte. W. H.
 Bean, Pte. R. A.
 Beattie, Pte. T. A.
 Ball, Pte. A. C.
 Bell, Pte. A. J.
 Bell, Cpl. A. R.
 Beseler, Pte. G. H.
 Bews, Pte. W.
 Bickford, Cpl. L.
 Binnell, Pte. S. K.
 Bills, Pte. T. H.
 Binfield, Pte. G. T. H.
 Bligh, Pte. E. P.
 Bloomfield, Cpl. B.
 Bodycoat, Pte. H. W.
 Bogg, Pte. E.
 Bolitho, Pte. T.
 Boor, Pte. W. D.
 Bowen, Pte. L. J.
 Bowers, Pte. A. J. L.
 Bradley, Pte.
 Brallsford, Pte. W. W.
 Brandie, Pte. W. J.
 Branot, Pte.
 Bray, Pte. F. D.
 Brett, Pte. A. J.
 Bridge, L.-Cpl. A.
 Brooke, Cpl. J. J.

Broom, Pte. S.
 Brown, Pte. C. C.
 Brown, Pte. J. E.
 Bruce, Cpl. J. D.
 Bruce, Pte. L. A.
 Brumby, Pte. W. C.
 Bugden, Pte. P.
 Burrell, Pte. R.
 Burt, Pte. C. E.
 Burton, Pte. J. E.
 Butcher, T/Sgt. A. J.
 Byrne, Pte. W.
 Campbell, Cpl. D. M.
 Campbell, Pte. J.
 Cannon, Pte. F. J.
 Carstens, Pte. W.
 Carter, Sgt. J. H.
 Cartwright, Pte. A. L.
 Casey, Pte. C. V.
 Cash, Pte. F. H.
 Castles, Pte. W. E. J.
 Castoldy, Pte. F.
 Caughey, Pte. R.
 Chadwick, Pte. F.
 Chalk, Pte. H. F.
 Chapman, Pte. J. E.
 Charles, Pte. L. G.
 Charter, Sgt. A.
 Chatfield, Pte. J.

Other Ranks—cont.

- Cherry, Pte. E. E.
 Christensen, Pte. J. W.
 Church, Pte. P. C.
 Clarke, Pte. A. S.
 Clarke (formerly Gay), Pte. E.
 Clarke, Pte. W. D.
 Close, Cpl. H. N.
 Coghlan, Pte. J.
 Cognet, Pte. J.
 Collins, Pte. P.
 Collier, Pte. A. A.
 Conyers, Pte. E. F.
 Cornish, L.-Cpl. H. M.
 Cork, Pte. E. E.
 Cox, Pte. F.
 Coyne, Sgt. D. E.
 Craigs, Pte. M.
 Crawford, Pte. N. M. M.
 Cravino, Pte. E. J.
 Cryan, Pte. S. J.
 Cuddihy, Pte. J. T.
 Cullen, Pte. W.
 Cullinan, Cpl. P. J.
 Cummings, Pte. A. D.
 Cummings, Sgt. G. W.
 Cummings, Pte. M.
 Curran, Pte. J. J.
 Currie, Pte. C. N.
 Cuthbertson, Pte. A. B.
 Dangri, Pte. N.
 Daley, Pte. L. R.
 Dank, Pte. C. C.
 Dann, Pte. G. R.
 Davey, Cpl. C. G.
 Davey, Pte. H. H.
 Davies, Sgt. B.
 Davies, Pte. W. A.
 Davis, Pte. D. B.
 Davis, Sgt. D. J. R.
 Davison, Pte. J.
 Delacey, Pte. W. C.
 Denton, Pte. R. G.
 Dodson, Pte. H. E.
 Dolan, Pte. S. T.
 Dolan, Pte. T.
 Dolan, Pte. T. G.
 Dorrell, Pte. G.
 Downes, Pte. H.
 Downing, Sgt. J. F.
 Douglas, Sgt. G.
 Dubbo, Pte. H.
 Duffey, Pte. A. J. F.
 Dunbar, Pte. G. L.
 Dunn, Pte. J.
 Dunn, Pte. L. C.
 Dunne, Pte. E. B.
 Dunningham, Pte. F.
 Durkin, Pte. J.
 Eales, Pte. A. R.
 Eavns, Pte. W.
 Emery, Pte. F. L.
 Erickson, Sgt. W. W.
 Esam, Pte. H.
 Evans, Pte. W.
 Eyckens, Pte. A. E.
 Face, Pte. J. J.
 Falle, Pte. H.
 Farrell, Pte. J. S.
 Farrell, Pte. R. L.
 Fillet, Pte. A. E.
 Fitzgerald, Pte. V. E.
 Fitzpatrick, Pte. F. J.
 Flanders, Pte. C. H.
 Fleming, Sgt. F. R. J.
 Fleet, Pte. A. E.
 Floyd, Pte. C. F.
 Ford, L.-Cpl. P.
 Ford, Pte. R. E.
 Ford, Pte. T. H.
 Forrest, Pte. H.
 Foster, Pte. C. C.
 Francis, Sgt. A. E.
 Francis, Pte. H. W.
 Francis, Pte. W. J.
 Fraser, L.-Sgt. A. K.
 Fraser, Pte. L. M.
 Freckleton, L.-Sgt. W. J. T.
 Furneyauil, Dvr. E. J.
 Furston, Pte. W. R.
 Gaden, Pte. N.
 Gadsby, Pte. S. H.
 Gale, Pte. M.
 Gall, Pte. W. G.
 Gard, Dvr. W. E.
 Gavin, Pte. J.
 George, L.-Cpl. W. H.
 Gill, Pte. H. J.
 Gillard, Pte. A. W. G.
 Gillanders, A/Cpl. D.
 Glassey, Pte. W.
 Gloyer, Pte. H. J.
 Goodwin, Pte. L. J.
 Gough, Pte. T. J.
 Goulding, Pte. J. J.
 Grace, Pte. J.
 Grace, Pte. W. A.
 Graham, Pte. D. L.
 Graham, Pte. T. B.
 Grange, Pte. R. E.
 Grant, Pte. A. G.
 Grant, Pte. G. M.
 Grant, Pte. H.
 Gray, Pte. D.
 Green, Pte. F. H.
 Greening, Pte. J. G.
 Greenshields, Pte. C.
 Griffin, Pte. A. L.
 Griffiths, Pte. E. B.
 Griffiths, Pte. W. A.
 Gwynn, Pte. D. I.
 Hale, Pte. N. A.
 Hall, Pte. R. L.
 Hamilton, Pte. F. J.
 Hamilton, Pte. J. H. N.
 Hamilton, Pte. R.
 Hampson, Pte. M. F.
 Hannan, Pte. R. E.
 Hardy, Pte. J. C.
 Harker, Pte. R. H.
 Harris, Pte. W. H.
 Harrison, Pte. C. F.
 Harvey, Pte. S. G.
 Harvey, Pte. W.
 Hassed, Pte. J. M. B.
 Hastings, Pte. P. E.
 Hay, Pte. G.
 Hays, Pte. J. W.
 Healy, Pte. W. J.
 Heaney, Pte. G. H.
 Heard, Q.M.S. A.
 Heath, L.-Cpl. T. A.
 Hetherington, Pte. A.
 Hibbert, L.-Cpl. A. G.
 Higgs, Pte. L. F.
 Higgs, Pte. W. A.
 Hill, Pte. R. (696).
 Hill, L.-Cpl. R. (1591).
 Hicks, Pte. W.
 Hicks, Pte. W. S.
 Hoar, L.-Cpl. H. R.
 Hook (formerly Cook), Pte. J.
 Holland, C.S.M. E.
 Holland, Pte. T.
 Holley, L.-Cpl. C.
 Holmes, Pte. A. C.
 Holmes, Pte. C. G.
 Holmsen, Pte. F.
 Hopkins, Sgt. L. R.
 Horne, L.-Cpl. G.
 Houghton, Pte. R.
 Howard, Pte. J. T.
 Howard, Pte. R. J.
 Hughes, Cpl. W. W.
 Humphrey, Pte. F. W.
 Hunt, Pte. T. V.
 Hyams, Pte. S.
 Hyde, Pte. T.
 Jackson, Cpl. E. F.
 Jacob, Cpl. T. G.
 Jamieson, Pte. W. A.
 Jarvis, Pte. A. E.
 Jeffery, Pte. W. G.
 Jenkins, Pte. A. C.
 Jenkins, Pte. C. H.
 Jenkins, Pte. S.
 Jenkinson, Pte. C.
 Jenns, C.S.M. H. C.
 Jensen, Pte. A. P.
 Jessop, Pte. A. G.
 Johnson, Pte. A. E.
 Johnson, Pte. A. J.
 Johnson, L.-Cpl. R.
 Johnson, Pte. W. F.
 Johnston, Cpl. S. J.
 Jolly, Pte. P. P.
 Jolly, Pte. W. C.
 Jonce-Hoyer, Pte. C.
 Jones, Pte. T. W.
 Jordan, Pte. S. M.
 Joseph, Pte. D. De T.
 Kane, Pte. E. J.
 Kean, Pte. L. M.
 Keen, Cpl. E. J.
 Keen, Pte. J. V.
 Kelly, Pte. F. C.
 Kelly, Pte. P.
 Kelynack, Pte. W. H.
 Kendall, Cpl. H. M. H.
 Kerridge, Cpl. C. N.
 Kilfoyle, Cpl. A. G.
 King, Pte. F. J.
 King, Pte. G.
 King, Pte. H.
 King, Pte. S. B.
 King, Pte. W. H.
 Kipple, Pte. J. M.
 Kirkaldy, Pte. T. D.
 Kirwan, Cpl. A.
 Klug, Pte. G.
 Klump, Pte. L.
 Knight, Pte. J.
 Koening, Pte. T. J.
 Laidlaw, Pte. E. R.
 Landrigan, Pte. M. D.
 Lansdowne, Pte. C.
 Lanyon, L.-Cpl. C. J.
 Larkins, Pte. J. J.
 Larsen, Pte. W. L.
 Law, Pte. E. M. V.
 Layerick, Pte. B.
 Lee, Pte. H. A.
 Leeder, Pte. W.
 Legel, Pte. F. H.
 Leigh, Pte. A. D.
 Linton, Cpl. A.
 Long, Pte. N. A. J.
 Lyman, Pte. F. J.
 Lynn, Pte. T.
 Lyons, Pte. T. J.
 Mabin, Pte. H.
 Macfarlane, Pte. A.
 Mackay, R.Q.M.S. J. A.
 Mackenzie, Sgt. A.
 Mackie, Pte. I. E.
 McCandless, Cpl. D.
 McCarrroll, Pte. H. S. H.
 McCool, Pte. O. W.
 McCormack, Pte. J.
 McDougall, Pte. D. G.
 McDougall, Sgt. N. A.

Other Ranks—cont.

McDonald, Pte. A.
 McDonald, Pte. C. G.
 McDonald, Pte. D.
 McDonald, Pte. J. A.
 MacDowall, Pte. T. L.
 McFarlane, Pte. A.
 McFarlane, Pte. B. H.
 McIntosh, Pte. J. A.
 McKenzie, Sgt. A.
 McKenzie, Pte. O. A.
 McLean, Pte. J. B.
 McLeod, Pte. H. McD.
 McMath, Pte. G. F.
 McMillian, Pte. E. J. O.
 McMurdo, Pte. L. C.
 McNulty, Pte. J. F.
 McPherson, Sgt. J. J.
 McReynolds, Pte. F.
 Magson, Pte. A.
 Mallam, Pte. P.
 Mann, Pte. H. W.
 Marcus, Pte. R.
 Martin, Pte. J. A.
 Mason, Pte. J. L.
 Mates, Pte. H.
 Meacham, Pte. R. E.
 Mead, Pte. H. W.
 Medhurst, Pte. H. J.
 Meehan, Pte. J. T.
 Meskell, Pte. J. T.
 Meyts, Pte. J. J.
 Middleton, Pte. A. R.
 Millard, Pte. G. P.
 Milward, Pte. W.
 Minett, Pte. E. C.
 Moodie, Pte. D. H.
 Moor, Pte. C.
 Moffat, Cpl. J.
 Moran, Pte. S. G. W.
 Morgan, Pte. C.
 Morgan, Pte. G.
 Morley, Pte. C.
 Morrison, Pte. D. A.
 Mullins, Pte. T. H.
 Murphy, Pte. H. P.
 Murray, Pte. J. R.
 Naismith, Pte. J. R.
 Nevill, Pte. J. H.
 Newcombe, Pte. A. B.
 Newman, Pte. A.
 Nichol, Pte. E.
 Nickols, Pte. S. A.
 Nuttall, Pte. L.
 O'Brien, Pte. J.
 O'Donoghue, Pte. H. P.
 O'Keefe, Pte. J. C.
 O'Neil, Pte. J. P.
 Oliver, Pte. S.
 Oisen, Pte. A.
 O'Rourke, Pte. C.
 Ostwald, Pte. J. A.
 Otterspool, Pte. F. J.
 Page, Pte. W. P.
 Parker, Pte. E. T.
 Parkes, Pte. H.
 Pascoe, Pte. J. M.
 Paton, Pte. A. A.
 Peak, Pte. S. G. B.
 Pearson, Pte. G. C.
 Perham, Pte. T. G.
 Perrin, Pte. H. E.
 Peters, Pte. W. L.
 Phillips, Pte. H.
 Plummer, Cpl. H. R. D.
 Power, Pte. T.
 Prime, Pte. G.
 Prior, Pte. W. J.
 Purcell, Pte. J. W.
 Putman, Pte. D. W.
 Pye, Pte. W. L.
 Quinton, Pte. R. E.
 Radford, Pte. J. C.
 Rae, Pte. N. H.
 Rasmussen, Pte. H.
 Rawlings, Pte. F.
 Rayner, Pte. J. A.
 Redfern, Pte. S.
 Reeves, Pte. A. E.
 Reid, Sgt. W.
 Reinhold, Pte. T.
 Reschke, Pte. R.
 Revill, Pte. W. J.
 Rles, Pte. R. H.
 Riley, Pte. H.
 Robbins, Cpl. E. G.
 Roberts, L.-Cpl. D. A.
 Roberts, Pte. W. J.
 Robertson, Pte. R.
 Robertson, Pte. W. C.
 Robinson, Pte. A. H.
 Robinson, Pte. S. L.
 Robson, Pte. R. T.
 Rodda, Pte. B. P.
 Rodgers, Pte. W. J.
 Rogers, Pte. G. E.
 Rooney, Pte. P. B.
 Rose, Pte. G. H.
 Ross, Pte. W.
 Rowland, Pte. R.
 Rowlands, Pte. W. R.
 Ruffell, Pte. J. F.
 Ruggier, Pte. A. J.
 Russell, Pte. R.
 Ryall, Pte. H.
 Ryan, Pte. J.
 Ryan, Sgt. J. P.
 Ryan, Cpl. W. P.
 Sadler, Pte. H.
 Sandilands, Pte. J. J.
 Saunders, Cpl. N. H.
 Sawers, Pte. R.
 Scanlan, Pte. T. P.
 Scheffe, Pte. H. C.
 Scott, Pte. A. M.
 Sexton, Pte. J.
 Shadforth, Pte. G. S.
 Shaw, Cpl. F. C.
 Shaw, Pte. H. A.
 Shelvy, Pte. J. F.
 Shoemark, Pte. L.
 Sheppard, Pte. W.
 Simmons, Pte. W. T.
 Simpson, Pte. J. Y.
 Simpson, Pte. L. W.
 Sinclair, Pte. W. B.
 Sinnamon, Pte. A. W.
 Sliimon, Pte. R. McR.
 Smith, Pte. B.
 Smith, Pte. C. J.
 Smith, Pte. H. W.
 Smith, Pte. J.
 Smith, Pte. J. R. (4815A).
 Smith, Pte. J. R. (3983).
 Smith, Pte. L.
 Smith, Pte. T.
 Smyth, Pte. W. R.
 Sorensen, Pte. S. C.
 Spence, Pte. J.
 Stanbury, Pte. S.
 Steel, Pte. E.
 Stephens, Pte. A. F. B.
 Stevens, L.-Sgt. W.
 Stiles, Pte. A.
 Stilgoe, Pte. W.
 Stoddart, Pte. W.
 Stoodley, Pte. C. F.
 Stratford, Pte. H. T.
 Stratham, Pte. G.
 Stubbins, Pte. L. H.
 Suffolk, Pte. J. J.
 Sutherland, Pte. G.
 Symonds, L.-Cpl. A.
 Symonds, Pte. E.
 Tanner, Pte. R.
 Tapsall, Pte. E. J.
 Taylor, Pte. E.
 Taylor, Pte. W.
 Tedford, Pte. T. H.
 Tegart, Pte. H. L.
 Terrens, Pte. A. J.
 Thomas, Pte. J.
 Thomas, Pte. W.
 Thompkins, Pte. H. N.
 Thompson, Pte. R.
 Thompson, Cpl. S.
 Thornburrow, Pte. E. J. J.
 Tice, Pte. G.
 Tidswell, Pte. W. D.
 Tinsley, Sgt. J.
 Todd, Pte. R.
 Tolly, Pte. T. H.
 Tozer, L.-Cpl. E. W.
 Treader, Pte. L. H.
 Treble, Cpl. A. G.
 Treherne, Pte. G. R.
 Treloar, Pte. H. T.
 Trusson, Pte. H.
 Varty, Pte. J. T.
 Vickers, Pte. H. G.
 Vioent, Pte. J. M.
 Wall, Pte. C. F.
 Wallace, Pte. C.
 Wallis, Pte. E. G.
 Walker, Pte. V. L.
 Warby, Pte. C. F.
 Ward (formerly Hayward), Pte. J.
 Walsh, Pte. L. G.
 Walsh, Pte. T.
 Washington, Pte. D.
 Watson, Pte. S.
 Weakley, Pte. P.
 Weir, Pte. J. A.
 Wells, Pte. W. A.
 Welsh, Pte. A. J. J.
 Westbury, Pte. C. A.
 Whelan, Cpl. N. J.
 Wheldon, Pte. W.
 White, Pte. F. G.
 Widt, Pte. P. C.
 Wilde, Pte. T.
 Wilkie, Pte. D.
 Wilkinson, Cpl. S.
 Williams, Pte. A. E.
 Williams, Pte. A. F. M.
 Williams, Pte. F. P.
 Williams, Pte. J.
 Willis, Pte. H. V.
 Wils, Dvr. W. J.
 Wilmer, Pte. J. H.
 Wilson, Pte. A.
 Wilson, Pte. O. W.
 Wilson, Pte. W. O.
 Wood, Pte. J. J.
 Woodburn, Pte. P.
 Woodman, Pte. G. A. C.
 Woodman, C.S.M. H. G.
 Wright, Pte. A.
 Young, Pte. G.

32ND BATTALION

Officers

Higgon, Maj. J. A.
Mills, Capt. S. E. G.
Rogers, Capt. A. T.
Chinner, Lt. E. H.
Hagan, Lt. T. P.
Huiks, Lt. F.
Ion, Lt. J.

Johnson, Lt. E. C.
Nelson, Lt. F. M.
Sargent, Lt. M. S.
Sinclair, Lt. A. C.
Tench, Lt. and Q.M. G. T. K.
Benson, 2/Lt. J.
Cutts, 2/Lt. E. L. S.

Davey, 2/Lt. A. I.
Duxbury, 2/Lt. L. V.
Galloway, 2/Lt. A. H.
Griffen, 2/Lt. R. T.
Pateron, 2/Lt. A.
Towers, 2/Lt. T.
Wheaton, 2/Lt. G.

Other Ranks

Allan, L.-Cpl. G.
Allen, Pte. W. G.
Allengame, Pte. P. H. D.
Alexander, Pte. J. S.
Ambler, Pte. J. L.
Anderson, Cpl. A. B.
Anderson, Pte. A. O.
Anderson, Pte. C. C.
Anderson, Pte. J.
Anderson, Pte. L.
Anderson, Pte. P. M.
Andreas, Pte. N. E. R.
Andrews, Pte. E. B.
Applebee, Pte. E. R.
Arnold, T/Cpl. W. E.
Arscott, Pte. V. P.
Ash, Pte. C. N.
Atholl, Pte. P. T.
Atkinson, Pte. E. R.
Atkinson, Cpl. J. W.
Attwell, Sgt. F. R.
Babington, Pte. H. T.
Backler, L.-Cpl. A. R.
Bagnell, T. F. R.
Balrd, T/Sgt. J.
Baldrey, Pte. A. E.
Ball, Pte. A. E.
Bampton, Pte. H. J.
Barber, Pte. W.
Barns, Pte. A. I.
Bartlett, Pte. C. E.
Bartlett, Pte. J.
Bartley, Pte. F. H.
Bassett, Pte. L. J.
Bates, Pte. H. S.
Batt, Pte. A. G.
Baumann, Sgt. O. E.
Baxendale, Pte. H. W.
Barr, Sgt. B.
Bellinger, Pte. A. S. R. J.
Bennett, L.-Cpl. A.
Benton, Pte. G. R.
Best, Pte. F. A.
Bethune, Pte. J.
Bickhoff, Pte. J. S.
Bishop, Sgt. F. J.
Bishop, Sgt. G.
Bislands, Pte. J. R.
Black, Pte. C. T.
Black, Pte. J. H. A.
Blacksell, Pte. W. R.
Blain, Pte. E. J.
Blann, Pte. W.
Blott, Pte. H. W.
Bollard, Pte. A. M.
Bonnard, Pte. E. H. C.
Bonney, Pte. G. E.
Bontoft, Pte. F. G.
Bosville, Sgt. H.
Boswell, Pte. J. H.
Bottrall, Pte. J.
Boyce, Pte. W.
Bourke, Pte. J. P.
Brady, Pte. A. P.
Brand, L.-Cpl. W. C.
Bray, Pte. A. E.
Brealey, Pte. S. T.

Brecknow, Pte. A. A.
Bridger, Pte. A. E.
Brigden, Pte. G. E.
Briggs, Pte. W. R.
Bright, Pte. R. A.
Brimage, Sgt. H.
Brand, Pte. W. C.
Brooks, Pte. A. E.
Brough, Pte. N. J.
Broughton, Pte. A.
Brown, Pte. L. G.
Bruhn, Pte. W. C.
Bull, Pte. W. S.
Burbidge, Sgt. H. J. C.
Burchell, Pte. C. H.
Burford, Pte. A. H.
Burford, Pte. A. R. E.
Burne, Pte. R. N.
Burnett, Pte. A. J.
Burrows, Pte. H.
Butler, Pte. F.
Butler, Pte. T.
Byrne, Pte. J.
Byrne, Pte. N. E.
Cain, Cpl. V. E.
Cameron, Pte. A. W.
Cameron, Pte. I. A.
Cameron, Pte. P.
Cann, Pte. S. J.
Carrail, Pte. L. McN.
Carson, Pte. D. G.
Carson, Pte. V. H.
Carter, Pte. D.
Cartwright, Pte. T. C.
Castle, Pte. L. G.
Cavender, Pte. C.
Challinger, Pte. P. G.
Chandler, Pte. P. G.
Chapman, Pte. W. D.
Chase, Pte. L.
Chatfield, Pte. A. G.
Choat, Pte. A. P.
Choat, Pte. R. H.
Choat, Pte. R. H.
Christinger, Pte. J.
Clark, Pte. F. J.
Clarke, Pte. F. W.
Clarke, Pte. T. J.
Claxton, Pte. M. J.
Clayer, Pte. E. A.
Coates, Pte. S. C. R.
Cochrane, Pte. W. J. L.
Cockrell, Cpl. R.
Collis, L.-Sgt. F. J.
Collins, Pte. E. W.
Cooke, Pte. W. H.
Cooper, Pte. E. W.
Coote, Pte. N. I.
Cope, Pte. A. S.
Cope, Pte. G. W.
Cope, Pte. W. V.
Corigliano, Pte. M.
Cormack, Pte. H. W.
Cotching, Pte. G. A.
Counsell, Pte. C. G.
Cowan, Pte. J.
Cowland, Pte. J. J.

Cowland, Pte. W. H.
Cowley, Pte. R. W. G.
Crankshaw, Pte. W.
Crawford, L.-Cpl. J. A.
Creedon, Pte. J. V.
Crisp, Pte. W. G.
Critchley, Pte. H. P.
Crocker, L.-Cpl. J. E.
Crompton, Pte. J.
Croser, Pte. W. G.
Crossman, Cpl. G. L.
Culshaw, Pte. J.
Cunningham, Pte. J. P.
Curgenven, Cpl. C.
Curtin, Pte. F. N.
Daniel, Pte. J. H.
Daniels, Pte. L. G.
Davenport, Pte. L. N.
Davidson, Pte. D. H.
Davies, Pte. T. L.
Davison, Sgt. E. D.
Davy, Pte. D. W.
Dawe, Cpl. W. S.
Dawes, Pte. A. J. S.
Day, Pte. A. L.
Day, Pte. W. H.
Deane, L.-Cpl. J.
Dearlove, Pte. T. A.
Dennis, L.-Cpl. S. W.
Dew, Pte. A.
Dewhurst, Pte. G. B.
Dibben, Pte. J. A.
Dillon, Pte. M. N. H.
Dimmick, Sgt. T. H.
Dix, Pte. B. G.
Dodd, Pte. F.
Donaldson, Pte. A. S.
Doody, Pte. M.
Dornauf, Pte. A.
Drake, Sgt. N. H.
Drane, Pte. A.
Dunstan, Pte. P. P.
Dubois, L.-Cpl. B.
Dwyer, Pte. P. F.
Dyke, Pte. T. D.
Easton, Pte. E.
Edgley, Pte. B.
Edwards, Pte. T.
Elliott, Pte. W. E.
Ellis, Pte. C. S.
Ellis, Pte. A. J.
Emblem, L.-Sgt. C. E.
Emery, L.-Sgt. E. S.
Evans, Pte. R.
Evellard, Pte. F.
Feldt, Pte. J. J.
Ferguson, Pte. A. P.
Fiebert, Pte. E. A.
Fielden, Pte. S.
Finney, Pte. C. L.
Fisher, Pte. C. C.
Fisk, L.-Cpl. L. T.
FitzGerald, Pte. L. H.
Flower, Pte. R. J. C.
Fraser, Pte. A. H.
Furze, Pte. R. A.
Ga'e, Pte. H. J.

Other Ranks—cont.

Gamlen, Pte. C. N.
 Gare, Pte. N. L.
 Gentner, Pte. W.
 George, Pte. H. G.
 Gerhardy, Pte. G. A.
 Gibbs, Pte. T.
 Gibney, Pte. G. S. D.
 Gilbert, Pte. W.
 Gill, L.-Cpl. A. G.
 Gillett, Pte. A. E.
 Gillispie, Pte. F.
 Gladwell, Pte. H.
 Grant, Pte. P. D.
 Graves, Pte. J.
 Gray, Pte. C. G. H.
 Gray, Pte. E. C.
 Gray, L.-Cpl. M.
 Green, Cpl. R. C.
 Greenfield, Pte. P.
 Greenwood, Pte. P. J.
 Greay, Pte. D. B.
 Griffen, Pte. J. J.
 Griffiths, Pte. G. A.
 Griffiths, Pte. R. C.
 Gudopp, Pte. E. C.
 Gully, Cpl. K. J.
 Gully, Pte. T.
 Haines, Pte. W. W.
 Hall, Pte. M. A.
 Hamlyan, Pte. J. R.
 Hammond, Pte. G. A.
 Hanlan, Pte. E. J.
 Hann, Pte. E. G. W.
 Harland, L.-Cpl. C. G.
 Hart, Cpl. L. W.
 Hayes, Pte. S. J.
 Hazell, Pte. H. H.
 Heath, Pte. W. V.
 Henderson, Pte. C. S.
 Henderson, T/Cpl. R.
 Hendry, Pte. W. C.
 Hennessy, Pte. W. J.
 Hever, Pte. W.
 Hill, Pte. C. A.
 Hill, Dvr. G.
 Hill, Pte. J. T.
 Hill, Cpl. F. V.
 Hoban, Pte. K. A.
 Hobbs, Sgt. K. H.
 Hocking, Pte. N.
 Hoffman, L.-Cpl. C. R.
 Hogan, Pte. W. E.
 Hogarth, Pte. C.
 Holle, Pte. H.
 Hollings, Pte. W. C.
 Hollow, Pte. J.
 Holmes, Pte. A.
 Holt, Pte. P. B.
 Holzberger, Pte. H. W.
 Hood, Cpl. V. C. R.
 Hook, Pte. R. S. W. H.
 Hopper, Pte. C. L.
 Honey, Pte. G.
 Hornby, Pte. W. I.
 Hough, Pte. S.
 Hounslow, L.-Cpl. A. B.
 Hughes, Pte. T.
 Humphris, Cpl. B.
 Hunt, Pte. T.
 Hunter, Pte. D.
 Hutchinson, Pte. J. W.
 Ingram, Sgt. J.
 Ingram, Pte. V. R.
 Irving, Pte. A. W. I.
 James, Pte. C. A.
 Jameson, Pte. R. W.
 Jarman, Cpl. E. H.
 Jarrett, T/Cpl. J.
 Jeffrey, Pte. A. H.
 Jenkinson, Pte. F. J.
 Jennings, Pte. C. A.
 Jergens, Pte. E. W.
 Johnson, Pte. E. H.
 Johnston, Pte. E.
 Johnston, L.-Cpl. F. D.
 Jolly, Pte. D. C.
 Jones, Pte. R. O.
 Jose, Pte. H. N.
 Joyce, Pte. J.
 Judd, Pte. E. C.
 Judge, Pte. C. F.
 Keating, Pte. W.
 Keller, Pte. V. D.
 Kelly, Cpl. G. E. A.
 Kemp, Pte. H.
 Kent, Dvr. W. C.
 Kennard, Pte. V. A.
 Kennedy, C.Q.M.S. B. St. J.
 Kennedy, Pte. J.
 Kingsley, Pte. J.
 Kirby, Pte. N. A.
 Knable, Pte. A. T.
 Knight, Pte. A. R. Y.
 Korber, L.-Cpl. A.
 Lacey, Pte. S.
 Langdon, Pte. G.
 Larking, Pte. D. A.
 Larwood, Pte. W. J. F.
 Lawrence, Pte. H. H.
 Lawrence, Pte. H. N.
 Lawrence, Pte. H. T.
 Lanyon, Pte. C. J.
 Laylor, Pte. D. M.
 Lee, Pte. J. T.
 Lemon, Pte. P. E.
 Lewis, Pte. W.
 Liddington, Cpl. H. G.
 Liddle, Pte. R.
 Linton, Pte. N. R.
 Little, Pte. E.
 Little, Pte. J.
 Loader, Pte. F. O.
 Lockyer, Pte. P.
 Lodge, Pte. W. S.
 Low, Pte. D.
 Lovibond, Cpl. S. G.
 Lovick, Pte. L. L.
 Lydeamore, Pte. J. A.
 Lydiate, Pte. F. W.
 Lynch, Pte. J. B.
 Lynch, Pte. T. F.
 Mack, Pte. H.
 Maddock, Pte. P. E. A.
 Magor, Pte. R. H.
 Mahoney, Pte. S. N.
 Malsch, Pte. H. A.
 Martin, Pte. A. P.
 Martin, Pte. F. K.
 Mason, Pte. E. J.
 Matthews, Pte. H. K.
 Matthews, Pte. P. R.
 Maudsley, Pte. R. T.
 Maxwell, Pte. J. W.
 MacKenzie, Pte. G. H.
 MacKnight, Pte. J.
 McArthur, Pte. D. J.
 McArthur, Pte. R.
 McDowell, Sgt. J.
 McCarthy, Pte. I.
 McCarthy, Pte. J. T.
 McCagh, Pte. P.
 McCann, Pte. T.
 McCrossin, Pte. A. J.
 McCulloch, Pte. A.
 McGoldrick, Pte. P.
 McGrath, Pte. P. A.
 McGregor, L.-Cpl. P.
 McGregor, Pte. W. G.
 McGuinness, Pte. C. H.
 McKenzie, Pte. A. McG.
 McKenzie, Pte. J. G.
 McLaughlin, Pte. H.
 McLean, Pte. A.
 McLean, Pte. H.
 McNeess (formerly Mackness),
 Pte. H.
 McPhee, Pte. W. J. C.
 Meakins, Pte. W. L.
 Meggs, L.-Sgt. R. J.
 Millar, Pte. G. H.
 Miller, Cpl. G. L.
 Miller, Cpl. H.
 Miller, Pte. H. G. J.
 Minter, Pte. C. H.
 Mitchell, Sgt. J.
 Mitchell, Pte. A. J.
 Moir, Pte. H. S.
 Mold, Pte. C. E.
 Monphlaite, Pte. A. V.
 Moore, L.-Cpl. A. E.
 Moore, Pte. W. R.
 Morgan, Pte. R. J.
 Morphet, Cpl. A. H.
 Morris, Pte. G. H.
 Morrison, L.-Cpl. F. R. S.
 Mortimore, Pte. P.
 Morton, Pte. J.
 Mossop, C.S.M. V. W.
 Muller, Pte. L. A. W.
 Muller, Pte. A. W.
 Muller, Pte. C. B.
 Mundy, Pte. A. H.
 Murdoch, Pte. W. H. W.
 Murphy, Pte. J. P.
 Murphy, Pte. J. T.
 Murray, Pte. H. A.
 Mutton, Pte. R. D. E.
 Neilson, Pte. C. C. A.
 Neville, T/Cpl. W.
 Newman, Pte. A. C.
 Nicholson, Pte. A. F.
 Nicholson, Pte. G. M.
 Nicolle, Pte. H. G.
 Nilson, Pte. O.
 Oates, L.-Cpl. C. N.
 O'Brien, Pte. J. P.
 O'Connell, Pte. M.
 O'Donnell, Pte. M. E.
 O'Donnell, Pte. W. L.
 O'Leary, Pte. H.
 O'Leary, Pte. J. J.
 Olifent, Pte. P.
 Omerod, Pte. J. E.
 O'Neill, Pte. O. R.
 Osborn, Pte. F. G. W.
 Owlter, Pte. N.
 Oyston, Pte. F. J. Mc. M.
 Packendorff, Pte. J. A.
 Page, Pte. A. E. R.
 Page, Pte. J. W.
 Palmer, Pte. W. J.
 Parham, Pte. E. W.
 Pascoe, Pte. L.
 Paul, Pte. H.
 Payne, T/Cpl. C.
 Pearce, T/Cpl. F. S.
 Pearce, Sgt. J.
 Perlich, Pte. W. D.
 Perry, Pte. A. M.
 Petersen, Pte. P.
 Pilnam, Pte. R. H.
 Philp, Pte. J. L.
 Pierce, Pte. H. D.
 Pillon, Pte. P. J.
 Pitt, Pte. H. C.
 Pittock, Pte. H. W.
 Plunkett, Pte. C. F.
 Polle, Pte. J. L.
 Polkinghorne, L.-Cpl. S.
 Pollard, Pte. A. M.

Other Ranks—cont.

Potts, Pte. J. W.
 Powell, Pte. B.
 Pretty, Pte. W. H.
 Price, Pte. A. W.
 Price, Pte. S. E.
 Prior, T/Cpl. W. S.
 Pugsley, Cpl. H. E. R.
 Purser, Cpl. A. H.
 Putland, Pte. A. S.
 Quintrell, Pte. R. H.
 Radke, Pte. O. A.
 Randall, Pte. H. J.
 Randell, Sgt. R. B.
 Read, Pte. P. H.
 Redman, Pte. L.
 Reid, Pte. M. L.
 Reidel, Pte. J. B.
 Renton, Cpl. W. A.
 Richards, C.Q.M.S. G. H.
 Ridler, Pte. S. T. J.
 Ritter, S.-Sgt. R. H.
 Roberts, Cpl. A. W.
 Rosenthal, Pte. C. H. R.
 Ross, Pte. M.
 Rostron, Pte. G. H.
 Rowe, Pte. J.
 Rowley, Pte. P. R. L.
 Rowntree, Pte. J. L.
 Rundle, Pte. H. C. E.
 Russell, Pte. P. E.
 Ryan, Pte. E. J.
 Sampson, Pte. B.
 Sandford, Pte. F. W.
 Sando, Sgt. L. H.
 Searle, Pte. H.
 Secomb, Pte. L. D.
 Sedunary, Pte. P. C.
 Scott, Pte. H.
 Scott, Pte. R. G. M.
 Shaw, Pte. H.
 Shepherd, Pte. C. F.
 Shepherd, Pte. E. W. D.
 Shields, Pte. J.
 Simon, Pte. V. G.
 Simpson, Pte. W. F.
 Simpson, Pte. W. S.
 Sinclair, Pte. H. J.
 Sinigear, L.-Cpl. A. G.
 Smith, Pte. A. G.
 Smith, Pte. C. G. G.
 Smith, Pte. E. C.
 Smith, Pte. F. W.
 Smith, Pte. J. B.
 Smith, Pte. P. E.
 Smith, L.-Cpl. T. J.
 Smith, Pte. W.
 Smith, Pte. W. A. E.
 Smith, Pte. W. J.
 Snook, Pte. G.
 Soans, Pte. B.
 Soloman, Pte. M.
 Sommerley, Pte. M.
 Sowter, Pte. C. C. S.
 Sparks, Pte. W. G.
 Spurling, Pte. W. J.
 Standley, Pte. F. W.
 Staples, Pte. E. L.
 Starkey, Pte. H. T.
 Stead, Pte. J. R.
 Steele, Pte. J. N.
 Steer, Pte. H. A.
 Stokes, Pte. A. J.
 Stokes, Cpl. R. W.
 Stone, Pte. W. W.
 Stonehouse, Pte. H. W.
 Stott, Pte. G. T.
 Stranger, Cpl. A. T.
 Stuart, Pte. J. H.
 Stutley, Pte. J. E.
 Sutton, L.-Cpl. W.
 Swanton, Pte. H. T.
 Symes, Pte. H. E.
 Taylor, Pte. F. K.
 Tester, Pte. R.
 Thomas, Pte. A.
 Thomas, L.-Sgt. A.
 Thompson, Pte. A.
 Thomson, Pte. D. C.
 Thorpe, Pte. S. H.
 Thorsheim, Pte. O. N.
 Tomlin, Pte. R.
 Towers, Pte. H. J.
 Tregilgas, Pte. F. M.
 Trezona, Sgt. H. A.
 Tucker, Pte. W. C.
 Turner, Pte. H.
 Tymons, Sgt. J. P.
 Underwood, Pte. R. W.
 Veale, C.S.M. D. F.
 Vickers, Cpl. W.
 Vincent, Pte. E. A.
 Virgin, Pte. R. L. H.
 Voce, Pte. L.
 Wahlstedt, L.-Cpl. C.
 Waldin, Pte. G. H.
 Walker, Sgt. J.
 Wall, Pte. L. G.
 Wallace, Pte. C.
 Waller, T/Cpl. W. A.
 Wallis, Pte. A. A.
 Wallis, Pte. V.
 Walsh, Pte. R. A.
 Warner, L.-Cpl. E. A.
 Warren, L.-Cpl. C. H.
 Waters, Pte. R. L.
 Watterson, L.-Cpl. W.
 Watts, L.-Cpl. H. A.
 Webber, L.-Cpl. A. R. B.
 Webber, L.-Cpl. H. R.
 Wehrmann, L.-Cpl. J. T.
 Weir, L.-Cpl. W. C.
 Welsh, L.-Cpl. L. J.
 Welsh, L.-Cpl. F. O.
 Westlake, L.-Cpl. G.
 White, L.-Cpl. G. L.
 Whitehead, L.-Cpl. A.
 Whittaker, L.-Cpl. C. D. V.
 Wilkins, Pte. E.
 Williams, Pte. C. A.
 Williams, Pte. D. E.
 Williams, Pte. J. R.
 Williamson, Pte. J. C.
 Wilson, Pte. B.
 Wilson, Sgt. H.
 Wilson, Pte. H. R.
 Wilson, Pte. H. W.
 Wilson, T/Cpl. V. H. B.
 Wilson, Pte. W. W.
 Wisslesworth, Pte. K. L.
 Winter, Pte. A. V.
 Witheridge, Pte. A. R.
 Wither, Pte. C. C.
 Woodcock, Pte. J.
 Woodham, Pte. E.
 Woodhouse, Pte. D.
 Worthington, Pte. A. G.
 Wortley, Pte. H. J.
 Wray, Pte. A. W.
 Wuntrell, Pte. J. A.
 Zachariah, Pte. D. H. M.

8TH LIGHT TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY

Officer

Ranson, Lt. T. R.

Other Ranks

Andrew, L.-Cpl. C. D.
 Bannister, Pte. J. P.
 Beaton, Pte. L. R.
 Booth, Pte. H. C.
 Cameron, Pte. J. A.
 Cooper, Pte. G.
 Dunncliffe, Pte. R. D.
 Flindell, Cpl. F. R.
 Frith, Cpl. S. C.
 Furneyvall, Pte. E. J.
 Garrat, Pte. A. J.
 Griffiths, Pte. E. P.
 Guthridge, Pte. G. S.
 Hawley, Sgt. P. F.
 Hughes, Pte. F. W.
 Hunter, Pte. H. D.
 Hustler, Pte. T.
 Howells, Pte. F. C.
 Jones, Pte. G. A.
 Mann, Pte. A.
 Marriott, Pte. A. R.
 McKae, Pte. J. S.
 Morgan, Sgt. J. K.
 Neilson, Pte. C. O.
 Pitfield, Gnr. V. H.
 Ridley, Pte. R. N.
 Roberts, Pte. C. W.
 Rose, Pte. H. J. D.
 Sorell, Pte. E. T.
 Speed, Pte. H.
 Stoate, Pte. R. J.
 Taylor, Pte. E. A.
 Ward, Pte. W.
 Wase, Pte. V. P.
 Woodcock, Pte. J.

8TH MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Officers

Ansell, Lt. H. A.
 Basedow, Lt. F. N.
 Fyfe, Lt. A. H. P.
 Scouler, Lt. M. A.

DEATHS

443

Other Ranks

Abbott, Pte. E. H.
Anderson, Pte. L. G.
Atkinson, Sgt. W.
Bayley, Cpl. A.
Beamish, Pte. E. D.
Bennett, Pte. G.
Bergin, Pte. E. P.
Berwick, Pte. C. T.
Briggs, Pte. R. W.
Bruderlin, Pte. A. J.
Buckley, Dvr. D. F.
Burnett, Pte. G.
Cannon, Sgt. R. G.
Carnegie, Pte. W. L.
Clarke, Pte. B. H.
Coe, Dvr. W. H.
Coman, Pte. W. G.
Copley, Pte. A. W.
Cravins, Pte. E. H.
Davies, Pte. J. E. L.
Deveson, Pte. F. W.
Dingle, Pte. F. W. O.
Ferrier, Pte. J.
Gale, Pte. S. W.
Gilmour, Pte. D.
Haggis, Pte. J. T.
Harriss, Pte. J. W.
Harvey, Pte. W. E.

Hatcher, Pte. A. M.
Hawksford, Pte. T. H.
Henderson, Pte. E. O.
Hill, Pte. W. J.
Holgate, Pte. H. G.
Huxley, Pte. S. L.
Ings, Pte. P. E.
James, Pte. L. M.
Kendall, Pte. F. S.
Kirk, Pte. R.
Knight, Pte. L. J.
Laity, Pte. E. R.
Lane, Pte. W. D.
Litster, Pte. A. B.
Makeham, Pte. J. J.
Maxwell, Pte. L. R.
McKinnon, Cpl. J.
Milhuich, Pte. A.
Mills, Dvr. H. J.
Milton, L.-Cpl. R. C.
Molineux, Pte. S. L.
Moran, Pte. J.
Mugg, Pte. R. W.
Murphy, Pte. F. H.
Oldfield, Pte. F. J.
Padman, Pte. C. S.
Pearce, Pte. W. S.
Perez, Pte. G.

Pullen, Pte. W.
Rawley, Pte. P. R. L.
Regan, Pte. A.
Rhodes, Pte. W.
Richardson, Pte. H.
Ross, Pte. J. V.
Russell, Sgt. W.
Shelly, Pte. P.
Shillabeer, Pte. W. L.
Skimmings, Pte. W.
Smith, Pte. J.
Smith, Pte. L. J.
Stevens, Pte. W.
Stratford, Pte. G. E.
Taylor, Pte. C. E.
Tinsley, Pte. S. V.
Turnbull, Pte. J.
Turner, Pte. A. L.
Vincent, Pte. K. J.
White, Pte. C. R.
Whittaker, Pte. H. P.
Wilsdon, Cpl. A. M.
Wisnred, Pte. A. S.
Wiseman, Pte. H. G. F.
Yelland, Pte. A.
York, Pte. J. W.
Young, Pte. T. J.

14TH BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

Other Ranks

Jackson, Pte. M. W.

53RD BATTALION

Officers

Crowshaw, Lt.-Col. O. M.
Norris, Lt.-Col. I. B.
Sampson, Maj. V. H. B.
Arblaster, Capt. C.
Francis, Capt. T.
Johnson, Capt. C. A.
Wilson, Capt. W. E.
Wilson, Capt. W. G.
Allan, Lt. G. E.
Aithouse, Lt. E.

Anslow, Lt. R.
Collier, Lt. C. T.
Cooper, Lt. A. W.
Correy, Lt. A. O.
Davies, Lt. L.
Jefferson, Lt. J. M.
Jennings, Lt. W. C.
Lamerton, Lt. W. L.
Lane, Lt. L. W.

Moffitt, Lt. H. L.
Mudge, Lt. G. E.
Nelson, Lt. B.
Noble, Lt. W. M.
Paulin, Lt. H.
Pratt, Lt. A. E.
Ralph, Lt. P. E.
Rickard, Lt. T. N.
Shearwood, Lt. E. M.

Other Ranks

Abbott, Pte. D. R.
Adams, Pte. A.
Adams, Pte. E.
Adams, Pte. H.
Adams, Pte. J.
Aherm, Pte. J. A.
Alchin, Pte. W. E.
Allanson, Pte. T. H.
Allen, Pte. F. J.
Allen, Pte. G. W.
Allsop, Pte. F. W.
Anderson, Pte. A. A.
Anderson, Cpl. A. P.
Anderson, Pte. F. C.
Anderson, Pte. J. A.
Andrews, C.Q.M.S. A. M.
Armstrong, Pte. G. F.
Ashton, Pte. E.
Aspinall, Pte. F.
Atkinson, Pte. W.
Auhl, Pte. A. W.
Austin, Pte. W. J.
Ayre, T/Cpl. C.
Ayson, Pte. F. H.
Back, Pte. R. C.

Bacon, Pte. W. J.
Balley, Pte. G.
Bainbridge, Pte. J. A.
Baker, Pte. A. E.
Baker, Pte. E. M.
Baker, Pte. T. N.
Baldwin, L.-Cpl. E. Y.
Baldwin, Pte. F.
Ballantyne, Pte. J. G.
Bancroft, Pte. H. W.
Barracks, Sgt. R. G.
Barrie, L.-Cpl. W. P.
Bartley, C.Q.M.S. H.
Battese, Pte. C. H.
Beare, Pte. R. J.
Beck, Pte. W. S.
Bell, Pte. C. F.
Bell, Pte. W. G.
Bennett, Pte. A. L.
Bentley, Pte. J. W. W.
Birch, Pte. W. H.
Bird, Pte. C.
Black Sgt. A. J.
Blandford, Pte. F. R.
Blomfield, Pte. F. G.

Bolton, Pte. A. R.
Booth, Pte. W. S.
Borthwick, Pte. D. D.
Bottrell, Pte. A.
Bourne, Pte. C. J.
Bowder, Pte. T.
Boyd, Pte. W.
Bradley, Pte. E. W.
Brady, Pte. T.
Breech, Pte. F. W.
Brennan, Pte. P. A.
Brewer, Pte. C.
Brewer C.S.M. H.
Brookhouse, Pte. R.
Bromley, Pte. A. C.
Bromley, Pte. S. R.
Brown, Pte. C.
Brown, Pte. N. E.
Brown, Pte. T. W.
Browning, Pte. V.
Bruce, Pte. A. K.
Bryant, Pte. J. B.
Bryant, Pte. T. S.
Bryson, Cpl. J. B.
Buckland, Sgt. F. A.

Other Ranks—cont.

- Buckley, Pte. J. J.
 Bugg, Pte. L. J.
 Brandy, Pte. W. J.
 Burns, Sgt. A. H.
 Bush, Pte. J. H.
 Byrne, Pte. J. A.
 Cairns, Pte. J. D.
 Caldwell, Pte. B.
 Cameron, Pte. A.
 Camp, Sgt. J. W.
 Capper, Pte. A. M.
 Carey, Pte. J. G.
 Carey, Pte. P. J.
 Carey, Pte. T. J.
 Carmichael, Pte. R. A.
 Casimir, Pte. L. A.
 Casson, Pte. J.
 Cathcart, Pte. M. R.
 Chapman, Pte. E. C.
 Childland, Pte. F.
 Chenworth, Dvr. T.
 Chopping, L.-Cpl. S. D.
 Christie, Pte. J. C.
 Chuck, Pte. F. J.
 Clark, Pte. J.
 Clarke, Pte. G. W.
 Clarke, Pte. J. B.
 Clarke, Pte. C. T.
 Clifford, Pte. A. J.
 Clifton, Pte. T. B.
 Clinsan, Pte. A. S.
 Coady, Dvr. R.
 Coe, Pte. J. H. A.
 Collins, Pte. P. J.
 Collman, T/Cpl. R. H.
 Comb, Pte. K. J. F.
 Comerford, Pte. M.
 Commins, Pte. F. B.
 Commins, Pte. F. B.
 Connell, Pte. W. J.
 Connor, Pte. E. T.
 Costin, Pte. J.
 Coutts, Pte. J. W.
 Coxon, Pte. W. T.
 Cook, Pte. J. E.
 Cooke, Pte. S. E.
 Cooper, Pte. T. H.
 Coote, Pte. C. C.
 Craig, Pte. G.
 Cram, Pte. W. J.
 Creswick, Pte. F. J.
 Croker, Sgt. J. E. B.
 Crossman, Pte. W.
 Croucher, Pte. W. R. E.
 Cruickshank, Pte. R.
 Cullen, Pte. W. F.
 Cummings, Pte. F. W.
 Curran, Pte. T.
 Daley, Pte. G. E.
 Dark, Pte. A. W.
 Dark, Pte. G. H.
 Darwood, Pte. H. J.
 Davies, Pte. F.
 Davies, Pte. J. D. (formerly
 Driver, Pte. J. L.).
 Davies, Pte. J. I.
 Davies, Pte. R. D.
 Davis, Pte. F. J.
 Dawson, Pte. G. A.
 Day, Pte. W.
 Delaney, Pte. S. H.
 Dewhurst, Pte. G. H.
 Dickson, Pte. T. J.
 Dight, Pte. J. C.
 Dixon, Pte. F.
 Dobbie, Pte. H.
 Dobbins, Pte. H. J.
 Dodd, Pte. R.
 Doherty, Pte. T. P.
 Downie, Pte. E. L.
 Drane, Pte. S.
 Druce, A/Cpl. A. A.
 Duffecy, Pte. T. E.
 Duncan, Pte. J. A.
 Dunn, Pte. W.
 Eamens, Pte. G. A.
 Edgley, Pte. W.
 Edgworth, Pte. R. I.
 Edwards, Pte. C. W.
 Edwards, Pte. J. D.
 Edwards, Pte. W. O.
 Elaus, Pte. C. H.
 Evans, Pte. F.
 Evans, Pte. W. F.
 Fair, Pte. H. S.
 Feenan, Pte. P.
 Ferguson, Pte. A.
 Ferguson, Pte. J. E.
 Field, T/Cpl. J.
 Finlay, Pte. D. J.
 Fitzjohn, Pte. C. S.
 Freeman, Pte. H. E.
 Fleming, Pte. H. J.
 Fletcher, Pte. W. A.
 Foran, L.-Cpl. V. C.
 Forbes, Pte. A. J.
 Forbes, L.-Cpl. C. N.
 Forland, Pte. R. C.
 Foster, Sgt. R. T. R.
 Foulser, Pte. P. J.
 Fry, Pte. W.
 Fryer, Pte. C. H.
 Fuller, Pte. F. A.
 Fulton, L.-Cpl. R. J.
 Gale, Pte. B.
 Gallagher, Pte. A. E.
 Gallagher, Pte. T.
 Gane, Pte. G. T.
 Gardiner, Pte. A. G.
 Gardiner, Pte. B.
 Gardiner, L.-Cpl. C. D.
 Gavel, L.-Cpl. S. J.
 Gearing, Pte. P.
 Gibbs, T/Cpl. O. R.
 Gilfin, Pte. W. B.
 Gilbert, Pte. A.
 Gilligan, Pte. W.
 Gilmore, Pte. J. E.
 Glaister, Pte. D.
 Godden, Pte. A. R.
 Godding, Pte. F. H.
 Gollan, Pte. S. J.
 Gordon, Pte. A. E.
 Gordon, Cpl. S. W.
 Goodwin, Sgt. A. E.
 Goold, Pte. J.
 Grant, Pte. J. H.
 Green, Pte. A. J.
 Green, Pte. E. C.
 Grice, Pte. B. S.
 Griffiths, Pte. A. G.
 Griffiths, Pte. T.
 Grimmond, Pte. R. P.
 Gunnell, Cpl. J. L.
 Haddock, Pte. A.
 Hall, Pte. J.
 Hall, Pte. A.
 Halliday, Pte. A. T.
 Hamer, Pte. T.
 Hammond, Pte. D. P.
 Harden, Pte. W. H.
 Harper, Cpl. C. O.
 Harris, L.-Cpl. F. C.
 Harvey, Pte. R. E.
 Haskins, Pte. W. G.
 Hatchett, Pte. P. F.
 Hawkins, Pte. W. J.
 Hawley, Pte. M.
 Hayward, Cpl. A. F.
 Head, Pte. K.
 Heath, Pte. S.
 Heaton, Pte. W. H.
 Hepburn, Pte. R. J.
 Hepburn, Pte. W.
 Henry, Pte. F. H.
 Herbert, Pte. S. G.
 Herbert, L.-Cpl. W. H.
 Herlihy, Pte. W. B.
 Hewit, Pte. S. P.
 Hicks, Pte. E. G.
 Hickson, Pte. E. G.
 Higginson, Pte. S. P.
 Hilborne, Pte. W. N.
 Hill, Pte. F.
 Hill, Sgt. C. S.
 Hill, Pte. G. R. T.
 Hillsdon, Pte. F. T.
 Hillary, Cpl. A. U.
 Hindley, Pte. A. R.
 Hinge, Pte. E. A.
 Hodgkinson, Pte. H.
 Holman, Pte. F. C.
 Hopwood, Pte. C.
 Howatson, Pte. C.
 Hubbard, L.-Cpl. E. A.
 Hudson, Pte. R.
 Hudson, Pte. T.
 Humphris, Pte. R. H.
 Hungerford, Pte. G. W.
 Ingle, Pte. W.
 Ingram, Pte. S. E.
 Ismay, Pte. J.
 Jackson, Pte. C. T.
 Jackson, Pte. J. F.
 James, Sgt. C. H.
 Jefferey, Pte. J.
 Jenkin, Pte. J. S.
 Jenkins, Pte. R.
 Jennings, Pte. C. W.
 Jentzen, L.-Sgt. E. A.
 Jobson, Pte. W.
 Johnson, Pte. A. C. D.
 Johnston, Pte. F.
 Johnston, Pte. G. H.
 Johnston, Pte. R. H.
 Jones, Pte. W. A.
 Joyce, Pte. P. J.
 Judd, Sgt. W. H.
 Judson, Sgt. E. W.
 Kafer, Pte. F.
 Kearney, Cpl. P. R.
 Keenan, L.-Cpl. J. P.
 Kellaway, Pte. G. G.
 Kelly, Pte. H.
 Kemp, Pte. L. M.
 Kendall, Pte. W. J.
 Kennedy, Pte. V.
 Kentwell, Pte. G. S.
 Kidd, Pte. T. H.
 King, Pte. C.
 Kilburn, Pte. W.
 Knight, Pte. F.
 Kullerheim, Pte. J.
 Laing, Pte. W. L.
 Landsler, Pte. E. L.
 Lannen, Pte. A. P.
 Larkin, Pte. J.
 Larsen, Pte. C. H. R.
 Latham, Pte. A. H.
 Lawler, Pte. E.
 Lawler, Pte. T. J.
 Lawrence, Pte. J.
 Lawson, Pte. S.
 Lawson, Pte. W. R.
 Layton, Pte. C. H.
 Lee, Pte. P. H.
 Lee, Pte. J. F.
 Legate, Pte. C. M.
 Lemaître, Pte. H. W.
 Leslaighter, Pte. A. E.

Other Ranks—cont.

Lester, Pte. C. H.
 Levy, Pte. L. H.
 Lillindal, Pte. A.
 Littlejohn, Pte. J. B.
 Logan, Pte. R. T.
 Loney, C.S.M. F. W.
 Loudon, Pte. J. A.
 Lucas, Pte. T. O.
 Lyons, Pte. J.
 Lyons, Pte. J. W.
 Lyons, Pte. T. D.
 Mackenzie, Pte. D. R.
 Madge, Pte. S. W.
 Maher, Pte. T. J.
 Main, Pte. A. E.
 Mainger, Pte. N.
 Major, Pte. R.
 Mannion, Pte. W.
 Manuels, Sgt. G. S. H.
 Mara, Pte. W. E.
 Marshall, Pte. C. L.
 Marshall, Pte. J.
 Marshall, Pte. T. J.
 Martin, Pte. A. R.
 Martin, Pte. W.
 Martin, Pte. W. B.
 Masson, Pte. H.
 Masson, Pte. W. M. D.
 Mathers, Sgt. T.
 Mathison, Pte. J.
 Maynard, Pte. A. E.
 McArdle, Pte. R. F.
 McCullach, Pte. E.
 McDonald, Pte. D. S.
 McDougall, Pte. K. J. D.
 McFarlane, Pte. R.
 McGinley, T/Cpl. E.
 McGrath, Pte. D.
 McGregor, Pte. R.
 McGuinness, Pte. R. W.
 McHugh, Pte. R. B.
 McIntosh, Pte. D.
 McKay, Pte. A. J.
 McKay, Pte. S. T.
 McKay, Pte. N.
 McKenzie, Pte. A. G.
 McKenzie, Pte. D. E.
 McKenzie, Pte. T. J.
 McKinnon, Pte. A. G.
 McKinnon, Pte. J.
 McLean, T/Sgt. L.
 McLeod, Pte. J.
 McLeod, Pte. S. J.
 McLeod, Pte. W. E.
 McLennan, Pte. M.
 McLoughlin, Pte. J.
 McMahon, Pte. W.
 McManus, Pte. E. A.
 McPherson, Pte. W. T.
 McSpeddon, Pte. G. A. D.
 McWilliam, Pte. A.
 Mead, Cpl. F. C.
 Meads, Pte. F.
 Mears, Pte. S. J.
 Meloy, Pte. S. A.
 Memes, Pte. J. W. S.
 Meyres, Pte. A. E.
 Miles, Pte. J. H.
 Miller, Pte. J. F.
 Miller, L.-Cpl. T.
 Milne, Pte. J. S.
 Mingonie, Pte. R. H.
 Mitchell, T/Sgt. C. F.
 Moate, Pte. P. G.
 Moore, Pte. W.
 Moran, Pte. J.
 Morey, Pte. G. M.
 Morrice, Pte. G. H.
 Morris, Pte. J. A.
 Morrison, Pte. M. J. L.
 Moylan, Pte. V. N.
 Mudford, Pte. A. E.
 Muir, Pte. J. W.
 Munro, C.S.M. S.
 Murphy, Pte. P.
 Murray, L.-Cpl. L. B.
 Neil, Sgt. R.
 Nelson, Pte. S. W.
 Newman, Pte. B. F.
 Nicholl, Pte. J. W.
 Nicholl, Pte. L.
 Nulty, Pte. B.
 O'Brien, Pte. J.
 O'Brien, Pte. J. P.
 O'Donnell, Pte. W.
 O'Reilly, Pte. B. J.
 O'Rourke, Pte. J.
 O'Ryan, Pte. S.
 O'Sullivan, Pte. P.
 Ohlson, Pte. A. O.
 Oliver, Pte. R. V.
 Outlaw, Pte. W. S.
 Owston, Pte. V. M.
 Oxenham, Pte. J. M.
 Pain, Pte. R.
 Paling, Pte. C. J. D.
 Paimer, Pte. C. B.
 Palmer, Pte. P.
 Parkin, Pte. J.
 Parkinson, Pte. E. G.
 Paterson, Sgt. W. H.
 Patterson, Pte. P. J.
 Parton, Pte. R.
 Pavay, T/Sgt. A. R.
 Pearse, Sgt. N. W.
 Peat, Pte. W. H.
 Peel, Pte. C. H.
 Pegrum, Pte. W. H.
 Pendleton, Pte. R.
 Pennell, Pte. F. J.
 Percy, Pte. R. J.
 Perran, Pte. A. H.
 Peterie, Pte. E. C.
 Pett, Pte. E. F.
 Phillips, Pte. J. P.
 Phillips, Pte. W. H.
 Philp, Pte. S.
 Pickburn, Pte. R. D.
 Pickering, A/Cpl. S.
 Pike, Pte. R.
 Pilkington, Pte. F.
 Pinchin, Pte. L.
 Plumb, Pte. R. J.
 Plummer, L.-Cpl. E. G.
 Plunkett, Pte. A. E. G.
 Podger, Pte. J. T.
 Porter, Pte. S. G.
 Porter, Pte. W. H.
 Potter, Pte. W. E.
 Potter, L.-Sgt. G.
 Poulton, Pte. J. W.
 Powne, Pte. L. C. F.
 Powter, Pte. E. L.
 Poynan, Pte. F. L.
 Pratt, Pte. S. R.
 Preece, Pte. W. E.
 Price, Pte. A. T.
 Pruss, Pte. W. W. J.
 Quigley, L.-Cpl. J.
 Quist, Pte. R. G.
 Radburu, Pte. A. J.
 Raward, Pte. L. H.
 Ray, Pte. S. A.
 Read, Pte. C. H.
 Reed, Pte. H.
 Regan, Pte. W. E.
 Reid, Pte. E. C.
 Reid, Sgt. T.
 Reynolds, Pte. E.
 Richards, Pte. L. A.
 Richardson, Cpl. H. S.
 Richardson, L.-Cpl. T.
 Ries, Pte. C. G.
 Rilen, Pte. R. N.
 Roach, Pte. D.
 Roach, Pte. J.
 Roberts, L.-Cpl. C. A.
 Roberts, Pte. F.
 Roberts, Pte. F. B.
 Robertson, Pte. R. C.
 Robertson, Pte. W. H.
 Robin, Sgt. G. De Q.
 Robinson, Pte. E. J.
 Robinson, Pte. W. J. L.
 Ronson, Pte. W.
 Rootes, Pte. J. S.
 Rowley, Pte. J. R.
 Royan, Pte. W.
 Ryan, L.-Cpl. F. J. C.
 Ryan, Pte. J. J.
 Sattler, Cpl. A. R.
 Saunders, Pte. H.
 Saunders, Pte. W. T.
 Scanes, Pte. R. O.
 Scott, Pte. J. (3568)
 Scott, Pte. J. (2470)
 Scullin, Pte. M. H.
 Shanahan, Sgt. M. F.
 Shannon, Pte. J. T.
 Sharp, Pte. J.
 Sharpe, Pte. G. L.
 Shepherd, Pte. T.
 Sheridan, L.-Cpl. L. T.
 Shuck, Pte. G.
 Sims, Pte. F. C.
 Sims, Pte. H. N.
 Smeeth, L.-Cpl. A. J.
 Smith, Sgt. A.
 Smith, Pte. E.
 Smith, Pte. E. H.
 Smith, Pte. F. C.
 Smith, Pte. F. W. A.
 Smith, Pte. G.
 Smith, Pte. H. E. A.
 Smith, Cpl. H. J.
 Smith, Pte. J. A.
 Smith, Pte. M. N.
 Sowter, Pte. P. E.
 Sparkes, Pte. J.
 Spiller, Pte. G. L.
 Spratt, Pte. A. E.
 Spratt, Pte. A. J.
 Stacker, Pte. S. G.
 Stapleton, Pte. A. E.
 Staunton, Pte. D. J.
 Stephenson, Pte. T. W.
 Stewart, Pte. G.
 Stewart, Sgt. J. Mc.
 Stewart, Sgt. N. C.
 Stockdale, Pte. E. J.
 Stokes, Pte. L. E.
 Stone, Pte. J.
 Styles, Pte. W. J.
 Sullivan, Pte. J. J.
 Sullvan, Pte. M.
 Summer, Pte. H.
 Swan, Pte. A. L.
 Swinfield, L.-Cpl. J. E.
 Sypfers, L.-Cpl. J.
 Taylor, Pte. R. C.
 Taylor, Pte. S. L.
 Taylor, Sgt. W. S.
 Thomas, Pte. W.
 Thompson, Pte. A. C.
 Thompson, Pte. C.
 Thompson, L.-Cpl. P. A.
 Thorpe, Pte. G. H.
 Tickner, Pte. C.
 Tier, Pte. W. B.
 Tindall, Pte. E. W.

Other Ranks—cont.

Tols, Pte. J.
 Tollefson, Pte. O. B.
 Tollis, Pte. R.
 Trevena, Pte. H. F. B.
 Tromp, Cpl. J. F.
 Trudgett, Pte. U. J.
 Turner, Pte. A.
 Turner, Pte. B. C. (3495A)
 Turner, Pte. B. C. (3531)
 Turner, Pte. H.
 Turner, Pte. S. G.
 Upton, L.-Cpl. C. L.
 Verpillot, Pte. A.
 Wall, Pte. B.
 Wallace, Pte. L. H.
 Walker, Pte. A. W.
 Walker, Pte. D. S.

Walker, L.-Cpl. W. J.
 Walsh, Pte. F. J.
 Walton, Pte. T.
 Ward, Pte. C.
 Waters, Pte. E.
 Watkins, Pte. J. E.
 Watson, Pte. J. H.
 Watson, Pte. L. L.
 Weaver, Pte. R. A.
 Weiss, Pte. F. A.
 Wells, Pte. C. H.
 West, Pte. W. H.
 Weston, Pte. J. C.
 Whitebread, Pte. E. S.
 Whiteman, Pte. R. J.
 Whitton, Pte. H. C.

Wilcox, Pte. J. G.
 Widdison, Pte. W. H.
 Wilkes, Pte. F. A. D.
 William, Pte. A. H. M.
 Williams, Pte. E.
 Williams, Pte. F. J.
 Williams, Pte. J.
 Williamson, Pte. W. B.
 Willis, Pte. E. W.
 Wilson, Pte. A. E.
 Wilson, Pte. A. W.
 Wilson, Pte. E. R.
 Wilson, Pte. S. C.
 Wooton, Pte. G. C. H.
 Wright, Pte. J. V.
 Youman, Pte. J.

54TH BATTALION

Officers

McConaghy, Lt.-Col. D. McFie
 Harrison, Maj. R.
 Jack, T/Major B. D.
 Hunt, Capt. F. W.
 Lovett, Capt. N. B.
 Taylor, Capt. H.
 Maxted, Chap. (Rev.) S. E.

Ahern, Lt. T. P.
 Boone, Lt. C. A.
 Bowran, Lt. J.
 D'Alpuget, Lt. J. N.
 Fullarton, Lt. J. McB.
 Green, Lt. W. T. R.
 Hall, Lt. H. J.

Holder, Lt. F. P.
 McArthur, Lt. D.
 Reid, Lt. F. W.
 Staples, Lt. H. E. G.
 Strangman, Lt. J. S.
 Tuck, Lt. G. B.
 Twomey, Lt. F. O. C.

Other Ranks

Adams, Pte. A.
 Alford, Pte. A. V.
 Anderson, Sgt. D. S.
 Andrews, C.S.M. C. H.
 Andrews, Pte. J. L.
 Angus, Pte. T.
 Anstey, A/Sgt. J. P.
 Arthurson, Pte. D. H.
 Artist, L.-Cpl. P.
 Assender, Pte. T.
 Ausburn, Pte. E. H.
 Austin, Pte. G. R.
 Backhouse, Pte. V. J.
 Bailey, Sgt. T.
 Baillie, Pte. W.
 Balkin, Pte. M.
 Ballard, Pte. H. A. S.
 Barr, Cpl. P. A.
 Bayliss, Pte. J.
 Beard, Pte. R. F.
 Beattie, Sgt. T.
 Beetles, Pte. N. W.
 Bell, Sgt. W. G.
 Bennett, Pte. J.
 Benson, Pte. G. W.
 Bentley, L.-Cpl. W.
 Biggs, Pte. R. M.
 Billington, Pte. M. E.
 Billsborough, L.-Sgt. H. N.
 Bingley, Pte. C. W.
 Bishop, Pte. W. H.
 Blyton, Pte. B. L.
 Blyton, Pte. H. C.
 Bonnett, Pte. T. M.
 Boynton, Cpl. R. H.
 Bradney, Pte. W. E.
 Brand, Pte. F. T.
 Brentnall, Sgt. G. V.
 Brindal, Pte. C. S.
 Bromhead, Pte. G. E.
 Brooke, Cpl. W. E.
 Brown, Pte. J.
 Brown, Pte. J. J.
 Brown, Pte. J. M.
 Bryant, Cpl. V. W.
 Buckley, T/Cpl. A. H.
 Burgess, Pte. E.

Butcher, Pte. B.
 Butler, Pte. C. D.
 Caffrey, Pte. W.
 Callaghan, Pte. W. L. J.
 Cameron, Pte. A. C.
 Campbell, Pte. H. W.
 Campbell, Sgt. J. M.
 Campbell, Pte. R. A.
 Carden, Pte. T. L.
 Cardy, Pte. L. G.
 Carlin, Pte. H.
 Carpenter, Pte. F.
 Carroll, Pte. J. J.
 Carson, Pte. F. J.
 Casmir, Pte. Guillaume
 Castle, Pte. G. F.
 Castle, Pte. H.
 Cavanagh, Pte. W.
 Cawley, Pte. H. T.
 Chambers, Pte. T.
 Chapman, Pte. J.
 Chapman, Pte. W. G.
 Cheffins, Pte. C. R.
 Christie, Pte. J.
 Churchland, Pte. A. V.
 Clark, Pte. G.
 Clark, L.-Cpl. R.
 Clarke, Pte. H.
 Clarke, L.-Cpl. W. H.
 Clapperton, Pte. G.
 Collier, Pte. L.
 Collins, Pte. A. B.
 Cooper, Pte. J.
 Compton, Pte. H. G.
 Concoran, Pte. J. J.
 Connolly, Pte. J.
 Connolly, Pte. W. T.
 Conroy, Pte. C. W. G.
 Conway, Pte. J.
 Concoran, Pte. H.
 Corr, Pte. G.
 Cottie, Pte. A. P.
 Coupur, Pte. C. B.
 Cox, Pte. C.
 Cox, Pte. W. G.
 Coxall, T. G.
 Crabb, Cpl. W.

Craigie, L.-Cpl. W. A.
 Cramp, Pte. E.
 Crapp, Pte. A. L.
 Creagh, Pte. H.
 Cressey, Pte. H. A.
 Cuckson, Pte. W. J.
 Cutting, Pte. H. R.
 Daley, Pte. N.
 Daley, Pte. W.
 Dalzell, Pte. G.
 Davidson, Pte. B. J.
 Davie, Pte. H. G.
 Davies, Pte. D.
 Davies, Pte. G. E. S.
 Davis, Pte. K. W.
 Deas, Pte. E. D.
 Delaney, Pte. F. T.
 Devos, Pte. J.
 Dibben, Pte. E. H.
 Diggs, Pte. C.
 Dillon, Pte. C. T.
 Doggett, Pte. W. B.
 Doherty, Pte. W. J.
 Donnellan, Sgt. R. B.
 Doust, Pte. R.
 Doust, Pte. W. H.
 Doyle, Pte. E. H.
 Doyle, Pte. R. J.
 Doyle, Pte. V. F.
 Drewette, Pte. F. G.
 Drummond, Sgt. E. J. A.
 Dryden, Pte. O. W.
 Dudley, Pte. A. J.
 Dunbar, Pte. R.
 Duncan, Pte. W.
 Dunstan, Pte. B. J. A.
 Dwyer, Pte. J. H.
 Dyson, Pte. F. A.
 Eaves, Pte. J. H.
 Edwards, Pte. E.
 Edwards, Pte. H.
 Edwards, Pte. T.
 Emery, Pte. J.
 Espuett, Pte. F. D.
 Evans, Pte. H. C.
 Ewin, Pte. A. E.
 Fadden, Pte. J.

Other Ranks—cont.

Fargie, Pte. W. G.
 Farrar, Pte. F.
 Ferguson, Pte. T. C.
 Ferrier, Pte. H. V.
 Field, Pte. G. N.
 Field, Pte. J.
 Findlay, Pte. R. E.
 Finn, Pte. J.
 FitzGerald, Pte. G. L.
 Fletcher, Pte. R.
 Flude, Pte. H.
 Forrest, Pte. J. R.
 Forsythe, Pte. W. D.
 Foster, Pte. N. W.
 Freeman, Pte. P.
 Frith, L.-Cpl. L. C.
 Frost, Pte. S. C.
 Fryer, L.-Cpl. T. E.
 Funston, Pte. H. E.
 Gadd, Pte. A. E.
 Gage, Pte. C. H.
 Gainsford, Pte. F. W. B.
 Gallwey, Pte. M. P.
 Gardiner, Pte. V. C.
 Garnett, Pte. A.
 Gates, Pte. C.
 Gatley, Pte. B.
 Gaunt, Pte. E. G.
 Genner, Pte. A. J.
 Gibson, Pte. W. B.
 Giffen, Pte. C. G.
 Giles, Pte. G. E.
 Gillard, Pte. A. W. G.
 Goodall, Pte. P.
 Goring, Pte. N. T.
 Gosper, Pte. H. R.
 Gow, Pte. J. R.
 Graham, Pte. H.
 Graham, Pte. H. J.
 Granney, Pte. T.
 Grant, Cpl. E.
 Grant, Pte. J. L.
 Gray, Pte. G. R.
 Gray, Pte. S. J.
 Green, Pte. C.
 Green, Pte. T. B.
 Gullely, Pte. F.
 Guthrie, Pte. G. A. A.
 Hales, Pte. A. E.
 Halgren, Cpl. A. R.
 Halkyard, Pte. F.
 Hall, Pte. H. G.
 Hall, Pte. W.
 Hallinan, Pte. J.
 Hammond, Cpl. A. J.
 Hansen, Pte. J. S.
 Hardie, Pte. V. P.
 Harding, Pte. A.
 Harper, Pte. A. J.
 Harper, Pte. N.
 Harriott, Pte. L.
 Hartman, L.-Cpl. S. T. V. W.
 Hatter, Sgt. O. H.
 Hay, Pte. D.
 Hazelton, Pte. R. R.
 Healey, Pte. R. A.
 Heard, Pte. R. F.
 Heath, Pte. W. F.
 Heming, Pte. F. T.
 Henry, Pte. J.
 Herbert, Pte. F.
 Hertslet, Pte. J. L.
 Hewes, Pte. G. W.
 Hewitt, L.-Cpl. F.
 Higgins, Pte. A. J.
 Hill, Sgt. E.
 Hill, Pte. J. H.
 Hillzinger, Pte. C. A. G.
 Hilyander, Pte. S. E.
 Hiskey, Sgt. F. S. P.
 Hobbs, Pte. C.
 Holliday, Pte. C. D.
 Holmes, Sgt. E. C.
 Holmes, Pte. E. W.
 Holmes, Pte. J. L.
 Holmes, Pte. J. N.
 Hood, Pte. W. R.
 Hope, Pte. E. J.
 Horn, L.-Cpl. A. T.
 Hornby, Pte. J.
 Houghton, Pte. A.
 Howard, Pte. C. C.
 Hoyer, Pte. A. E.
 Hughes, Cpl. W. G.
 Hull, Pte. C.
 Hull, Pte. H.
 Humphries, Pte. W.
 Hunt, Pte. W.
 Hurdis, L.-Cpl. J.
 Hurley, Pte. S. N.
 Hurt, Pte. H.
 Hutherford, Pte. J. E.
 Hutson, Pte. W. H.
 Hynes, Pte. E. W.
 Ilk, Pte. J. H.
 Ingram, Pte. W. S.
 Innes, Pte. J.
 Irvan, Pte. D. G.
 James, Pte. H. P.
 Jamieson, Pte. W.
 Jarvis, Pte. W.
 Johnson, Pte. C. F.
 Johnson, Pte. J.
 Johnson, Pte. W.
 Johnston, Pte. C. D.
 Johnston, Pte. F.
 Jones, Pte. S. A.
 Jones, Pte. W. H.
 Keats, Pte. P. G.
 Keed, Pte. A. E.
 Kellett, Pte. S. V.
 Kelly, Pte. F. J. A.
 Kelly, Pte. H.
 Kelly, Pte. W.
 Kemp, Pte. C. H.
 Kennealy, Cpl. J. F.
 Kennedy, Pte. L. C. K.
 Kentish, Pte. A.
 Killmister, Sgt. J.
 King, Pte. H. J.
 Knowles, Pte. C. S.
 Krogman, Pte. A.
 Laidlow, Pte. G. A.
 Lambert, Pte. R. R.
 Lane, Pte. A. J.
 Lanham, Pte. W.
 Latta, Pte. J. J.
 Lawrence, Pte. D. H.
 Lawson, Pte. W. W.
 Lee, Pte. J.
 Lee, Pte. J. J.
 Lee, Pte. P. V.
 Lemon, Pte. L. J.
 Leslie, Pte. R. J.
 Lewis, Pte. D. R.
 Lindholm, Pte. J.
 Little, L.-Cpl. V. H.
 Longhurst, Pte. S.
 Lowe, Pte. J.
 Lutherborough, Pte. T. W.
 MacGregor, Pte. W. A. A.
 Mackay, Pte. J.
 Mackey, Pte. T.
 Maclaren-Webb, Pte.
 McAnlay, Pte. R.
 McCabe, Sgt. J.
 McCaulay, Pte. H.
 McCauliffe, Pte. W. A.
 McCooley, Pte. T. J.
 McDonald, Pte. L. (2195)
 McDonald, Pte. L. (3161)
 McFarlane, Pte. R. A. M.
 McGrath, Pte. T. D.
 McInerney, Pte. J.
 McIntosh, Pte. C. H.
 McIntosh, Pte. R. M.
 McKenzie, Pte. E. C.
 McLaughlin, Pte. W.
 McNamara, Pte. F.
 McPherson, Pte. D.
 McQueen, Pte. R. F.
 McKrae, Pte. F. A.
 Maculay, Pte. J.
 Maher, Pte. I. E.
 Malcolm, L.-Cpl. W.
 Mann, Pte. C. F.
 Mansfield, Pte. J.
 Marles, Pte. H. A.
 Martin, Cpl. A. M.
 Martin, Pte. G.
 Martin, Cpl. J.
 Martin, Pte. P. J.
 Marshall, Pte. E.
 Masterman, Pte. H.
 Mayo, Pte. B. S.
 Mayo, Pte. J. C.
 Mealey, C.S.M. P.
 Medhurst, Pte. N.
 Melrose, Cpl. J.
 Melville, Pte. J. L.
 Merin, Pte. W. A.
 Merrifield, Pte. V. H.
 Miller, Pte. A. W. J.
 Millynn, Pte. R. B.
 Mitchell, Pte. G. L.
 Mocatta, Pte. J.
 Mondy, Pte. C.
 Moore, Pte. V. H.
 Morgan, Sgt. R. J.
 Morgan, Pte. W. H.
 Morrison, Pte. D.
 Mowthorpe, Cpl. T.
 Moxon, Pte. H. V.
 Moylan, Pte. J.
 Mulhearn, Pte. J. J.
 Mullis, Pte. E.
 Munn, Pte. G.
 Murphy, Pte. L. J.
 Murray, Pte. W. G. T.
 Musgrove, Pte. E.
 Myers, Pte. P. L.
 Nash, Pte. C. E.
 Neal, Pte. A. E.
 Neasby, Sgt. C. W.
 Needham, Pte. A.
 Newman, Pte. S. W. T.
 Newman, Pte. W. H. S.
 Nicholson, Pte. J. B.
 Nicholson, Pte. R.
 Norman, Sgt. W. T.
 Nould, Pte. R. R.
 O'Brien, Pte. C. V.
 O'Brien, Pte. W. C.
 O'Donnell, Pte. A.
 Osborne, Pte. A. S.
 Owen, Pte. W. T.
 Page, Pte. R. H.
 Pagan, L.-Cpl. G.
 Pairey, Pte. W.
 Pape, L.-Cpl. G. E.
 Parish, Pte. H. H.
 Parkes, Pte. F. V.
 Parsons, Pte. J.
 Partridge, Pte. T.
 Partridge, Pte. A. S.
 Paterson, Pte. J.
 Paul, Pte. R. M.
 Peables, Cpl. G. E. D.
 Peesant, Pte. W.
 Phippen, Pte. V.

Other Ranks—cont.

Plater, Pte. E.
 Poole, Pte. B.
 Porter, Pte. F. M.
 Preston, Pte. V. H. G.
 Proctor, Pte. I. E.
 Pybus, Pte. A. C.
 Pyne, Pte. L. C. W.
 Quibampton, Pte. W.
 Raleigh, Pte. J. P.
 Ramsey, Pte. J. H.
 Rannard, Pte. A. E.
 Rayell, Pte. J. H.
 Raynor, Pte. F. (formerly
 Zink, H. O.)
 Read, Pte. F.
 Reakes, Pte. L. M.
 Redden, Pte. C. W. B.
 Redding, C.S.M. B. G.
 Regan, Pte. H. H.
 Resso, Pte. R. W.
 Reynolds, Sgt. A. A.
 Reynolds, Pte. J. C.
 Reynolds, Pte. S. H.
 Rhall, Pte. A. J.
 Richards, Pte. T. J.
 Richardson, Pte. B.
 Richardson, Pte. P. R.
 Riordon, Pte. W. E.
 Rishardson, Pte. H.
 Robbins, Pte. J. T.
 Roberts, Pte. J. H.
 Robinson, Cpl. A. J.
 Robinson, Cpl. L. H.
 Roby Cpl. E.
 Rodda, Cpl. J. A.
 Ross, Cpl. E.
 Rowe, Cpl. J. P.
 Russell, Cpl. A.
 Russell, Cpl. F.
 Ryan, Cpl. D.
 Ryan, Cpl. F. J.
 Ryan, Cpl. R.
 Ryan, Cpl. W. F.
 Sadler, Pte. A. A.
 Sadler, Pte. G. W.
 Sadlier, L.-Cpl. G. T.
 St. Ledger, Pte. W. J. W.
 Samuels, Pte. A. E.
 Sandalls, Pte. J. H.
 Saunders, Pte. J. F.
 Scally, Pte. F. P.
 Scott, Pte. J.
 Scott, Pte. J. T.
 Scott, Pte. R.
 Scrutton, Pte. A. E.
 Sewart, Pte. W. H.
 Shaw, Pte. D.
 Shaw, Pte. H. V.
 Simm, Pte. W.
 Singleton, Pte. A.
 Skelly, Pte. T.
 Skeen, Pte. J.
 Sloggett, Pte. H. R.
 Smith, Pte. A. H.
 Smith, Pte. C.
 Smith, Pte. C. F.
 Smith, Pte. E.
 Smith, Pte. E. G.
 Smith, Pte. F.
 Smith, Pte. F. C.
 Smith, Pte. H. K.
 Smith, Pte. H. T.
 Smith, Pte. J.
 Smith, Pte. J. E.
 Smith, Pte. R. F.
 Smith, Pte. W. F.
 Smyth, Pte. A. M.
 Spike, Pte. W.
 Stanton, Pte. F.
 Starr, Pte. V. J.
 Stephens, L.-Cpl. R. L.
 Stone, Pte. I. G. A.
 Stuart, Cpl. A. A.
 Stubbs, Pte. P. A.
 Swanson, Pte. H. W.
 Swift, Pte. G. E.
 Sweeney, Pte. E.
 Sweeney, Pte. J. J.
 Syle, Pte. W. R.
 Taber, Pte. C. L.
 Tate, Pte. C. W.
 Taylor, Sgt. C. S.
 Taylor, Pte. H.
 Thomas, Pte. W. J.
 Thomson, Pte. J.
 Thorncroft, Pte. C. A.
 Tibey, Pte. J.
 Till, L.-Cpl. J.
 Tilling, Cpl. S. C.
 Tisdell, Pte. C. J.
 Toole, Cpl. J.
 Towne, Pte. H. V.
 Trenouth, Pte. G. G. R.
 Turner, Pte. A. J.
 Wallis, Pte. J. P.
 Walsh, Cpl. A. J.
 Walshe, L.-Cpl. B. M.
 Walton, Pte. W. F.
 Ward, Pte. H.
 Ward, Pte. W. J.
 Wass, Pte. W.
 Watkins, Cpl. H. E.
 Watley, Pte. V.
 Watts, Pte. J. H. T.
 White, Pte. D. H.
 White, Pte. E. C.
 White, Pte. H.
 White, Pte. J.
 Whitmee, Pte. H. E.
 Whitmill, Cpl. I.
 Wildman, Pte. R. R.
 Wilkinson, Pte. H. M.
 Williams, Pte. A. W.
 Williamson, Pte. A.
 Willis, Pte. G. T.
 Wilson, Pte. A.
 Wilson, Pte. H.
 Wislom, Pte. J. S.
 Woodbury, Pte. G. H.
 Woodlands, Pte. J.
 Woodley, Pte. J. T. W. A.
 Woods, Pte. W. A.
 Wouters, Pte. L.
 Wright, Pte. J.
 Yabsley, Pte. T. W.
 Yeo, Pte. W. H.

55TH BATTALION

Officers

Chapman, Capt. P. W.
 Cotterell, Capt. F. J.
 Gardner, Capt. A. R.
 Gibbons, Capt. B.
 Marshall, Capt. J. J.
 Palmer, Capt. H. L.
 Hunter, Chap. (Rev.) D. De V.
 Clark, Lt. W. F.
 Colless, Lt. S.
 Collins, Lt. A. J.
 Dillow, Lt. W.
 Horniman, Lt. L. V.
 Hunt, Lt. S. E.
 Inglis, Lt. A. J.
 Jackson, Lt. A. R.
 Kerr, Lt. J.
 Mendelsohn, Lt. B. L.
 Munroe, Lt. S.
 Piddington, Lt. W. T.
 Smith, Lt. A. H.
 Stafford, Lt. L. N.
 Vogan, Lt. A. H.
 Woolley, Lt. C. R.

Other Ranks

A'Gassiz, Dvr. T.
 Ainsworth, Pte. J.
 Akhurst, Cpl. C. W.
 Alchin, Pte. O. H. E.
 Alcorn, Pte. J. C.
 Allen, Pte. E. T.
 Allen, Pte. S. L.
 Allen, Cpl. W. O. H.
 Amour, Pte. P. W.
 Anchor, Sgt. V. B.
 Anderson, Pte. E. L.
 Anderson, Pte. G.
 Arnett, Pte. A. S.
 Arnold, Pte. D. E.
 Arnold, Pte. J.
 Ayers, Pte. C. T.
 Babbage, Pte. J. F.
 Bagge, Pte. R. N.
 Baker, Pte. A.
 Baker, Pte. V. B.
 Baker, Pte. V. E.
 Bald, Pte. T. J.
 Baldwin, Pte. W. A.
 Ball, Pte. M. J.
 Banwell, Pte. H.
 Baragry, Pte. E. J.
 Barber, Cpl. A. H.
 Barber, Cpl. R.
 Barker, Pte. H. F.
 Barker, Pte. (formerly Hogan, P.).
 Barnard, Pte. J. O.
 Barrett, Pte. R. A.
 Barry, Pte. P.
 Barton, Pte. D.
 Bates, Sgt. A.
 Baugh, Pte. F. C.
 Beaven, Pte. F. W.
 Bedson, Pte. A. L.
 Bell, Pte. J. W.
 Bell, Pte. S.
 Belford, Pte. H. J.
 Bellchambers, Pte. A. A.
 Bennett, Pte. L. W.
 Berryman, Pte. G.
 Bingham, Pte. A. C.
 Bingley, Pte. C. S.
 Birch, Pte. C. E.
 Bird, Pte. F. H.
 Bishop, Pte. R. C.
 Black, Pte. P. A.
 Black, Pte. N. S.

Other Ranks—cont.

Blackburn, Pte. H. S.
 Blunt, Sgt. G. A.
 Bolt, Pte. H. T.
 Bolton, Pte. L. H.
 Bourke, Pte. W.
 Box, Cpl. A. L.
 Royce, Pte. S. J.
 Boyle, L.-Cpl. E. F.
 Boyle, Pte. J.
 Bradford, Pte. A.
 Broadhurst, Pte. J.
 Broadhurst, Pte. L.
 Breen, Pte. W.
 Bridges, Pte. W. F.
 Brown, Pte. F. C.
 Browne, Pte. A.
 Bruce, Pte. J. K.
 Bryant, Pte. W. H.
 Buckenham, Pte. R. V.
 Buckley, Pte. J. J., M. M.
 Burch, L.-Cpl. A.
 Burgess, Pte. S. E.
 Burnaby, Pte. E. A.
 Burns, Pte. J. W.
 Burns, Pte. R. H.
 Burt, Pte. A.
 Burton, L. Cpl. A. H.
 Bush, Pte. G. W. H.
 Butler, Cpl. T. P.
 Byrne, Pte. T. F. J.
 Byrnes, Pte. C. J.
 Caldwell, Pte. J. D.
 Caldwell, Pte. W.
 Cameron, Pte. R.
 Campbell, Pte. H. S.
 Cane, Pte. A. S.
 Cantwell, C.S.M. M. H.
 Carmichael, Pte. A. J. E.
 Casey, Pte. E. H.
 Christie, Pte. R. W.
 Churchill, Pte. J. E.
 Clark, Pte. H. G.
 Clarke, Pte. F. G.
 Clarke, Pte. G. G. I.
 Clarke, Sgt. S.
 Clifton, Pte. E. W.
 Clifton, Pte. W. J.
 Cochran, Pte. J.
 Cohen, Pte. S. I.
 Cook, Sgt. W. H.
 Cooney, Pte. T. A.
 Cooper, Pte. S.
 Coleman, Pte. L. R. E.
 Collier, Pte. L. P.
 Collins, Pte. W. G.
 Commelin, Cpl. A. A. C.
 Connelly, Pte. A.
 Conlon, Pte. W. E.
 Cornick, Pte. R.
 Cosgrave, Sgt. W. P.
 Coughlan, Pte. J. F.
 Cowan, Pte. C. W.
 Cracknall, Pte. R. W.
 Crane, Pte. H. P.
 Crane, Pte. S.
 Crawford, Pte. C. R.
 Crocker, Pte. J. A.
 Crockett, Sgt. W. J.
 Crooks, Pte. T.
 Croucher, Pte. F. C.
 Cullen, Pte. A.
 Cullen, Pte. T. H.
 Dalton, Pte. M. G.
 Dark, Pte. N.
 Davies, L.-Cpl. J. T.
 Davis, Pte. V. E. S.
 Day, Pte. C. W.
 De Jongh, Pte. P.
 Delaney, Pte. W. W.
 Dennis, Pte. G. H.
 Detmers, Pte. O. W. F.
 Dewar, Pte. R. A.
 Dickman, Pte. J.
 Dirksen, Pte. W.
 Dixon, Pte. B.
 Dixon, Pte. B. J.
 Dobson, Pte. W.
 Donghue, Pte. T.
 Donohue, Pte. W.
 Donovan, Pte. J.
 Donovan, Pte. S.
 Doughan, Pte. W. R.
 Downer, L.-Cpl. W. C.
 Duffy, L.-Cpl. F.
 Eagleton, Pte. A. H.
 Earl, Pte. B. W.
 Eccleston, Cpl. N. S.
 Edwards, Pte. E. J.
 Egan, Pte. E.
 Egan, Pte. J. M.
 Elphick, Pte. S. H.
 Elrick, Pte. J. R.
 Ellis, Pte. R. S.
 Ellis, Pte. V. M.
 Erskine, Pte. R. O.
 Eyre, Pte. R. H.
 Ezzy, Pte. C.
 Fahey, Pte. P. W.
 Farrell, Pte. G. C.
 Farrell, Pte. T. O.
 Fenwick, Pte. P.
 Ferguson, Pte. P.
 Ferris, Pte. E.
 Field, Pte. D. I.
 Fluch, Pte. J.
 Fisk, Pte. G. M.
 Flanagan, Pte. H. E.
 Flanigan, Pte. P.
 Fletcher, Cpl. F.
 Flynn, Pte. W. A.
 Ford, Pte. A. W.
 Foret, Pte. T. A., M.M.
 Fox, Pte. W.
 Franklin, Pte. C. K.
 Franklin, Pte. G. E.
 Franks, Cpl. E. R.
 Freebody, Pte. E. J. T.
 Freeman, Pte. N. L.
 Garrett, Pte. W.
 Geason, Pte. P.
 Geil, L.-Cpl. S. L.
 Gilbert, L.-Cpl. L. E.
 Ginns, Pte. A. E.
 Girvan, Pte. R. R. C.
 Gleeson, Pte. T. J.
 Glynn, Pte. H.
 Goodman, Pte. R. G.
 Goodwin, Pte. J.
 Granger, Pte. E. D.
 Grantley, Pte. J. T.
 Gray, Pte. W. F.
 Greathead, Pte. F.
 Greathead, Pte. H. P.
 Grene, Pte. J.
 Gribble, Pte. P. P.
 Griffiths, Pte. E. S.
 Guillaume, Pte. L.
 Gunn, Pte. H.
 Hackman, Pte. W.
 Hagger, Pte. C.
 Hall, Pte. L. J.
 Hall, Pte. R. E.
 Halpin, Pte. L.
 Hamblin, Pte. W.
 Hamilton, Cpl. E.
 Hancock, Cpl. E. F.
 Harding, Pte. W.
 Hare, Pte. D. E.
 Harpur, Pte. P. E.
 Hart, Pte. W. B.
 Harris, Pte. J. J.
 Dewar, Pte. L. A.
 Harvey, Cpl. W. R.
 Hauber, Pte. H. E.
 Hayden, Pte. J. A.
 Haydon, L.-Cpl. H. E.
 Haymer, Pte. A. E.
 Hester, Cpl. W.
 Hewson, Pte. C.
 Higgins, L.-Cpl. S. Mc.
 Hill, Pte. W. R.
 Hinson, Pte. R. S.
 Hooking, Sgt. F. A.
 Hogan, Pte. E. T.
 Holden, Pte. E.
 Holliday, Cpl. S. C.
 Hollingsworth, Pte. C.
 Holloway, Pte. L. J.
 Horsfield, Pte. F.
 Hughes, Pte. G.
 Hughes, Pte. J. A.
 Hunt, Pte. A. G.
 Hunt, Pte. F.
 Hunt, Pte. R. G.
 Hutchings, T/Cpl. L. J.
 Hyde, Pte. W. J.
 Ibbott, Pte. A. E.
 Ipkendanz, L.-Cpl. E.
 Isedale, Pte. G.
 Isedale, Pte. H. R.
 Jaques, Pte. A. H.
 Jennings, Pte. A. F.
 Jennings, Pte. W. J.
 Johns, Pte. S.
 Johnson, Pte. E. B.
 Jones, Pte. H. H.
 Jones, Cpl. H. W. R.
 Jones, Pte. R. A.
 Jones, L.-Cpl. W. E.
 Joy, Pte. J.
 Kanaana, Pte. E. M.
 Kasel, Pte. J.
 Kavanagh, Pte. A.
 Kay, Pte. S. D.
 Kearney, Pte. E. D.
 Keefe, Pte. A.
 Keeling, Pte. G.
 Kellond, Pte. J. H.
 Kelly, Cpl. P.
 Kelly, Pte. R. W.
 Keown, Pte. W.
 Keyte, Pte. R.
 King, Pte. G.
 Kinsela, Pte. J. F.
 Knight, Pte. A. L.
 Kumsay, Pte. C. G.
 Kwnedy, Pte. J. H. R.
 Lakeman, Pte. L. J.
 Lannon, Pte. J.
 Lawrence, Pte. F. J.
 Leister, Pte. L.
 Lennard, Pte. H.
 Lennard, Pte. S. R.
 Levy, Pte. C.
 Lewis, Pte. R. H.
 Lidden, Pte. W.
 Loader, Pte. J.
 Longhurst, Pte. V. J. M.
 Luby, Pte. A. A.
 Lulham, Pte. H. O.
 Lund, Pte. W.
 Luxford, Pte. E.
 Lyons, Pte. F. N.
 MacAllum, Pte. H. A.
 MacDonald, Pte. J.
 Mackenzie, Pte. W.
 Maher, Pte. L. E.
 Manning, Pte. H. T.
 Maroney, Pte. W. J.
 Marsden, Pte. T. S.

Other Ranks—cont.

Masterman, Pte. A.
 Mayer, Pte. H.
 McAllister, Pte. H. W.
 McCarrroll, Pte. F.
 McCormack, Pte. E. A.
 McCulloch, Sgt. T.
 McDonald, Pte. L.
 McGill, Pte. J. L.
 McGuarr, Pte. R. J.
 McIlwain, Pte. A. E.
 McIlwain, Pte. J. O.
 McIntyre, Pte. D.
 McKenna, Pte. E. F.
 McLeod, Pte. H.
 McLoughlin, Pte. W. G.
 McMeehin, Pte. G.
 McMillan, Pte. W.
 McNeigh, Pte. W. H.
 McPherson, Pte. L. D.
 McRae, Sgt. G. W.
 Meale, Pte. S. V.
 Menser, L.-Cpl. L. M.
 Merritt, Pte. H. A.
 Metcalfe, Pte. A.
 Mewburn, Pte. E. R.
 Meyer, Pte. E. S. R.
 Meyer, Pte. F. H. G.
 Miles, Pte. L.
 Millard, Pte. C. W.
 Milligan, Pte. F. F.
 Mills, Pte. A.
 Mines, Dvr. J.
 Mitchell, Pte. A. E.
 Mitchell, Pte. P.
 Moore, L.-Cpl. E. O.
 Moore, Pte. R. T.
 Moore, Pte. W. M.
 Morgan, Pte. P. L.
 Moriarty, Pte. M. M.
 Morrison, Pte. J.
 Morrow, Pte. G. F.
 Murphy, Pte. E. P.
 Murphy, Pte. H. R.
 Murray, Pte. H.
 Mulvihill, Pte. L. R.
 Naylor, Sgt. J.
 Neave, Pte. W. A.
 Nelson, Pte. A. E.
 Nelson, Pte. J.
 Nelson, Sgt. J. McD.
 Newman, Pte. E.
 Nichols, Pte. H.
 Noakes, Pte. A. T.
 Noble, Pte. J. O. E.
 Noldart, Sgt. A. S.
 Nott, Pte. H. W.
 Nowland, Cp. F. E.
 Oakes, Pte. A.
 Oliver, Cpl. W. R.
 O'Brien, Pte. T. F.
 O'Neill, Pte. P. W.
 O'Reilly, Pte. D. H.
 O'Reilly, Pte. E. H.
 O'Rourke, Sgt. T.
 O'Shea, Pte. W. H.
 Pardey, Pte. L. J.
 Parker, Pte. H. A. D.
 Parryman, Pte. J. E.
 Partridge, Pte. C.
 Partridge, Pte. W. M.
 Passmore, Pte. A.
 Paul, Pte. A. R.
 Paynes, Pte. E. A.
 Pegram, Pte. A. G.
 Pegram, Pte. A. J.
 Penfold, Pte. N.
 Penney, Pte. W. B. P.
 Pettit, Pte. A. E.
 Phillips, Pte. H. R.
 Pickersgill, Pte. R.
 Poole, Pte. E. W.
 Poole, Pte. F. A.
 Prichard, Pte. N.
 Priddle, Pte. A. J.
 Primmer, Pte. E. M.
 Pringle, Pte. G. McD.
 Pryce, Pte. W. L.
 Quinlivan, Pte. W. J.
 Quinlivan, Pte. J. P.
 Quisley, Pte. L. J.
 Randall, Cpl. R. J.
 Rankin, Pte. H. A.
 Rankin, Pte. L. Y.
 Raymon, Pte. R. W.
 Reay, Pte. J. G.
 Reeves, Pte. W. J.
 Reidy, Pte. H. S.
 Renouf, Pte. A.
 Reynolds, Pte. F. B.
 Reynolds, Pte. W. M.
 Rex, Cpl. E. H. B.
 Rixon, Pte. J. O. M.
 Roberts, Pte. H.
 Robertson, Pte. A. C.
 Robertson, Pte. H.
 Robertson, Pte. M. C.
 Robinson, Pte. A. W.
 Roddan, Cpl. A. R.
 Rogers, L.-Cpl. W.
 Rose, C.S.M. W. H.
 Roth, Pte. H. W.
 Rootes, Pte. H. L.
 Rue, Pte.
 Ruse, Pte. S. B.
 Rutherford, Pte. W. R.
 Ryan, Pte. C. J.
 Schafer, Pte. F. J.
 Seaman, Pte. G. A.
 Seater, Pte. W. A.
 Seckold, Pte. P. F.
 Sewell, Pte. J. A.
 Sharkey, Pte. E. F.
 Shephard, Pte. L.
 Sheridan, Pte. J. F.
 Siddons, Sgt. B. L.
 Simmonds, Pte. D. J.
 Simmonds, Pte. E. E.
 Simons, Pte. J. L.
 Sinclair, Pte. C. R.
 Sinclair, Pte. G. W.
 Smith, Pte. A. R.
 Smith, Pte. C. L.
 Smith, Pte. D. B.
 Smith, Pte. H. E.
 Smith, L.-Sgt. L.
 Smith, Pte. R.
 Smith, Pte. R. N.
 St. Smith, Pte. H. N.
 Spinder, Pte. A. E.
 Stapleton, Pte. J.
 Starr, Pte. W. G.
 Steavens, Pte. J. E.
 Stephens, Cpl. W. J.
 Stevens, Pte. G.
 Stewart, Pte. H. W.
 Sticker, Pte. P. O.
 Stirling, Pte. R.
 Scott, Pte. J. R.
 Stott, Pte. J.
 Stringer, Cpl. A. F.
 Stubbins, Cpl. W.
 Sullivan, Sgt. E.
 Sullivan, Pte. J. T.
 Syren, Pte. K.
 Taylor, Pte. F. A.
 Taylor, Sgt. J.
 Thatcher, L.-Cpl. S. R.
 Thompson, Pte. A.
 Toone, Pte. W. J.
 Tooser, Pte. A. S. A.
 Turner, Pte. S. H.
 Twining, Pte. J. G.
 Tyler, Pte. J. J.
 Urquhart, Pte. W.
 Vogt, Pte. P. C.
 Walker, Pte. A. W.
 Walsh, Pte. P. J.
 Walsh, Pte. T.
 Watson, L.-Cpl. C. S.
 Wearne, Pte. R.
 Webb, Pte. J.
 Weir, Pte. J. F.
 Wensor, Pte. E. J.
 West, Pte. E. H.
 Westlake, Pte. H. B.
 Whipp, Pte. W. A. S.
 Whitehouse, Pte. W.
 Whiteman, Pte. V. J.
 Whitnall, Pte. A. C.
 Whittaker, Pte. T.
 Williams, Pte. F. J.
 Williams, Pte. L. E. C.
 Willis, Pte. A. V.
 Wilson, L.-Cpl. D.
 Wilson, Pte. G. H.
 Wilson, Sgt. H. O. B.
 Wilson, Pte. O. W.
 Wilson, Pte. T. W.
 Winner, Cpl. A. J.
 Wolfe, Pte. T. E.
 Wood, Pte. G.
 Woodward, Pte. E. H.
 Yass, Pte. D.
 Yeark, Pte. A.
 Young, Pte. J.

56TH BATTALION

Officers

Scott, Lt.-Col. A. H.
 Chappell, Capt. A. C.
 Christiansen, Capt. G. C.
 Fanning, Capt. F.
 Sheen, Capt. W. R.
 Single, Capt. R. V.

Thompson, Capt. H. G.
 Benson, Lt. F. C.
 Chauncy, Lt. C. L.
 Davison, Lt. A.
 Dykes, Lt. S. McP.
 Gordon, Lt. T. F.

Kidson, Lt. A. DeV.
 Musgrove, Lt. H. R.
 Oldham, Lt. W. H.
 O'Halloran, Lt. W. E.
 Spratt, Lt. S. F.
 Warden, Lt. B. W.

Other Ranks

Abbott, Pte. S.
 Adams, Pte. F. C.
 Adams, Pte. J.
 Aldworth, Pte. G. A.
 Alford, L.-Sgt. F. J. H.
 Allen, Pte. C.
 Anderson, Pte. N. L.
 Archibald, Pte. J.
 Arman, Pte. J.
 Arnold, Pte. A. R.
 Bain, Cpl. R. B.
 Baker, Pte. S. C.
 Baldry, Pte. N. S.
 Bancroft, Pte. J.
 Banks, Pte. A. T.
 Baring, L.-Cpl. E.
 Barker, Pte. E.
 Barner, Pte. A. D.
 Barnes, Pte. L. E.
 Bartlett, Pte. N.
 Barton, Pte. P.
 Baxter, Pte. C. J.
 Baxter, L.-Cpl. E. A.
 Beckett, Pte. A.
 Beith, Pte. W.
 Bennett, Pte. F. T.
 Bennett, Pte. W. A.
 Berningham, Pte. J.
 Bishop, Pte. E. J.
 Blisset, Pte. A.
 Blackmore, Pte. J. H.
 Bladwell, Cpl. R. R.
 Boss, Pte. R.
 Boucher, Pte. C. P.
 Bowne, Pte. H. G.
 Boyne, Pte. J. H.
 Bradford, Pte. C.
 Bradley, Pte. W. E.
 Bradney, Pte. J.
 Brennan, Pte. R. J.
 Brennan, Pte. T. J.
 Briggs, Pte. G.
 Brill, Pte. C. J.
 Brogan, Pte. J.
 Brokenshire, Pte. H. W.
 Brown, L.-Cpl. E.
 Brown, Pte. B.
 Brown, Pte. R. J.
 Brown, Pte. W. J.
 Browne, Pte. T.
 Brundrett, Pte. H.
 Budd, Pte. J. R.
 Buckley, Pte. A. J.
 Buckley, Pte. E.
 Burn, Pte. C. F.
 Burnell, Cpl. A.
 Burrage, Pte. W. J.
 Bussell, Pte. R. D.
 Butcher, Sgt. F.
 Butterworth, Cpl. R. G.
 Cahill, Pte. J. P.
 Callam, Pte. E. L.
 Caloy, Pte. H. L.
 Cann, Pte. L.
 Carey, Pte. H. E. E.
 Carney, Pte. M.
 Carney, Pte. R.
 Carney, Pte. W.
 Carpenter, Pte. W.
 Carty, Pte. W. J.
 Cato, Pte. R. J.
 Chandler, Pte. A. C.
 Chappell, Pte. F. J.
 Chard, Pte. W. A.
 Cheadle, Pte. C. A.
 Chignell, Pte. D.
 Chinnery, Pte. T. P. B.
 Churchhill, Pte. S. J.
 Clarke, L.-Sgt. E. J. C.
 Clayton, Pte. A. E.
 Clunne, Pte. A. H.
 Clunne, Pte. J. J.
 Clynn, Pte. J. M.
 Cockburn, Pte. A.
 Cockburn, Pte. W.
 Cole, T/Sgt. H. F.
 Collier, Pte. E. W.
 Comport, Pte. A.
 Condell, Pte. G. H.
 Connors, Pte. J.
 Cootes, L.-Cpl. G. J.
 Copping, Pte. F. O.
 Conlter, Pte. W. H.
 Crampton, Pte. A.
 Crawford, Pte. G.
 Creasy, Pte. J. M.
 Cropley, Pte. N. S.
 Cross, Pte. H. A.
 Cross, Pte. J. S.
 Cullen, Pte. P. J.
 Daley, Sgt. J. C.
 Dallas, Pte. L. C.
 Davidson, Pte. H.
 Davis, Pte. E. S.
 Davis, Pte. P. H.
 Dawson, Pte. E. L.
 Day, Pte. W. J.
 Dignam, Pte. O.
 Dilworth, Pte. L. D.
 Disher, Pte. W. F.
 Dixon, Pte. G. E.
 Dodd, Pte. D.
 Dodds, Pte. A.
 Doherty, Pte. B. J.
 Doncaster, Pte. G.
 Donovan, Pte. J.
 Doust, Pte. F. P.
 Drowsett, Pte. S. N. J.
 Drewitt, Pte. A. R.
 Drewitt, L.-Cpl. A. W.
 Duddle, Pte. W. C.
 Duncan, Pte. F. D.
 Duncan, Pte. F.
 Dunsmaur, Pte. J. B.
 Durkin, Pte. A. F.
 Dutton, Pte. F.
 Dutton, Cpl. L. J.
 Dwyer, Pte. J. F.
 Dwyer, Pte. J. J.
 Dyball, Pte. T. L.
 Dyer, Pte. V. C.
 East, Pte. E. A.
 Edwards, Pte. H. S.
 Ellareguy, L.-Cpl. H.
 Elliott, Pte. A. H. C.
 Elliott, L.-Cpl. J. R.
 Ellis, Pte. A.
 Elvin, L.-Cpl. P.
 Elwin, Pte. F.
 Eriksson, Pte. T. G.
 Evans, Pte. J.
 Evans, Pte. K. W.
 Evans, Pte. W. J.
 Ewan, Pte. J.
 Falconer, Pte. K. N.
 Fardell, Pte. F.
 Farrell, Pte. J.
 Ferguson, Sgt. J.
 Ferguson, Pte. V. G.
 Finch, Pte. F. A.
 Fishenden, Cpl. W. T.
 Flodin, Pte. O. W.
 Fordham, Pte. A. J.
 Forester, Sgt. L. W.
 Foster, Sgt. L.
 Fowler, Pte. J. H.
 Fraser, Pte. D. A.
 Frew, Pte. A. S.
 Gagen, Pte. C.
 Gagg, Pte. C. A.
 Gardner, Pte. W.
 Garland, Pte. W. P.
 Gatcha, Pte. F.
 Geldard, Pte. W. H.
 Gibson, Pte. N. J.
 Glanville, Pte. S.
 Glassington, Pte. L. G.
 Glascock, Pte. G.
 Glazebrook, Pte. R.
 Glenn, Pte. H. E.
 Goldie, Pte. J. H.
 Goldsbrough, Pte. H.
 Goldsbrough, Pte. R.
 Gorman, Pte. F.
 Graham, Pte. J. N.
 Graham, Pte. R. C.
 Grant, L.-Cpl. A. A.
 Gregory, Pte. A. H.
 Grubiff, Pte. R. D.
 Grubb, L.-Cpl. H. R.
 Grumys, Pte. A.
 Gurney, Pte. H.
 Guyer, Pte. G. P.
 Hagley, Pte. N. L.
 Half, Pte. S. E.
 Hall, Pte. H.
 Hall, Pte. W. C.
 Hand, Pte. W. R.
 Hann, Pte. L. F.
 Hardie, L.-Cpl. R. C.
 Hare, Pte. J. W.
 Harlor, Pte. A. J.
 Harrison, Pte. R.
 Harvey, Pte. E. J.
 Haynes, Pte. C. W.
 Hazell, Pte. T.
 Heath, Pte. N. J.
 Heinecke, Pte. G. C.
 Heinecke, Pte. H. H.
 Helson, Pte. A. P.
 Henderson, Pte. J.
 Henson, Cpl. C.
 Herd, Pte. L. J.
 Hibbert, Pte. R. T.
 Hicks, Pte. W.
 Hilder, L.-Cpl. T. E.
 Hirst, Pte. F.
 Hockley, Pte. R. R.
 Hodgkinson, Pte. E. A.
 Hodgson, Pte. S.
 Hoff, Pte. O.
 Holdford, Pte. H. V.
 Holst, Pte. J. W.
 Hood, Pte. A. L.
 Hooley, Pte. G. B.
 Horsington, Pte. A. H.
 Howard, Pte. W. M.
 Howarth, Pte. D.
 Hunt, Pte. F. J.
 Huntington, Pte. K. R.
 Hutchinson, Pte. G.
 Ireland, Pte. C. S.
 Jackson, Pte. F. J.
 Jackson, Pte. J.
 James, Pte. F. H.
 James, Pte. J. W.
 Jardine, Pte. H.
 Jeffery, Pte. A.
 Jennings, Pte. E. L.
 Johns, Pte. W. J.
 Johnson, Sgt. H.
 Johnson, Pte. H.
 Johnston, Pte. C. E. W.
 Johnston, Pte. H.
 Johnston, Pte. W.
 Johnstone, Pte. E.
 Jolley, Pte. B. C.
 Jones, Pte. H. L.
 Jones, S.-Sgt. R.
 Jones, Pte. K. G.

Other Ranks—cont.

Kairl, Pte. A. J.
 Kay, Pte. W. R.
 Keech, Pte. A. G.
 Kelly, Pte. G.
 Kelly, Pte. J.
 Kelly, Pte. P. T. R.
 Kemp, L.-Cpl. A. W.
 Kenny, Pte. W.
 Kerley, Pte. E. W.
 Kew, Pte. W. C.
 King, Pte. G. R.
 King, Pte. P. S.
 Kirchner, Pte. A. A.
 Kirkham, Sgt. W. E.
 Kruse, Pte. W. E.
 Laird, Pte. C. S.
 Lambert, Pte. A. B.
 Lander, Pte. H. R.
 Lane, Pte. A. V. J.
 Lawton, Pte. J.
 Leabeater, Pte. A. E.
 Lean, Pte. E. L.
 Learmont, Pte. A.
 Ledwell, Pte. W. C.
 Lee, Pte. E. J.
 Lee, Pte. T. J.
 Lever, Pte. L. G.
 Levy, Pte. L.
 Lilley, Pte. C. E.
 Logan, Pte. G. G.
 Logan, L.-Cpl. H. S.
 Logan, Pte. J. A.
 Long, Pte. W. S. C.
 Lonsdale, Pte. N.
 Lowe, Pte. N. B. A.
 Lowry, Pte. G. T. J.
 Lygoe, Pte. R. P.
 MacDouall, Sgt. F. J.
 Mackenzie, L.-Cpl. D. A.
 Mackney, Pte. G. E.
 Madden, L.-Cpl. T. E.
 Maher, Pte. M. T.
 Manktelow, Pte. A.
 Marment, Pte. C. S.
 Marshall, Pte. J.
 Martin, Pte. A. E.
 Martin, Pte. C. A.
 Martin, Pte. F.
 Mason, Pte. E. W.
 Mathews, Pte. T. W. B.
 Maxwell, Pte. W. C.
 McAllister, Pte. R.
 McCall, Sgt. M. G.
 McCann, L.-Cpl. P.
 McCann, Pte. G.
 McConaghy, Pte. W.
 McDonald, Pte. C. I.
 McDonald, Pte. R. W.
 McGauchie, Pte. J.
 McGowan, Pte. J.
 McGown, Pte. J.
 McGrath, Pte. R.
 McGrath, Pte. W. R.
 McIntosh, Cpl. A.
 McIntosh, Pte. G.
 McIntyre, Pte. A.
 McIntyre, L.-Sgt. W. A.
 McKenzie, Cpl. J. D.
 McKeon, Cpl. F. S.
 McKeon, Pte. R. C.
 McKinnon, Sgt. J. E.
 McLaren, Pte. J. H.
 McLeod, Pte. A. D.
 McLucas, Pte. H.
 McMahon, Pte. E.
 McMillan, Pte. N. R.
 McMillan, L.-Cpl. W. S.
 McNair, Pte. H. W.
 McPherson, Pte. A. C.
 Meadows, Pte. W. J.
 Mi-hael, Pte. J. B.
 Michell, Pte. F. C.
 Miller, L.-Cpl. A. E.
 Miskelly, Pte. J. P.
 Monkhouse, L.-Cpl. C. E.
 Moore, Pte. R. W.
 Moran, Pte. P. F.
 Morgan, Pte. G. W.
 Mulhall, Pte. E. A.
 Murphy, Pte. E.
 Murray, L.-Cpl. G. W.
 Naismith, L.-Cpl. O.
 Nichol, Pte. D. B.
 Nicholls, Cpl. E. G.
 Nixon, Pte. H. G.
 Noble, Pte. G.
 Norman, Pte. E. W.
 Norrie, Pte. E. F.
 Norris, L.-Cpl. F. C.
 Oakley, Pte. C. V.
 O'Connell, Pte. W. B.
 O'Connor, Pte. B. L.
 O'Connor, Pte. M.
 O'Connor, Sgt. T. W.
 O'Donnell, Pte. J. P.
 Ogden, Pte. J.
 Oliver, L.-Cpl. L.
 O'Reilly, Pte. V.
 O'Rourke, Pte. A.
 O'Toole, L.-Cpl. L.
 Owen, Pte. J. A.
 Owen, T/Sgt. R.
 Page, Pte. J. P.
 Palmer, Pte. E.
 Parker, Pte. N. L.
 Parsons, Pte. A.
 Paterson, Pte. J. G.
 Patterson, Pte. R.
 Penfold, Pte. C. J.
 Petch, Pte. H. P.
 Peterson, L.-Cpl. P. A.
 Phelan, Sgt. M. J.
 Phillips, Pte. A. E.
 Pickworth, Pte. R. F.
 Pike, Pte. R. J.
 Piper, Pte. A. E.
 Pitt, Pte. E. W.
 Plovman, Pte. W. R.
 Plucknett, Pte. C. A.
 Port, Pte. R.
 Potter, Pte. A.
 Poyitt, Pte. L.
 Pratt, Pte. G. H.
 Preece, Pte. E.
 Prentice, Pte. J. D.
 Purvis, Pte. W. R.
 Quick, Sgt. F. H.
 Quilty, Pte. F. B.
 Quinn, Pte. A.
 Raaven, Pte. W. W.
 Ralph, Pte. H.
 Ramage, Pte. A. D.
 Raybold, Pte. L. F.
 Reay, Pte. A.
 Redman, Sgt. G. S. S.
 Reed, Pte. F.
 Reeves, Pte. F. G.
 Reeves, Pte. W. R.
 Reibel, Pte. W.
 Reid, Pte. R.
 Reid, Sgt. R. G.
 Remilton, Pte. J. J.
 Reneham, L.-Cpl. E. G.
 Richards, Pte. S. J. P.
 Richardson, Pte. R. F.
 Ridley, Pte. W.
 Riley, Pte. J.
 Robbins, Pte. G.
 Roberts, Pte. H. V.
 Robinson, Pte. G.
 Rodwell, Pte. W. G.
 Rogers, Pte. H. H. S.
 Rogers, Pte. J.
 Rose, Pte. W. A.
 Ross, Pte. D. E.
 Rourke, Cpl. H. G.
 Rowland, Pte. D.
 Rudd, Pte. P. M.
 Rush, L.-Cpl. F. E.
 Russell, Pte. M. W.
 Ryan, Pte. W. H.
 Savage, L.-Cpl. R. C.
 Scott, Pte. A.
 Scott, Pte. R.
 Seers, Pte. C. E.
 Sharman, Pte. A. J.
 Sheather, Pte. E. F.
 Shepherd, Sgt. H. J.
 Sheppard, Pte. C. H.
 Sheumack, Pte. R. J.
 Shumack, Pte. B.
 Sibthorpe, Pte. G. H.
 Silk, Pte. R. R.
 Simmonds, Pte. G. B.
 Simpson, Pte. G.
 Simpson, Pte. F. H. A.
 Sims, Pte. S.
 Sinnema, Pte. G.
 Slack, Pte. H. J.
 Slater, Pte. T.
 Smith, Pte. A.
 Smith, Pte. C. T.
 Smith, Pte. F.
 Smith, Pte. W.
 Snowden, Pte. W. S.
 Spain, Pte. W.
 Spencer, Pte. H. W.
 Spicer, Pte. A. J.
 Stapleton, Pte. J. E.
 Starr, Pte. W. L.
 Stephens, Pte. S. E.
 Stephenson, Sgt. H. J.
 Stockdale, Pte. W. J.
 Stork, Pte. R.
 Stormont, Pte. F. G. L.
 Stott, Pte. A. C.
 Strang, Cpl. D. J.
 Sturgeon, Pte. W.
 Sugden, Pte. N.
 Sullivan, Pte. A. T.
 Sullivan, Pte. J.
 Sullivan, Pte. J. J.
 Sutherland, Pte. D.
 Sweeney, Pte. J. L.
 Syme, Pte. P. M.
 Symonds, Pte. J.
 Tait, Pte. P.
 Talbot, Pte. J.
 Taylor, Pte. H. L.
 Taylor, Pte. S.
 Thomas, Pte. W.
 Thornton, Pte. G. R.
 Tobin, Pte. J. T.
 Toohey, Pte. J.
 Tosh, Pte. J.
 Tough, Pte. J. F.
 Trinder, Pte. I.
 Tuke, Pte. R.
 Turley, Pte. B. L. W.
 Turner, Pte. W. A.
 Upmal, Pte. E.
 Upward, Pte. F. H.
 Walker, Pte. C. R. J.
 Walker, Pte. S. A.
 Walsh, Pte. T.
 Walther, Pte. M. H.
 Ward, Pte. G. A.
 Warren, Pte. H.
 Watt, Pte. J.
 Watts, Pte. A.

DEATHS

453

Other Ranks—cont.

Webber, Pte. F. J.
Weir, Pte. R. H.
West, Pte. R. R.
White, Cpl. J.
White, Pte. L.
Whittle, Pte. C. R.
Williams, Pte. A. R.

Williams, Pte. H. J.
Williams, L.-Cpl. J. E.
Williams, Pte. R. J.
Williamson, Pte. A.
Willis, Pte. H. D.
Wilson, Pte. A. R.
Wilson, Pte. J. T.

Witton, Pte. J. A.
Wood, Pte. S. G.
Woods, Pte. W. H.
Worley, T/Cpl. S.
Yeoman, Pte. G. F.
York, Pte. J. L.
Young, Pte. E.

14TH L.T.M.B.

Officers

Hopkins, Capt. C. B.

Smith, Lt. A. H.

Other Ranks

Bean, Pte. N. M.
Boss, Pte. R.
Boyan, Pte. A.
Clarke, Pte. N. A.
Della-valle, Pte. B.
Foster, Pte. N. W.
Gordon, Cpl. A. J.
Maslen, Pte. W. H.
McDowell, Pte. A.
McDowell, Pte. J. S. P.

McFarlane, Pte. R.
McGregor, L.-Sgt. J. H.
Neill, Pte. J. H.
Nicholls, Pte. A.
O'Riordan, T/Cpl. T.
Poxon, Pte. J.
Rigby, Pte. T.
Small, Pte. K. C.
Smith, Pte. J. W.

Speirs, Pte. J.
Stewart, Pte. J.
Thomas, Pte. F. W.
Tiedemann, Pte. J. A.
Tuite, Pte. N. A.
West, Pte. R.
Willis, Pte. O. D.
Wooderson, Pte. J.
Young, Cpl. G.

14TH MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Officers

Dick, Capt. W. T.
Briggs, Lt. H. F.
Burns, Lt. H. D.

Cox, Lt. A. C.
Hallenstein, Lt. D. I.
Hoddle-Wrigley, Lt. T.

Maughan, Lt. D. L.
Rush, Lt. A. L.

Other Ranks

Anderson, Pte. J. A.
Atwell, Pte. S. H.
Barry, Pte. P. J.
Baskerville, Pte. E. M.
Bell, L.-Sgt. E. W.
Bettles, Pte. H. F.
Borne, Sgt. D. R.
Broomhead, Pte. F.
Byrne, Pte. L. H.
Cain, Pte. A. V.
Christie, Pte. T. S.
Clark, Pte. J. T.
Clarke, Pte. J. H.
Crundall, Pte. V. G.
Daley, Cpl. R. J.
Davis, Pte. A. E.
Donald, Pte. A. A.
Drew, Pte. S. R.
Ducksbury, Pte. J. S.
Duffy, Pte. P. J.
Duncan, Pte. J. E.
Eley, Pte. S. T.
Frankhauser, Pte. H. F.
Frear, Pte. F. R.
Gaynor, Pte. J.
Gibson, Pte. W. H.

Goodwin, Sgt. E. J.
Grundall, Pte. V. C.
Hall, Sgt. G. H.
Hansen, Pte. A. W.
Higgs, Cpl. C.
Hills, Pte. R. W. J.
Howard, Sgt. A. E.
Hutton, Pte. G.
James, Pte. F.
Jordan, Pte. R.
Kelaher, Pte. B. A.
Lauder, Pte. J.
Laylee, Sgt. G.
Lowe, Pte. H.
Lowe, Pte. A. E.
Lougheed, Pte. H.
Luke, Pte. C. S.
Mair, Pte. M. G.
Maisey, Pte. M. H.
Malone, Pte. T.
Marchmont, Pte. S. H.
May, Pte. H. T. G.
McCawley, Pte. G.
McDonald, Pte. A. R.
McKay, Pte. F. W.
McNamara, Pte. T. C.

Millen, Pte. J. R.
Moore, Cpl. C. J.
Murphy, Pte. J. P.
Nash, Pte. P. J.
O'Brien, Pte. L. G.
O'Donnell, Pte. K.
Partridge, Pte. A. S.
Quinn, Pte. L.
Richards, Sgt. S.
Robinson, Pte. C. L.
Rogerson, Pte. G.
Royce, Pte. R. E.
Rayn, Pte. D.
Ryan, Pte. J. M.
Saunders, Sgt. S. A.
Shade, Pte. J.
Shearer, Pte. F. L.
Smith, Pte. J.
Smith, Pte. L. W.
Staglis, Cpl. G. F.
Stewart, Sgt. A. J.
Strange, Pte. R. W.
West, Pte. T. G.
Wiles, Pte. W. T.
Wilkins, Pte. D. G.
Wotton, Pte. C. R.

15TH BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

Other Ranks

Rogers, Pte. B.

57TH BATTALION

Officers

Aram, Capt. J. T. H.
Dickinson, Capt. H. S.
Harris, Capt. F. W.
Morgan, Capt. R. R.
Snowball, Capt. J. I.
Allen, Lt. W. R.
Anderson, Lt. E. H.

Davis, Lt. A.
Duncan, Lt. G. D.
Falconer, Lt. J. A.
Gowenlock, Lt. E. S.
Hedgecock, Lt. A. H.
Joynt, Lt. G. V. W.
Kerr, Lt. R. J. L.

Marxsen, Lt. R.
Miller, Lt. A. H.
Muter, Lt. M. C.
Nicholson, Lt. P. E.
St. Pinnock, Lt. C. C. D.
Sutherland, Lt. E. B.
Thomson, Lt. J. J.

Other Ranks

Abrahamson, Pte. A.
 Adams, Pte. F. C.
 Agnew, Pte. M.
 Alpey, Pte. A. R.
 Anslin, Pte. M.
 Arbon, Pte. R. E.
 Archer, Pte. A.
 Arthur, Pte. D. W.
 Ashford, Pte. H. G.
 Ashley, Pte. T. F.
 Baker, Pte. R. J.
 Baker, Pte. V. R.
 Bannister, Pte. L. C.
 Bastian, Pte. R. C.
 Beath, Sgt. R.
 Bell, Pte. D. McK.
 Bell, Pte. H. H.
 Bell, Pte. S. A.
 Best, Pte. F. T.
 Beswick, Pte. L. E.
 Bibbs, Pte. L.
 Birrell, Pte. R.
 Black, Pte. M. R.
 Bladen, Pte. L.
 Blandford, L.-Cpl. T.
 Boothroyd, Pte. H.
 Bowring (formerly Bevan), Pte.
 R. J. L.
 Boxall, Pte. A. E.
 Bradley, Pte. D.
 Bradshaw, Pte. W. H.
 Bray, Pte. E. L.
 Breustedt, Pte. L. L.
 Bright, Pte. S. W.
 Brierley, Cpl. A.
 Brinsmead, Pte. A. J.
 Bristow, Pte. C.
 Brognus, Pte. D.
 Brook, Pte. W.
 Brooks, Pte. R. J.
 Brown, Pte. W. A.
 Brown, Pte. W. E.
 Brown, Pte. W. E. C.
 Bryant, Pte. G. F.
 Buchan, Pte. W. F.
 Bull, Sgt. W. W.
 Buller, Sgt. A. A.
 Buller, Pte. C. E.
 Burgess, Pte. E. H.
 Burley, Pte. E. L.
 Byrne, Pte. C. F.
 Caddle, L.-Sgt. W. J.
 Cahill, Pte. J. J.
 Callin, Pte. F.
 Campbell, Pte. C. G.
 Campbell, Pte. E. C.
 Campbell, Pte. R. W.
 Campbell, Pte. P.
 Campbell, Pte. W. C.
 Cann, Pte. G. L.
 Carter, Pte. A. B.
 Cawse, Cpl. F. W.
 Chapman, Pte. A. E.
 Chapman, Pte. F.
 Christie, Pte. R.
 Clarke, Pte. A. R.
 Clayton, Pte. A. N.
 Cleary, Pte. W. C.
 Clinton, Pte. R. G.
 Coard, Pte. C.
 Cock, Pte. J. A.
 Collie, Pte. G. G.
 Collins, Sgt. C.
 Collins, Pte. L. M. N. W.
 Connell, Pte. J. B.
 Conway, Pte. F. W.
 Conway, Pte. J. P.
 Cook, Pte. F. W.
 Cook, Pte. P.
 Cook, Pte. P. H.
 Cook, Pte. W. J.
 Corrigan, L.-Cpl. W. H.
 Cossar, Pte. J. L.
 Cousins, Pte. W. J.
 Crawford, Pte. R. S.
 Cropley, Pte. G. F.
 Crozier, Pte. F.
 Cummings, Pte. A. R.
 Curnow, Pte. T.
 Curry, Cpl. R. A.
 Daniel, Pte. J. M.
 Dann, Pte. L. W.
 Dargatz, Pte. N. F.
 Dark, Pte. A. C.
 Darrelle, Sgt. R. T.
 Davey, Pte. E. C.
 Davey, L.-Sgt. J. F.
 Davies, Pte. D.
 Davies, Pte. G. F.
 Davies, Sgt. H. M.
 Davis, Pte. A. H.
 Davis, Pte. T.
 Dean, Pte. L.
 Delahey, Pte. W. J.
 Devitt, Pte. P. J.
 Dodemaide, Pte. F.
 Dodgson, Pte. W.
 Dooley, Pte. A. J.
 Doran, Pte. H. P.
 Dowsey, Pte. I.
 Drew, Pte. J.
 Dudley, Pte. T. E.
 Duncombe, Pte. E. S.
 Dunn, Pte. T. D.
 Dutfield, Pte. A.
 Eddy, L.-Cpl. G.
 Edwards, Pte. C. P.
 Edwards, Pte. J. W.
 Edwards, Pte. P. A.
 Edwards, Pte. W. G.
 Egan, Cpl. M. J.
 Eldershaw, Pte. A. G.
 Ellens, Pte. A. H.
 Elston, Pte. A. H.
 Emmett, Pte. R.
 Evans, Pte. S.
 Fagg, Pte. W.
 Fahey, Pte. M. S.
 Farnell, Pte. A. E.
 Farronds, Sgt. A. V.
 Faulkner, Pte. C. E. T.
 Featherstone, Pte. J. F. V.
 Felgenhauer, Cpl. F. C.
 Fernance, Pte. A.
 Ferrar, Pte. J. W.
 Ferrow, Pte. C. W.
 Flavell, Pte. G. E.
 Forsyth, L.-Cpl. E. J.
 Forsyth, Pte. H. K.
 Fossey, Pte. C. V.
 Fraser, Pte. J. F.
 Fraser, Pte. J. W.
 Freeman, Pte. H.
 Fregon, Pte. F.
 Fregon, Pte. R. A.
 Frost, Pte. G.
 Fuller, Pte. C. L.
 Fyfe, L.-Cpl. W. B.
 Garden, Pte. G. S.
 Gleeson, Pte. C. J.
 Godden, Pte. F. E.
 Graham, Pte. G.
 Graham, Cpl. W. H.
 Granfield, Pte. G. A.
 Grant, Pte. S. W.
 Grass, Pte. L. McK.
 Green, Pte. J.
 Gregory, Pte. J. M.
 Gregory, Pte. W.
 Gregory, Pte. W. H.
 Gulmart, Pte. G. H.
 Hales, Pte. W. J.
 Hall, Pte. H. A. T.
 Hall, Pte. S. F.
 Hailberg, Pte. J. B. W.
 Hallett, Sgt. R. R.
 Hamer, Pte. J.
 Hamilton, Pte. W. H.
 Hammond, Pte. P. E.
 Hancock, Pte. A. J.
 Hanger, A/Cpl. A. T.
 Hannasky, Pte. F. M.
 Hardingham, Pte. C.
 Hardwick, Pte. S. F.
 Harris, Pte. G. L.
 Harris, Pte. J. S.
 Hart, Pte. J.
 Harvey, Cpl. R. A.
 Harvey, Pte. V. D. C.
 Harvey, Pte. W. J.
 Haw, Pte. M. B.
 Hawker, L.-Cpl. A.
 Hazell, Pte. A.
 Heard, Pte. R. T.
 Heddell, Pte. T. H.
 Henderson, Pte. L.
 Henson, Pte. G. L.
 Hickin, Pte. J.
 Hicks, Pte. C. H.
 Hicks, Pte. J. A.
 Hill, Pte. D.
 Hinchcliffe, Pte. T. W.
 Hocking, Pte. W. F.
 Hodgetts, Pte. C. J.
 Hodgkinson, Pte. J.
 Hogan, Cpl. C. C.
 Hogg, Pte. B. M.
 Holland, Cpl. E. M.
 Holmes, Cpl. G. T.
 Homer, Cpl. A. H.
 Homer, Cpl. V. W. M.
 Hood, Pte. L. G.
 Houstow, Cpl. F. G.
 Hughes, Pte. M. J.
 Hughes, Pte. S. R.
 Hume, Pte. W.
 Hummerston, Pte. G.
 Hunt, Pte. A.
 Hunter, Sgt. R. J.
 Howard, Pte. H. S. J.
 Howard, Sgt. R. S.
 Howlett, Pte. J. B.
 Inrrie, Pte. E. A.
 Ingelfinger, Pte. L. C.
 Ingleton, Pte. C.
 Ingram, Pte. J.
 Ireland, Pte. V.
 Jacks, Pte. L.
 Jackson, L.-Cpl. H. E.
 Jacobson, Pte. H. W.
 Jacobson, Pte. J.
 Jarman, Sgt. W.
 Jason, L.-Cpl. C. V.
 Jason, L.-Cpl. J. V.
 Jenkin, Pte. G. E.
 Jessup, Sgt. A. E.
 Johnson, Pte. A. H. M.
 Johnson, Pte. H.
 Jolliffe, Pte. F.
 Jones, Pte. E. S.
 Jones, L.-Cpl. W. T.
 Keane, Pte. J. G.
 Kee, Pte. J. E.
 Kelleher, Pte. T.
 Kennell, Pte. C. J.
 Kenny, Pte. J. F.
 Kerr, Sgt. A.
 Kerr, Pte. J.
 King, Pte. A. W.
 King, Pte. D. F.
 King, Pte. L. V.
 King, Sgt. W. J.
 Kinsey, Pte. F. A.

Other Ranks—cont.

Kirby, Pte. W.
 Knight, Pte. R. O.
 Kuhne, Pte. A. G.
 Ladson, Pte. W. S.
 Laim, Pte. J.
 Lambert, Pte. A.
 Lambert, Pte. S. W.
 Latta, Pte. W. T.
 Leed, Pte. D. R.
 Lester, Pte. H. C.
 Lever, Pte. S. E.
 Lewis, Pte. G. H.
 Lindley, Pte. W.
 Livie, Pte. J.
 Locke, Cpl. W. R.
 Lockyer, Pte. N. A.
 Logton, Pte. J. A.
 Lucas, Pte. P. C.
 Lugg, Pte. N. W. H.
 Luke, Pte. W. H.
 Lynch, Pte. E.
 Lyon, Sgt. J. S.
 Macbryde, Pte. G. A.
 Mackay, Pte. A.
 Macklin, Pte. J. F.
 Magel, Pte. C. H.
 Mahoney, Pte. M. F.
 Makepeace, Pte. P. A. G.
 Malcolm, Pte. W.
 Malone, Pte. J. H.
 Manallack, Pte. W.
 Manceer, Pte. F. C.
 Mann, Sgt. T. H.
 Margules, Pte. T. R.
 Mark, Pte. F.
 Marshall, Pte. G. H. S.
 Martin, Pte. G. E.
 Martin, Pte. T. E.
 Martin, Pte. W. E.
 Martin, Pte. W. W.
 Martinelli, Pte. H. B.
 Maybury, L.-Cpl. S. C.
 McAdam, Pte. G.
 McAuley, Pte. E.
 McCahery, Pte. P. J.
 McCart, Pte. C.
 McConnell, L.-Cpl. W. J.
 McConnell, Pte. W. J.
 McCoppin, Pte. J. R.
 McCracken, Pte. J. N.
 McDonald, Pte. A.
 McDonald, Pte. D.
 McDonald, Pte. H. L.
 McDonald, Pte. H. V.
 McGain, Pte. R.
 McGrath, Pte. P.
 McGregor, Pte. C. L.
 McGregor, Sgt. J.
 McIntyre, Pte. D. S.
 McKay, Pte. W.
 McKee, Dvr. H.
 McPhee, Pte. S. C.
 Metelmann, Pte. C. J.
 Milgate, Pte. S. V.
 Mills, Pte. E. G.
 Mitchell, Pte. F. W.
 Mitchell, Pte. R.
 Mitchell, L.-Cpl. W. J.
 Mitchell, Pte. W. W.
 Montgomery, Pte. A. L.
 Moore, Pte. L. W.
 Morris, Pte. G. J. T.
 Morrison, Pte. H. H.
 Morrow, Cpl. S.
 Moulton, Sgt. L. L.
 Muir, Pte. I. C.
 Mullard, Pte. E. C.
 Mullins, Pte. A. J.
 Mulquinney, Pte. J. J.
 Muncery, Pte. J. H. T.
 Munweek, Pte. H.
 Naylor, Pte. R. W.
 Nevinson, L.-Cpl. J. W.
 Newman, Pte. P. A.
 Noonan, Pte. T. F.
 Northill, Pte. T. J.
 Oakes, Pte. C. H.
 O'Brien, Pte. J. J.
 O'Brien, Pte. M.
 O'Brien, Pte. R.
 O'Callaghan, Pte. T.
 O'Connor, Pte. T. H.
 O'Donnell, Pte. E.
 Oliver (formerly Finchley), Pte. C. F.
 Orr, Pte. J.
 Pace, Pte. H. T.
 Packhan, Pte. F.
 Palmer, L.-Sgt. H. K.
 Parker, Pte. G. T.
 Paterson, L.-Cpl. H. B.
 Paxter, Pte. H. R.
 Peart, Pte. J. M.
 Pengelly (formerly Smith), Pte. H. J.
 Penna, Pte. W. C. F.
 Perkins, Pte. A. E.
 Pickering, Pte. F. A.
 Pierson, Pte. J. F.
 Pollock, Pte. A.
 Pont, Pte. V. F.
 Prew, Pte. C. V.
 Pugh, Pte. J. R.
 Pryse, Pte. A. L.
 Pyne, Pte. F.
 Quade, Cpl. W.
 Quigg, Pte. W. M.
 Quinlan, Pte. J. J.
 Rathbone, Pte. G. E. T.
 Rees, Pte. W.
 Reis, L.-Cpl. H. J.
 Richards, Pte. D. G.
 Riddell, Pte. A. H. T.
 Ridding, Pte. T.
 Roberts, Pte. O. M.
 Robertson, Pte. A. F.
 Robertson, Pte. J. B.
 Robertson, Pte. W. B.
 Rochester, Pte. T. J.
 Roderick, Pte. D.
 Rogers, Pte. C. C.
 Rogers, Pte. R. C.
 Rooney, Pte. E. T.
 Rosendale, Pte. J.
 Rossborough, Pte. W.
 Round, Pte. W. A.
 Rowley, Pte. T. M.
 Rudd, Pte. W.
 Russell, L.-Cpl. G.
 Ryan, Pte. E. J.
 Ryan, Pte. J. L.
 Ryan, Pte. P. J. (2784)
 Ryan, Pte. P. J. (3775)
 Salt, Pte. B. P.
 Saltan, L.-Cpl. B. J.
 Santilla, Pte. W. J.
 Savolainan, Pte. A. J.
 Scott, Pte. C. S.
 Scott, Pte. T. G.
 Screeck (formerly Rogers), Pte. H. R.
 Sedgman, Pte. W. H.
 Shanahan, Sgt. W.
 Shand, Pte. J. B.
 Shelton, Pte. L. F.
 Shepherd, Pte. F. C.
 Shields, Pte. A.
 Shore, Pte. A. H.
 Short, C.S.M. J. S.
 Shrimpton, Pte. W. T.
 Silcock, Pte. E. J.
 Simons, Pte. D. L.
 Simons, Pte. J. J.
 Simpson, Pte. W. H.
 Sizer, Pte. A. A.
 Sizer, Pte. A. J.
 Skene, Pte. G. A.
 Slattery, Pte. C. P. T.
 Smith, Pte. E.
 Smith, Pte. H. F.
 Smith, Pte. R.
 Smith, Pte. W. G.
 Solano, Pte. W.
 Soloman, Pte. F. J.
 Spedding, Pte. H.
 Spiller, Pte. R. S.
 Stanford, Pte. J.
 Stoct, Pte. A.
 Stephens, Pte. T. J.
 Stephenson, Cpl. R. T.
 Stewart, Pte. G. W.
 Stewart, Pte. J. McA.
 Stone, Sgt. C. C.
 Stone, Pte. L.
 Strahan, Sgt. A.
 Strahan, Pte. C. E.
 Stranger, Pte. F.
 Street, Pte. H. H. S.
 Sullivan, C.S.M. H. P.
 Sweeney, Pte. N. J.
 Symons, Pte. S. T.
 Tavener, Pte. A.
 Taylor, Pte. A.
 Taylor, Pte. T.
 Temple, Pte. H.
 Tennant, Pte. C.
 Thomas, Pte. L. G.
 Thompson, Pte. F. N.
 Thompson, Pte. J. F.
 Thorn, Pte. W. T.
 Timms, A/Cpl. A. H.
 Tognolini, Pte. J.
 Toll, Pte. O.
 Turlan, Pte. L. H. A.
 Turnbull, Pte. A. F.
 Turner, Pte. W. E.
 Uglow, Pte. A. H.
 Vickers, Pte. E. W. J.
 Vine, Pte. R. V. B.
 Wallace, Pte. H. E.
 Walsh, Pte. J. P.
 Walter, Pte. J.
 Walters, Pte. G. E.
 Walters, Pte. W. H.
 Warburton, Pte. W. J.
 Ward, Pte. G. R.
 Warnock, Cpl. R.
 Watson, Sgt. A.
 Watt, Pte. J.
 Weir, Pte. R. R.
 Wells, Pte. F. E.
 Wellstead, Pte. W. G.
 Westgarth, Pte. R.
 Whillance, Pte. B. G.
 White, Pte. A.
 Williams, L.-Cpl. E. C.
 Williams, Pte. F. J.
 Williams, Pte. S. W.
 Williams, Cpl. W. J.
 Williamson, Pte. J.
 Willis, Pte. T. N.
 Willoughby, Pte. A. S.
 Wilson, Pte. B. G.
 Wilson, Pte. J. H.
 Wilson, Pte. M.
 Winter, Pte. H. W.
 Wise, Pte. H. M.
 Woollett, Pte. R.
 Wright, L.-Cpl. J. R.
 Wyeth, Pte.
 Young, Pte. A. J.
 Znamer, Pte. W. H.

58TH BATTALION

Officers

Hutchinson, Maj. A. J. S.
 Schutchson, Maj. A. J.
 Mair, Capt. G. H.
 Baensch, Lt. H. E.
 Barlow, Lt. W. G.
 Barnfather, Lt. R.
 Burn, Lt. H. T.
 Campbell, Lt. C. K. D.
 Crockford, Lt. F. C. H.
 Cronin, Lt. A.

Dagleish, Lt. N.
 Fraser, Lt. S.
 Gratton, Lt. H. V. G.
 Gray, Lt. C. M.
 Johnson, Lt. F. R.
 Keane, Lt. J. M.
 Kidd, Lt. R.
 Latta, Lt. C. H.
 Morey, Lt. H. V.
 Pearson, Lt. E. R.

Pelton, Lt. N. G.
 Rosenthal, Lt. S.
 Scott, Lt. G. N.
 Smith, Lt. L. K.
 Thompson, Lt. I. S.
 Thompson, Lt. J. J.
 Topp, Lt. S. J.
 Watson, Lt. G. W.
 Weir, Lt. F. J.
 Wood, Lt. G.

Other Ranks

Abley, Pte. A. E.
 Aitken, Pte. J. A.
 Allan, Pte. J. G.
 Allen, Pte. C. A.
 Allen, Pte. D. C.
 Allen, Pte. R. F.
 Allen, Pte. W. E. F.
 Allen, L.-Cpl. A. N.
 Allison, Pte. F.
 Anderson, Cpl. A. F.
 Anderson, Pte. C. R.
 Anderson, Pte. H. R.
 Andrew, Pte. G.
 Apperley, Pte. F. C.
 Armstrong, Pte. D. C.
 Ash, Dvr. H. C.
 Ashley, Pte. A. E.
 Aspinal, Pte. W. H.
 Atkinson, Pte. R. P.
 Baines, Pte. C. V.
 Baker, Pte. J. L. B.
 Baker, Pte. J. H.
 Ball, Pte. W. W.
 Barker, Pte. G.
 Barnes, Pte. A. N.
 Barnes, Pte. W. G.
 Barnett, Pte. R. M.
 Barr, Pte. R. W.
 Barter, Pte. F.
 Bartlett, Pte. A.
 Bassett, C.S.M. E. A.
 Batten, Pte. A. T.
 Baulch, Pte. W. J.
 Bayfield, Cpl. R.
 Beal, Pte. C. E. H.
 Beer, Pte. C.
 Bellingham, Pte. A. P.
 Berry, Pte. G.
 Berry, Pte. J. G.
 Berry, Sgt. J. L.
 Bickley, Pte. G.
 Biggs, Cpl. A.
 Bird, Sgt. C. G.
 Birrell, Pte. N. St. P.
 Black, Pte. G.
 Blayney, Pte. A. N. R.
 Bodsworth, Pte. V.
 Bogue, Pte. T.
 Bolger, Pte. W. J.
 Bond, Pte. W. A.
 Bond, Pte. W. E. E.
 Bottomley, Pte. H. N.
 Bouchier, Pte. A. P.
 Boutke, Pte. L. P.
 Boustead, Pte. H. W.
 Bowden, Pte. E.
 Bowler, Sgt. J. B.
 Boyle, Pte. R. N.
 Bradshaw, Pte. D. G.
 Bray, Pte. S.
 Bray, Pte. W. R.
 Brett, Pte. A. J. C.
 Brien, Pte. J. E.
 Bright, Pte. E. H.

Brokenshire, Cpl. J.
 Brooks, Pte. W. G.
 Broomhall, Pte. J.
 Bromley, Pte. A. J.
 Brown, Pte. A. C.
 Browne, Pte. P.
 Bruce, Sgt. G. H.
 Bruce, Pte. G. O.
 Bruce, Pte. W. E. A.
 Buddle, Pte. T. P.
 Bryant, Cpl. N. H.
 Bunn, Cpl. E.
 Bunting, Cpl. F.
 Burnett, Cpl. A. A.
 Butcher, Pte. G. L. F.
 Butland, Sgt. A. V.
 Butler, Pte. J. T.
 Butterfield, L.-Cpl. J. P.
 Buttle, Pte.
 Byrne, Cpl. T.
 Byrne, Cpl. F. J.
 Byrne, Cpl. J. F.
 Caddy, Sgt. F. A.
 Calder, Pte. D. W.
 Cameron, Pte. H. P.
 Cameron, Cpl. S. J.
 Campbell, Pte. R.
 Campbell, Pte. A.
 Campbell, Pte. W.
 Carlson, Pte. A. E.
 Carr, Pte. W. C. G.
 Carra, Pte. W. A.
 Carson, Pte. J.
 Cartledge, Pte. L. A.
 Cassidy, Pte. P.
 Cations, Pte. W. J.
 Cawood, L.-Cpl. A. H.
 Cerine, Pte. W. C.
 Challis, Sgt. G. D.
 Chandler, Pte. T.
 Charlwood, Pte. A. E.
 Chapple, Pte. R. C.
 Chisholm, Pte. D.
 Chisholm, Pte. J.
 Christie, Pte. J. S.
 Clarke, Pte. T.
 Clayton, Pte.
 Clinch, Pte. E.
 Clinton, Pte. H. J.
 Coad, Pte. J. G.
 Coates, Pte. J. F.
 Collins, Pte. C.
 Colwell, Pte. J.
 Coogan, Pte. M.
 Cook, Pte. G. W.
 Cook, Cpl. J.
 Cooper, Pte. T. M.
 Cooote, Pte. T. E.
 Connor, Pte. A. A.
 Connor, Pte. J. G.
 Conway, Pte. J.
 Corby, Cpl. J. S.
 Cornthwaite, Cpl. W. M.
 Coulsell, L.-Cpl. R. F.

Cox, Pte. L. H.
 Cox, Pte. W. F.
 Craig, Pte. E. A.
 Craig, Pte. F. H.
 Crawford, Pte. J. C.
 Crayford, Pte. P.
 Creasley, Cpl. J.
 Crick, Sgt. A.
 Crowe, Pte. J. A.
 Dakin, Pte. G.
 Dale, Pte. J. S.
 Dale, Pte. J. W.
 Daly, Pte. J. F.
 Daly, Pte. W. W.
 Daniel, Pte. C. C.
 Davies, Pte. H. E.
 Davies, Cpl. H. W.
 Davis, Pte. C. C.
 Davis, Pte. L.
 Davis, Cpl. W. G.
 Davis, Pte. F. H.
 Dawes, Pte. G.
 Day, Pte. A. J.
 Day, Pte. H. W.
 Deakin, Pte. G. R.
 Dear, Pte. C. E.
 Dillon, Pte. E. J.
 Disher, L.-Cpl. P. W.
 Dobell, Pte. J.
 Dobson, Sgt. W. J.
 Donaldson, Pte. H. A.
 Donoghue, Pte. J.
 Donnelly, Pte. E.
 Doonan, Pte. J.
 Dowling, Pte. F. B.
 Douglas, Cpl. F. C.
 Douglas, Pte. J.
 Duggan, Pte. H. J.
 Duncan, Pte. R. S.
 Duncan, Pte. W.
 Dunk, Pte. T.
 Dunn, Pte. A. J.
 Dupe, Pte. C. S.
 Durack, L.-Cpl. H. M.
 Dyer, Pte. J. J.
 Eade, Pte. F.
 Eadon, Pte. H. T.
 Easton, Pte. J. N.
 Edwards, Pte. A.
 Eldridge, Pte. S. J.
 Ellis, L.-Cpl. A. H.
 Ellis, Pte. R. R.
 Evans, Pte. A. J.
 Evans, Pte. B. J.
 Everett, Pte. G. J.
 Ewart, Pte. G. E.
 Ewart, Pte. W. C.
 Fahey, Sgt. J. F.
 Fair, Pte. F. R.
 Falconer, Pte. A. A. H.
 Fankhauser, Pte. J. J. G.
 Farmer, Pte. H.
 Farrar, Pte. R. C.
 Farrell, Pte. G. C.

Other Ranks—cont.

Ferguson, Pte. W.
 Fiddes, Pte. D.
 Field, Pte. G. T.
 Finnigan, Pte. T.
 Pittell, L.-Sgt. P. F.
 Fleet, Pte. A. G.
 Flett, Pte. A. C.
 Flynn, Pte. E. J.
 Flynn, Pte. T.
 Ford, Pte. F.
 Forrest, Pte. R.
 Fowler, Pte. W.
 Frisch, Pte. H. W.
 Gannon, Pte. F. J.
 Gardner, L.-Cpl. A.
 George, Pte. W. E.
 Gibson, Pte. A.
 Gilchrist, Pte. E. M.
 Gill, L.-Sgt. L. S.
 Gill, Pte. M. W.
 Gillahan, Pte. L.
 Gillies, Pte. J. L.
 Gladstone, Cpl. E.
 Glover, Sgt. G. S.
 Glew, Pte. C. R.
 Goldin, Pte. R.
 Gordon, Pte. P. L. D.
 Gordon, Pte. W. J.
 Gouillet, Pte. C. J.
 Goostray, Pte. J. G.
 Gradner, Pte. A. F.
 Grant, Pte. H. B.
 Gray, Pte. J.
 Grieve, Pte. A.
 Griggs, Pte. A. J.
 Groves, L.-Cpl. H. E.
 Grundy, Pte. A.
 Gunn, Pte. C. J.
 Gys, Pte. S. C.
 Hallam, Pte. H.
 Hallyburton, Pte. A. G.
 Hambling, Pte. H. R.
 Hamlyn, Pte. B. W.
 Hannan, Sgt. E.
 Hanrahan, Pte. E. P.
 Haran, Pte. H.
 Harding, Pte. G. T.
 Hardy, Pte. F. G.
 Hardgrievies, Pte. E. G.
 Harper, Pte. A. V.
 Harvey, Sgt. N. J.
 Harrison, Pte. C. J.
 Harrison, Pte. H. P.
 Hasseth, Pte. H.
 Hawke, Pte. G. M.
 Hayes, Pte. E.
 Haywood, Pte. P. W.
 Hearle, Pte. E. R.
 Hedberg, Pte. C. P.
 Hegarty, Cpl. A.
 Hems, L.-Sgt. C.
 Henderson, Pte. W. A.
 Henderson, L.-Cpl. S. G.
 Hennessy, Pte. H.
 Herman, Pte. C.
 Hewitt, Pte. R.
 Hilderbrand, L.-Cpl. C.
 Hills, Pte. G. R.
 Hogan, Pte. T. G.
 Holden, Pte. C. W.
 Hollioake, Pte. P.
 Holy, Pte. G.
 Hosken, Pte. R. W.
 Howarth, Pte. E.
 Howlett, Pte. H. L.
 Hughes, Pte. F. H.
 Hughes, Pte. H. L.
 Hughes, Pte. P.
 Hunter, Pte. J.
 Huntley, Pte. J. W.
 Hutcheson, Pte. W. J.
 Hutchinson, Pte. R.
 Jackson, Pte. N. E.
 Jaggs, Pte. A. W. C.
 James, Pte. F.
 Jasper, Pte. B.
 Jenkin, L.-Cpl. G. A.
 Jenkin, Cpl. T. H.
 Johnson, Pte. A. C.
 Johnson, Pte. J. C.
 Johnson, Pte. T. R.
 Johnston, Pte. A. D.
 Johnston, Cpl. F. H.
 Johnston, Pte. J. H.
 Johnston, Pte. P. H.
 Johnston, L.-Cpl. W.
 Jolly, Pte. S.
 Jones, Pte. D. S.
 Jones, Pte. R. R.
 Jones, Pte. W.
 Jones, Pte. D.
 Kaufman, Pte. K.
 Keath, Pte. D. N.
 Kearney, Pte. J.
 Keddwell, Cpl. M. W.
 Keen, Pte. G. C.
 Keenan, Pte.
 Kelly, Pte. E.
 Kelly, Sgt. L. F.
 Kelly, Pte. R.
 Kelsall, Pte. J.
 Kennedy, L.-Cpl. J. H. W.
 Kenney, Sgt. A. R.
 Kernick, Pte. A. E.
 Kerr, Pte. R. M.
 Kerr, Pte. R. W.
 Kerr, Sgt. W. J.
 Kerris, Pte. D.
 Kidd, Pte. R. A.
 Kidstone, Pte. E. B.
 King, Pte. A. L.
 King, Pte. F. G.
 King, Pte. S.
 Kinsella, Pte. B. M.
 Kinsey, Pte. G. W.
 Kirwan, Pte. A.
 Kneale, Pte. A.
 Knight, Pte. S.
 Lamb, Pte. J. J.
 Landy, Pte. W.
 Lang, L.-Cpl. I. J.
 Langworthy, Pte. F. A.
 Larkman, Pte. F. H. A.
 Laverick, Pte. R. W.
 Leary, Pte. A. B.
 Lebrocq, Pte. N. E.
 Leddin, Pte. P. T.
 Leishman, L.-Cpl. T. E.
 Lee, Pte. A. G.
 Lee, Pte. J. C.
 Leech, Sgt. A.
 Lepp, Sgt. A. E.
 Lewis, Sgt. H. C.
 Lock, Sgt. A.
 Lockhead, Sgt. W.
 Lockwood, Sgt. C.
 Lodge, Pte. G. L.
 Lodge, Cpl. J. A.
 Looney, Pte. L.
 Lording, Pte. J. J.
 Lovett, Pte. E. C.
 Lowe, Pte. W.
 Lumsden, Pte. J. W.
 Lyons, Pte. C.
 Lyne, Pte. R. E.
 Maddern, Pte. J.
 Madgwick, Pte. H. W.
 Magner, Pte. M.
 Major, Pte. R. H.
 Maloney, Pte. M. F.
 Martin, Pte. T. J.
 Martin, Pte. W. W.
 Mason, Pte. R.
 Maxwell, Pte. R.
 Mayo, Pte. G. A.
 McArdle, Pte. F. P.
 McAssey, Pte. T.
 McCarthy, Pte. D.
 McConnell, Pte. A. E.
 McConnell, Pte. J. T.
 McCorbric, Pte. F. C.
 McCrorey, Sgt. R.
 McDonald, Pte. A. W.
 McDonald, Pte. L. J.
 McDonald, L.-Cpl. N. L.
 McEnery, Pte. T.
 McGill, Pte. J. E.
 McGregor, Sgt. A. F.
 McGregor, Pte. H. K.
 McGregor, Cpl. J.
 McIntosh, Pte. J.
 McKellar, Pte. P.
 McKenzie, Sgt. D. M.
 McLachlan, Pte. D.
 McLean, Pte. H. W.
 McSullea, Pte. R. E.
 Melville, Pte. R. B.
 Merricks, Pte. C. A. C.
 Middleson, Pte. C. A.
 Miles, Sgt. J. C.
 Millard, Pte. V. C.
 Millick, Pte. C.
 Mills, Pte. L. A.
 Mitchell, Cpl. N.
 Moffat, Pte. H. J.
 Monks, Pte. T. P.
 Morgan, Pte. J. E.
 Morgan, Pte. N. J.
 Morgan, Sgt. F. J.
 Morphet, Pte. G. H.
 Morton, Pte. F. L. G.
 Muir, Pte. A. E.
 Mulconry, Pte. S. J.
 Muller, Pte. H. W.
 Mulholland, L.-Cpl. T.
 Mulligan, Pte. J.
 Munro, Pte. W. A.
 Murray, Pte. J. H.
 Murray, Pte. W. J.
 Myers, Pte. R. H.
 Naylor, Pte. G.
 Newey, Pte. E. J. H.
 Newton, Pte. E. I.
 Newton, Pte. T. J.
 Nicholson, Pte. H.
 Niddrie, Sgt. S. R.
 Nolan, Pte. W.
 Norris, Pte. M.
 North, Pte. H. H.
 Oakley, Pte. S. G. F.
 O'Bryan, Pte. R. J.
 O'Connor, Pte. J. R.
 O'Hara, Pte. F. A.
 O'Neill, Pte. J. B.
 O'Neill, Pte. J. F.
 Osbourne, Cpl. J. A.
 Osborne, Pte. S. R.
 Osbourne, Q.M.S. W. J.
 O'Shannassy, Pte. A. N.
 Outram, Pte. W.
 Owens, Pte. C.
 Paine, Pte. F. J.
 Palmer, Pte. M.
 Parker, Pte. I. L.
 Parkes, Pte. A. E.
 Partridge, Sgt. F. L.
 Partridge, Pte. S. C.
 Patching, Pte. S. J.
 Pathe, Pte. J. J.
 Payne, Pte. A. R.

Other Ranks—cont.

Peachey, Pte. J. E.
 Pearce, L.-Cpl. E. A.
 Pearson, Pte. W.
 Peart, Pte. A. J.
 Peoples, Pte. J.
 Peters, Pte. J.
 Phillips, Pte. A. J.
 Phillips, Pte. F. G.
 Phillips, Pte. W. C.
 Pickford, Cpl. H.
 Pilven, Pte. H.
 Piper, Pte. G. R.
 Pitchers, Pte. A. S.
 Pittman, Pte. A. F.
 Plant, Dvr. L.
 Plasto, Cpl. W.
 Plowright, L.-Sgt. W. S.
 Plozza, Pte. J.
 Porter, Pte. A. W.
 Price, Pte. T. E.
 Pressley, Pte. H. G.
 Preston, Pte. J. W.
 Pummeroy, Pte. E.
 Pye, Pte. I. V.
 Quaye, Pte. R. A.
 Quinn, Pte. V. W.
 Quirk, Pte. J.
 Rae, Pte. W.
 Raven, Sgt. G.
 Reed, Pte. C. V.
 Reid, Pte. J.
 Richardson, Pte. R. W.
 Rickard, Pte. C. C.
 Ritchie, Pte. A. B. E.
 Roberts, Pte. H. S.
 Robertson, Pte. C.
 Robertson, L.-Cpl. W. C.
 Rodgers, Pte. W. H.
 Rollins, Pte. P. J.
 Room, Pte. G. H.
 Rout, Pte. J. T.
 Rowe, Pte. W. A.
 Rumpf, Pte. O. L.
 Ryan, Cpl. A. J.
 Ryan, Pte. J. E.
 Ryan, Pte. J. M.
 Ryan, Sgt. J. M.
 Ryan, Pte. M.
 Salt, Sgt. J.
 Sampson, Pte. G. E.
 Sampson, Pte. J.
 Sandberg, Pte. C. J.
 Saunders, Pte. G. W.
 Sayers, Pte. V. H.
 Schofield, Cpl. J.
 Scott, L.-Cpl. W. J.
 Sellars, Cpl. R. C.
 Seeley, L.-Cpl. W.
 Setter, L.-Sgt. G. F.
 Sheen, Pte. A.
 Sherry, Pte. G.
 Shufflebotham, Pte. W. T.
 Simmons, L.-Cpl. E. Y. W.
 Skinner, Cpl. E. C.
 Smith, Sgt. A. B.
 Smith, Cpl. A. J.
 Smith, Pte. C. H.
 Smith, Pte. N.
 Smith, Pte. S.
 Smith, Pte. W. L.
 Smith, Pte. W. M.
 Smithers, Pte. R. C. N.
 Soderstrom, Pte. A.
 Spicer, Pte. H. S.
 Spivey, Pte. A.
 Stainrose, Pte. A.
 Stanley, Pte. F. A.
 Starr, Pte. H.
 Stein, L.-Cpl. W. D.
 Steers, Pte. W. R.
 Stephens, Pte. L.
 Stephens, Sgt. R.
 Stevenson, Pte. D. B.
 Stewart, Sgt. J.
 Stuart, Pte. C. W.
 Stone, Pte. H.
 Sykes, Pte. V. L.
 Tait, Pte. J.
 Talbot, Pte. G. H.
 Templeman, Pte. J. A.
 Templeton, Pte. G. H.
 Thomas, Pte. B.
 Thomas, Pte. J. R.
 Thomas, Pte. L. L.
 Thomas, Pte. D. H.
 Thompson, Pte. J. A.
 Thould, Pte. L.
 Thurston, Pte. S.
 Tickner, Pte. A. L.
 Todd, Pte. W. R.
 Tredgett, Pte. E. J.
 Trigg, Pte. R. L.
 Tully, Pte. J. L. V.
 Twitt, Pte. F. T.
 Tyler, Sgt. T. H.
 Wainwright, Pte. H. J.
 Waldron, Pte. W. G.
 Wallace, Pte. W. H.
 Walters, Pte. W. F.
 Wark, Pte. H. W.
 Watt, L.-Sgt. G.
 Webb, Pte. P. G.
 Weir, Pte. W.
 Welsh, Pte. G.
 Westgarth, L.-Cpl. H. L.
 Whatman, Pte. W. J.
 Willance, Pte. H. J.
 White, Pte. E. H.
 White, Pte. H. G.
 White, Pte. C. N.
 White, Pte. L. H. J.
 Whitehill, Pte. J. A.
 Whiting, Cpl. F.
 Wilcock, Pte. H.
 Wilder, Pte. H.
 Wilkinson, Pte. J. T.
 Williams, Pte. C. W.
 Williams, Pte. E.
 Williams, Pte. F. E.
 Williams, Pte. T. E.
 Willis, Pte. N. C.
 Wilson, Pte. S. M.
 Wilson, Pte. E. C.
 Wilson, Pte. J.
 Winnell, Pte. W.
 Wisby, Pte. A.
 Wise, Pte. A.
 Wooding, Pte. J. L.
 Woods, Pte. E.
 Woods, Pte. C. A.
 Worland, Pte. A. R.
 Worner, Pte. W. A.
 Worrall, Pte. E. E.
 Worth, Pte. R. M.
 Wootton, Pte. A. J.
 Whunhym, Pte. J. A.
 Wynne, Sgt. P. J.
 Yates, Pte. W.
 Yelland, Pte. A.
 Yendle, Pte. A. C. W.
 Young, Pte. D. W.

59TH BATTALION

Officers

Hornby, Capt. L. L.	Francis, Lt. J. W.	McIntosh, Lt. F. R.
Liddelow, Capt. A.	Gibbs, Lt. R. H. M.	Parr, Lt. A. P.
Neale, Capt. S. W.	Halligan, Lt. J.	Robb, Lt. J. F.
Stanley, Capt. M. W.	Howard, Lt. H. C.	Rowson, Lt. J. G.
Stockfield, Capt. G. R.	Kirkham, Lt. M.	Shaw, Lt. F.
Bowden, Lt. J. C.	Lucke, Lt. A. J.	Tucker, Lt. A. J.
Carr, Lt. E. T.	Mitchell, Lt. T.	Turnour, Lt. L. J. E.
Cousins, Lt. F. L.	Morrow, Lt. A. D.	Vaille, Lt. W. H.
Facey, Lt. S. G.		

Other Ranks

Adams, Pte. T. D.	Anderson, Pte. J.	Balfour, Pte. A. G.
Adamthwaite, Pte. E.	Andrews, Sgt. G.	Ballinger, L.-Cpl. T.
Aifleck, Pte. D. C.	Andrews, Pte. C.	Bambury, Pte. J.
Aitken, Pte. J.	Anson, Pte. C.	Banks, Pte. A. J.
Aitken, Pte. T.	Anstee, Pte. A. J.	Barber, Pte. H. V.
Atkins, Pte. S. G.	Argent, Pte. W. R.	Barber, Pte. W. E.
Allen, Cpl. C. P.	Armstrong, Pte. W.	Barclay, Pte. C. W.
Alexander, Pte. A. E.	Armstrong, Pte. L.	Barclay, Pte. A. J. I.
Allison, Pte. T. C. C.	Aspin, Pte. W.	Barker, Pte. J. G.
Allison, Pte. J. W.	Avery, Pte. L. W.	Barker, Pte. P.
Alliss, Pte. G. S.	Avery, Pte. R. E.	Barrand, Pte. F.
Amor, Pte. H. J.	Babidge, Pte. E. S.	Barrett, Sgt. F. P.

Other Ranks—cont.

Bartholomew Pte. W. G.
 Bartlett, Pte. F. W.
 Bartlett, Pte. W. E.
 Bastin, Pte. W. J. A.
 Baxter, Pte. J.
 Beard, Pte. F. A.
 Bearham, Pte. A.
 Beck, Pte. G. T.
 Beck, Pte. A. S.
 Bell, Pte. A. F.
 Bellette, Pte. A.
 Bellingham, Pte. P.
 Bennett, Pte. C. J.
 Benton, Pte. A.
 Berry, Pte. J. W.
 Beston, Pte. T. J.
 Bethune, L.-Cpl. R. C.
 Bevan, Pte. G. A.
 Bicket, Pte. J. A.
 Bigelow, Pte. G. M.
 Biggs, Pte. W. F.
 Biggs, Pte. T. R.
 Bill, Pte. C.
 Bingham, Sgt. W. R.
 Bird, Pte. D.
 Bishop, Pte. T. C.
 Blake, Pte. G. F.
 Blanford, Pte. C. W.
 Blee, Pte. G. G.
 Blencowe, Pte. F. T.
 Bond, Pte. R. R.
 Bond, Pte. W. J.
 Botterill, Pte. F. C.
 Boyce, Pte. A. J.
 Boyd, Pte. A. J.
 Boyd, Pte. R. F.
 Boyd, Pte. J.
 Boyd, Pte. H.
 Boyle, L.-Cpl. H.
 Brache, Pte. M. W.
 Bradshaw, Pte. F. J.
 Brand, Pte. B.
 Breslin, Pte. T.
 Briese, Pte. A. O.
 Briggs, Pte. F.
 Brinckmann, Pte. H. C.
 Brittlebank, Cpl. A. B.
 Brown, L.-Cpl. A. M.
 Brown, Pte. H. D.
 Brown, Pte. R. T.
 Brown, Pte. F. H.
 Brown, Pte. H. W.
 Browne, Pte. J. E.
 Brownridge, Pte. J.
 Brunston, Pte. H.
 Bryant, Cpl. L.
 Bryant, Pte. W.
 Buck, Sgt. H. A.
 Bulmer, Dvr. C. O.
 Burden, Pte. A. H. A.
 Burford, Pte. J. H.
 Burns, Pte. W.
 Burns, Pte. J. C.
 Burrows, Pte. J. K.
 Burton, Cpl. J. A.
 Butcher, Pte. G.
 Butler, Pte. A.
 Byrne, Pte. F. T.
 Cain, Pte. W. J.
 Caines, Pte. P. C.
 Cahill, Pte. F. P.
 Cahill, Pte. W. P.
 Callaghan, Pte. W. J. E.
 Cameron, Pte. N.
 Cameron, Pte. F. J.
 Cameron, Pte. O.
 Cameron, Pte. J. L.
 Campbell, Cpl. M. C. P.
 Campbell, Pte. R. T.
 Campbell, Pte. F. G.
 Campbell, Pte. A.
 Cant, Pte. C. R.
 Cantwell, Pte. J. W.
 Carr, Pte. W. T.
 Carrington, Pte. J. D.
 Carroll, Pte. G.
 Carruthers, Pte. J. T.
 Carter, Pte. H.
 Carter, Pte. R. A. E.
 Cesson, Pte. H.
 Charles, Pte. W. S.
 Cherry, Cpl. J. H.
 Chewings, Pte. H. T.
 Chivers, Pte. J. H.
 Christian, Pte. C. O. J.
 Christie, Pte. J. L.
 Christie, Pte. W. J.
 Clare, Pte. A. E.
 Clark, Pte. C. H.
 Clark, Pte. S. T. C.
 Clark, Pte. R. G.
 Clarke, Pte. O. J.
 Clarkson, Pte. A. E.
 Clayden, Pte. A. J.
 Clements, L.-Cpl. V. J.
 Clements, Cpl. H. G.
 Cobbett, Pte. W.
 Cochran, Pte. A. V.
 Coe, Pte. L. A.
 Coe, Pte. A. V.
 Cohen, Pte. J.
 Coleman, Pte. W. J.
 Collins, Pte. F. W.
 Cook, Pte. E. A.
 Cooper, Pte. H. A.
 Condor, Pte. E. D.
 Conlan, Pte. J. J.
 Conroy, Pte. J. P.
 Cosgriff, Pte. T. J.
 Corin, Pte. E. A.
 Costello, Pte. W.
 Cotter, Pte. W.
 Cotterell, Pte. E. J.
 Coulson, Pte. H.
 Coverdale, Cpl. R.
 Cox, Pte. E. T.
 Cramond, Sgt. A. K.
 Croach, Cpl. G. T.
 Crombie, Pte. P. C.
 Crossman, Pte. W.
 Crow, Pte. W. F.
 Cunningham, Pte. J. J.
 Cunningham, Pte. A. J.
 Currie, Sgt. A. W.
 Currie, Cpl. A. A.
 Currie, Pte. W. W.
 Curtin, Pte. F. G.
 Curtois, Pte. H. H.
 Dale, Pte. W. H.
 Dale, Pte. F.
 Daley, Pte. C. H.
 Daly, Pte. E. J.
 Dalzell, L.-Cpl. B. A.
 Danes, Pte. W. G.
 Daniels, Pte. H. G.
 Darned, Pte. J. J. E.
 Davidson, Pte. A. L.
 Davies, Pte. H. G.
 Davies, Pte. W. E. L.
 Davis, Pte. G. Y.
 Davis, Pte. A. J.
 Davis, Pte. E. S.
 Denison, Pte. A. A.
 Denny, Pte. E. S.
 Dent, Pte. A. J.
 Dewsnap, Pte. J. W.
 Dixon, Pte. F. A.
 Dobson, Sgt. D.
 Dobson, Pte. J. J.
 Donahoo, Pte. M. F.
 Dossdale, Pte. A.
 Dowdle, Pte. T. J.
 Duffy, Pte. J. A.
 Duffy, Pte. J. C.
 Duggan, Pte. H. J.
 Duncan, Pte. G. R.
 Dunham, Pte. W. S.
 Duke, Pte. F. B.
 Dunn, Pte. J. P.
 Dunstan, Pte. E. W.
 Dwyer, Pte. F.
 Edney, Pte. J. E.
 Ellis, Pte. A. W. G.
 Elsdon, Pte. H. R.
 Emery, Pte. H. E.
 Ethernott, Pte. L. R.
 Evans, Pte. E. M.
 Fahey, Pte. H. S.
 Farr, Pte. T. E.
 Farrell, Pte. F. A.
 Farrelly, Pte. M.
 Feagan, Cpl. W. A.
 Ferguson, Pte. R. W.
 Ferguson, Pte. A.
 Ferns, Pte. W.
 Ferrier, Pte. J. A.
 Field, Pte. R. T. W.
 Finck, Pte. C. J. T.
 Firth (formerly Keen), Sgt. H.
 Firth, Cpl. J. T.
 Fisher, Pte. J.
 Fitton, Pte. W. R.
 Fitzgerald, Pte. J. L.
 Fitzgerald, Pte. D.
 Flack, Pte. A. W.
 Fletcher, Pte. J. M.
 Fletcher, Pte. J.
 Fletcher, Pte. J. K.
 Flower, Pte. W. F. C.
 Fogo, Pte. J.
 Ford, Pte. H. B.
 Forster, Pte. H.
 Forster, Pte. C. A. P.
 Fox, Pte. A. L.
 Franklin, C.S.M. A. G.
 Fraser, Pte. R. J.
 Frazier, Pte. J.
 Frebrace, L.-Cpl. J. A.
 Freeman, Pte. S. M.
 French, Pte. F. A.
 Frew, Pte. L. G.
 Fulton, Pte. A. R.
 Fynch, Pte. R. A.
 Gaboret, Pte. T. L.
 Galloway, Pte. T.
 Gandy, Pte. J. F.
 Garry, Pte. W.
 Geal, Pte. G.
 Geal, Pte. A.
 Gibbet, Pte. A. H.
 Giblett, Pte. C. W.
 Gibson, Pte. A. L.
 Gibson, L.-Cpl. E. B.
 Gilbert, Pte. C. N.
 Giles, Pte. S.
 Gilfoy, Pte. H.
 Gill, Cpl. W. A.
 Gill, Pte. G. A.
 Gillies, Pte. W.
 Ginman, Pte. G. L.
 Giroud, Pte. W. L.
 Gittoes, Pte. E. C.
 Glaysher, L.-Cpl. J. W.
 Glen, Pte. W. G.
 Glover, L.-Cpl. G. E.
 Goldby, Sgt. W.
 Goldie, L.-Cpl. C. E.
 Goldsmith, L.-Cpl. R. G. H.
 Gouge, Pte. R. E.
 Goodwin, Pte. A. B. H.

Other Ranks—cont.

Grace, Pte. G. H.
 Grant, L.-Cpl. D. A.
 Graubln, Pte. J. G.
 Gray, Pte. J. M.
 Gregor, Pte. W. T. H.
 Gregory, Pte. C. C.
 Green, Pte. R. P.
 Green, Cpl. S. F. W. H.
 Grentfall, Pte. J. H.
 Grentfall, Pte. R.
 Grenville, Pte. V.
 Griffith, Pte. H.
 Griffiths, L.-Cpl. G. A.
 Grumont, Sgt. C. A.
 Hade, Pte. E. T.
 Hair, Pte. W. R.
 Hall, Pte. W.
 Hall, L.-Cpl. P. E.
 Halloran, Pte. T.
 Hamer, Pte. J.
 Hamilton, Pte. A. W.
 Harrap, Pte. E. M.
 Harrap, L.-Cpl. J. W.
 Harbert, Pte. H. B.
 Harrington, L.-Cpl. L. F.
 Harris, Pte. R.
 Harris, Pte. J. G.
 Harris, Pte. R. A. A.
 Harrison, Pte.
 Hart, Pte. J. E.
 Hart, Pte. W. H. G.
 Harvey, Pte. W.
 Hayes, Pte. P. F. J.
 Hayes, Sgt. H. S.
 Haynes, Pte. P. A.
 Healey, Pte. A. J.
 Henderson, Pte. F. A.
 Hendrie, Pte. L.
 Henry, Sgt. D.
 Henton, Pte. J.
 Hennins, Pte. G. E.
 Herriott, Pte. W. E.
 Heward, L.-Cpl. F. H.
 Hewitt, Pte. P. W.
 Higgins, Pte. P.
 Hill, Pte. W. J.
 Hind, Pte. J.
 Hitchins, Pte. F. H.
 Hitzeroth, Pte. G. R.
 Hogan, Pte. D.
 Holmes, L.-Cpl. E. C.
 Holmes, Pte. J. T.
 Holloway, Pte. C.
 Holten, Pte. R. F.
 Hopkins, Pte. J. R.
 Horner, Sgt. G. S. C.
 Hosie, L.-Cpl. G. G.
 Hotham, Pte. C. J.
 Howard, Pte. J.
 Howe, Pte. A. M.
 Hubbard, Sgt. E. A.
 Hubbard, Pte. E. W.
 Hughes, Pte. G. A. C.
 Humphreys, L.-Cpl. H.
 Hunt, Sgt. W. H.
 Hunt, Sgt. A.
 Hunter, Pte. R. A.
 Hunter, Pte. D.
 Huntingford, Pte. G. T.
 Hurdis, Pte. T.
 Hutcheson, Pte. D. W.
 Huxtable, Pte. C. W.
 Ingram, Pte. C.
 Irving, Pte. E. R.
 Jacobs, Pte. L. J.
 Jacobson, Pte. E. A.
 Jackson, Pte. A. H. J.
 Jamieson, Pte. T. Y.
 Jenkin, Pte. C.
 Jenkins, L.-Cpl. W. H.
 Jennings, Pte. W. W. A.
 Jessop, Pte. S.
 Jewell, Pte. H. J.
 Johnson, Pte. J. E.
 Johnson, Cpl. R. W.
 Johnston, Pte. A. (304)
 Johnston, Pte. A. (3524)
 Johnston, Pte. A. A.
 Johnston, Pte. R. D.
 Jones, Pte. A.
 Jones, Pte. R. G.
 Jones, Pte. H. I.
 Jones, Pte. J.
 Jones, Pte. R. S.
 Joyce, Pte. C. E.
 Kelleher, Pte. J.
 Keogh, Pte. J. W.
 Kennedy, Pte. J.
 Kent, Pte. E. W.
 Kerr, Pte. J. C.
 Kiellerup, Cpl. O. J.
 King, Cpl. W. F.
 King, Pte. A. W. L.
 King, Pte. C.
 King, Pte. J.
 Kingston, Pte. W.
 Knapp, Pte. L. H.
 Knowls, Cpl. J. V.
 Kurtzman, Pte. L.
 Kyle, Pte. T.
 Ladd, Pte. W. H.
 Laidler, Pte. N.
 Lake, Pte. C. L.
 Lambert, Pte. S.
 Lane, Pte. T. A.
 Langdon, Pte. W. T.
 Larsen, Pte. A. A.
 Lawrence, Pte. F. E. H.
 Laycock, Pte. G. A.
 Layton, Pte. R. C.
 Layton, Pte. T. W.
 Leach, Cpl. F. E.
 Lear, Pte. I. J.
 Leckie, Pte. S.
 Lee, Pte. F. A.
 Legge, Sgt. H. A.
 Leigh, Pte. C. T.
 Leeson, Pte. A. H.
 Letts, Pte. J.
 Lidgett, Pte. A. F.
 Lindford, Pte. R. J.
 Lindsay, Pte. H.
 Lister, Sgt. R. M.
 Llewellyn, Pte. E. E.
 Lloyd, Pte. A.
 Lobb, Pte. R. T.
 Long, Pte.
 Love, Pte. J. R.
 Lucas, L.-Sgt. H. S.
 Lynch, Pte. E. G.
 Macklan, Pte. A. J.
 Macdonald, Cpl. A. S.
 Macpherson, Pte. R.
 Madden, Pte. T. W.
 Maddocks, Pte. J. H.
 Male, Pte. S.
 Mann, Pte. P. R.
 Marsh, L.-Cpl. R.
 Marshall, Cpl. W. T.
 Mason, Pte. S. M.
 Mathews, Pte. A. E.
 Matthew, Pte. A.
 Maule, Pte. A. J.
 Mayberry, Pte. C. J.
 Mayo, Pte. G. J.
 McClure, Sgt. N. J.
 McCleary, Pte. N.
 McColl, Cpl. D. H.
 McConnell, Pte. A.
 McCormack, Pte. P. L.
 McCulloch, Pte. F. H. A.
 McDonald, Pte. R.
 McDonald, Pte. H.
 McDonald, Pte. A.
 McDonald, L.-Cpl. H.
 McDonald, Pte. J. A.
 McEwan, Pte. T. M.
 McGhee, Pte. D.
 McHardy, Pte. J.
 McIlroy, Pte. R.
 McInerney, Pte. W. J.
 McInnes, Pte. D.
 McInnes, Pte. J. G. D.
 McKeane, Pte. J. J.
 McKenzie, Pte. W. J.
 McKone, Pte. E.
 McLean, Pte. T. E.
 McLean, Pte. M.
 McLearn, Pte. C. H.
 McMahan, Pte. T. J.
 McMeekin, Cpl. J.
 McNamara, Pte. C. J.
 McPherson, Cpl. J. S.
 McPherson, Pte. W.
 McRae, Pte. C. R.
 Meade, Pte. D.
 Megines, L.-Cpl. F.
 Merton, Pte. C.
 Middleton, Pte. W.
 Milham, Pte. T. S.
 Miles, Pte. A. E.
 Miles, Pte. W. O. M.
 Miller, Pte. R.
 Mills, Pte. L. C.
 Mitchell, Pte. A. E.
 Mitchell, Pte. A. C.
 Mitchell, Pte. S. J.
 Moller, Pte. C. E.
 Montgomery, Pte. W. H.
 Moore, Pte. A.
 Moran, Sgt. E. D.
 More-Reid, Cpl. G.
 Morey, Pte. S. A.
 Morgan, Pte. J. W. A.
 Morris, Pte. L. C.
 Morrissey, Pte. P. W.
 Morrison, Pte. E.
 Morrison, Pte. F. H.
 Mossenton, Pte. H. D.
 Mottram, Pte. H.
 Mowbray, Pte. A. O.
 Moyes, Pte. F. L.
 Mullett, Pte. R. S.
 Murphy, Pte. J.
 Murphy, Pte. C.
 Muxworthy, Pte. A. A.
 Nain, Pte. W. J.
 Nash, Sgt. C. H.
 Neil, L.-Cpl. L. J. J.
 Nelson, Pte. A.
 Neville, Pte. W. J.
 Newey, Pte. H. R.
 Nichols, Pte. O.
 Noble, Pte. R. J.
 North, Pte. E. F.
 Noy, Pte. J.
 Nugent, Pte. J. F.
 Nunn, Pte. S. M.
 Nuttall, Pte. W. R.
 O'Brien, Pte. T.
 O'Day, Pte. W. J.
 Odgers, Pte. F. L.
 O'Hara, Pte. J. A.
 O'Keefe, Pte. W. P.
 O'Keefe, Pte. M. L.
 O'Leary, Pte. J.
 Oliver, Pte. R.
 Oliver, Pte. G. D.
 O'Loughlin, Cpl. P. J.
 Olsen, Pte. G. A. M.
 Olston, Pte. J. A.
 O'Mara, Pte. V. M.
 O'Meara, Pte. P. J.

Other Ranks—cont.

O'Neill, Pte. H. P.
 O'Neill, Pte. R. S.
 Orenshaw, Cpl. W. H.
 Orrock, Cpl. P. N.
 O'Shea, Sgt. W. S.
 O'Sullivan, Pte. W.
 Outen, Pte. R. J.
 Owen, Pte. W. C.
 Page, Pte. W.
 Pairman, L.-Cpl. A. G.
 Palmer, L.-Cpl. W. E.
 Pamphlett, Pte. J. G.
 Parker, Sgt. J. F.
 Parker, Pte. H.
 Parry, Pte. R. D.
 Parsons, Pte. W.
 Patterson, Pte. R. A.
 Paull, Pte. W. L.
 Payne, Pte. V. T.
 Pearce, Pte. C. E.
 Pearce, Pte. R. V.
 Pearce, Pte. C.
 Peiper, Pte. R. F.
 Perks, Pte. L.
 Perkins, Pte. C. E.
 Perkins, Pte. E.
 Perrett, Pte. S. C.
 Perry, Pte. R. F.
 Perry, Pte. W. E. E.
 Phelan, Pte. J. F.
 Phelps, L.-Cpl. W. T.
 Phillip, L.-Cpl. J. F.
 Phillips, L.-Cpl. C. W.
 Phillips, Pte. A. E. (1804)
 Phillips, Pte. A. E. (4868)
 Pitcher, Pte. B. B.
 Pleasance, Pte. A. F.
 Polglase, Pte. C. A.
 Polwarth, Sgt. G. Mc. A.
 Poole, Pte. A. R.
 Powell, Pte. C. (1755)
 Powell, Pte. C. (2710)
 Powell, Pte. J.
 Power, Sgt. A. C.
 Porter, Cpl. O. P.
 Porter, Pte. E. T.
 Prescott, Pte. H. H. P.
 Price, Pte. D. F.
 Prichard, Pte. A. R. H.
 Prowd, Pte. L. M.
 Purser, L. G. G.
 Quin, Pte. C. J.
 Quinn, Pte. J. L.
 Rabinovitch, Pte. B.
 Rainbird, Sgt. F.
 Ralston, Pte. J. A.
 Randall, Pte. F. C.
 Rankin, Pte. S.
 Ratcliffe, Pte. F. E.
 Raw, L.-Sgt. W. W.
 Ray, Pte. A. W.
 Rayson, Sgt. C.
 Read, Sgt. G. R.
 Reeves, Sgt. R. E.
 Reid, Pte. C. J.
 Respini, Pte. H.
 Reynolds, Pte. W. R.
 Rice, Pte. T. E.
 Rice, Pte. H. S.
 Richardson, Pte. G. W. H.
 Richardson, Pte. F.
 Richardson, Pte. W. H.
 Richardson, Pte. J. L.
 Richmond, Pte. A. C. P.
 Ricketts, Pte. L. A.
 Roberts, Pte. R. O.
 Roberts, Pte. C. E.
 Robilliard, Pte. A. A.
 Robinson, Q.M.S. E.
 Robinson, Pte. R.
 Robinson, Pte. R. W.
 Rogers, Pte. H. E.
 Rogers, Pte. L.
 Rooney, Pte. T. P.
 Rosney, Pte. P. J.
 Ross, Sgt. G.
 Ross, Pte. R. L.
 Rowley, Pte. E.
 Rowley, Pte. E. A.
 Ruff, Pte. V. H.
 Rule, Sgt. A. M.
 Rusden, Cpl. A. S. K.
 Russell, Pte. J. A.
 Russell, Pte. J. H.
 Russell, Pte. L. T.
 Russell, Pte. A. J.
 Russell, Pte. F. G.
 Russell, Cpl. H. I.
 Rust, Pte. W. H.
 Ryan, Pte. E.
 Ryan, Pte. T.
 Samuels, Pte. E.
 Sanger, Pte. B.
 Saunders, Pte. H. N. S.
 Sawyers, Pte. A. P.
 Sawyers, Pte. J. L.
 Sayer, Pte. P. T.
 Scott, Pte. R. W.
 Scoweroff, Pte. R.
 Seamons, Pte. H.
 Secombe, Pte. L. A.
 Sedgman, Pte. W. R.
 Serong, Pte. E.
 Shepherd, Pte. P. H.
 Sheridan, Pte. P. D.
 Shimleck, Pte. C. S.
 Shoebridge, Pte. H. G.
 Sibbin, Pte. G. S.
 Simmons, Pte. N. T.
 Simpton, Pte. W. S.
 Skinner, Cpl. R. H.
 Skinner, Pte. A.
 Skinner, Sgt. W. F.
 Skuse, Pte. A. R.
 Slackwitch, Pte. A.
 Slater, Pte. J.
 Slatter, Pte. T. J.
 Slattery, Pte. F. P.
 Sleigh, Pte. S.
 Sloan, Pte. R.
 Smiley, Pte. E. J.
 Smith, Pte. W.
 Smith, Pte. R.
 Smith, Pte. J.
 Smith, Pte. G.
 Smyth, Pte. W.
 Somers, Pte. G. L. E.
 South, Pte. F. J. J.
 Spotswood, Pte. C. W.
 Stanford, Pte. C. T.
 Statham, Pte. G. W.
 Stephens, C.S.M. J. D.
 Stephens, Sgt. W. E.
 Stephens, Pte. R. W.
 Stevens, Pte. A. B.
 Stewart, Pte. W. (2797A).
 Stewart, Pte. W. (993).
 Struhs, Pte. F. W.
 Summers, Pte. A. V.
 Summers, Pte. W. J.
 Swinfield, Pte. L. A.
 Sydes, C.S.M. C. F.
 Symonse, Pte. J.
 Taylor, Pte. N. B.
 Thexton, Pte. J. W.
 Thomas, Pte. D.
 Thomas, Pte. H. H.
 Thomlinson, Pte. E. E.
 Thompson, Pte. W. H.
 Thomson, Pte. J.
 Thomson, Pte. E. M.
 Thomson, Pte. G. J.
 Thow, Pte. D. C.
 Tod, Pte. G.
 Tooley, Pte. W. A.
 Tooth, Cpl. E. W.
 Townrow, Pte. T. C.
 Tracey, Pte. M.
 Trezise, Pte. R.
 Treverton, Pte. E. N.
 Trost, Pte. J.
 Tullock, Sgt. J. D.
 Turner, Sgt. F.
 Turner, Cpl. S. G.
 Upchurch, Pte. J. W.
 Usher, Pte. F. G.
 Vass, L.-Sgt. J. J.
 Vennell, Pte. W. J.
 Vincent, Cpl. F. L.
 Wade, Pte. W. E.
 Wade, Pte. S. V.
 Walkem, Sgt. G. L.
 Walker, Pte. W. S.
 Walker, Pte. L. G.
 Waller, Pte. H. D.
 Wallis, Pte. R. E.
 Walsh, Pte. T.
 Walsh, Pte. H. R.
 Waring, Pte. H. P.
 Waring, Pte. F. S.
 Wason, Pte. T. M. T.
 Watson, Pte. R. (2921).
 Watson, Pte. R. (2831).
 Watson, Pte. J. H. E.
 Watt, Pte. A.
 Watts, Pte. J. H.
 Webb, Pte. R. I.
 Weller, Cpl. F. N.
 Went, Pte. A. E.
 Wheeler, Pte. G. W.
 Wheeler, Pte. W. J.
 Whiston, Pte. F.
 Whiston, Pte. J. T.
 White, Sgt. W. J.
 White, Pte. T. H. W.
 Whitebread, Pte. J. T.
 Whitehouse, Pte. C.
 Whyllie, Pte. J. A.
 Wiggins, Pte. R. T.
 Wild, Pte. E. V.
 Wicking, Pte. O. M.
 Wilkins, Pte. P. G.
 Wilkinson, L.-Cpl. W. B.
 Willey, Pte. J.
 Williams, L.-Sgt. G. F.
 Williams, Pte. H. T.
 Wilson, Sgt. C.
 Wilson, Dvr. B. F.
 Wilson, Pte. W.
 Wilson, Pte. J. J.
 Wilson, Pte. L. W.
 Wilson, Pte. A. J.
 Windram, Pte. H. C.
 Winfield, Pte. E.
 Witham, Cpl. S.
 Winterbottom, Pte. K.
 Wood, Pte. D.
 Woodcock, Pte. A.
 Woodhouse, Pte. R. L.
 Woodlands, Pte. C. W.
 Woodman, Pte. A. R.
 Woods, Cpl. W. W.
 Woolhouse, Pte. A.
 Wright, Cpl. T. J.
 Wright, Pte. L. C.
 Wylie, Pte. E. W.
 Yendle, Pte. G.
 Young, Pte. G.
 Young, Pte. J.
 Young, Pte. G. W.
 Zambatti, Pte. P. P.

60TH BATTALION

Officers

Elliott, Maj. T. P.
McRae, Maj. G. G.
Evans, Capt. E. A.
Ground, Capt. H. O.
Plowman, Capt. H. Mc. D.
Roberts, Capt. C. H.
Freeman, T/Capt. W. E.
Banner, Lt. A.
Bayliss, Lt. W. A.

Beaver, Lt. W. N.
Bowen, Lt. C. E.
Gannon, Lt. W. R.
Gurner, Lt. L.
Holgate, Lt. E. S.
Knight, Lt. M. D.
Leslie, Lt. C. A.
Moore, Lt. J. C.
McKinnon, Lt. A. C.

Parker, Lt. A. T.
Reeves, Lt. L. C.
Rhind, Lt. J. M.
Stimpson, Lt. J. L.
Smith, Lt. J. H.
Sterling, Lt. J. H.
Wrathall, Lt. H. S.
Wright, Lt. E. E.

Other Ranks

Abbey, Cpl. E.
Adair, Pte. F.
Adams, Pte. A. E. T.
Adamson, Pte. C. S.
Anderson, Sgt. R. D.
Anderson, Pte. N.
Anderson, Pte. C. C.
Andrews, Cpl. W. H.
Andrews, Pte. R. P.
Andrews, Pte. B.
Armstrong, Pte. J. H.
Arnold, Pte. E.
Arnold, Pte. W.
Arnold, Pte. W. S.
Artis, Pte. A.
Ashley, Pte. A.
Ashworth, Pte. P. A.
Ashworth, Pte. A. J. T.
Atkinson, Pte. F. G. T.
Bailey, Pte. C.
Bailey, Pte. A.
Bain, Pte. W. A.
Baker, Pte. A. S.
Bannister, Pte. W. H.
Bannon, Pte. C. C.
Barger, Pte. W. G.
Barker, Pte. P.
Barr, Pte. G. H.
Barr, Pte. D.
Barr, Pte. C. C.
Barnes, Pte. H.
Barrett, Pte. J. B.
Bartlett, Pte. D. C.
Barton, Pte. J.
Bartram, Pte. A. R.
Baulch, Pte. E.
Bayne, Pte. W. D.
Beattie, Pte. W. G.
Beazby, Pte. G.
Beddoe, Pte. J. E.
Beirne, Pte. W. B.
Belcher, Pte. C. S.
Bellinger, L.-Cpl.
Bentley, C.S.M. E. J.
Betoneor, Pte. R. J.
Bicket, Pte. M. D.
Bingham, Pte. D.
Bishop, Pte. S. G.
Bishop, Sgt. A. S.
Bishop, Pte. J. H.
Black (formerly Miles), Pte. H. J.
Blacklock, Pte. G. E.
Blatch, Pte. J. S.
Blatchford, Pte. E.
Blight, Pte. G. A.
Blookey, Pte. L.
Bone, Pte. R. H.
Bonetti, Pte. E.
Booler, Pte. T. F.
Botting, Pte. D. B.
Bowden, Pte. F. A.
Bowen, Pte. C. E.
Boyce, Pte. F. T. E.
Boyd, Pte. C. T.
Boyd, Pte. T. H. C.

Bradley, Pte. E. J.
Bragg, Cpl. A. R.
Bramley, L.-Cpl. H. T.
Brasher, Pte. W.
Brear, Pte. C. H.
Brennan, Pte. T.
Bridges, Pte. A.
Brook, Pte. A. S.
Brown, Pte. P.
Brown, Pte. W. H.
Brown, Pte. J. H.
Brown, Pte. F. L.
Browne, Pte. T. T.
Browne, Pte. E. T.
Bruce, Pte. W. D.
Bruun, Pte. E. D.
Buchan, Pte. C.
Bull, Pte. E. L.
Bullen, Pte. S.
Burge, Pte. W. E.
Burns, Pte. P. J.
Burnet, Pte. D. J.
Burrgran, Pte. A. H.
Buswell, Pte. W.
Butcher, Pte. C. H.
Butler, Pte. W. W.
Byrnes, Pte. C. F.
Caldwell, Pte. E. T.
Cahill, Pte. R. N.
Callen, Pte. A. C.
Cameron, Cpl. C. B.
Cameron, Cpl. E. A.
Cameron, Pte. L. G.
Campbell, Pte. R. L.
Campbell, Pte. J.
Campbell, Pte. J. H.
Candy, Pte. G.
Carlin, Pte. G.
Carroll, Pte. R. J.
Carroll, Pte. P.
Carroll, Pte. F.
Carter, Pte. J. (1527).
Carter, Pte. P. A.
Carter, Pte. J. (3046A).
Carter, Pte. J. A.
Cassell, Pte. A.
Catchpole, Pte. E. E.
Catto, Pte. R. G.
Challis, L.-Cpl. F. H.
Chamberlain, Pte. F.
Chambers, L.-Cpl. J. W.
Charles, Pte. H.
Cheeswright, Pte. F.
Christensen, Pte. D.
Claridge, Pte. C. R.
Clark, Pte. L. N.
Clark, Pte. A.
Clarke, Pte. T. G.
Clarke, Pte. A. R.
Clay, Pte. G. C.
Clayton, Pte. C. J.
Clayton, Pte. G. S.
Clery, Pte. A.
Clout, Pte. L. W. F.
Cohen, Pte. C. S.

Collins, Pte. G. S.
Collins, Pte. W. C.
Condon, Pte. J. C.
Conley, Pte. J.
Connick, Pte. H. H.
Conway, C.S.M. J.
Conway, Pte. L. G.
Cook, Pte. D. C.
Cooke, Pte. J. W.
Cooke, Pte. W. G.
Cooper, Pte. H. E.
Copeman, Cpl. A. J.
Corbough, Pte. V. T.
Cottren, Pte. A. E. C.
Couchman, Pte. J.
Cowl, Pte. R. H.
Crammond, L.-Cpl. J. H.
Crough, Pte. A. G.
Cubbins, Pte. L. J. L.
Cunningham, Pte. N. L.
Cunningham, Pte. W. F.
Currie, Pte. H. R.
Currie, Pte. J.
Curwen, Pte. V. R.
Daley, Pte. J. M.
Dalton, Pte. A. V. W.
Daly, Cpl. R. W.
Daniel, Pte. N. L.
Davies, Pte. G.
Davis, Pte. J.
Dawson, Pte. T.
Decker, Pte. C. W.
Deegan, Pte. J. T.
Delaney, Pte. P. A.
Dellisle, Pte. C. V.
De Melker, Sgt. H.
Denham, Pte. L. S.
Denten, Pte. W. J.
Diamond, Pte. F. M.
Dixon, Pte. F.
Dobbin, Pte. W. F.
Doctor, Pte. T. C.
Doherty, Sgt. A. E.
Donaldson, Pte. F. H.
Doney, Pte. A.
Donohue, Pte. W. P.
Dougheney, Pte. J. L.
Douglas, Pte. J. A.
Downard, Pte. E.
Draffin, Pte. I. T.
Drayton, Pte. G. F.
Dredge, Pte. J. W.
Drew, C.Q.M.S. E. J.
Drew, Pte. B. R.
Dugdale, Cpl. B. R.
Dyall, Pte. H.
Eason, Pte. W. C.
East, Pte. B.
Edward, Pte. H. H.
Edwards, Pte. J.
Edwardsen, Pte. H.
Eddy, Pte. R.
Egan, Pte. W. A.
Ellington, Pte. A.
Elliott, Pte. P. W.

Other Ranks—cont.

Ellis, Pte. J.
 Engel, Pte. A. F.
 Evans, Pte. J. E.
 Evans, Pte. W. G.
 Evans, Pte. F. A.
 Fackerall, Pte. L. J.
 Fargher, Pte. P. A.
 Farley, Pte. S. E.
 Ferguson, Pte. F. E.
 Ferinnie, Pte. B.
 Filmer, Pte. R. A.
 Fisher, Pte. W. J.
 Fisher, Pte. R. T.
 Fitzpatrick, Pte. W.
 Fletcher, Pte. W.
 Fletcher, Pte. E. D.
 Flowers, Pte. F.
 Fogarty, Pte. J. P.
 Foley, Pte. M. L.
 Forrest, Pte. J. W.
 Forrest, Pte. M. T.
 Forsyth, Pte. J. W.
 Fowler, Pte. G. H.
 Fowler, Pte. W. H.
 Franklin, Pte. A. V.
 Franklin, Pte. H. L.
 Franklin, Pte. C. W.
 Fraser, Pte. S.
 Frazer, Pte. E. S.
 Frazer, Pte. A. A.
 Frazer, Pte. A. G.
 Fry, Pte. A. G.
 Gallagher, Pte. J. F.
 Gamble, Pte. R. A.
 Gearing, Pte. J. W.
 Gibson, L.-Cpl. A. E.
 Gibson, Pte. V. R.
 Gilbee, Pte. F. G.
 Given, Pte. A. M.
 Gleeson, Pte. D. J.
 Gosling, Pte. A. F. C.
 Gow, Pte. P. J.
 Goymer, Pte. W. E.
 Graham, C.Q.M.S. H.
 Gravell, Pte. W. E.
 Green, Pte. F. R.
 Greet, Pte. C. W.
 Gregory, Pte. E.
 Greig, Pte. G. M.
 Greville, Pte. C. T.
 Griffiths, Pte. C. V.
 Grogan, Sgt. V. M.
 Groom, Pte. W. C.
 Groves, Pte. K. L.
 Gunn, Pte. E. I.
 Haase, Pte. Le-Ray
 Haines, Pte. A. G.
 Hales, Pte. H. G.
 Hamilton, Sgt. V. A. F.
 Hamilton, Pte. W.
 Hammond, Pte. W. H.
 Hanna, Pte. J. R.
 Hannan, Pte. J.
 Hansen, Pte. J.
 Harrington, Pte. G. H.
 Harrison, Pte. N.
 Harrison, Pte. T.
 Harry, Pte. S. H.
 Hart, Pte. J. D.
 Hart, Pte. W. S.
 Hart, Pte. J. J.
 Harvey, Pte. C.
 Havey, Pte. V.
 Hawkins, Pte. R. W.
 Heather, Pte. H. G.
 Hefferman, Pte. L.
 Heeps, Pte. E. S.
 Heggie, L.-Cpl. A. D.
 Henderson, Pte. E. A.
 Henderson, Pte. L. D.
 Hickey, Pte. J. J.
 Hill, Pte. H. E.
 Hoberg, Pte. T. G.
 Holst, Pte. F. G.
 Hopkins, Pte. F. W. B.
 Hopper, Pte. H.
 Hordern, Pte. A. C.
 Horsley, Pte. R.
 Hosie, Pte. R. W.
 Howes, Pte. E.
 Humbert, Pte. G.
 Humphries, Pte. J. H.
 Humphrey, Cpl. J. E.
 Humphreys, Pte. S.
 Humphry, Pte. F.
 Hussey, Pte. C.
 Hyles, Pte. E.
 Hyles, Pte. O.
 Incledon, Sgt. E. G.
 Ingamells, Pte. V. T.
 Irvine, Pte. J. Mc.
 Irwin, Pte. V. T.
 Jackson, Pte. T.
 Jacobs, Pte. A.
 Jamieson, Pte. J. G.
 Jenkins, Pte. F. H. L.
 Jewell, Sgt. W. B. T.
 Johnson, Pte. B.
 Jonas, Pte. G. E.
 Jones, Pte. H. E.
 Jones, Pte. G. E.
 Jones, Pte. C. D.
 Jones, Pte. G.
 Jones, Pte. K. H.
 Jones, Pte. A.
 Jones, Pte. V. H.
 Jones, Pte. R.
 Jones, Pte. M. S.
 Jordan, Pte. D.
 Jourdain, Pte. A. W.
 Kann, Pte. S.
 Keane, Pte. T. F.
 Keefer, Pte. C. G.
 Keegan, Pte. W. W.
 Kelly, Pte. M.
 Kelly, Pte. J.
 Kenny, Pte. W. A.
 Kerr, Cpl. N. H.
 Kerr, Pte. W. W.
 Kerr, Pte. H.
 Kett, Pte. J. L.
 Killeen, Pte. J. F.
 King, Pte. W. J.
 Kingsham, Pte. J. H.
 Kingsford, Pte. S. F.
 Knight, Cpl. P. T.
 Knight, Pte. G. W. C.
 Knight, Pte. A. C.
 Lakeman, Pte. S.
 Lancaster, Pte. J. W.
 Lane, Pte. W. G.
 Lane, Pte. A. J.
 Latham, Pte. P. J.
 Layton, Pte. W. H.
 Leheny, Pte. G. D.
 Lee, Cpl. J. E.
 Lee, L.-Cpl. W.
 Leeson, Pte. C. A.
 Lennox, Cpl. R. T.
 Le-Roy, Pte. A.
 Leslie, Pte. G.
 Letcher, Cpl. J. G.
 Lewis, Pte. W.
 Little, Pte. S.
 Lloyd, Pte. T. R.
 Lock, Pte. C. W.
 Lockett, Cpl. H.
 Lovegrove, Cpl. W. B.
 Lucas, Pte. J.
 Luckhurst, Pte. A.
 Ludwig, Pte. A. E.
 Lukey, Pte. C. W.
 Lynch, Pte. M.
 Lynch, Pte. T. J.
 Macdonald, Pte. H. O.
 Mackay, Pte. G.
 Mackenzie, Pte. R. H.
 Mackinnon, Pte. H. M.
 Maddern, Pte. E.
 Maidment, Pte. A. H.
 Main, Pte. T.
 Mancer, Pte. A. W.
 Mann, Pte. H. T.
 Mannall, Pte. C.
 Manning, Pte. H. A. B.
 Manson, Pte. H. J. M.
 Martin, Pte. F. C.
 Martin, Pte. F. W.
 Martin, Pte. J.
 Martin, Pte. C. J.
 Marshall, Sgt. A. C.
 Marshall, Pte. H.
 Maskell, Pte. A. J.
 Matthews, Pte. J. E.
 Mathieson, Pte. C. G.
 May, Pte. A. E.
 Mays, Pte. W. H. J.
 McArdle, Pte. J. E. F.
 McArthur, Pte. A.
 McCaul, Pte. D. C.
 McClaren, Pte. W. E.
 McClure, Pte. W. C.
 McCook, Pte. J.
 McCrathy, Pte. T.
 McDermott, Pte. W. R. P.
 McDonald, Pte. W. T.
 McDowell, Sgt. A. H.
 McEwan, Pte. A. J.
 McGregor, Pte. G.
 McGuepie, Sgt. D. K.
 McInnes, Pte. A. L.
 McIntosh, Sgt. J. D.
 McKenna, Sgt. R. J.
 McKenzie, Pte. J.
 McKenzie, L.-Cpl. M.
 McKenzie, L.-Cpl. K. F.
 McKenzie, Pte. J.
 McKinley, Pte. J. P.
 McKinley, Cpl. A. W.
 McKinnon, C.S.M. J. A.
 McLaren, Pte. F. F.
 McLaren, Pte. W. E.
 McLean, Pte. A. L.
 McLean, Pte. V. H.
 McManus, Pte. S. (2719)
 McManus, Pte. S. (2917)
 McManus, Pte. P.
 McPherson, Pte. J.
 Membrey, Pte. J. H.
 Menzies, L.-Cpl. H. G.
 Mickels, Pte. J. H.
 Mildred, Pte. W. J.
 Millgate, Pte. E. A.
 Miller, Pte. W.
 Miller, Pte. R. C.
 Milligan, Pte. W. H.
 Minogue, Pte. W. P.
 Mitchell, Pte. J. E.
 Moss, Pte. L.
 Molly, Pte. H. Mc.
 Monro, Pte. J. E.
 Moore, Pte. W. V.
 Moore, Pte. J. J.
 Morgan, Pte. D. J.
 Morgan, Pte. R. E.
 Morley, Sgt. E. J.
 Morris, Pte. L.
 Morris, Pte. C. H.
 Mortimer, Cpl. A. E.

Other Ranks—cont.

Morton, Pte. V. E.
 Moxon, Cpl. J. H.
 Moyniham, Pte. C. D.
 Mullin, Pte. H.
 Murray, Pte. W.
 Murton, Pte. H. R.
 Nash, Pte. F.
 Natham, L.-Sgt. F. J.
 Natham, Pte. A.
 Naylor, Pte. J.
 Neill, Pte. T.
 Neilson, Pte. M.
 Newall, Pte. J. M.
 Newman, Sgt. J.
 Newman, Pte. H.
 Newman, Pte. A. E.
 Nichols, Pte. E. C. C.
 Nicholls, Cpl. F. H.
 Nitchie, Pte. J. L.
 Noble, Pte. N. J.
 Northrop, Pte. J. G.
 Nott, Pte. W. E.
 O'Bree, Pte. S. P.
 O'Connell, Cpl. H. D.
 O'Connor, Pte. G. A.
 O'Grady, Pte. T. B.
 O'Grady, Pte. P. A.
 O'Grady, Pte. J.
 Olfield, Pte. G. H.
 Olney, Pte. E. P.
 O'Neill, Pte. F.
 Orchard, Pte. M. H.
 Oriat, Pte. W. H.
 O'Sullivan, Pte. H. M.
 O'Sullivan, Pte. D.
 Osmond, Pte. W. W.
 Otreay, Pte. H. G.
 Paice, Pte. V. A. G.
 Park, Pte. W. J.
 Pattison, Pte. H.
 Paton, Pte. J. G.
 Paul, Pte. C. J.
 Peart, Pte. R. C.
 Pegler, Pte. J.
 Pemberton, Pte. T.
 Penaluna, Pte. E. B.
 Pengelly, Pte. A.
 Penglase, Pte. P. R.
 Perrin, L.-Cpl. C. R.
 Perry, Pte. A. J.
 Phillips, Pte. A. C.
 Phillips, Pte. E. J.
 Phillips, Pte. W. L.
 Phipps, Pte. H. R.
 Pinniger, Pte. L. J.
 Plowman, L.-Cpl. R.
 Pollard, Pte. J. H.
 Pollard, Pte. F. J.
 Pomery, Pte. F. R.
 Porter, Pte. F. O.
 Potts, Pte. H. V.
 Potter, Pte. J. H.
 Poulter, Cpl. R. E.
 Power, Sgt. G.
 Power, Pte. W. H.
 Power, Pte. A. P.
 Pritchard, Pte. H. R.
 Prosser, Pte. R.
 Purcell, Pte. J. J.
 Purvis, Pte. K.
 Rafferty, Pte. R.
 Rahilly, Pte. P. V.
 Rainbow, L.-Cpl. W. J.
 Rainsbury, Pte. W.
 Ralston, C.Q.M.S. J.
 Ramsay, Pte. G. S.
 Ramsbury, Pte. G.
 Rankin, L.-Cpl. J.
 Rattray, Pte. A.
 Reeves, Pte. A.
 Reynolds, Pte. S. W.
 Reynolds, Pte. C. W.
 Richardson, Pte. P.
 Riley, Pte. W. E.
 Roach, Pte. E.
 Roberts, Pte. A. J.
 Robertson, Pte. J. N.
 Robertson, Pte. W.
 Robertson, Sgt. W. H. G.
 Robin, Pte. C. T.
 Robinson, Pte. G. W.
 Robinson, Pte. A. D.
 Rogers, Pte. S. A.
 Rogers, Pte. R. C.
 Rojo, Pte. E. F.
 Roney, Pte. G.
 Ross, Pte. W. P.
 Routley, Sgt. R. F.
 Rowe, Pte. W. A.
 Rowe, Pte. W. C. H.
 Ryan, Pte. T. P.
 Ryan, Pte. W.
 Ryan, Pte. C. O.
 Ryan, Pte. C. T.
 Salt, Pte. E. T.
 Salter, Pte. R. S.
 Salton, Pte. A.
 Santwyk, Pte. H. M.
 Sawers, Pte. S. S.
 Scott, Pte. A. A.
 Seamark, Pte. C.
 Sebire, Pte. F. H.
 Sergeant, Pte. H. T.
 Sharp, Pte. H. G. K.
 Shaw, L.-Cpl. H. V.
 Shawe, Pte. W. C.
 Sheehan, Pte. F.
 Sheen, Pte. F. J.
 Sheldrick, Pte. R.
 Shephard, Pte. G. A.
 Shephard, Pte. T. H.
 Shephard, Pte. J. E.
 Sherlock, Pte. S. T.
 Sherrin, Pte. H. L.
 Shields, Pte. P.
 Shine, Pte. H. F.
 Shore, Pte. J.
 Shurwer, Pte. R. S.
 Silver, Pte. J.
 Sims, Pte. J. E. T.
 Simpson, Pte. N. R.
 Simpson, Pte. J. H.
 Sitlington, Pte. A. F.
 Skewes, Cpl. H.
 Skinner, Pte. R.
 Slattery, Pte. G. M.
 Smart, Sgt. G.
 Smart, Sgt. H. C.
 Smith, Sgt. C. H.
 Smith, Pte. J. H. A.
 Smith, Pte. J. A. V.
 Smith, Pte. C. W.
 Smith, Pte. F.
 Smith, Pte. J. J.
 Smith, Pte. G. H.
 Smith, Pte. S. W.
 Smith, Pte. M.
 Smyth, L.-Sgt. H. B.
 Smyth, Pte. H.
 Snell, Pte. W. C.
 Spooner, Pte. J. E.
 Spooner, Pte. E. M.
 Spivey, Pte. P. W.
 Spring, Cpl. J. L.
 Staveley, Pte. W. G.
 Steer, Pte. A. E.
 Steward, Pte. F. J.
 Stobans, Pte. G.
 Stuart Murray, Cpl. S. H.
 Sullivan, Pte. A. J.
 Sullivan, Pte. J. H.
 Summers, L.-Cpl. D.
 Teasdale, Pte. C. G.
 Tedge, Pte. A.
 Terry, Pte. E. H.
 Thompson, Pte. R.
 Thompson, Pte. E. J.
 Thompson, Pte. A. D.
 Thurlow, T/Cpl. R. L.
 Tiedeman, Pte. A. O.
 Tippet, Pte. H.
 Tipton, Pte. J. L.
 Tomkins, Pte. A.
 Tompson, Pte. H.
 Tompson, Pte. C. W.
 Toogood, Pte. A. W.
 Towe, Pte. J.
 Tredrea, Pte. F. S.
 Trehearn, Pte. D. Y.
 Trenwith, Pte. E.
 Trevorah, Pte. A. A.
 Truscott, Sgt. J. V.
 Tucker, Pte. A. H.
 Tully, Pte. W. A.
 Turnbull, Pte. W. R.
 Turnbull, Pte. I. J.
 Twilight, Pte. C.
 Underwood, Pte. A.
 Waiting, Pte. A. J.
 Wallmeyer, Pte. F.
 Walters, Pte. F. C.
 Ward, Pte. R.
 Ward, Pte. R. C.
 Wardell, Pte. A. P. M.
 Warren, Pte. S. M.
 Warren, Pte. C. R.
 Watkins, Pte. F.
 Watson, Pte. L. M.
 Watt, Pte. C. D.
 Watt, Pte. W. W. E.
 Waugh, Pte. H. H.
 Webb, Pte. J. M.
 Webb, Pte. T. R.
 Welsh, Pte. R. H.
 Whelan, Pte. F. J.
 Whelan, Pte. V.
 White, Pte. I.
 White, Pte. W.
 Whitehurst, Pte. J.
 Wickham, Pte. A. W. F.
 Wilde, Pte. K. R.
 Wilkins, C.Q.M.S. T.
 Williams, Sgt. H. L.
 Williams, Pte. A.
 Williams, Pte. H. E.
 Williams, Pte. L. St. C.
 Williamson, Sgt. H. T.
 Willis, Pte. J.
 Willox, C.S.M. J. S.
 Wilmott, Pte. S. C.
 Wilson, Pte. H. F.
 Wilson, Pte. W.
 Wilson, Pte. L. E.
 Windley, Pte. H.
 Wishart, Pte. C. D.
 Wood, Pte. J. E.
 Wood, Pte. A. B.
 Woodgate, Pte. G.
 Woodward, Pte. H.
 Wright, Pte. J. R.
 Wright, Pte. R.
 Wright, Pte. K.
 Wrigley, Pte. F. R.
 Wyatt, Pte. C. J.
 Wylie, Cpl. J. D.
 Wynne, Pte. W. C.
 Yarrow, Pte. J.
 Young, Pte. W. V.

DEATHS

465

15TH L.T.M.B.

Officers

Miles, Capt. T. F.

Davies, Lt. A. C.

Moore, Lt. J. C.

Other Ranks

Cough, Pte. S.
Duggan, Pte. L. J. P.
Duncombe, T/Cpl. A. J.
Harris, Pte. W. C.
Higgins, Cpl. J. E.
Hurley, Gnr. M.
Johnson, Pte. W. J.
Lewis, Pte. J. E.

Lowe, Pte. A. L.
Marr, Pte. A. F. W.
McDonald, L.-Sgt. D. J.
McKay, Cpl. R.
Meeham, Pte. W. W.
Murphy, Pte. T.
Nihill, Pte. C. P.

O'Sullivan, Cpl. F.
Peady, Sgt. T. A.
Pettit, Pte. W. H. S.
Ryder, L.-Sgt. M. W.
Smith, L.-Sgt. J. H.
Thomas, L.-Sgt. F. W.
Williams, L.-Sgt. F. E.

15TH MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Other Ranks

Allan, Pte. J. F.
Annis, Pte. T. A.
Balshaw, Pte. R. R.
Barber, Pte. G. T.
Belgrove, Pte. R. T.
Borneman, Pte. J. T.
Brodie, Pte. W. R.
Casey, Pte. R. H.
Chandler, Pte. W. R. E.
Collins, Pte. A. S.
Connor, Pte. H. M.
Cook, Pte. W.
Cox, Pte. S. R.
Crofts, Pte. W. R.
Crozier, Pte. J. E.
Doutch, Pte. D. C.
Eastbrook, Pte. R. T.
Gillis, Cpl. A.
Gradner, Pte. W. A.
Grainger, Pte. W. J.
Grant, Pte. H. B.
Gyer, Pte. H.
Hadlow, Pte. E. C.
Hansen, Pte. H. J.
Harrigan, Pte. J. E.

Hetherington, Pte. E. W.
Hindle, Cpl. G. H.
Holmes, Pte. E.
Holophey, Pte. J. P.
Horwood, Pte. C. H.
Jennings, Cpl. G. W.
Johns, Pte. J. P.
Johnston, Pte. J.
Kingshott, Pte. G. V. E.
Kingsley, Pte. H. E.
Kitchen, Pte. H. L.
Lewis, Pte. H.
Little, Pte. C. R.
Mabardi, Pte. G. S.
Mackrell, Pte. L.
Magner, Pte. F. J.
McAskill, Pte. A. A.
McCarthy, Pte. C. T.
McDonald, Pte. F. N.
McIntyre, Pte. W.
McNab, Pte. J. C.
McQuinn, Pte. H. M.
Mills, Pte. A. C.
Moyna, Sgt. J. P.

Nicholls, Sgt. G.
O'Connor, Pte. J. J.
O'Shea, Pte. J. A.
Perkins, T/Sgt. I. T.
Perry, Pte. J.
Price, Pte. A. S.
Rawlings, Pte. W. J.
Rennick, Cpl. E. F.
Richards, Pte. A. J.
Ridding, Pte. T.
Roberts, Pte. O. M.
Round, Pte. W. A.
Schumacher, Pte. J. T.
Shearer, Pte. A.
Sherman, Pte. W. H.
Shrives, Pte. W. H.
Sutherland, Pte. D.
Sutherland, Pte. L. B.
Swanson, Cpl. G. S.
Tarpey, Pte. J.
Tomkins, Pte. B. J.
Venn, Pte. M. S.
Wilkins, Pte. R.
Wilson, Pte. L. G.

25TH MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Officers

Brewster, Lt. F. E.
Coolahan, Lt. J. S.
Dakin, Lt. C. H.

Fraser, Lt. F.
Gritten, Lt. S. W.
Meredith, Lt. S. P.

Pflaum, Lt. T. M.
Tennant, Lt. T.

Other Ranks

Ashton, Pte. S.
Biegel, Pte. S.
Blandford, Pte. W. A.
Bousquet, Pte. R. L.
Bradley, Pte. B.
Bromham, T/Cpl. L. F.
Burns, Pte. V. S.
Case, Dvr. G. H.
Chenhall, Pte. H. B.
Cross, Pte. L.
Crowley, Pte. J.
Cusack, Pte. E. T. S.
Davis, Pte. A. E.
Dicken, Pte. P. R. H.
Downing, Pte. W.
Duncan, Pte. A. A.
Edge, Pte. A.
Ferrier, Pte. I. E.
Fraser, Pte. R. J.
Gale, Pte. S. H.
Gilmour, Pte. J.
Graham, Pte. R. B.

Green, Pte. J.
Hall, Pte. H. J.
Hamilton, Dvr. F. A.
Harrison, Pte. F. G.
Hill, A/Cpl. W. J.
Hobbs, Pte. A. J.
Hoskins, Pte. L. F.
James, Pte. L. A.
Kay, Pte. R.
Kenny, Cpl. E. G.
Launchbury, Pte. J. A.
Lazenby, Pte. R. J. B.
Litster, Pte. A. B.
McGuinness, Pte. C. H.
McKellar, Cpl. A.
McLeod, Pte. J. E. R.
McQuinn, Pte. H. N. R.
Milhinah, Pte. A.
Moran, Pte. J.
Morriss, Pte. L. G.
Mowat, Pte. M.
Needham, Dvr. G. W.

Newberry, Dvr. C.
O'Connell, Pte. J. A.
O'Dea, T/Cpl. D. J.
Parsons, Cpl. F. W.
Phillips, Pte. J. G.
Pullman, Pte. W.
Rivett, Cpl. J.
Robinson, L/Cpl. G. C.
Shiels, Pte. W., M.M.
Skinner, Pte. H. H.
Smart, Pte. H. T.
Smith, Pte. J.
Stubbings, Pte. W.
Tideswell, Pte. P.
Wade, Pte. P. E.
Walker, Pte. W. H.
Warren, Pte. S. J.
Welch, Pte. L. J.
White, T/Cpl. R. T.
Williams, Pte. C. G.
Wyatt, Pte. F. A. E.

5TH PIONEER BATTALION

Officers

Bailey, Lt. W. L.
Hassell, Lt. R. L.

Palmer, Lt. R. W.
Turner, Lt. C. H.

Wilson, Lt. M.

Other Ranks

Acres, Pte. E. C.
Adams, Pte. B.
Agett, Pte. S. S.
Alexander, Pte. C.
Anderson, Pte. A. G.
Appleby, Pte. D. G.
Arblaster, Pte. W. H.
Bailey, Sgt. F. J.
Barhain, Pte. W. J.
Baschbauer, Pte. E. E.
Baxter, T/Sgt. S.
Benna, Pte. L. M. C.
Berrill, Pte. C. L.
Biggs, Pte. J.
Billing, Sgt. F.
Birbeck, Pte. W. H.
Blackmore, Pte. F. W.
Bond, Pte. J.
Boucher, Pte. A. E.
Bowie, Pte. A. D.
Boylan, Pte. H. A.
Broadbent, Pte. A. G.
Brown, Pte. P. W.
Bruce, Sgt. A. H.
Buckley, Pte. J. Y.
Caldicott, Cpl. G.
Carrington, Cpl. G. H.
Chisholm, Pte. J.
Clarke, Pte. J.
Clowes, Pte. J. E. H.
Coates, Pte. H. C.
Cockburn, Pte. S. L.
Cockerill, Pte. F. D.
Cocking, Pte. F. J.
Coker, Pte. A. O.
Collins, Pte. D.
Condon, Pte. L.
Cooper, Pte. E. F.
Cotterrell, Pte. W. G.
Cress, Cpl. F.
Crocker, Pte. C.
Crowhurst, Pte. G. W.
Curd, Pte. A. B.
Curnow, Pte. D.
Curtin, Pte. J.
Davey, Pte. J. N. R.
Davies, Pte. J. G.
Dearlove, Pte. C. R. H.
Dhu, Pte. H.
Dickens, Pte. E. J.
Dixey, Pte. J. T.
Dobson, Pte. E.
Durstun, Pte. F. H.
Dwyer, Pte. G.
Edwards, Pte. J.
Evans, Sgt. R. B.
Fahey, Pte. P.
Fahey, Pte. T.
Fawcett, Pte. A. E.
Ferguson, Pte. J.
Fidge, Pte. G. T.
Fitch, Pte. A. W.
Flower, Pte. A. L.
Fogarty, Pte. W. F. J.
Foster, Pte. H.
Foulis, Pte. A. E.
Franev, Sgt. A.
Frisby, Pte. C. S.
Gambling, Pte. J.
Gann, Pte. F. M.
Gannon, Pte. J.
Garlick, Pte. J.
Gates, L.-Cpl. A.

Gavens, L.-Cpl. H.
George, Pte. F. W.
Gilbert, Pte. S. C.
Giles, Pte. A. F. E.
Green, Pte. J.
Green, Pte. J.
Griffin, Pte. M.
Griffiths, Pte. C.
Griffiths, Pte. W. H.
Grosvenor, Pte. E. F. T.
Gum, Pte. F. W.
Hague, Pte. H.
Hainsworth, Pte. H.
Hamilton, Pte. M.
Hamilton, Pte. W. E.
Hamilton, Pte. R. H.
Hartvigsen, Pte. W. J.
Hayes, Pte. H.
Henderson, Pte. B. E. A.
Hilder, Pte. P.
Hill, Pte. S.
Hillier, Sgt. J. H.
Hinds, Pte. R. T.
Hintz, Pte. A. R.
Hodge, Pte. R. H.
Hollows, L.-Cpl. J.
Hook, Pte. W. L.
Hughes, Cpl. S. W.
Hull, Pte. T.
Hunter, Pte. H. A.
Ireland, Pte. T. J.
James, Pte. A. V. G.
Jeffs, Pte. J. F.
Jennings, Pte. E. H.
Johnson, Pte. C. E.
Jones, Pte. H.
Jones, Pte. T. A.
Jury, Pte. E.
Kidd, Pte. W. G.
Kihang, Pte. H.
Koop, Pte. H. G.
Landaman, Sgt. A. E.
Lay, Pte. J.
Lelch, Sgt. S.
Leunig, Sgt. G.
Lienhart, Pte. H. G.
Lucas, Pte. R. O.
Maclaine, Pte. S. A.
Magill, Pte. M.
Magnus, Pte. G. H.
Maher, Pte. L.
Marks, Pte. H. W.
Marshall, Pte. J.
Mason, Pte. F. R.
Maxwell, Pte. J. S.
May, Pte. W. E.
McCartin, Pte. F. J.
McGrath, Pte. J.
McGregor, Pte. J. R.
McKay, Pte. C. T.
McNamara, Pte. J. P.
McPherson, Sgt. S. O.
Metcalie, Pte. R. R.
Michael, Pte. D. J.
Morgan, Cpl. J.
Moore, Pte. J.
Morriss, Sgt. J. G.
Munro, Pte. J.
Nalder, Pte. J.
North, Pte. H. C.
Nugent, Pte. H. T.
Odam, Pte. H.
O'Dwyer, Pte. S.

Orgill, Sgt. A. G.
Orr, Pte. A. J.
Palmer, Pte. A.
Parkinson, Pte. H.
Parkinson, Pte. W. F.
Penn, Pte. A.
Pettigren, Pte. A. D.
Phillips, Cpl. R.
Pianta, Pte. M. D.
Pickering, Pte. H. M.
Pike, Pte. C. W.
Pigg, Pte. V. H.
Pill, Pte. J. G.
Porter, Pte. G. E.
Pullen, Pte. F. G.
Punch, Pte. F. R.
Ramdsen, Pte. J.
Ratley, Pte. L. C.
Regan, Pte. M. J.
Retell, Pte. F.
Rhys, Pte. I. E.
Richardson, Pte. E. J.
Robinson, Pte. H. E.
Rocks, Pte. J.
Ross, Pte. A. P.
Rowarth, L.-Cpl. R. R.
Rowe, Pte. F. H.
Rowe, Pte. A. G. E.
Ruddy, Cpl. G. H.
Russell, Pte. J.
Ryan, Pte. J.
Ryan, Pte. T. J.
Schemmell, Pte. B.
Schubert, Pte. H. H.
Scown, Pte. A. T.
Seaton, Pte. F. G.
Simcock, L.-Cpl. W. H.
Sizer, Pte. W.
Smith, Cpl. A. J.
Smith, Pte. A. R.
Smith, Pte. H. W.
Smith, Cpl. G. A.
Smith, Pte. W. G.
Smith, Pte. R. J.
Sneddon, Pte. J.
Sorley, Sgt. R.
Spiller, Pte. S.
Stewart, Pte. H.
Stickland, Cpl. T. H.
Stuart, Pte. J. J., M.M.
Tear, Pte. W. T.
Thompson, Pte. I.
Thompson, Pte. W. J.
Thompson, Pte. J. G.
Thor, Pte. T. A.
Thornoughood, Pte. S.
Turner, L.-Cpl. R.
Turner, Pte. F.
Usher, Pte. J. T.
Vaubel, Pte. F. C.
Warren, Pte. J.
Watson, Pte. F. J.
Watson, Pte. P. J.
White, Pte. A.
Whyte, Pte. J. A.
Willis, Pte. W. J.
Wilson, Pte. C.
Windram, Pte. H. M.
Winter, Pte. W. W.
Wytkin, Pte. L. T.
Young, Pte. H. E.
Young, Pte. C. F.
Zackrisson, Pte. B. R.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS

Officers

Mather, Lt.-Col. L. F. S.
Lawrence, T/Capt. A. W.
Erguson, Lt. J. S.

Gillies, Lt. W. K.
McBrydon, Lt. K.

Tenbosch, Lt. C.
Turner, Lt. G. H.

Other Ranks

Arnold, Spr. B. S.
Ashdown, Spr. C. P.
Barker, Dvr. W.
Beck, Dvr. C.
Bernard, Spr. A. L.
Brown, Spr. J.
Brown, Spr. J. D.
Buchanan, Spr. G. A.
Burrows, T/Cpl. H. J.
Burton, Spr. T. A.
Busby, Spr. S.
Calder, Spr. A. F.
Caldwell, Spr. A.
Campbell, Dvr. J. H.
Cannon, Spr. J. J.
Cassell, Spr. A.
Caygill, Spr. L. M.
Chalkley, Dvr. J.
Collins, Spr. G. J.
Cook, Spr. G.
Cooke, Spr. W.
Corby, Spr. M. J.
Couchman, Spr. A. G. V.
Curnow, Spr. J. A.
Dadson, Spr. H. J.
Davidson, Spr. G. D.
Dawson, Spr. G. H.
Denney, Spr. H. R.
Dickson, Spr. A.
Doddridge, Spr. W. G. J.
Eadie, Spr. F. McK.
Elliott, Sgt. R.
Elliott, L.-Cpl. R. B.
Ettingshausen, Spr. H. V.
Fase, Spr. B. A.
Ferguson, Spr. G. W.
Fisher, Spr. A.
Fuller, Spr. E. J.
Gates, Spr. G. K.
Grant, Spr. H. G.
Gross, Spr. J. C.

Groves, Spr. R. C.
Gustafson, Spr. G. A.
Harman, Spr. L. H.
Harris, Spr. K. J.
Harrison-Smith, Spr. K. J.
Healey, Sgt. F. J.
Hill, Spr. E.
Hilton, Spr. D.
Hitchins, Spr. R.
Hull, Spr. A. W.
Hunt, Dvr. H. S.
Hurt, Spr. F. T.
Hyland, L.-Cpl. C. E.
Johns, Spr. J. H.
Lawler, Spr. F. M.
Leahy, Spr. E.
Lighten, Spr. A.
Linaere, Spr. H. S.
Loader, Spr. P. H.
Luscombe, Spr. E. M.
Lyden, Spr. A.
Lyell, Spr. J.
Lynch, Spr. A.
Lynn, Spr. J.
Manders, Spr. J. G.
Marris, Spr. W. J.
McAllister, Cpl. D. L.
McCallum, Spr. D.
McConchie, Spr. A. T.
McDonald, Spr. P.
McGhie, Spr. T. M. C.
McGowau, Spr. W. C.
McInnes, Spr. J. W.
McIntosh, Spr. W. V.
McKay, Spr. E.
McKeadie, Spr. A.
McLennan, Spr. O. K.
Meer, Spr. R.
Milne, Spr. R.
Morrison, Spr. W. J.
Moulday, Spr. G.

Murray, Spr. R. N.
Newton, Spr. W.
Norton, Spr. H.
O'Neill, Spr. J. R.
Pace, Spr. J. S.
Parker, Spr. J. L.
Poulton, Spr. C. J.
Rae, Spr. T. R.
Ralp, Spr. L. A.
Ramsay, Cpl. J. T.
Randall, Spr. D.
Reeves, Spr. J.
Rickard, Spr. W. J.
Robertson, Spr. J. D.
Ross, Spr. J. A.
Sainty, Spr. F. L.
Saunders, Spr. F. E.
Scotland, Spr. J. A.
Scott, Spr. J.
Scott, Spr. W.
Smithwaite, Cpl. G. H.
Smith, Spr. A. A.
Smith, L.-Cpl. H. T.
Smith, Spr. J. L.
Stirling, Spr. W. A.
Strettell, Spr. H. C.
Terrell, Spr. E. G.
Thompson, Spr. W.
Thomson, Cpl. A. A.
Tickner, Spr. W.
Tufnell, Spr. J.
Turner, Spr. L. A.
Uren, Spr. E. H.
Urquhart, Spr. G. R.
Verran, Spr. W. R.
Walker, Spr. A. C.
Ward, Spr. R. D.
Wells, Spr. M. A.
White, Spr. W.
Young, Spr. A. H.

DIVISIONAL SIGNAL COMPANY

Officer

Reid, Lt. R. J.

Other Ranks

Baker, Spr. H. L.
Bartlett, Spr. H. L.
Berryhill, Spr. J. A.
Clark, Spr. M. O. W. A.
Conlon, Spr. P. J.
Davis, Spr. J. W.
Ellens, Spr. A. H.
Ellis, Spr. A. O.
Fitch, Spr. W. A.
Freeman, Spr. R.
Galbraith, Spr. A. G. E.
Gittins, Spr. J.

Gotin, Spr. W. C.
Graham, Spr. J. K.
Grumont, Spr. D. C.
Hamilton, Spr. J. L.
Hammond, Spr. J.
Hawke, Spr. A. R.
Hilliar, Spr. F. G.
Jarmau, Spr. H. G.
Johnson, L.-Cpl. T. A.
Johnson, Spr. T. W.
Lynch, Dvr. P.
Massey, Spr. G. E.

Metcher, Spr. C. T.
Mile, Dvr. A. W.
Morton, Spr. W. A.
Mullin, Spr. E. V.
O'Connor, Spr. A. E.
O'Donnell, Spr. T. J.
Overington, Spr. E. A.
Robinson, Spr. G.
Sinclair, Spr. J. H.
Stevens, Spr. J. H.
Tannebring, Spr. R. H.
Windsor, Spr. G. F.

APPENDIX IV

DIVISIONAL TRAIN

Officer

Berglund, Lt. C. B.

Other Ranks

Allinson, Dvr. P. C.
 Bayliss, Dvr. E. F.
 Fowler, Dvr. S. S.
 George, Dvr. S. E.
 Hamilton, Dvr. S.
 Heald, Dvr. C. A.
 Keeley, Dvr. H. M.
 McNair, Dvr. F. W.
 Mealmaker, Pte. H. J.
 Murphy, L.-Cpl. W. E.

Olsen, Dvr. C.
 Paul, Sgt. G. F.
 Payne, Dvr. C. L.
 Rees, Dvr. R. T. O.
 Riley, Dvr. J.
 Richardson, Dvr. H.
 Robinson, Dvr. W. J.
 Rosevear, Dvr. T. T.
 Shaw, Dvr. E. F.
 Thompson, Dvr. R.

Thornbury, Dvr. J.
 Wadsworth, Dvr. A.
 Webb, Sgt. A.
 White, Pte.
 White, Dvr. P. R.
 Woodhill, Dvr. R. C.
 Young, Dvr. R. W.
 Young, Dvr. W. J.
 Young, Dvr. J. A.

A.A.M.C.

Officers

Bullen, Maj. N. J.
 Wells, Maj. J. C.
 Elliott, Capt. G.

Elliott, Capt. S. S.
 Hughes, Capt. M. R.

Roberts, Capt. L. E. W.
 Wilson, Capt. J. S.

Other Ranks

Addon, Pte. H. C.
 Anderson, Pte. F. de W.
 Anderson, L.-Cpl. G. H.
 Ballard, Pte. L. W.
 Bennett, Pte. J. A.
 Bone, Pte. C.
 Bowd, Pte. S. V. D.
 Bradley, Pte. C.
 Byrne, Pte. G.
 Campbell, Pte. O. D.
 Callon, Pte. J.
 Chapman, Pte. W. J.
 Clay, Pte. J.
 Connell, Pte. J. I.
 Daley, Pte. H. H.
 Doyle, Pte. M.
 Doyle, Pte. W. S. H.
 Drew, Dvr. K. D.
 Eldridge, Pte. J. H.
 Ellis, Pte. H. E.
 Fenton, Pte. J. H.
 Fleischman, L.-Cpl. H.
 Foster, Dvr. J. E.
 Gedwello, Pte. A.
 Gullick, Pte. R. C.
 Hanson, Pte. L. B.

Haskins, Pte. J. B.
 Henehan, Pte. J. T.
 Hills, L.-Cpl. G. H.
 Hopkins, Pte. A. J.
 Hornby, Pte. H. W.
 Howarth, Pte. L. R.
 I'Anson, Pte. G. R.
 Ingram, Pte. R. C.
 Johnson, Sgt. W. R. B.
 Joyce, Pte. A. A. A.
 Lawrence, Pte. A. S.
 Levin, Pte. H. G.
 Lindsay, L.-Cpl. A. D.
 Mallyon, Pte. H. T. M.
 Martin, Pte. C. E.
 Martin, Pte. E. J.
 Mayston, Pte. M. C.
 McClenaghan, Pte. J. H.
 McDowall, Pte. K.
 Mercer, Pte. H.
 Moore, Pte. F. G.
 Morey, L.-Cpl. H. H.
 Murray, Pte. P. R.
 Noble, Pte. G.
 Oakley, Pte. H. A.
 Onley, Pte. E. R.

Powell, Pte. J. H.
 Quirk, Pte. R. G.
 Roberts, Sgt. R.
 Robinson, Pte. E.
 Roebuck, Sgt. C. C.
 Rugner, Pte. R. C.
 Saunders, Pte. J. T.
 Saunders, Dvr. W. F.
 Silverman, Pte. J.
 Smith, Pte. J.
 Smith, Pte. L. M.
 Smith, Pte. T. W.
 Stewart, Pte. R.
 Taylor, Pte. W. G.
 Thomson, Pte. J.
 Thornton, Pte. C. L.
 Thornton, Pte. M. W.
 Vickers, Sgt. T.
 West, Pte. D.
 Westwood, Pte. A. D.
 Wheldon, Pte. W. R.
 Whitaker, Pte. C. S.
 Williams, Pte. J.
 Williams, Pte. W. C.
 Wilson, Pte. W. T.
 Yates, L.-Cpl. H. L.

A.P.C.

Other Ranks

Harston, Cpl. A. L.
 Hitchcock, Tpr. L. J.
 Lowe, L.-Cpl. N. A.

Morgan, Pte. W. H.
 Peake, Cpl. H. E.

Robertson, Tpr. D.
 Scott, Pte. A.

A.A.O.C.

Other Ranks

Mansfield, Cpl. G. S.

Robertson, Cpl. E. C.

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Bergin, Rev. M. H.



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